< Back to Book 3, Part 2, Commentary
Aristotle now turns his attention to wishes/wishing (βούλησις). Choice, he maintains, is about the means to an end. Wishes, on the other hand, are about the ends themselves. We wish for "ends" not the means to get there.
But then, the word salad begins. Oh my!
"Some hold that what is wished for** is the good (τἀγαθοῦ "The Good"), others think it is what appears to be good (ἀγαθοῦ "good, in general")." Rackham notes at "wished for"** that "The inherent ambiguity of the Greek verbal adjective form causes some confusion in this chapter between what is and what ought to be wished for, the desired and the desirable." So, even in the original Greek, Aristotle isn't clear. Oh, that's a good sign!
And the next section is a prime example of the word salad I mentioned. Try to parse this, even in Rackham's English!
"Those however who say that what is wished for is the really good (τἀγαθὸν), are faced by the conclusion, that what a man who chooses his end wrongly wishes for is not really wished for at all; since if it is to be wished for, it must on their showing be good, whereas in the case assumed it may so happen that the man wishes for something bad. And those on the other hand who say that what appears good is wished for, are forced to admit that there is no such thing as that which is by nature wished for, but that what each man thinks to be good is wished for in his case; yet different, and it may be opposite, things appear good to different people." (1113a.20)
Ostwald doesn't help much either. Here's the same section...
"Those who maintain that it is the good are faced with the conclusion that man who makes a wrong choice does not really wish what he wishes: for it is the object of his wish it must be good, while in the case in question it is actually bad. On the other hand, those who assert that the object of wish is what seems good must conclude that nothing is by nature the object of wish, but only what seems good to a particular individual. Yet different, and in many instances opposite things seem good to different individuals."
This section is a perfect example of what Metrodorus and Epicurus were talking about, as reported by Plutarch, when they said one shouldn't "stroll about (περιπατῇ) prating meaninglessly about good." περιπατῇ (peripatei) is obviously (and every source agrees) a dig at the Peripatetics or the philosophical school that Aristotle himself founded, so-called because they like to walk around as they were teaching. Plutarch provides the context in his essay, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible:
Metrodorus asserts in his Reply to the Sophists: ‘Hence this very thing is the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν > τἀγαθοῦ), escape from the evil; for there is nowhere for the Good (τἀγαθὸν) to be put when nothing painful to the body or distressing to the mind is any longer making way for it.’ Epicurus too makes a similar statement to the effect that the Good is a thing that arises out of your very escape from evil and from your memory and reflexion and gratitude that this has happened to you. His words are these: ‘For what produces a jubilation unsurpassed is the contrast of the great evil escaped; and this is the nature of good, (τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν) if you apply your mind rightly and then stand firm and do not stroll about (περιπατῇ) prating meaninglessly about good (περὶ ἀγαθοῦ).’ Oh, the great pleasure and blessed state this company enjoy, as they revel in suffering no hardship or anxiety or pain! (Usener Fragment 423 (Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually Makes a Pleasant Life Impossible, Section 7, Greek text. See also here for Loeb.)
So, the Epicureans had a very clear definition of what The Good was. It was simple and direct, and they didn't see any need to "stroll about prating meaninglessly about good." And remember, especially in the context of the above Plutarch excerpt, that Epicurus said, "I do not think I could conceive of the good without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms." (Usener 67) If we are filled to the top with pleasure (The Good), "there is nowhere for the Good (τἀγαθὸν) to be put when nothing painful to the body or distressing to the mind is any longer making way for it." Aristotle's slicing, dicing, hair-splitting, micro-analysis becomes superfluous and "meaningless," literally κενῶς kenos "meaninglessly, emptily, vainly" (the same word Epicurus uses for "the void").
But, to return to Aristotle...
The main point Aristotle was trying to make in the above excerpts and their follow-up is (wait for it): Different things appear good to different people! (1113a.3) I know, what an idea! He also goes on to circuitously define "a good man" by saying "the good man judges everything correctly... what chiefly distinguishes the good man is that he sees the truth in each kind, being himself as it were the stand ard and measure of the noble and pleasant." The good man himself is the standard and measure of the noble and pleasant?
He also can't help getting yet another dig in at pleasure: "It appears to be pleasure that misleads the mass of mankind; for it seems to them to be a good, though it is not, so they choose what is pleasant as good and shun pain as evil." So, pleasure is not good. And yet, didn't you say back in Book 2 that "A man is temperate if he abstains from bodily pleasures and finds this abstinence itself enjoyable." So, are you saying, Aristotle, that a man is temperate if he abstains from bodily pleasures and finds this abstinence itself pleasurable? But didn't you just say pleasure misleads the mass of mankind? And that pleasure is not good? So, if the temperate man is finding pleasure in his abstinence, how can that be good or - oh my! - even virtuous??
