< Back to Book 2, Part 2, Commentary
Book 3 begins with more categorizing by Aristotle.
The first categories he identifies are actions and emotions that are ἑκούσιον (hekousion) and those that are ἀκούσιον (akousion). Many translations treat these simply as "voluntary" and "involuntary." The words are opposites, but Ostwald and others provide more context and nuance for these two Greek words.
ἑκούσιον: "An agent is described as hekon when he has consented to perform the action he is performing. This consent may range from mere passive acquiesence to intentional and deliberate conduct." (Ostwald)
ἀκούσιον: "An akon is a man who has not given consent to acting the way he does, regardless of whether he acts unconsciously, inadvertently, or even against his own will." (Ostwald) Rackham also uses the word "compulsory."
Rackham has this commentary: "ἑκούσιον and ἀκούσιον are most conveniently rendered ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’; but the word ἀκούσιον suggests ‘unwilling’ or ‘against the will,’ and to this meaning Aristotle limits it in 1.13. There he introduces a third term, οὐχ ἑκούσιον, ‘not voluntary’ or ‘not willing,’ to describe acts done in ignorance of their full circumstances and consequences, and so not willed in the full sense; but such acts when subsequently regretted by the agent are included in the class of ἀκούσια or unwilling acts, because had the agent not been in ignorance he would not have done them."
So, voluntary vs involuntary is part of the description, but not necessarily the whole story in ancient Greek. In fact, LSJ does simply say ἑκούσιον is "voluntary;" but ἀκούσιον gets a little more context with definitions like "against the will, constrained, of acts or their consequences; involuntarily."
Aristotle does have an interesting discussion about how we can categorize acts as ἑκούσιον and ἀκούσιον; and we'll use "voluntary" and "involuntary" for ease of discussion. As part of that, he brings up the example of "a tyrant having a man's parents and children in his power commands him to do something base, when if he complies their lives will be spared but if he refuses, they will be put to death." He also uses the example of a sea captain throwing cargo overboard in a storm to save their life. Throwing away property isn't normally done, but to save your life, it can be done. In these cases, a person's actions are a combination of both voluntary and involuntary, although Aristotle says these actions are closer to being voluntary than to being involuntary. He says this because the acts are voluntary at the moment of action; however, they are involuntary (or "constrained") because "nobody would choose to do any one of them for its own sake." He continues giving examples, back and forth, but the next section is interesting.
He starts looking at how the term "compulsory/involuntary" can be applied to acts that people do "for the sake of pleasure or for noble objects." He can't bring himself to say that noble acts could be compulsory but lumps pleasurable acts into the mix for good measure (emphasis added):
"pleasure and nobility between them supply the motives of all actions whatsoever.
"to act under compulsion and involuntarily is painful, but actions aiming at something pleasant or noble are done with pleasure.
"it is absurd to blame external things, instead of blaming ourselves for falling an easy prey to their attractions; or to take the credit of our noble deeds to ourselves, while putting the blame for our disgraceful ones upon the temptations of pleasure. (1110b.10)
Aristotle just can't allow himself to admit that the feelings of pleasure and pain are motivating factors for BOTH virtuous/"noble" acts and "base" acts. Through practical wisdom (phronesis), we deliberate the consequences of our actions. But, ah!, Aristotle has a whole discussion of "deliberation" coming up soon!
He has a digression on acts due to ignorance or intoxication, acts done in anger. He doesn't give the person acting in "general" ignorance any breaks. Their acts are still ψέγονται "blameworthy; worthy of censure." However, acts can be involuntary/constrained if there is "ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the things affected by it, for in this case the act is pitied and forgiven, because he who acts in ignorance of any of these circumstances is an involuntary agent." And, of course, Aristotle can't neglect an opportunity to outline those circumstances that may make you an involuntary agent:
the agent (this is YOU! so you're probably not getting a pass on this one unless there's a really serious mental problem going on!)
the act
the thing that is affected by or is the sphere of the act
sometimes also the instrument, for instance, a tool with which the act is done
the effect, for instance, saving a man's life
the manner, for instance, gently or violently
I begrudgingly admit I like Aristotle's exposition of each of these factors in the following section (1111a.5-10):
"Now no one, unless mad, could be ignorant of all these circumstances together; nor yet, obviously, of
the agent—for a man must know who he is himself. But a man may be ignorant of
what he is doing, as for instance when people say ‘it slipped out while they were speaking,’ or ‘they were not aware that the matter was a secret,’ as Aeschylus said of the Mysteries; or that ‘they let it off when they only meant to show how it worked’ as the prisoner pleaded in the catapult case. Again
a person might mistake his son for an enemy, as Merope does; or
mistake a sharp spear for one with a button on it, or a heavy stone for a pumice-stone; or
one might kill a man by giving him medicine with the intention of saving his life; or
in loose wrestling hit him a blow when meaning only to grip his hand.
"Ignorance therefore being possible in respect of all these circumstances of the act, one who has acted in ignorance of any of them is held to have acted involuntarily, and especially so if ignorant of the most important of them; and the most important of the circumstances seem to be the nature of the act itself and the effect it will produce. Such then is the nature of the ignorance that justifies our speaking of an act as involuntary, given the further condition that the agent feels sorrow and regret for having committed it."
Ah, so the plot thickens... Involuntary acts involve "sorrow and regret" when they are committed.
With that, let's move on to Part 2 of our commentary on Book 3...