< Back to Book 2, Part 1 Commentary
Aristotle then gets to the heart of his definition of virtue, quoting Ostwald:
"Virtue or excellence is a characteristic involving choice, and that it consists in observing the mean relative to us, a mean which is defined by a rational principle, such as a man of practical wisdom would use to determine it. It is the mean by reference to two vices: the one of excess and the other of deficiency... virtue is a mean, but in regard to goodness and excellence it is an extreme. " (1106b-1107a)
LOL! There is SO much that is problematic here from my perspective. Allow me to break down my issues with Aristotle's exhortations.
He defines "virtue" (excellence, αρητη arete) as a characteristic/disposition (ἕξεις hexeis) which remember is a "trained habit, skill, state or habit of mind" determining the choice of actions. We choose actions all the time! Epicurus puts great importance on our responsibility to choose our actions and that which we reject. The "choice" Aristotle uses here is προαίρεσις (proairesis), ‘choice’ or ‘purpose’, which he discusses in Book 3.2. It is obviously connected with the the word Epicurus uses, hairesis, but we'll leave more discussion until Book 3. So, the fact that "virtue" is connected with choices, yeah, okay, that seems mildly non-controversial. Go on...
But the mean/middle is "defined" (and we're using that word loosely, Aristotle) by a "rational principle" such as a person using practical wisdom would use to determine it! LOL! So, virtue is something that we choose by using practical wisdom - phronesis? So, far, I don't think we've defined practical wisdom either. Epicurus also places great importance on practical wisdom: It's one of the three things without which we can't experience a pleasurable life. It helps us make prudent decisions on which actions to choose and which to avoid. But Aristotle is going MUCH further in defining "virtue" in relation to this without even giving as much description as Epicurus!
And I love the last part! Virtue is a mean between extremes BUT "in regard to goodness and excellence it is an extreme"! Aristotle is attempting once again of trying to have it both ways. It sounds circular, self-refuting, and ridiculous. I am not impressed.
The next part makes me laugh as well! He goes to great length here of trying to define virtue as that elusive mean (that is actually an extreme of goodness remember) between two extremes, but then says...
"Not every action nor every emotion admits of a mean... Some actions and emotions "whose very names connote baseness, e.g., spite, shamelessness, envy; and among actions, adultery, theft, and murder."
Those are just actions to my understanding. He's trying to say you can't "virtuously" commit adultery, theft, and murder. Duh! Epicurus would say those things do harm to others and so aren't just. They disrupt society or harm relationships. However, is it just to steal bread to feed your starving children? Is it "murder" if you kill someone while defending yourself? Someone may still have to be punished for the good of society BUT maybe not? Context and social contracts are key to Epicurus's discussion of justice... I'm not as sure he's getting hung up on "virtue."
Aristotle goes on to list some of these extremes, means, and deficiencies (1107b), but - egads! - "many virtues and vices have no name" as in not all excesses or deficiencies actually have a name. So, he's going to make up things that have no name, are not referred to in regular speech, don't actually exist, but for the sake of his argument, we're supposed to pretend they exist. Methinks he's starting to use unicorns and centaurs.
Deficiency < Mean > Excess >> Trait
COWARDLY < COURAGE > RECKLESS >> fear/confidence
INSENSITIVE** < SELF-CONTROLLED > SELF-INDULGENT >> pleasure/pain
STINGINESS < GENEROSITY > EXTRAVAGANCE >> money
**INSENSITIVE is αναισθητοι "without sense" which is the SAME word used in Principle Doctrine 2 to describe someone who is dead!
Aristotle seems to make up categories then make up "means" between two "extremes." He has others, but those will do to demonstrate his procedure. He says again that "most of the virtues and vices have no name, but for the sake of clarity and easier comprehension we must try to coin names for them." Okay, Aristotle, what do you have?
"In respect of truth then, the middle character may be called truthful, and the observance of the mean Truthfulness***; pretence in the form of exaggeration is Boastfulness, and its possessor a boaster; in the form of understatement, Self-depreciation, and its possessor the self-depreciator."
(***1 From Bk. 4.7 it appears that the quality intended is sincerity of speech and conduct in the matter of asserting one's own merits. The observance of the mean in this respect is there said to have no name; and here the form of expression apologizes for using ‘Truthfulness’ in so limited a sense. The defect in this respect Aristotle expresses by εἰρωνεία, a word specially associated with the affectation of ignorance practised by Socrates. Neither this nor its other shades of meaning correspond very closely to that of its English derivative irony.)
"In respect of pleasantness and social amusement, the middle character is witty (εὐτράπελος) and the middle disposition Wittiness; the excess is Buffoonery (βωμολοχία) and its possessor a buffoon; the deficient man may be called boorish (ἄγροικός) and his disposition Boorishness."
Note that Aristotle is still looking down on the ἄγροικός, the country bumpkin, the rustic.
