The text published here is a combination of my erstwhile reaction to Cameron*s speech at Bloomberg on January 23, 2013 and the comments I added in June 2019, six years later at a time when Brexit was coming to a conclusion. This shows how the views had changed over the years of the Brexit negotiations. Lamentably my initial pessimism was justified. From the start I warned to underestimate the consequences. But in 2013 many just did not believe that "it could really happen".
My view was that Cameron had a real chance to win allies and to move forward in the EU, but only if he would insist on susidiarity and embark on reforms in the interest of Europe as a whole. Striving for more cherry picking for the UK was a recipee for desaster. Like many British politicians he did not really grasp the political context on the continent - he was even not too interested in such complicated issues. He saw the world from the perspective of a Little Englander. Cameron was unable to put himself in the shoes of others - his intellectual capacity was too limited to see the consequences of his gambling with the EU membership. In the end he followed the worst instincts of his europhobe wing and consequently embarked on sleepwalking out of the EU. The Bloomberg speech was a first step in the wrong direction.
Published June 19, 2019
© Georg Boomgaarden
Translation from German original with help of Google Translator
On January 23, 2013, the then British Prime Minister David Cameron gave a speech at Bloomberg in London. I sat in the front row - Cameron kept looking over at me, probably to study my reaction. I tried to look friendly, but his speech horrified me. I thought his announcement that he would hold an in-out referendum on Britain's EU membership if he won the next election was irresponsible and a path to disaster. Some German journalists I spoke to afterwards found my assessment too pessimistic. Unfortunately, things turned out to be even worse than I thought at the time.
Shortly after the speech I wrote down my thoughts. I always find it exciting to look at such texts again after a few years and see what has become of them. Most of the time, the ancient texts are embarrassing evidence that people - me included - are not prophets and predictions are a matter of luck.
Excerpts from my analysis of Prime Minister Cameron's speech at Bloomberg's in London on January 23, 2013 are shown in blue letters. The comment on this comes from June 19, 2019, when the Brexit negotiations had not yet been completed but were well advanced. I'm comparing the two here just to see what an assessment looks like six years later, when events show whether the first assessment was accurate or not.
So here is the analysis from 2013 and the commentary from 2019:
Prime Minister Cameron has given his speech - and we move on to business as usual! That would be the most convenient solution - the debate takes place in Britain, we keep our profile low, and at some point the fervor will cool and give way to sober politics on all sides. Or not ? Rather not ! The genie is out of the bottle and we won't be able to force him back in.
At the time, I feared that the possibility of Brexit was not really being taken seriously in the other EU countries. This was largely the case until the vote on June 23rd. This was also reflected in the low level of engagement among European politicians in the referendum campaign.
Which scenarios are conceivable and what opportunities and risks are associated with them? What does the British Prime Minister want? Does he mean what he said? Did he say everything he meant? Does he speak for his party? For a future conservative majority? For the British economy or at least the City of London? For the British people?
We are now seeing the division that he caused in his country with the referendum. He had not spoken for the British people. Europe was not a priority there, a referendum was called for by the extremist press, especially the Daily Mail and Murdoch's Sun, but there was no big movement for it. He certainly didn't speak for the economy at all - they didn't take the whole thing seriously and thought it was party political tactics with no consequences. The future conservative majority was more of his target group. In the previous European elections, scores of voters defected to the United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP, then still led by Nigel Farage.
The big issue that won UKIP voters was “immigration” – where no one in Britain differentiated between immigration due to European freedom of movement and the even greater immigration from third countries.
The speech in January 2013 was entirely an attempt by Cameron to hold together his Conservative Party, which had worn out every Conservative leader since John Major over the issue of Europe. Cameron pursued party interests and was not at all interested in the national interest.
First of all, I'll take him at his word, so I'll just go by what he said:
It's common to suspect a hidden agenda behind everything a politician says. Cameron's speech was interpreted very differently. But at the time I wanted to assume that he meant what he said.
Great Britain's relationship with the European Union must be reorganized; the dynamics that are developing for the Eurozone as a result of the crisis in some Euro countries make a change in the relationship even more urgent. But the current state of the EU can no longer be tolerated.
