Research
General descriptions of current and previous research
2023-2024
Enactivism: developments and challenges
Enactivism is a recent approach to cognition, according to which living systems are fundamentally relational: their meaningful and evaluative experiences emerge from the dynamic interaction between organic and environmental processes. The present proposal thematizes the enactivist understanding of individual and interactive cognitive processes. More specifically, linguistic, logical, phenomenological and ethical processes, composing four research nodes.
The constitution of these nodes is justified by the theory itself, which considers sense-making, the phenomenal character and the valuation dimension as basic conditions of life. The nodes will address issues related to the emergence of meaning and symbolism, its interactive and phenomenal aspects and its evaluative dimensions. The general question that guides these themes is whether the enactivist approach succeeds in maintaining its assumptions to explain higher-order cognitive processes, such as language and reasoning. This is a relevant question due to its current underdevelopment, which is largely recognized in the literature. The hypothesis is that the theory can be successful in explaining these processes based on the thesis that meaningful experience is intrinsic to the interactions between organism and environment, and higher-order processes result from the complexity of the agent-environment interaction. To provide evidence for its plausibility we will have four methodological focuses: theoretical development, scope review, interactivity experiments and phenomenology experiments. These methodologies aim to explore (i) the participatory sense-making in linguistic cognition; (ii) the agential bases of logical inference, (iii) the relationship between the experience of possibilities and basic affectivity; and (iv) questions about normativity and oppression in social interactions, with developments in social epidemiology, the philosophy of emotions and normative cognition.
Umbrela project:
Linguistic Enactivism: influences and developments
(2021 - current)
The central question that drives my research is how enactivism, which is a recent theory of cognition, can influence developments in research on language and in philosophical perspectives in general. Based on one of its basic principles, namely, that organism and world are mutually constituted, I investigate different ways that enactivism and, more specifically linguistic enativism, can influence developments in philosophical perspectives and in theoretical and empirical research. They focus on (i) the philosophical bases of the theory of evolution, which can assimilate recent developments in evolutionary biology and cognitive archeology towards a conception of evolution as natural drift; (ii) Enaction and hinge epistemology; (iii) Enaction and Linguistics; (iv) Enaction and Feminist Epistemologies; (v) Enaction and Virtual Reality, (vi) Enaction and Dance Improvisation.
These lines of investigation are developments of research initiated between 2019 and 2020. Published results:
Rolla, G.; Figueiredo, N. M. (2021) Bringing forth a world, literally. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Post-print here
Linguistic Enactivism, philosophy of language and empirical research
(2019 - 2020)
Linguistic enactivism, as I call it, is a version of enactivism that develops a theory of linguistic bodies. This theory is explained in the book 'Linguistic Bodies: The continuity between Life and Language' (2018) MIT Press and synthesized in this review. My research aims to promote new developments in the philosophy of language according to this paradigm, as well as to point to possible influences that this theory may have on empirical investigations of human cognition.
Improvisation and Enactivism
(2020 - 2021)
This collaborative research, coordinated by Profa. Ivani Santana - UFBA / CNPq and developed with other members of the Group MI - Women of Improvisation, involves researchers from philosophy, music, dance and audiovisual technologies, to explore new ways of investigating cognitive models. Research on artistic processes with technological mediation is a fertile ground for the development of theories of cognition, as they can benefit from artistic experiences and explorations. According to Linguistic Enactivism, a theory that I work with, the body and the environment it inhabits are constitutive of human cognition. Thus, performance, improvisation, movement and dance, activities that focus on the body and the environment, seem fundamental for this research.
The skeptic and the enativist: reflections on the foundations of hinge epistemology.
(2020-2021)
This work explores interactions of the autopoietic enactivist theory and the question of epistemic justification in hinge epistemology.
Dialectics in Linguistic Enactivism
(2019-2020)
The theory of Linguistic Bodies rests on a fundamental notion which cuts across the whole theory: the concept of dialectics. The three levels of embodiment interact dialectically (i.e: dialectic situations occur in the three levels of cognition and among them) and dialectical situations are also on each step of the model towards the realization of participatory sense-making, for each of those steps is the result of an interplay between tensions that logically anticipate them. I propose that the reader can identify three aspects under which one can understand dialectics: the methodological aspect, the ontological aspect and the very dialectical model and subsequently suggest that the ontological claim should be taken as an epistemological claim that is consistent with their view of concreteness as a constant goal of considering elements as embedded within the totality of their relations.
Current issues on body and language: embodied cognition, empirical agenda and linguistic enactivism
With Josie Siman
(2020)
Embodied approaches to human cognition emphasize the role of the body in processes of linguistic comprehension and production. Several empirical studies have presented support to these approaches. The linguistic enactivist approach to cognition stands out for suggesting that we have to deepen our concept of the body. In this context, we present (1) empirical evidences for embodied approaches of cognition; (2) two theoretical approaches to embodied cognition in the cognitive sciences: the grounded cognition approach, and one approach based on dynamic systems theory — our focus is on how these theories consider the conceptual system; and (3) the enactivist linguistic approach to cognition. Then, based on introductory clarifications on these three theories, we suggest that the empirical evidence supports a shallow perspective of the role of the body in cognition, by the linguistic enactivist standards, and we emphasize the importance of understanding the empirical reach of linguistic enactivism.
