Book 1 of Nichomachean Ethics
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Nicomachean Ethics starts out with:
“Every art and every investigation, and likewise every practical pursuit or undertaking, seems to aim at some good: hence it has been well said that the Good is That at which all things aim.”
This sets up the difference between “some good” ἀγαθοῦ and The Good τἀγαθόν. The latter is the exact word Epicurus uses in:
"I know not how to conceive the good, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form." (On the Ethical End)
Using Aristotle’s definition (and this appears to possibly trace back as far as Eudoxus of Cnidus (c. 400-350 BCE; Aristotle was 384-322 BCE) we could get:
"I know not how to conceive That at Which All Things Aim, apart from the pleasures of taste, sexual pleasures, the pleasures of sound and the pleasures of beautiful form."
The Good τἀγαθόν is also the word used in the Tetrapharmakos for “The Good is easy to obtain.”
Then Aristotle sets up a refinement of that definition of the Good:
“...in some cases the activity of practicing the art is itself the end, whereas in others the end is some product over and above the mere exercise of the art; and in the arts whose ends are certain things beside the practice of the arts themselves, these products are essentially superior in value to the activities.”
The word he uses for “activity” is ἐνέργεια. Since Aristotle places some gravity/emphasis on the idea of the activity versus the product of an activity, I was curious to see where Epicurus may have used this word.
I found two references in Epicurus’s writings:
"Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest ; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity." “ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀταραξία καὶ ἀπονία καταστηματικαί εἰσιν ἡδοναί: ἡ δὲ χαρὰ καὶ ἡ εὐφροσύνη κατὰ κίνησιν ἐνεργείᾳ βλέπονται.” (Epicurus, On Choice and Avoidance)
[37] "Hence, since such a course is of service to all who take up natural science, I, who devote to the subject my continuous energy (τὸ συνεχὲς ἐνέργημα) and reap the calm enjoyment of a life like this, have prepared for you just such an epitome and manual of the doctrines as a whole. (Epicurus, Letter to Herodotus)
Not much more on that for now, but it could be important as we go along.
1094a & b
Then we get into what exactly constitutes The Good. What are we supposed to aim at? His statement made me laugh out loud in the Ostwald translation:
“This good, one should think, belongs to the most sovereign and most comprehensive master science, and politics clearly fits this description.”
The other translation provides “Now it would seem that this supreme End must be the object of the most authoritative of the sciences—some science which is pre-eminently a master-craft. [5] But such is manifestly the science of Politics…”
LOL! How convenient! The Good we have to discover is the End of politics (really, sociology might be a better translation of politike, which was the study of the polis, the city-state, and all that went on in it. BUT my question would be “Is knowing what is best for the state the same as knowing what is best for the individual? Is what the state should aim at the same as what the individual should aim at?” I have no doubt that Aristotle would say “Absolutely!” As he famously points out, humans are “political” animals - meaning that we exist best within a society, in his words, in a polis “a city-state.” Aristotle goes on to say that “politics determines which sciences exist in states,” and politics “legislates what people are to do and what they are not to do.””The end of politics is the good for man.”
Our function within the polis is what is important to Aristotle. I’m not so sure Epicurus was so keen on the polis and the culture that happened within the polis. Aristotle himself says “The attainment of the good for one man alone is, to be sure, a source of satisfaction; yet to secure it for a nation and for states is nobler and more divine.” (1094b5-10)
I have to ask: Is it? The attainment of the good for one person alone is a source of satisfaction. Agreed, and, if it’s The Good, the greatest source of satisfaction. But, of course, Aristotle would say that’s not The Good, by definition because it isn’t the End of politics. Clever, isn’t he? I would ask: Can a state secure satisfaction for itself? Is that like “corporations are people” in modern politics or business law?
In 1094b15-20, Aristotle writes something that I think Epicurus would actually agree with:
“In many cases good things bring harmful results. There are instances of men ruined by wealth, and others by courage.” That doesn't seem controversial to me, and Epicurus himself wrote things like “we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. [132] It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table…” Too much drinking, revelry, sex, and gorging on fish and delicacies are going to mess you up. Aristotle even says later (1096a5-10) that “wealth is not the good which we are trying to find, for it is only useful, i.e., it is a means to something else.” So, that’s a point of agreement it seems on the surface.