The core of his speech is the statement: first he will negotiate changes in the European Union and Britain's relationship with the EU, then he will present the result to the British people in a referendum in 2017 in which the clear alternative is: either leave from the EU or remaining in an EU that has been changed by the outcome of the negotiations. Remaining in the EU as it is today is not up for debate and is out of the question.
Cameron says he wants to stay in a changed EU on different terms. In an EU that does not exist today. He doesn't want to stay in today's EU. He would therefore like to leave the existing EU by 2017 at the latest.
The statement that remaining in an unchanged EU was out of the question was overlooked by most rapporteurs at the time or not taken at face value. Cameron has spoken out in favor of a Brexit that can only be averted through concessions from the EU. Cameron did not say what concessions these might be. I heard that he actually wanted to make some specific demands. His advisors advised him against this because otherwise he would have been forced to act.
If precisely these demands had proven impossible to meet, then Cameron would have had to support Brexit.
Cameron's self-portrayal as someone who actually wanted to stay in the EU and expected the referendum to confirm his goal is at least questionable. Because he was playing with fire from the start. He had already given in to the Europhobes in his party and left the EPP group in the European Parliament. In his shadow cabinet before the 2009 election, the extremely anti-European Mark Francois served as “shadow Europe minister” - today he is still one of the hardliners, against whom Rees-Mogg looks moderate, and one of the biggest political idiots I have met. He then did not get into the cabinet because the Conservatives had to enter into a coalition with the Liberal Democrats due to their lack of a majority. This was the only reason why the pro-European conservative MP David Lidington became European Minister.
To keep Britain in the EU, either Cameron would have to lose the next election or the EU would have to comply with his wishes for change. The Prime Minister only hinted at what changes are required but did not elaborate - the current inventory of the “balance of competences” will play an important role in this. The ideas of the think tank “Fresh Start” were the inspiration for the speech.
The “balance of competences”, i.e. the distribution of competences between national politics and European integrated politics, is a serious issue. There are always disputes when the European Commission - often with the help of the European Court of Justice - disregards the principle of subsidiarity and regulates things at European level that could be better regulated at national, regional or even local level. However, the British government approached the issue differently: it was only concerned with renationalization, there were no suggestions as to where more European competence might be necessary, the partner countries were asked whether they would support British goals, and the concept of pan-European goals was one foreign word. It was completely ignored that the current acquis is a compromise that has developed over many years and was painstakingly negotiated jointly among all member states.
Can Cameron “deliver”? Can he get the Europhobes and Eurosceptics in his party to develop a positive attitude towards a changed EU, so that a constructive European policy becomes possible on a new basis? Can he take his party with him if he can achieve some substantial reforms in the EU and a reorganization of his country's relationship with the EU? There are considerable doubts about this. The appeasement of the Europhobic group in his group has so far failed consistently.
Cameron had already tried to appease the Europhobic “bastards” (as former conservative Prime Minister John Major called them!) by leaving the EPP. In addition, the “referendum lock” was decided (and, to my horror, not prevented by the actually Europe-friendly liberal coalition partner). This meant that any substantial changes to the EU treaties had to be subject to a referendum in Great Britain. This made further development in the EU almost impossible, but was not taken seriously by the other member states.
None of this was enough for the Europhobes! I was already sure back then that this extremist wing of the Conservative Party would concede every concession without being deterred in the slightest from their goal: leaving the EU. At the time I said, "If Cameron gives them his little finger, they'll take his hand, his whole arm, and then they'll eat him whole!"
Can the rest of the EU “deliver”? Are the reforms that Cameron is calling for the EU feasible and capable of reaching a consensus? How far is the willingness to further expand Great Britain's existing special role in Europe? Here too there are doubts. Even the reforms that we also consider to be sensible will be difficult to achieve under the ultimate time pressure, the expected wishes for renationalization (to all member states) will be even more difficult and the equally expected wishes for repatriation (especially to Great Britain) are not exactly realistic.
In the end, the EU delivered what Cameron was able to achieve in the short time without treaty changes. That wasn't much. But anything more was unrealistic from the start. If some people still complain today that Cameron should have been given more, they fail to realize that this would have meant treaty changes (and possibly referendums in Denmark and Ireland) - and at the same time would not have satisfied his Europhobes at all.