Multiple representations and dynamic conceptual analysis in the wild
With Josie Siman
(2020)
Cognitive semantics has different research methods, such as introspection, corpora analysis, interaction analysis, and experiments. The analysis of “data in the wild” (corpora and interaction) is generally informed by theories, but rarely by the current landscape of experiments’ findings on language and cognition. The goal of this paper is twofold: first, we want to highlight the possibility and importance of shortening the gap between theory, empirical evidence, and analysis of data in the wild in the study of cognition. Second, we suggest that resorting to the state of the art of empirical research about language and cognition allows for more flexible analyses, which may surpass the limits of current theories. In order to do that, we (i) provide a current overview of neuro and psycholinguistic findings about the grounding of concrete and abstract concepts, (ii) discuss how these findings can support linguistic data analysis and (iii) emphasize trends toward multiple representation theories and dynamic systems.
Analogical reasoning: representationalism or enactivism?
With Raquel Krempel and César Meurer
(2020)
Analogical reasoning is traditionally conceived as involving comparing mental representations. More recently, with the rise of non-representationalist theories of human cognition, the question arises of how to explain processes traditionally conceived as representational. In this context, we raise the discussion of whether mental representations will be part of an explanation of analogical reasoning, offering opposite perspectives, with the main goal of promoting debate. First, we present the view that analogical reasoning involves representational mental processes. Next, we present some problems raised by Fodor for its computational treatment, but we suggest that these problems do not affect the idea that analogical reasoning involves mental representations. In the following section, we introduce the linguistic enactivist theory and suggest the possibility that this theory is compatible with a conception of analogy as a non-representational categorization process. Finally, we summarize the two perspectives and suggest that the contrast of opposite perspectives on cognitive abilities is especially fruitful for our understanding of the mind.
Shade distinctions - seeing colors or differences?
With Etienne Roesch, Giovanni Rolla, Catriona Scrivener e Ivano Raz
(2018-2021)
In this project we investigate whether perception is due to comparisons of experiences or not. It is an intense philosophical debate in philosophy and in the cognitive sciences. We suggest, by presenting the results of a philosophically driven experiment, that perception of differences and perceptions of change (change is defined as difference in time) are not due to comparisons of experiences. Data on chromatic experiences of pairs of color samples varying in luminance indicate that identifying differences and changes of lightness of color samples depends more on context than on the samples. Subsequently we argue, based on the nature of the spectral vision (Atkins and Hans, 2014), that when we identify the samples we are actually capturing differences of contrast and chroma.
Unpublished manuscript - final revisions: FIGUEIREDO, N. M., ROESCH, E. B., SCRIVENER, C. L. & RAZ, I. Shade distinctions - seeing colors or differences ?
Mental or Neural Representations
(With Dr. Fabiana Carvalho)
(2016 - 2020)
In this project, Dr Fabiana Carvalho and I investigate whether one of the most common uses of the concept of representation is justifiable by suggesting the conditions under which it can be accepted and how it can be related to mental states. We present mental states in terms of private experiences and public events. We argue that a representation is a relation involving three main elements as well as the user of the representation, and defend that the conditions in which we can conceive neural activity as representational are set by the context of observing a correlation between public events and patterns of neural activity. We aim at demonstrating that neural activity can be seen as both representational and non-representational - but rather constitutive - depending upon if we are considering public events under the perspective of the observer, or if we are considering private experiences under the subjective perspective
On the philosophical foundations of episodic memory as awareness of past events
(2018)
Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy. The notion was set by experimental psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Endel Tulving in the 1980s and refers to the ability to be aware of subjective past and future events. Tulving’s view on memory and consciousness provides an important conceptual distinction founded in experimentally observed data. In this paper I discuss (1) his concept of episodic memory as awareness, based on Peter Hacker’s distinction of perception and sensation, and his account of memory, and (2) whether memory can be taken as an own-body subjective perception, which, therefore, challenges the conception of memory as stored information in the brain and the idea that we could somehow perceive our memories. The main puzzle is: if awareness is a conscious state that involves veridical perception of present inner or outer states/events, how can we conceive awareness of past and future events? This discussion aims to contribute to Tulving’s conception of MTT by clarifying the conceptual foundations on which we can understand memory.
The Problem of the Unbridgeable Ontological Gap Between the Brain and Our Private Experiences in Wittgensteinian Terms
(2017 - 2019)
One of my aims was helping to compatibilize philosophical problems on cognition with cognitive neuroscience, and, therefore, contribute not only to the dissolution of conceptual confusions, but also with empirical investigation. My motivation for this work started with the need of clarifying and showing the possibility of a philosophical activity that considers cases of uses of words, clarifies conceptual relations and interact with the empirical sciences. This need raised from my doctoral research, and the work on the role of Philosophy from a Wittgensteinian perspective. The main outcome of this research was presented as paper suggesting, from a wittgensteinian perspective, that the common notion that there is a gap between a physical scope, namely, brain processes, and something immaterial such as private experiences is an illusion provoked by the conceptual conflicts of our understanding. In order to overcome this illusion, it is necessary to clarify the foundations and implications of the uses of key concepts in the cognitive field.