In regional trade agreements (RTAs), member countries choose a

common rule of origin (RoO) for each product. This study examines the factors that influence RoOs in four ASEAN-plus-one RTAs, which are agreements between ASEAN and four individual countries. One unique feature is that ASEAN as a whole negotiates with a plus-one country, which may dilute the interests of individual ASEAN countries at large. Our findings are summarized as follows. First, the more restrictive RoOs are set in the products where plus-one countries are less competitive against most ASEAN countries. Second, the more restrictive RoOs are likely to be imposed in products that plus-one countries protect with higher most favored nation tariffs. These two results reflect the bargaining power among a plus-on country and ASEAN countries and indicate that plus-one’s preference influences RoOs more strongly. Third, we find contrasting results between intermediate and final products. RoOs are likely to be less restrictive in intermediate products and more restrictive in final products when plus-one countries have higher export competitiveness or when the majority of ASEAN countries have higher MFN tariffs.

We examine the “magnification effect,” which demonstrates that as the number of separable production stages increases, trade increases dramatically as trade costs decline. We empirically investigate the existence of this magnification effect by estimating gravity-type equations for worldwide trade to obtain the tariff elasticity of trade per industry. We find that tariff elasticity is higher in industries with a greater degree of global value chain participation. These results are observed for both gross and value-added trade. Furthermore, we find that tariff elasticity is higher in intra-Asian trade, especially in machinery industries.

In this study, we quantify the worldwide tariff pass-through, that is, the impact of tariff reductions on trade prices. Some estimations show that a one-percentage-point reduction in tariffs decreases trade prices by approximately 0.1% (Lerner paradox). To determine the mechanism underlying this result, we decompose trade prices into product quality and quality-adjusted trade prices. We find that a one-percentage-point reduction in tariff rates decreases product quality by approximately 1.6% and increases quality-adjusted trade prices by approximately 1.5% (Metzler-like paradox in terms of quality-adjusted price). Thus, we construct a theoretical model to demonstrate the mechanism behind these empirical results. We suggest that both a firm-delocation mechanism under variable markups and a quality-sorting mechanism are the driving forces behind these empirical findings. Finally, we examine the welfare effect of tariff changes by employing this theoretical model. Despite the large decrease in trade prices, trade liberalization worsens consumer welfare. 

This study aims to empirically investigate the role of E-commerce (EC) on the trade impacts of COVID-19. To this end, we estimate gravity equations for bilateral trade among 34 reporting countries and their 145 partner countries during January–August in 2019 and 2020. Our major findings can be summarized as follows. A larger number of confirmed cases or deaths in both importing and exporting countries significantly decreases international trade. However, we found that EC development in importing countries contributes to mitigating this negative effect of COVID-19 on trade while that in exporting countries does not. These results are robust for our use of multiple measures of EC development.

We explore the new roles of rules of origin (ROO) when multinational enterprises (MNEs) manipulate their transfer prices to avoid a high corporate tax. The ROO under a free trade agreement (FTA) require exporters to identify the origin of exports to be eligible for a preferential tariff rate. We find that a value-added criterion of ROO restricts abusive transfer pricing by MNEs. Interestingly, an FTA with ROO can induce MNEs to shift profits from a low- to high-tax country. Because the ROO augment tax revenues inside FTA countries, they can transform a welfare-reducing FTA into a welfare-improving one.

Reciprocity is an important concept in international trade negotiations. However, we know little about who demands reciprocity in trade liberalization. This paper characterizes reciprocitarians based on a survey of 10,816 individuals in Japan. Workers in protected sectors tend to demand reciprocity in import liberalization, but oppose the demand for foreign countries to open their markets. In contrast, individuals in managerial occupations tend to demand foreign market opening, but reject the idea of no import liberalization without reciprocity. We also examine the effects of education, nationalism, and risk aversion.

This study investigates how the effects of COVID-19 on international trade changed over time. To do that, we explore monthly data on worldwide trade from January to August in 2019 and 2020. Specifically, our study data include the exports of 34 countries to 173 countries. We estimated the gravity equation by employing various variables as a proxy for the COVID-19 damage. Our findings can be summarized as follows: First, regardless of our measures to quantify the COVID-19 pandemic, we found significantly negative effects of COVID-19 on the international trade of both exporting and importing countries. Second, those effects, especially the effects of COVID-19 in importing countries, tended to become insignificant since July 2020. This result implies that the harmful impacts of COVID-19 on international trade were accommodated after the first wave of the pandemic to some extent. Third, we found heterogeneous effects across industries. The negative effects on non-essential, durable products persist for a long time, whereas positive effects in industries providing medical products were observed. 