Can Cameron win the next election with an absolute majority of seats in the House of Commons? Will British voters follow his recommendation – positive or negative – for their vote in a referendum? This is also completely open. In the middle of the election period there is a high risk that the vote will be on the popularity of a government and its austerity measures and not on the actual issue of Europe.
At the time, many observers agreed that Cameron could not win the next election. In 2013 it was still far too early to speculate about this. The risk of all referendums is that people vote on other things than the actual question on the ballot paper. Austerity was the issue that angered many voters.
Back then, I underestimated the issue of immigration, which was raised primarily by UKIP in 2013. After 10 new members joined the EU in 2004, the British government under Tony Blair waived the seven-year transition period stipulated in the accession treaty until the introduction of full freedom of movement for workers - and proudly boasted about this to the Germans. Almost a million Eastern Europeans came to Great Britain, the shortage of craftsmen was eliminated ("the Polish plumber" helped the economy on its feet) and integration was easier than that of non-European immigrants - who, however, continued to be the majority of immigrants.
UKIP's propaganda against all immigration was spurred on in 2015 by the growing flow of migrants to Europe. Before the referendum in 2016, the German Chancellor carelessly claimed that our borders could not be protected at all - the British opponents of the EU successfully advertised the migration of migrants on the Balkan route. EU opponents did not shy away from outright lies when they claimed that millions of Turkish immigrants would soon come to the UK thanks to Turkey's accession to the EU.
How will other political and social forces position themselves in the UK? How does the debate and its possible outcomes affect the British economy and society? How does the debate before a referendum affect Scotland's remaining in the UK? The pressure on the Labor Party to also commit to a referendum will increase significantly. Business has woken up and doesn't want an exit - but loyalty to the Conservative party means that many don't want to criticize Cameron.
Some have the illusion that a few concessions could turn the tide in Europe's favor. The debate that has begun could contribute to a more realistic view. The Scottish referendum is expected to go in favor of the Union, but a vigorous European debate could strengthen the SNP.
The Scotland issue remains on the agenda. The referendum in Scotland also went in favor of the Union because Brexit was not yet the focus of the debate, otherwise Scotland would no longer be part of the United Kingdom today!
Britain's cultural and economic elites certainly felt pro-European, but their pre-referendum campaign was tepid and unconvincing. They countered the Brexiteers' shouted NO with a mildly smiling YES-BUT. The City of London remained reserved and believed that nothing would happen - until it woke up with a start in Brexitland on June 24th.
The majority of the Labor Party was pro-Europe, but its new leader, Jeremy Corbyn, had been a proven anti-EU politician for decades. And that's how he ran his campaign: lukewarm, ambivalent and in such a way that Labor voters had the impression that Brexit was an option for Labor too. At the time I thought it was an illusion that Cameron could turn the tide with the few concessions that were realistic. And it was an illusion, as the referendum result showed.
How will the positioning of the British European partners affect the debate and ultimately the referendum? Can we even influence the debate? Essentially, the British public is looking at Germany and perhaps France, although the surprise intervention of the US government, where there are warnings about an exit, has triggered a lot of thought. We have to be careful that we don't end up with a debate: “We Brits against the continent”, but at the same time we have to counteract illusions that the Germans will “knock out” Cameron - that can lead to disappointments that backfire on us.
This illusion was: the Germans - actually the British only ever spoke of “Merkel” as if she were an icon - would knock her out. If the government doesn't want to, the German automotive industry will force Merkel to accommodate Cameron. The Chancellor herself should have confronted the British much more clearly at the time. Merkel didn't do that, even though she advocated a more rational approach. The British were so caught up in their autism that only shock could wake them up - and no one was willing - perhaps no one was capable - of that.
Obama's statements have not helped the Remainers - on the contrary. We now have a US president, Trump, who has described the EU as an “enemy”.
How can we contribute to solving the questions raised? What is our interest? And that of our other European partners?
I don't think any European partner would be happy if Great Britain left the EU, even if one or the other could quietly get used to getting rid of a constant troublemaker. It is in our political interest to prevent a feeling of German hegemony from arising among our partners. This will be more difficult if the balance of power is too clear for Germany. With Great Britain in the EU the balance is easier to maintain. In the British we also have committed free traders as partners, which we often need when others show more protectionist tendencies.