But Aristotle goes on to say (1095a) that “a good judge in each particular field is one who has been trained in it, and a good judge in general, a man who has received an all-round schooling. For that reason, a young man is not equipped to be a student of politics; for he has no experience in the actions which life demands of him… since he follows his emotions, his study will be pointless and unprofitable.”
Aristotle right there sets up the exclusionary flavor of his philosophy, whereas Epicurus in multiple places talks about people being neither too young nor too old to love and practice wisdom. As for Aristotle’s all-round schooling, that will be another bone of contention with Epicurus since he encourages his students to “set sail in your own little boat, free from all education/culture/indoctrination.” In fact, Epicurus and Aristotle use the SAME word to talk about “all-round education” and “free from all education.” Epicurus uses a noun form, Aristotle uses a verb form, but both use a variation of παιδεία paideia “training and teaching, education.” I find that VERY interesting!
That section also shows that Aristotle is NOT a fan of the emotions, Greek παθη pathe. Epicurus includes the pathe (feelings, emotions) of pleasure and pain as part of his Canon of Truth! Aristotle simply says they can’t be trusted and young people get led astray by them. The two couldn’t be farther apart!
Starting around 1095b, Aristotle appears to stake his flag against pleasure as the Good:
“The common run of people and the most vulgar identify [the highest good] with pleasure, and for that reason are satisfied with a life of enjoyment…a life suitable to cattle.”
LOL! Oh, a life of enjoyment! Perish the thought!
He goes on to say that there are really three notable kinds of life:
The life of enjoyment/pleasure
The political life (remember, life in service to the polis)
The contemplative life
However, Aristotle continues to refine his definition of the good and says “the good is a man’s own possession which cannot easily be taken away from him.” It seems to me something could not be more one’s own than one’s feelings of pleasure (and pain).
He goes on to refine it further in 1097a with the Good “is for the sake of the end that all else is done… The highest good must be something final. … We call that which is pursued as an end in itself more final than an end which is pursued for the sake of something else.” (Like wealth was above.)
At 1097b, Aristotle states “What is always chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to something else is called final in an unqualified sense. This description seems to apply to happiness above all else: for we always choose happiness as an end in itself and never for the sake of something else. Honor, pleasure, intelligence, and all virtue we choose partly for themselves – for we would choose each of them even if no further advantage would accrue from them – but we also choose them partly for the sake of happiness, because we assume that it is through them that we will be happy. On the other hand, no one chooses happiness for the sake of honor, pleasure, and the like, nor as a means to anything else.”
First, the word translated happiness here is εὐδαιμονία eudaimonia which I prefer to translate as “well-being.” LSJ provides various translations within its short entry: prosperity, good fortune; true, full happiness. The interesting issue is that Epicurus also made liberal use of the word eudaimonia as well. But did he identify it with The Good or the ultimate, final end? A quick search of writings brings up:
Vatican Saying 33. The body cries out to not be hungry, not be thirsty, not be cold. Anyone who has these things, and who is confident of continuing to have them, can rival the gods for happiness. σαρκὸς φωνὴ τὸ μὴ πεινῆν, τὸ μὴ διψῆν, τὸ μὴ ῥιγοῦν· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχων τις καὶ ἐλπίζων ἕξειν [hope or expect to have] κἂν <διὶ [dative of Zeus]> ὑπὲρ εὐδαιμονίας μαχέσαιτο. [contend/compete]
Fragment 548. Happiness and bliss are produced not by great riches nor vast possessions nor exalted occupations nor positions of power, but rather by peace of mind, freedom from pain, and a disposition of the soul that sets its limits in accordance with nature. τὸ εὔδαιμον καὶ μακάριον [happiness and blessedness, latter same word as in PD1] οὐ χρημάτων πλῆθος οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ὄγκος οὐδʼ ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀλλʼ ἀλυπία καὶ πραότης παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρίζουσα.