We investigate the impacts of COVID-19 on global value chains by examining bilateral trade in finished machinery products from January to June in both 2019 and 2020. We use the numbers of COVID¬ 19 cases and deaths as measures of the impact of the pandemic. Specifically, we investigate how these impacts affect value chains in three scenarios—countries that import finished machinery products, countries that export finished machinery products, and countries that export machinery parts to countries exporting finished machinery products—to assess the impacts on demand, output, and supply chain, respectively. In our analysis, the largest negative impacts were from supply chain effects, followed by output effects. In contrast, we did not find significant impacts from demand effects. We also found that output effects are not so strong in intra-Asian trade compared with trade in other regions.

This study examines how the rules of origin (RoO) of a free trade agreement (FTA) affect firms' pricing strategies. The value-added criterion (VAC) of the RoO requires firms to add more than a certain level of value within an FTA when firms use inputs originating from outside the FTA. The VAC may work as a price floor, and the resulting increases in prices can benefit all firms if it induces an offshoring firm to manipulate its output price. Meanwhile, a consumer-hurting FTA formation is possible, even if all firms make tariff-free exports. Furthermore, such an FTA formation may worsen total welfare.

The aim of this study is to quantify how lockdown policies implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic affected international trade in the first half of 2020. We examine monthly world trade data between January and June in both 2019 and 2020. Our findings can be summarized as follows. Stay-at-home orders did not have significant and robust effects on trade. Negative effects were found in only some industries, including those producing durable products and essential products. However, workplace closures had significantly negative effects on trade, except for intra-Asian trade. These effects of workplace closures can be found in most industries.

This study investigates the effects of parallel imports in two-sided markets, which may increase profits for manufacturers when products have a two-sided market nature. Additionally, parallel imports increase consumer surplus and social welfare in all countries if the network externalities from both sides are large enough. However, if one externality is small while the other is large, parallel imports can hurt consumers and welfare in all countries.

Reducing trade costs by reducing tariffs can be overturned if the tariff reductions induce governments to implement antidumping (AD) measures. Some empirical studies show that a commitment to reduce tariffs leads to more frequent use of AD protection. Other studies show that we rarely observe this substitution effect between tariffs and AD actions. This study theoretically explores the conditions under which a lower import tariff promotes AD actions. Results suggest that a lower tariff encourages AD actions in countries with a small market size. However, it can either encourage or discourage AD actions of countries with a large market size.

This study explores the welfare effects of parallel imports when the producer may refuse to provide repair services for parallel imported units, which reduces the degree of price convergence between countries. If the probability of the product’s breakdown is endogenously determined by the producer, permitting parallel imports could increase the probability, because a higher probability leads to a larger price gap. As a result, it is possible that prices increase and welfare deteriorates in both countries. This negative welfare effect is more likely to emerge as the liberalization of trade in goods proceeds. The prohibition of service discrimination recovers the positive welfare effect.

By employing firm-level export data in China, this paper empirically examines the effect of liberalization of services foreign direct investment (FDI) on exporting firms’ quality upgrading. To evaluate its relative effectiveness, we also examine other kinds of trade policies, including tariffs in export destination countries and input and output tariffs in China. With China's accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001, these trade policies changed substantially during our sample period of 2000–06. Empirical results showed that easing the restrictiveness of services FDI resulted in raising export product quality, mainly for foreign-owned enterprises. More than any other trade policy, we found that reduced input tariffs contributed to raising export product quality.

We examine the impact of free trade agreement (FTA) use on import prices. For this analysis, we employ establishment-level import data with information on tariff schemes, that is, the FTA and most-favored-nation schemes used for importing. Unlike previous studies, we estimate the effects of FTA use on prices by controlling for differences in importing-firm characteristics. There are three main findings. First, the effect of FTA use is overestimated when not controlling for importing firm-related fixed effects. Second, on average, firms’ FTA use reduces tariffs by 12 percentage points and raises import prices by 3.6–6.7 percent. Third, in general, we do not find a price rise resulting from the costs of complying with rules of origin.

This study examines individual attitudes toward foreign workers jointly with their trade policy preferences based on a survey of more than 10,000 respondents in Japan. Our bivariate probit estimation results show that people influenced by status-quo bias or risk aversion tend to have significantly lower probability of supporting both foreign workers and imports. Individuals opposing foreign workers tend to have pessimistic views of the national economy's prospects and no personal acquaintance with foreigners. We also confirm the effects of standard variables, such as education and occupation. These findings suggest that wide-ranging measures are required for expanding support for foreign workers.

This study examines the determinants of trade policy preferences, using individual-level data of Japan. We focus on the role of regional factors, considering the fact that there is a significant difference in preferences among regions. The results reveal that people residing in a region with a high share of agricultural workers are likely to support import restrictions even if they do not engage in agriculture, which is the most protected sector in Japan. It is also found that the effect of agricultural workers share is significant for some people not considering migration, suggesting that inter-regional immobility affects their trade policy preferences.