German interest in Britain remaining was manifest. In the meantime, however, the political landscape within Great Britain has changed so much that doubts arise as to whether such a partner would still be willing and able to cooperate constructively in the “ever closer Union”, which is more important today than ever before. The United Kingdom as a destructive Trojan horse, perhaps still in a close “special relationship” with Donald Trump, NO THANK YOU.
However, the problems mentioned will still occur. We have to treat France with far more care than the Chancellor is currently doing. The smaller partners in Western AND Eastern Europe must be treated far more considerately than is usual in Germany. We have to stop overestimating ourselves.
Germany is growing into a leadership role that it did not want: it has to fill it; self-confident, rational, sober - but also realistic, without arrogance, cooperative and giving even more sovereignty to Brussels.
Europe with Great Britain is better for us – and probably for all EU partners – than a Europe without Great Britain. However, a path outside the EU is very conceivable and even desirable for a large number of British citizens. If this view prevails in the United Kingdom, then the rest of the partners will not be able to avoid thinking about alternatives - at the latest after a British exit.
Today the situation is here! – I am currently expecting Brexit, in whatever form. This means that Germany bilaterally and the EU as a whole would have to reorganize its relations with the UK. This means implementing the goal of “best possible” relationships. But what is possible also depends on whether the British political class recovers from the Brexit disaster and regains an open view of the outside world. The current conservative party is not a reliable partner for Europe in the foreseeable future. The Labor Party under Corbyn is also not a partner with whom much cooperation is possible. We should give the British time to bring their internal affairs back into some sort of order and in the meantime keep as many doors open as possible.
We also have to ask ourselves which Europe do we want? Is our idea of Europe compatible with Cameron's wishes? Let's take a look at his speech: Cameron explicitly stated that the formula of "ever closer union", which has been sought in the treaties since the founding of the EEC, is obsolete - or at least should be understood in such a philosophical way, that it has no political effect. In his opinion, the process of integration has already gone too far, at least for Great Britain, and must be partially reversed.
Cameron was not alone in believing that some integration steps went too far overall, or at least in their implementation. However, he never sought allies for change, especially since it remained unclear what exactly he wanted.
Today, the “ever-closer union” is more important than ever, but also more difficult to achieve. If, contrary to expectations, the United Kingdom does return to the fold of the European Union, then the necessary reforms would hardly be achievable, because any future British government will have to deal with angry, “cheated” Brexiteers among the population, a raging Europhobic press and the accusation of Expect “submission” – not to mention the ongoing “referendum lock” for treaty changes. That would paralyze progress in integration.
The British Prime Minister certainly sees the need for greater integration for those countries that, in his view, have made the mistake of forming a monetary union, but all others, and especially the United Kingdom, should concentrate on the internal market and subordinate everything else to it.
The euro was actually intended for all EU states, it wasn't a problem that not everyone could or wanted to introduce the euro immediately, the withdrawal of Great Britain and Denmark from the commitment to the monetary union (and therefore also the economic and monetary union) was the first crack in the process the EU. Sweden refused to introduce the euro based on a referendum, even though it did not seek a dispensation from the euro when it joined - the referendum in Sweden was actually illegal because it was a violation of the law.
The European peace project that the EU was created as is complete and no longer a driving force for integration, which is why Cameron believes the EU should primarily develop the internal market. The common market is the core of the EU, a common currency is not part of this core.
Cameron had no sense of history and understood nothing of the importance of European unification for peace in Europe. He spoke carelessly as if the peace project was a “one-off” and not a permanent basis for peace. This shows once again that Cameron had no political stature.
The economic project alone is not a sufficient basis for EU-Europe. It only works if everyone understands that it is about common pan-European interests and not simply about reinforcing classic “national interests”. Only then can political solidarity emerge from economic cooperation. It is true that there is no “European demos” yet, but that is precisely why the European institutions are so important, as they bring together pan-European thinking until such a demos can emerge.
One could take the view that the formula of the “ever closer union” and the statement that the EU is now essentially just an internal market after the end of its peace mission are both more “philosophical” elements of the union that one can do without Damage could be given up in the interest of a “pragmatic solution”. As Cameron said, the British were concerned about the functioning of the internal market in a pragmatic manner and not about emotional elements.