Letter to Menoikeus: [122] "Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search thereof when he is grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it. [122] "Μήτε νέος τις ὢν μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν, μήτε γέρων ὑπάρχων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν: οὔτε γὰρ ἄωρος οὐδείς ἐστιν οὔτε πάρωρος πρὸς τὸ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὑγιαῖνον. ὁ δὲ λέγων ἢ μήπω τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ὑπάρχειν ἢ παρεληλυθέναι τὴν ὥραν ὅμοιός ἐστι τῷ λέγοντι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἢ μήπω παρεῖναι τὴν ὥραν ἢ μηκέτι εἶναι τὴν ὥραν. ὥστε φιλοσοφητέον καὶ νέῳ καὶ γέροντι, τῷ μὲν ὅπως γηράσκων νεάζῃ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διὰ τὴν χάριν τῶν γεγονότων, τῷ δ᾽ ὅπως νέος ἅμα καὶ παλαιὸς ᾖ διὰ τὴν ἀφοβίαν τῶν μελλόντων. μελετᾶν οὖν χρὴ τὰ ποιοῦντα τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εἴ περ παρούσης μὲν αὐτῆς, πάντα ἔχομεν, ἀπούσης δέ, πάντα πράττομεν εἰς τὸ ταύτην ἔχειν.
Also from the Letter to Menoikeus: [And of the necessary desires] some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. τῶν δ᾽ ἀναγκαίων αἱ μὲν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἰσὶν ἀναγκαῖαι, αἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἀοχλησίαν, αἱ δὲ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ζῆν.
Letter to Pythocles: [116] For such folly as this would not possess the most ordinary being if ever so little enlightened, much less one who enjoys perfect felicity. ἡ τοιαύτη μωρία ἐμπέσοι, μὴ ὅτι εἰς παντελῆ εὐδαιμονίαν κεκτημένον.
Diogenes Laertius relates this characteristic of the wise one: [118] Even on the rack the wise man is happy. [118] κἂν στρεβλωθῇ δ᾽ ὁ σοφός, εἶναι αὐτὸν εὐδαίμονα
Diogenes Laertius relates that, for the Epicurean, [121] Two sorts of happiness can be conceived, the one the highest possible, such as the gods enjoy, which cannot be augmented, the other admitting addition and subtraction of pleasures. [121] Τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν διχῆ νοεῖσθαι, τήν τε ἀκροτάτην, οἵα ἐστὶ περὶ τὸν θεόν, ἐπίτασιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν: καὶ τὴν <κατὰ τὴν> προσθήκην καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν ἡδονῶν.
Eudaimonia is obviously VERY important to Epicurus. In fact, we do everything to have it. But is it the Good? It doesn’t appear to be.
Aristotle goes on to examine the question of the good from the standpoint of self-sufficiency or αὐτάρκεια autarkeia. Aristotle defines self-sufficiency “not by reference to the ‘self’ alone. We do not mean a man who lives his life in isolation, but a man who lives with parents, children, a wife, and friends and fellow citizens in general, since man is by nature a social and political (i.e., living in a polis) animal. … for the present, we define as ‘self-sufficient’ that which taken by itself makes life something desirable and deficient in nothing. It is happiness (eudaimonia), in our opinion, which fits this description.”
Epicurus also makes use of the term autarkeia, and with his texts it has both a psychological as well as an economic connotation.
Aristotle continues to defend eudaimonia as The Good: “happiness is of all things the one most desirable, and it is not counted as one good thing among many others. … We see then that happiness is something final and self-sufficient and the end of our actions.”
Although as soon as he says this, he backpedals a little (1097b20-25): “To call happiness the highest good is perhaps a little trite.”
So then he starts to head into a discussion of the “proper functioning” of a human being and about what this all has to do with looking at one’s whole life. Aristotle does spend a little time on the importance to him of the rational life. “The mere act of living appears to be shared even by plants, whereas we are looking for the function peculiar to man; we must therefore set aside the vital activity of nutrition and growth. Next in the scale will come some form of sentient life; but this too appears to be shared by horses, oxen, and animals generally. [13] There remains therefore what may be called the practical life of the rational part of man.” (Rackham)
Aristotle, in stark contrast to Epicurus, has no time for a life “shared by horses, oxen, and animals generally.” Epicurus, on the other hand, says we should look exactly at the other animals (of which we are one!) and see what they are doing! He famously talks about looking to the animals and babies and that they follow pleasure and avoid pain. This is a major difference in how Aristotle and Epicurus even approach the problem of deciding how to look for the greatest good!
