Remainers are out – Brexit to come
Published December 13, 2019
© Georg Boomgaarden
On December 12 Boris Johnson got a clear majority of seats in the House of Commons to do what he made a slogan of his campaign: „Let‘s get Brexit done“.
For an observer from the continent the British electoral system is untterly unfair. For 43,6% of the British vote the Conservatives get an absolute majority of 56,2% of the seats in the House of Commons, the LibDems get 1,7% of the seats for 11,6% of the vote.
An extreme case of that unfairness are Scotland and Northern Ireland: The Scottish National Party SNP has just 45% of the vote, but it takes 81,4% of the seats in Scotland. The Conservatives in Scotland got 25,1% of the vote but only 10,2% of the seats, the Scottish Labour Party got just one seat or 1,7% of the seats for 18,6% of the vote, the Scottish LibDems got four seats or 6,8% of the seats for 9,5% of the vote. Northern Ireland is another example: The DUP got 30,6% and Sinn Fein 22,8% of the vote, both sharing the bulk of 44,4% and 38,9% of the seats. The Alliance in Northern Ireland got 16,8% of the vote, but only 5,6% of the seats, the SDLP got 14,9% of the vote but with 11,9% of the seats twice as much seats than the Alliance, while the UUP got not one seat although it had 11,7% of the vote in Northern Ireland.
This electoral system may seem unfair to us continentals, but a majority of the British people believe that the legitimacy of a member of Parliament comes from his relative majority in the constituency because the MP shall represent the constituents rather than his party or a certain ideology. In a referendum in 2011 a big majority rejected a proposal for an Alternative Vote system that would have given smaller parties better chances. The legitimacy coming from the constituencies beats the one coming from the share of certain opinions or parties. Therefore Boris Johnson can legitimately claim a landslide victory.
Both big parties set out in their respective manifestos that they promise a lot of money to be spent on social funds, health care and infrastructure. There are doubts if this will be financially feasable, trust in such promises is limited. These promises might not have been decisive for the result.
These were „Brexit-elections“ in a way replacing a second referendum on Brexit. Voters who had voted for Brexit in 2016 feared that their decision would be betrayed by Parliament. Boris Johnson addressed these voters with his slogan to get Brexit done. Being a credible Brexiteer he successfully stopped conservative voters running away to the Brexit party.
These were also „Brexit-fatigue elections“. Many voters were fed up with the stand-off in Parliament where there was not one solution that could secure a majority. These voters just wanted an end to insecurity. The fact that Boris Johnson could secure a deal before the elections were called helped a lot to convince the fatigue-voters that there was no longer a risk of no-deal and therefore even remainers could risk voting Conservative.
These were also anti-Corbyn elections. Even voters who did not like Boris Johnson preferred him to Jeremy Corbyn who led Labour back to nostalgic positions of far-left state socialism. Many remainers voted for Corbyn in 2017 hoping that Labour were taking a lead for stopping Brexit. The neutral ambiguity on Brexit had no attraction for them, while Corbyn‘s programme was a deterrent.
Jeremy Corbyn believed that a hard left manifesto would attract traditional Labour voters. He was a eurosceptic for most of his lifetime, believing that leaving the capitalist club of the few called EU would make the situation of the many better. The majority of Labour politicians did not endorse his view. Labour lost many constituencies which had voted Labour for nearly a century, mainly in areas which voted Leave in the 2016 referendum. They hoped that Brexit would give them a new chance and stop ‚immigrants taking away our jobs‘. Corbyn‘s ambiguous stand of „neutrality“ did not serve him at all – in a polarized climate neutral ships are sunk from both sides of the contention.
The British electoral system does not give a choice between different political views. If anybody wants to express his political will through a vote for a smaller party this vote will be completely underrepresented. In theory each elected member of Parliament should represent all of his constituents in Westminster. At least he or she should not dismiss the views of a big majority of the voters in his constituency.
If you look onto the big issues at this election, it was Brexit and Corbyn all over. In Scotland and Northern Ireland it was Brexit and the future of the Scottish or Irish nation respectively. The SNP claims that the vote means another drive towards independence. And in Northern Ireland the nationalists have for the first time a majority of seats over the unionists.