Anyone who ignores the emotional bonding forces in Europe gives room for other forces that can tear Europe apart - and have torn it apart for centuries!
However, the British attitude is not as emotionless as Cameron says: the debate in the United Kingdom is dominated by highly emotional and ideologically inflated views on national sovereignty, the role of the national parliament, the uniqueness of the British role in the world and British history as well as emotional outbursts, even hatred, towards the European Union. Pragmatic voices are hardly heard because the tabloid press, like UKIP and the Europhobes in the Conservative Party, are waging an emotional campaign that has nothing to do with pragmatism.
Everything that has happened since then in the UK, in Parliament, in government, in the Conservative Party and in Labor, has been deeply emotional, and at the same time deeply irrational. Reason, the objectively distanced dialogue, the weighing of arguments, the respect for those who think differently - everything that I had always admired about the British debate culture was switched off. The Europhobes, the majority of whom would belong to the extreme right on the continent, have significantly changed the political climate in Great Britain. In the 2016 referendum, the minority of extremists managed to win a slim majority using lies and manipulation. Now they canonize the result as a kind of divine judgment and declare it inviolable - as if a leader, once elected, could then claim for life that he won an election once - which would make further elections unnecessary.
At the same time, the political consequence of the demand to abandon the goal of ever closer union is that European integration must be viewed as complete or at least over and further integration is no longer a goal of the EU - and can at least only take place in the Eurozone under strict conditions that the internal market is not affected. Great Britain wants an extensive veto right (euphemistically called “safeguards”) in order to completely prevent further integration steps by the EU as a whole and to help control such steps for the euro area.
This was a demand from Cameron that could lead to the destruction of the project of European integration and was therefore completely unacceptable. When the EU was faced with the alternative of self-abandonment with Great Britain or self-assertion without Great Britain, it was clear that it chose the latter. Cameron was intellectually overwhelmed to really understand this.
Prime Minister Cameron gives a few examples that make EU reform urgently necessary for him. He demands such reforms for all members and wants to negotiate with everyone about them. The catalog is not complete and is limited to larger subject areas without requiring individual measures. So we don't know exactly which reforms Cameron wants to negotiate. One indication, however, are the demands of his party friends - not necessarily those in favor of leaving, but probably those of the predominantly Eurosceptic majority of the Tories.
The middle part of Cameron's speech struck a tone that was strongly reminiscent of the publications of the conservative think tank Fresh Start. Fresh Start has developed ideas for the far-reaching repatriation of skills from the EU to national jurisdiction. Foreign Secretary William Hague wrote a laudatory foreword to the paper setting out initial findings from Fresh Start's studies. It can be assumed that Fresh Start's ideas give a strong indication of Cameron's negotiating intentions, even if he did not make this clear in his speech.
The lack of clarity about the demands derived from the generalities has permeated the entire Brexit debate ever since. Somehow people were already thinking about ideas like those formulated by Fresh Start, but they couldn't be implemented operationally.
If reforms for the EU are proposed to the other members, they cannot of course simply reject them. Everyone will have to check whether such proposals are perhaps capable of reaching a consensus and can be included in a later change to the treaty. However, this applies to every member state and counter-proposals would then have to be treated in the same way. As the Chancellor remarked on Cameron's speech, w
There will be discussions about the proposals and compromises can be sought - always on the condition that the interests of all member states are taken into account.
The EU negotiated with Cameron and came a long way to accommodate him. It was clear from the start that the concessions would not be enough for the Europhobes in Cameron's party, because they did not want a compromise, but rather Brexit. In the negotiations, Cameron did not propose reforms of the EU as a whole, which would then have to be negotiated among all members, but rather demanded concessions for his country that would further strengthen Great Britain's special position. This has been a problematic relationship with the integration process since the United Kingdom's accession. You always wanted to eat the cake and keep the same cake. You were half in, half outside – and felt completely comfortable. The other Europeans accepted this because they had an economically and politically strong partner in Great Britain, which often made decisions more difficult than necessary, but then implemented them loyally - sometimes better than the founding members of the EEC.