Aristotle goes on to say “Moreover, to be happy takes a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness does not make a man supremely blessed and happy.” Ostwald provides a footnote that says Aristotle implied that makarion implied a happiness that, in some sense, was god-given whereas eudaimonia was a happiness that one achieved through one’s own efforts.
I found this last quote very interesting because the words Aristotle uses are μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα “blessed and happy.” μακάριον (makarion) is the exact word used in Principal Doctrine 1 to describe “a blessed and incorruptible being:”
One who is blissful/blessed and immortal has no trouble oneself, nor does such a one cause trouble for others, so that one is not affected by anger or gratitude (for all such things come about through weakness).
Τὸ μακάριον καὶ ἄφθαρτον οὔτε αὐτὸ πράγματα ἔχει οὔτε ἄλλῳ παρέχει· ὥστε οὔτε ὀργαῖς οὔτε χάρισι συνέχεται· ἐν ἀσθενεῖ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον.
I’m not saying there’s a connection, just that word held significance as a way to describe one who was blessed, supremely happy, blissful, etc. It also carried the idea of fortunate, wealthy (both materially and figuratively) as in “well-off” carrying along the idea of self-sufficiency.
Around 1098b, Aristotle provides a line that’s not a bad idea for anyone discussing philosophical matters (or any matters, in fact). We should “prevent minor points from assuming a greater importance than the major tasks.”
Then Aristotle moves onto looking closer at good things in general. He says they are divided into three classes:
1. External goods τῶν ἐκτὸς (ektos)
2. Goods of the soul τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν (psykhe)
3. Goods of the body καὶ σῶμα (soma)
However, he says unequivocably that those of the “soul” are the κυριώτατα and μάλιστα ἀγαθά “the highest and best goods.” However, he also stresses that he’s talking about the soul’s “actions and activities” or energeia (Refer back to our discussion of that word back near the beginning of this text.)
Remember that psykhe is rather poorly translated as “soul” or even “mind.” Rackham notes that it is better understood as “the whole of the vitality of any living creature” which gets at the comprehensive nature of it in Greek thought.
He refines his definitions again of happiness in saying “a happy man lives well and fares well” τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν I found this interesting since Diogenes Laertius says that one of Epicurus’s customary salutations in his letters was Εὖ πράττειν “Fare well” (as one translation would go).
Aristotle goes on to say: “Some people think happiness is (1) virtue; others (2) practical wisdom; (3) others some kind of theoretical wisdom; others again (4) believe it to be all or some of these accompanied by, or not devoid, of pleasure; and some people also include (5) external prosperity in its definition.”
In Greek, these are:
1. Ἀρετὴ arete “excellence, virtue”
2. Φρόνησις phronesis (an important word in Epicurus’s philosophy: one of the qualities without which it is impossible to live a pleasurable life.)
3. σοφία sophia
4. Ἡδονῆς hedones “pleasure” A word all Epicureans are familiar with!
5. εὐετηρία “prosperity, plenty” literally, “a good season (for the fruits of the earth)” per LSJ
Aristotle goes on to expand on these. His direction in the subsequent lines is to talk about the importance of looking at activities one participates in. In fact, he says,”it is those who act rightly who carry off the prizes and good things of life.” Note, that he says act “rightly” ὀρθῶς (orthos) not “justly.” Not sure if that’s significant but just pointing that out.
However, his next statement struck me and I’m going to quote Rackham’s translation at length:
“And further, the life of active virtue is essentially pleasant. For the feeling of pleasure is an experience of the soul, and a thing gives a man pleasure in regard to which he is described as ‘fond of’ so-and-so: for instance a horse gives pleasure to one fond of horses, a play to one fond of the theater, and similarly just actions are pleasant to the lover of justice (δίκαια dikaia “just”), and acts conforming with virtue generally to the lover of virtue. [11] But whereas the mass of mankind take pleasure in things that conflict with one another,2 because they are not pleasant of their own nature, things pleasant by nature are pleasant to lovers of what is noble, and so always are actions in conformity with virtue, so that they are pleasant essentially as well as pleasant to lovers of the noble. [12] Therefore their life has no need of pleasure as a sort of ornamental appendage,3 but contains its pleasure in itself. For there is the further consideration that the man who does not enjoy doing noble actions is not a good man at all: no one would call a man just if he did not like acting justly, nor liberal if he did not like doing liberal things, and similarly with the other virtues. [13] But if so, actions in conformity with virtue must be essentially pleasant.”