If the election would be seen as a second referendum, then the proportions of the vote should be considered. This was no Brexiteer landslide. The 43,6% conservative vote can now be counted 100% pro-Brexit – Boris Johnson purged his party from the last pro-Europeans. The Brexit Party got 2%, the DUP 0,8%, UKIP 0,1% – so the pro-Brexit vote stands at 46,5%. Even if I count the 2,1% of „all other votes“ as pro-Brexit (which may not be the case), Brexiteers got 48,6%.
The Labour vote could now at least be counted as giving remainers a chance to have a second referendum. Since the Labour Brexiteers voted Conservative this time the rest could be counted as being against this „Tory-Brexit“. The votes for the LibDems, Green, Plaid Cimru, SNP, SDLP, APDI, Sinn Fein could all be counted a 100% against Brexit, all together 51,4% of the vote.
That means: if this election would have been a real referendum, the majorities of 2016 would have been reversed to 51,4% Remain and 48,6% Leave. This confirms more or less the polls which also showed that the British society is as split on Brexit as it was in 2016 – but now with a small majority for Remain.
Boris Johnson succeeded with his tactics to have a general election instead of a second referendum. The electoral system gave him a Brexit-majority of seats against a Remain-majority of voters. Jeremy Corbyn and other Remainers were wrong when they did not forge a people‘s vote coalition to have a second referendum and reverse Brexit. They lost the chance – Remainers are out – Brexit will come.
Even after commenting on Boris Johnson several times his personality and political views are still open to speculation. His first speech after the electoral victory was moderate, he stressed his position as a One-Nation-Conservative, belonging to the same ideological wing like David Cameron or George Osborne. But his political career has shown that he is an opportunist to the bones who knows only one constant principle: Himself. This makes it very difficult to predict what kind of policy he will follow with a comforable majority behind him.
I just finished reading David Cameron‘s memoirs „For the Record“. David Cameron and Boris Johnson had both been Etonians. They met at university in Oxford. There were wild stories about the notorious Bullingdon Club. Boris Johnson gave his support for Cameron‘s leadership bid for the Conservative Party in 2005, David Cameron encouraged Johnson‘s succesful candidature for the London mayoral election in May 2008.
David Cameron's views on Boris Johnson are not flattering. Let me quote David Cameron:
„First though I had to deal with Boris. He had come out and tried to blame police cuts for the riots [in 2011]. I was furious, and called him straight away. ‚Why the hell did you do that?‘ He said it was revenge for No.10 saying this was his ‚Hurricane Katrina moment‘,… This had not come from my team, but from a Guardian article. He was being paranoid, and frankly at this stage of the proceedings a massive irritation.“ (Cameron, page 300)
„As for the London mayoral election, there was widespread theory that I did‘nt want Boris to win a second term… It really was‘nt like that. Boris was one who was full of jealousies and paranoias, which so often influenced his behaviour. I wanted him to win. He had been a great mayor, but I felt City Hall was dysfunctional, and that he could do the job a lot better.“ (Cameron, page 357)
„In one meeting I had with him before his campaign I asked him his top line, and he replied, ‚Driverless Trains‘,… ‚I have a nine point plan,‘ he then said. But he could‘nt even remember the points. ... For all our mini-run-ins, I liked Boris and he made me laugh. But I did‘nt always trust him.“ (Cameron, page 358)
„I had a lot of time for Boris. I respected his talent. While I found some of his political antics infuriating, there was a reason for his appeal to the public…. When I said I wanted him at the heart of my team, it was‘nt just a case of being better to have him inside the tent than outside. ... Boris‘s style on the court is like the rest of his life: aggressive, wildly unorthodox … and extremely competitive.“ (Cameron, page 651/652)
„It soon became clear that while Boris cared about this issue, it was secondary to another concern: what was the best outcome for him? I could almost see his thought process take shape. Whichever senior Tory politician took the lead on the Brexit side – so loaded with images of patriotism, independence and romance – would become the darling of the party. He did‘nt want to risk allowing someone else with a high profile – Michael Gove in particular – to win that crown. ... At the same time, he was certain that the Brexit side would lose. So opting to back it bore little risk of breaking up the government that he wanted to lead one day. It would be a risk-free bet on himself. ...