The Lisbon Treaty expressly stipulates the right of a member state to leave the EU (there was probably no doubt about this before). However, threatening to withdraw if a national negotiating package is not accepted by everyone else is not a good prerequisite for a successful negotiation process. The other partners might find the option more attractive of accepting a withdrawal and only then negotiating bilaterally on a new arrangement along the lines of Norway or Switzerland.
Brexit is legal, it is allowed, it has even been contractually guaranteed since the Lisbon Treaty. He's just stupid - and that's becoming increasingly clear! But the Brexiteers disagree, and that is their right – the proof of the pudding is with the eating. We will probably only know the exact consequences of Brexit in a few years.
This option may not seem very likely on the surface. However, it must be noted that many of the conservative EU opponents in Great Britain find such a solution more attractive than some “rotten compromise” in which not all British repatriation wishes are reflected. The red line beyond which Cameron cannot support remaining in the EU is the split in his party. Therefore, contrary to what he said in his speech, the exit and the path to the EEA can become more attractive for Cameron as soon as it becomes clear that the possible compromises are not enough. I think Cameron would accept the leave option if it meant he could keep his party together and maintain his power.
Before the referendum, there were also many Brexiteers who thought the Norwegian or Swiss models were conceivable. In the referendum, this was definitely one of the conceivable forms of Brexit. Most of the time they didn't know what they were talking about; when they looked closer, they didn't want to know anything about it. Today, the approximately 160,000 members of the Conservative Party want a hard Brexit, disregarding obligations under international law - a survey in June 2019 showed that among these "Conservatives" 43% would also accept Nigel Farage as party leader, 63% would support Scotland's exit, 58% would accept Northern Ireland's exit from the United Kingdom if only total Brexit came.
Germany in particular has no interest in Great Britain leaving the EU. The British know this! But German interest is only used instrumentally to achieve British goals; no concessions in the area of European integration are to be expected.
The German interest remains that Britain does not leave, but Britain remaining in its current state would probably be highly damaging to the European project. I don't know how the balance will turn out, but France seems determined not to jeopardize the EU by making further concessions to the British.
What is positive is that the long-standing connection between anti-German and anti-European sentiments has broken down in recent years. Many anti-EU politicians believe that Germany should essentially also have an interest in limiting Brussels' power and playing a stronger national role. British and German interests are no longer easily seen as opposites.
At the same time, Germany is no longer – as it was said after the end of the Cold War – “surrounded by friends”. Fears about Germany's strength have reawakened old anti-German sentiments in some EU countries. The mood in Great Britain towards Germany is more positive than in Greece, Italy, or Poland. But no one should rely on that. The manipulation of nationalist feelings at the expense of understanding is apparently considered an acceptable political instrument. A United Kingdom in decline will be tempted to blame others: Europe and Germany (and France) provide projection surfaces.
However, the Germans are not considered confident enough to follow Great Britain's path towards scaling back European integration and, if necessary, dismantling the EU. In contradiction to this, however, the same people also fear a hegemonic role for Germany, which the British would have to counteract - and this role will be strengthened by the EU. Cameron apparently does not share this view: he is prepared to accept an increased role for Germany in the eurozone if the British "safeguards" for the internal market and a new relationship between the UK and the EU are negotiated, which introduces new veto rights to further integration the EU as a whole. Against the deepening, Great Britain continues to rely on expansion - even if it sounds absurd: Cameron linked the threat of his own exit with the demand for expansion without a comma.
All of these aspects are outdated with the impending Brexit. These issues can be relieved for the remaining member states. I hope that it will be recognized that a deepening of the Union is necessary so that the EU can expand again. With Great Britain as a member, the over-expansion of the EU would have continued without suitable structures.
The demands for reforms in the structures of the EU and the demand for special British rights are mentioned by Cameron in the same breath. In fact, you have to keep the two apart. Reforms in the EU are also in our interest: a smaller and more powerful Commission was already envisaged in the Constitutional Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty then took into account the domestic political problems of the newly acceded countries of Eastern Europe, which could not live without a Commissioner in Brussels. If the British want to change that now, for example to a maximum of 14 commissioners, then we could be there. You can test whether this has a chance of success. If bureaucratic procedures can be dismantled and over-regulation cut back, then we can only agree with that - we know that this is not easy, despite clear decisions that have already been made. If the British manage to overturn the Strasbourg seat of the EP, we will not object to this - enjoy the discussions with Paris about this.