I don’t think Epicurus would fundamentally disagree with all that! Which surprised me. The middle part there about “their life has no need of pleasure as a sort of ornamental appendage” is a tad problematic, and Rackham notes that this refers to something “especially used of an amulet hung round the neck or fastened round a limb.”
Now Aristotle goes on to quote the inscription at Delos:
“ Justice is noblest, and health is best,
But the heart's desire is the pleasantest—,
“κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ᾽ ὑγιαίνειν:
ἥδιστον δὲ πέφυχ᾽ οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν.
And Aristotle provides commentary on the inscription by saying “for the best activities possess them all; and it is the best activities, or one activity which is the best of all, in which according to our definition happiness consists.”
Aristotle goes on to list (By Zeus! He IS a categorizer!!) the ways in which happiness could possibly be acquired (1099b):
1. a thing that can be learnt
2. acquired by training
3. cultivated in some other manner
4. bestowed by some divine dispensation
5. by fortune
Aristotle tries to solve this question by answering that he’s answered this by saying that happiness is some kind of activity of the soul (psykhe) in conformity with virtue. But he’s never defined virtue other than acting rightly which begs the question how do you act rightly? He goes on to say that “the Supreme Good was the end of political science, but the principal care of this science is to produce a certain character in the citizens, namely to make them virtuous, and capable of performing noble actions.” BUT for all his categorization and list-making, he seems to me to fail to say explicitly what makes a virtuous or noble action other than that what the polis trains you to do to be of benefit to the city-state! It seems a circular argument.
Moreover, he maintains, according to his definition, neither “an ox nor a horse no any other animal” nor even children can be happy. I may agree with animals, but children? His reason? “None of these is able to participate in noble activities.” LOL! Well, isn’t that convenient again! “Children cannot be happy, for they are not old enough to be capable of noble acts; when children are spoken of as happy, it is in compliment to their promise for the future. Happiness, as we said, requires both complete goodness and a complete lifetime.” The twists and turns of fortune basically make it so you can’t tell if someone is happy until they’ve lived an entire life and died happy. By Zeus! That doesn’t sound all that helpful to me!
This also sets up another stark distinction between Aristotle and Epicurus in that that latter insisted that no one was ever to young or too old to practice philosophy and let it benefit you! Aristotle seems to say, “Are you happy? Can you be happy? Well, certainly not until you’re dead I can’t say one way or the other.”
He spends the rest of Book 1 examining virtue and virtuous action, but, honestly, it all seems a little circular. He talks about whether the dead can influence the happiness of their descendants or the descendants the happiness of the deceased. Which, I would think, would frustrate Epicurus to no end!
At 1101b5, he mentions Eudoxus: “Indeed it seems that Eudoxus took a good line in advocating the claims of pleasure to the prize of highest excellence, when he held that the fact that pleasure, though a good, is not praised, is an indication that it is superior to the things we praise, as God and the Good are, because they are the standards to which everything else is referred.” Aristotle examines the claims of Eudoxus, who Rackham calls an “unorthodox pupil of Plato,” see Book 10.2, 3. I wonder if there are any thoughts from Epicurus on Eudoxus. That might be worth exploring.
Aristotle ends Book 1 with a quick look at the irrational and rational parts of the mind. “We see that the irrational part, as well as the soul as a whole, is double. One division of it, the vegetative, does not share in rational principle at all; the other, the seat of the appetites and of desire in general, does in a sense participate in principle, as being amenable and obedient to it （in the sense in fact in which we speak of ‘paying heed’ to one's father and friends, not in the sense of the term ‘rational’ in mathematics1）. And that principle can in a manner appeal to the irrational part, is indicated by our practice of admonishing delinquents, and by our employment of rebuke and exhortation generally.” I’m assuming he’ll come back to the desires later, but he is clearly on the side of the rational since we also saw his dim view of the feelings earlier in the study.
So, that’s the end of Book 1! I’ll admit there’s more here than I realized, and it really isn’t as hard-going as I anticipated. You have to pay attention, but I found some of his arguments so far rather circular and - honestly - not that deep. Lots of word salad in some places. So, am I intimidated by Aristotle? Nope, I don’t appear to be. We’ll see what happens as we move ahead…