This paper theoretically investigates whether improved access to the domestic market speeds up new technology adoption by foreign firms. Foreign firms choose between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) to serve the domestic market. If two firms compete in the domestic market, multilateral liberalization of FDI or the realization of multilateral free trade may deter or delay technology adoption, while they always promote and accelerate technology adoption if only a single firm serves the domestic market. Technology adoption can be quickest and consumer welfare greatest when the fixed cost of FDI and the trade costs are neither very high nor very low. Preferential liberalization of FDI promotes the technology adoption of the targeted firm but may not benefit consumers because it discourages technology adoption of the non-targeted firm.

This paper investigates the welfare effect of forming a free trade agreement (FTA). To receive tariff‐free treatment, firms must comply with the rules of origin (ROO). Outside firms could undertake either market‐oriented or export‐platform foreign direct investments (FDIs). ROO have the following effects: (i) An infeasible FTA may become feasible by deterring outside firms' FDIs, (ii) an FDI of a less efficient firm could replace that of an efficient firm, or (iii) FDIs made before the FTA is concluded might be eliminated. These potential effects complicate the welfare effect of the FTA and could decrease the consumer surplus.

This paper investigates the welfare effect of forming a free trade agreement (FTA). To receive tariff‐free treatment, firms must comply with the rules of origin (ROO). Outside firms could undertake either market‐oriented or export‐platform foreign direct investments (FDIs). ROO have the following effects: (i) An infeasible FTA may become feasible by deterring outside firms' FDIs, (ii) an FDI of a less efficient firm could replace that of an efficient firm, or (iii) FDIs made before the FTA is concluded might be eliminated. These potential effects complicate the welfare effect of the FTA and could decrease the consumer surplus.

We analyze the provision of repair services (aftermarket services that are required for a certain fraction of durable units after sales) through an international duopoly model in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm compete in the domestic market. Trade liberalization in goods, if not accompanied by the liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) in services, induces the domestic firm to establish service facilities for repairing the foreign firm’s products. This weakens the firms’ competition in the product market, and the resulting anti-competitive effect hurts consumers and reduces world welfare. Despite the anti-competitive effect, trade liberalization may also hurt the foreign firm because the repairs reduce the sales of the imported good in the product market. Liberalization of service FDI helps resolve the problem because it induces the foreign firm to establish service facilities for its own products.

Post-production services, such as sales, distribution, and maintenance, comprise a crucial element of business activity. We explore an international duopoly model in which a foreign firm has the option of outsourcing post-production services to its domestic rival or providing those services by establishing its own facilities through FDI. We demonstrate that trade liberalization in goods may hurt domestic consumers and lower world welfare, and that the negative welfare impacts are turned into positive ones if service FDI is also liberalized. This finding yields important policy implications, given the reality that the progress of liberalization in service sectors is still limited.

Using a simple monopoly model, we examine the effects of economic integration. We show that the number of markets and the shapes of marginal revenue curves, are crucial in evaluating economic integration when the marginal cost is not constant. The effects of tariff reductions in a three‐country model contrast with those found in a two‐country model. Effects also depend on which trade policy the non‐member country adopts. When both importing countries simultaneously lower their tariffs, the Metzler paradox may arise.

To analyze the effects of simultaneous tariff reductions by multiple importing countries on prices, we construct a simple three‐country model where a good is produced by a monopolist with nonconstant marginal cost and imported by two countries. We compare two representative tariff‐reduction formulas: the “fixed‐amount” and the “uniform percentage” reductions. The uniform percentage reductions may increase the consumer price in the importing country, whose initial tariff is lower. Thus, importing countries with relatively low tariffs may prefer a bilateral trade agreement to a multilateral one to ensure consumer gains.

Free trade agreements (FTAs) have rules of origin (ROOs) to prevent tariff circumvention by firms of nonmember countries. This article points out that in imperfectly competitive markets, ROOs have another role overlooked in the existing literature. Instead of focusing on the impacts of ROOs in the intermediate‐good markets, we draw our attention to the final‐good markets to examine the effects of ROOs. We find that under some conditions, ROOs benefit both firms at the expense of consumers. Under some other conditions, ROOs benefit the firm producing outside the FTA and hurt the firm producing inside the FTA.

This paper studies sequential negotiations of bilateral free‐trade agreements in an oligopoly model. The expansion of trading blocs through overlapping trade agreements allows the option of hub‐and‐spoke systems and achieves multilateral free trade as the equilibrium path, even if the expansion of trading blocs through the acceptance of new members is not feasible. The results suggest that free‐trade areas (FTAs) tend to expand more than customs unions (CUs). Lobbying by a producer can either promote or undermine the achievement of multilateral free trade through overlapping FTAs.

Previous analyses of free trade areas suggest that member countries reduce external tariffs to the level that improves welfare of non-member countries. Using an oligopoly model with product differentiation, this paper shows that when a free trade area entails endogenous change from segmented to integrated markets for internally produced goods, external tariffs become strategic complements and their equilibrium level is higher than in the market segmentation case. In this case, the non-member may lose from the formation of free trade area whereas each member gains more.