None of this played a role in Cameron's negotiations. For him it was not about reforming the EU, but about special British rights.
A fundamental misunderstanding of the issue of subsidiarity seems to have become entrenched in Great Britain: large-scale renationalizations that question the EU as such do not fall under it. The Laeken decisions are not very clear here. Withdrawals of competencies are certainly considered possible there. But the problem lies more in an overly broad interpretation of competences by the Commission than in the distribution of competences themselves.
But of course you can even talk about the distribution of competences. But one has to be clear that the EU - and also the internal market - reflects a balance that has emerged from the multilateral negotiations over the years. Anyone who breaks this up in one place has to make up for it somewhere else, and if too much is repatriated, then the EU is no longer a union, but a shadow of itself. If we want that, we could go a long way towards accommodating the British - other countries would certainly soon follow, and in the end Germany too.
Since Cameron and the British government did not strive for a “better EU”, but only renationalization for themselves, there was never a debate about how competencies and subsidiarity should be optimally distributed in the interests of the whole of Europe. Cameron missed an opportunity. He probably never understood this opportunity! The questions about the “balance of competences” were a transparent attempt to promote British interests by collecting points from each partner country that could be used for renationalization. It was about the debate in the Tory party, not in Europe.
Cameron placed strengthening competitiveness at the heart of his goals for a renewed European Union. We can't disagree with that. However, he sees the reasons for a lack of competitiveness in excessive regulation from Brussels. In fact, both the crisis in some euro countries and the completely unsatisfactory growth in Great Britain showed that it was primarily national political decisions - e.g. completely excessive private and public debt - which contributed significantly to structural deficiencies and a lack of competitiveness. The suspicion is not far-fetched that the EU should be held responsible for the failure of national economic policy. When Cameron castigates the austerity policy in the Eurozone in his speech, referring to the demonstrations in southern Europe, this is, to say the least, a contradiction in view of the British austerity policy.
This contradiction still exists today: we will soon see that British politics will not get any better, but the EU will no longer be able to serve as a scapegoat.
The opponents of Europe and those in favor of leaving the conservative party are cheering. Didn't they listen when, in the last part of his speech, Cameron outlined the important role of the EU in foreign and security policy, in the British economy and in the world - including vis-à-vis the USA. Yes: but they correctly recognized that this part of the speech, which was apparently formulated in the Foreign Ministry, is not the core. If there is a referendum and it is linked to – rather unrealistic and at the same time ultimate – demands for changes to the EU, then the actual goal of the opponents of Europe has almost been achieved. Compared to the existing EU, it is the announcement of the choice between leaving and leaving - only compared to a chimera of a denatured EU does the option to remain remain. This pleases those who want to leave anyway. Cameron should know that.
The Foreign Office was increasingly disempowered. Voices of reason only disturbed. Theresa May turned Great Britain's security policy role into a bargaining chip - that alone raises questions about its reliability. The partners in the EU have great interests in security policy cooperation - this will continue within the framework of NATO - with the risk that the USA can no longer be fully viewed as a reliable partner. Scheduling the referendum the way Cameron did, posing the alternative between a chimera of the EU and leaving, meant even then that Brexit was likely. Back then I was definitely angry and worried, but now I'm actually just sad about how great Britain is making itself small.
The UK's exit is no longer a remote possibility; we must be realistic about it. We can and should try to prevent it, but our ability to do so is very limited. But what possibilities are there in Great Britain itself for a pro-European turn? A lively, very heated and often polemical debate had already begun in the weeks before Cameron's speech. Many entrepreneurs have woken up and realized that they need to speak out publicly if they want to avoid the disadvantages of leaving. The Treasury spent two weeks laboriously mobilizing dissenting voices for a letter to the editor, but the really prominent business leaders warned in the Financial Times against such a va banque game of Brexit. Uncertainty over Britain's remaining in the EU will initially deter investors with the continent as a market.
Unfortunately, I was right here (and would rather have been wrong!): we had to be realistic about Brexit. Our options to prevent this were very limited. The British had to organize the countermovement themselves. It came up only hesitantly because many people simply didn't believe that a majority would decide on such nonsense. I overestimated the Remainers! Her performance was weak. But they had a difficult time.