"In respect of general pleasantness in life (τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ), the man who is pleasant in the proper manner is friendly (φιλος "philos"), and the observance of the mean is Friendliness; he that exceeds, if from no interested motive, is obsequious, if for his own advantage, a flatterer; he that is deficient, and unpleasant in all the affairs of life, may be called quarrelsome and surly (Ostwald: "a grouchy kind of person")."
Aristotle at least acknowledges the importance of friends/friendliness in a pleasant life. And Philodemus would agree with him that "flattery" is not an admirable trait.
Aristotle continues to tie himself in knots and make things up on the fly it seems for the balance of Book 2. He talks about the two extremes being vices but only the median is the virtue, but then says the two extremes of opposites of the median/virtue but are also opposites of each other. But then also says the two extremes are more opposed to one another than each is to the median. But in some cases it is the deficiency that is more opposed to the median; then in other cases it is the excess that is more opposed to the median.
And so on and so on... Sometimes it's this, sometimes it's that, sometimes, could be, might possibly... it's exhausting!!
Then, Aristotle gets another dig in at pleasure: "Since we are naturally more attracted to pleasure we incline more easily to self-indulgence than to a disciplined way of life. We describe as more opposed to the mean those things toward which our tendency is stronger; and for that reason the excess, self-indulgence, is more opposed to self-control than is its corresponding deficiency."
Even when he's trying to set up rules for what a virtue/median is and what it's opposed to, there are way too many caveats, addenda, provisos, etc.! It's still about context for Aristotle! There are not so much definitions as there are individual anecdotes and on-the-fly descriptions that he creates, giving the illusion of definitions.
I love how he starts to end Book 2 (1109a20):
"Enough has now been said to show that (1) moral virtue is a mean, and in what sense this is so, namely that (2) it is a mean between two vices, one of excess and the other of defect; and that (3) it is such a mean because it aims at hitting the middle point in feelings and in actions."
LOL! "Enough has now been said!" It's more like Aristotle is saying "I've said enough to hopefully obfuscate the topic that you'll just accept what I'm saying!"
But it gets better...
"This is why it is a hard task to be good, for it is hard to find the middle point in anything: for instance, not everybody can find the center of a circle, but only someone who knows geometry."
So, maybe that's why one had to know geometry if one wanted to enter Plato's Academy saw "Let none but geometers enter here" inscribed at the entrance? Not as inviting as Epicurus's "Dear Guest, here you will do well to tarry; here our highest good is pleasure."
Aristotle goes on to say "Hence the first rule in aiming at the mean is to avoid that extreme which is the more opposed to the mean" which as we've seen is different in EVERY case! Sometimes you have to avoid the excess, sometimes the deficiency. Aristotle gives no rules for helping people navigate these treacherous waters (according to him). He even provides some nautical proverbs and metaphors as in Homer's Calypso advising to "Steer the ship clear of yonder spray and surge" in giving advice to Odysseus to steer around Scylla and Charybdis. He also talks about the "second best say to said is to take the least of the evils" (referring to taking to the oars when there's no wind for the sails). But these just add color to the narrative without shedding any real light on Aristotle's arguments from my perspective.
"The second rule is to notice what are the errors to which we are ourselves most prone (as different men are inclined by nature to different faults) — and we shall discover what these are by observing the pleasure or pain that we experience—; then we must drag ourselves away in the opposite direction, for by steering wide of our besetting error we shall make a middle course."
Note that Aristotles's "rule" comes down to observing pleasure and pain. Hmm.... Where have I heard that before?? Could it be... Epicurus? I don't think Epicurus would characterize his decision-making process as "making a middle course." I think he would characterize it as seeking the path that provides the most pleasurable outcome overall. That seems a better North Star than trying to geometry out the middle of the circle so to speak.
"Thirdly, we must in everything be most of all on our guard against what is pleasant and against pleasure; for when pleasure is on her trial we are not impartial judges. The right course is therefore to feel towards pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and to apply their words to her on every occasion; for if we roundly bid her be gone, we shall be less likely to err."
Bid pleasure to be gone! Be on guard against pleasure! Egads! Didn't Aristotle himself say we should take joy -- I'd call that pleasure -- from following the mean?? Oh, yeah: "A man is temperate if he abstains from bodily pleasures and finds this abstinence itself enjoyable"! As I've said before (and will no doubt say again), you can't have it both ways, Aristotle.
He ends Book 2 with this:
"Thus much then is clear, that it is the middle disposition in each department of conduct that is to be praised, but that one should lean sometimes to the side of excess and sometimes to that of deficiency, since this is the easiest way of hitting the mean and the right course."
So, wobble and veer back and forth. Aristotle is basically saying, "I can't tell you what to do! I have no idea how to find the middle - the virtuous course of action - other than to wobble and veer around and, hopefully, somehow you'll hit that middle I've been going on about. Maybe. I don't know. Maybe you will. Maybe you won't."
I'm not seeing much more than obfuscation and some nice-looking word salad made up mostly of celery and lettuce and not much nutrition.
Sigh...
Onward to Book 3 and hopefully some meat to go with that salad!