I challenged him that ‚seizing meant leaving‘, and that ‚out meant out‘, he would counter that in those circumstances there could always be a fresh renegotiation, followed by a second referendum.“ (Cameron, page 654)
„That said the fundamental conclusion I am left with is that he risked an outcome he did‘nt believe in because it would benefit his political career.“ (Cameron, page 655)
„On 11 May, they unveiled their liveried battle bus, emblazoned with the words ‚We send the EU 350 million pound a week. Let‘s fund our NHS instead. - It was‘nt true. As Boris rode the bus around the country, he left the truth at home." (Cameron, page 668)
„As for Boris, who proudly trumpeted his Turkish heritage, and who had advocated Turkish membership, he was now backing the false claims about its accession.“ (Cameron, page 669)
„I think the few days he [Michael Gove] had had in harness with Boris had made him wonder if Boris as a prime minister was such a good idea. (Cameron, page 688)
„George [Osborn] sat there beaming at the TV. ‚We have taken Boris out. Now on to Port Stanley!‘ he said, meaning it was Michael‘s turn to fall next.“ (Cameron, page 689)
With a comfortable majority Prime Minister Boris Johnson can now put the ratification of the agreement on leaving the EU on fast track and leave the European Union on 31 January. But this only settles the past and organizes a smooth transition. Formally this means Brexit will be done. Britain will no longer be a member of the EU but a third country – even if it is still treated very much like a member state during the transition period.
Negiotiations on the future relationship will start soon. The timetable is very tight because the British government is very ambitious and wants to settle this within a year.
Many in Brussels are also fed up with the never ending debates in Westminster (just made a typing error writing ‚Westmonster‘ – may be some felt just that). Now Britain will leave and there is no more threat of having a hurt lion unwillingly roaring at the table in Brussels. Most Europeans regret Brexit, but many feel a relief. As the new president of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said, we must now take the chance for new good relations.
The negotiations about the future trade relationship will be more detailed and complicated than the divorce settlement. All 27 EU member states will have to ratify an agreement – so negotiations may become stuck if some country does not see its special interests taken into account. But there is much routine and a lot of precedents in Brussels how to deal with free trade agreements.
The United Kingdom may still have illusions about keeping privileges it had when being a member state. But there is no more cherry picking available but an exchange of fruits on a free market where demand and supply make the price. These negotiations should start in a spirit of good will from the EU side. We all have an interest to have a successful Britain as a good client and a good market at our doorstep, we also have an interest in best possible cooperation on many other fields outside the narrow trade interests. We want to remain friends. However, between the EU and a third country a leading principle is reciprocity: the EU offers some acces to a market of over 400 million consumers and producers, and expects Britain giving reciprocal offers.
We all suppose that Brexit will damage both sides, the EU as well as Britain. However, it is not easy to measure the damage because in economics there are a lot of complex interrelated feedback processes involved, such that it is difficult to link an effect to an action. Each effect can have a whole bunch of reasons. Experts know a lot, but Michael Gove was not wrong to be fed up with experts giving daring long term forecasts.
So I can only speak about my expectations, which are no more an exact prophecy as the ones of a good Shakespearean witch. First of all business will be glad that the time of insecurity is over and the next steps become somewhat more calculable. This may trigger some investments which were deferred when business was waiting to know the political and economic framework. Deferred and repair investment may bring a short-lived boom to Britain. New insecurity will come up as long as the terms of the trade agreement are not yet clear.
Depending on how close EU-British relations develop, trade will come with more or less friction. Not really ‚frictionless‘, because some paperwork and border controls will be inevitable for any third country. But ‚less friction‘ should be the goal – also to find a good solution for the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.
‚In the long run we are all dead‘ – said Keynes, but in the long run I am sure that not being in the EU will be disadvantageous for the United Kingdom. However, I have no doubt that there are really no safe forecasts because nobody knows how the EU will further develop – hopefully towards an ever closer union – and how the national efforts of the British people will offset the shooting in its own knee that was Brexit. Both must work hard to make the best of what is the real world and others outside of Europe will have a great influence on the manouevering space we can use.
Therefore I am very careful with long term forecasts. I can only wish both, Britain and the EU all the best.
© Georg Boomgaarden