Cameron's Liberal Democrat coalition partners are strictly against the announced referendum. They are pro-Europeans and are appalled at how far Cameron is accommodating his opponents of Europe. If the Conservatives do not have their own majority in 2015, it will be very difficult for the Liberal Democrats to continue the coalition if it threatens to leave the EU.
Today it is said that Cameron believed he did not need to fulfill his promise because he did not believe an absolute majority was possible and the LibDems would stop him from fulfilling it. If that is true, then Cameron is proving to be even more of an irresponsible gambler with the fate of his country, a gambler who values his own party over the national interest. At the time, I didn't believe that this irresponsibility would affect a majority of Tories.
The Labor Party is in a dilemma. Leader Ed Miliband believes a referendum under Cameron's terms would be nonsensical, but he will accept the argument that he should not appear to fear "the people's vote" on Europe. He would have to face a fierce battle after taking over government with a strong campaign of the Tories against any European policy. In addition, he is already under pressure to subject any new transfer of powers to Brussels to a referendum; the “referendum lock” is the law. This means that Miliband will not be able to agree to reforms in the EU - if substantial treaty changes are involved - without a referendum. But any referendum would take place under a wave of populism with angry anti-European tones from the tabloids and the Tories.
Things got even worse! With Jeremy Corbyn, an anti-European became the new leader of the Labor Party. In the referendum campaign he was lukewarm - no, actually just cold - in favor of Remain. Everyone knew that he actually thought Brexit was a good thing, if only to achieve his goal of “socialism in one country”. The fact that the Tories' path to unreason coincided with the Labor leadership's turn to left-wing utopias is a tragic combination that only made Brexit more likely.
Under a Labor government, the threat of leaving would no longer exist, but Labor can no longer support progress in integration given the referendum lock. And the next Conservative government is likely to pick up the whole issue where it left it. This could extend economic uncertainty beyond 2017.
This would still be the case if Labor were to conclude a customs union after winning an election or even remain in the EU: the next Tory government (or that of the Brexit Party, picking up the Conservatives' rubble) would question all compromises again. As long as the country remains so divided, economic uncertainty will continue.
Wouldn't it then be better for us if Great Britain left the EU and then reorganized its relationship with the EU? Given our clear interest in good relations with the United Kingdom, the new relationship could be generous - perhaps broader than with Norway. Further full membership in the EU would not end the debate for either side. The rest of the EU could continue its integration without hindrance; the British government can pursue national policy within a framework that is compatible with access to the internal market. A condition for such an arrangement should be Great Britain's accession to Schengen. However, this is currently still taboo in Great Britain.
This path is also now largely obstructed. Only a Labor election victory and a subsequent new referendum could open up the chance for an interim solution.
But wouldn't Great Britain's withdrawal be a blow to European security policy? Since the British prefer to define security policy through NATO, this is not to be feared. An EU security policy is already suspicious in London - the resistance to a European ESDP headquarters speaks volumes here.
This still applies today. However, the US policy under Trump has now created a new security policy situation, which I do not want to comment on further here.
The main danger of a British exit is likely to be that the British will quickly realize that their power to shape the situation will be significantly reduced. This could tempt them to resume their classic balance of power policy - which is well anchored in their mentality - and to try to destroy the rest of the EU by exploiting internal differences there because they hope to gain a better position of power. That doesn't necessarily have to be successful - but it would make relations with us rather unfriendly, and that can't be our concern.
Theresa May's government already succumbed to the temptation of "balance of power" - and it failed miserably, because it only strengthened the cohesion of the other EU countries.
CONCLUSION: We should mobilize the pro-Europeans in Great Britain and do something for the UK to remain in the EU wherever possible. It needs to be seriously examined whether a new arrangement is possible in Europe, where a more integrated Eurozone can be joined by a second group of members in a somewhat looser alliance with Europe (this is also likely to have an impact on further enlargements of the EU). But there is little point in accommodating David Cameron if he cannot deliver because the Europhobes in his party will not give up on a final exit. The precedent effect on others must also be taken into account, otherwise we will end up with “Europe à la carte” and end with the destruction of the EU.
The CONCLUSION is as valid today as it was back then!
© Georg Boomgaarden