Aristotle spends a good deal of words examining what it means to be held responsible for an action. How can the good man be lauded for his virtue or the bad man be punished for making the bad decision? This section was interesting to me...
"...the fact that an offence was committed in ignorance is itself made a ground for punishment, in cases where the offender is held to be responsible for his ignorance; for instance, the penalty is doubled if the offender was drunk, because the origin of the offence was in the man himself, as he might have avoided getting drunk, which was the cause of his not knowing what he was doing. Also men are punished for offences committed through ignorance of some provision of the law which they ought to have known, and might have known without difficulty; and so in other cases where ignorance is held to be due to negligence, on the ground that the offender need not have been ignorant, as he could have taken the trouble to ascertain the facts." (1113b)
Now, I'll admit that Epicurus may not have a lot to argue about with these points. Epicurus's philosophy was one of personal responsibility. You were responsible for your choices and rejections... up to a certain point. Epicurus also recognized that some things happened due to chance or things outside our control. However, he taught that we had the ability to make choices on which desires to fulfill and which ones to not pursue. So, this extended section - albeit filled from time to time with word salad - might have found some agreement with Epicurus. Again, maybe not *how* Aristotle got to his conclusions, but Epicurus could have agreed with the general conclusions when it came to personal responsibility.
Again, in 1114a, I would say that Epicurus would agree with Aristotle's statements with certain caveats. In fact, I would go so far as to say this section below echoes or parallels the section in the Letter to Menoikeus that discusses the "we do not say the pleasure of those who are prodigal" text (131-132):
"It may be objected that perhaps he is not the sort of man to take the trouble. Well, but men are themselves responsible for having become careless through living carelessly, as they are for being unjust or profligate if they do wrong or pass their time in drinking and dissipation. They acquire a particular quality by constantly acting in a particular way. [11] This is shown by the way in which men train themselves for some contest or pursuit: they practice continually. "
But let's examine, for a moment, some key words that Aristotle uses here: "men are themselves responsible for having become careless through living carelessly, as they are for being unjust or profligate if they do wrong or pass their time in drinking and dissipation."
"having become careless through living carelessly" ἀνειμένως (aneimenos) "at ease, carelessly" (i.e., without cares) and this is related to the word meaning "to let go, relaxation, etc." This, to me, echoes the aponia of Epicurus which, it seems to me more and more, is more about being relaxed than about actual physical pain in the body as per the LSJ definition. So, it is not living care-free, according to Epicurus, that is the problem!
"unjust" ἀδίκους (adikous) This is the word used throughout Greek philosophy, including Epicurus, for justice. Epicurus, again, stresses that being just is part of the pleasant life. If you are unjust, it will be difficult if not downright impossible to live a pleasant life.
"profligate" ἀκόλαστος (akolastos) The word here is NOT the "profligate" that Epicurus uses, which is consistently ἄσωτος (asotos). Whereas Epicurus's word connotes those who are lost, abandoned, or without hope, Aristotle's word connotes a more moral judgement: undisciplined, unbridled, licentious. Granted, both words can have the "profligate" connotation, but I find Epicurus's carries a little less "preachy, moralistic" baggage.
"if they do wrong" κακουργοῦντες (kakourgountes) "do evil, work wickedness"
(they who) "pass their time in drinking" οἳ δὲ ἐν πότοις (hoi de en potois) Potois comes from potos from which we get the English word "potable" (drinkable). A potos is a drinking bout or general "carousal" and is, in fact, the same exact word Epicurus uses in the Letter to Menoikeus when talking about drinking parties in 132. Neither Aristotle nor Epicurus are talking about symposia (which could also have become quite... rowdy) but rather drinking just to drink and get drunk. Think stereotypical frat party a la Animal House.
Aristotle's point here and in the following lines is to drive home his idea that if you act in these unseemly, unvirtuous ways, you will ingrain those "character" traits in yourself and so will become irredeemably of bad character. "When you have thrown a stone, you cannot afterwards bring it back again," as Aristotle says, as well as "having become unjust and profligate it is no longer open to them not to be so." Epicurus, on the other, seems to me to think that no one is every completely irredeemable. They've just made choices that have led to more pain than pleasure in the past.
Aristotle goes on a little longer, talking about how both our virtues and vices are voluntary. We are responsible for both, which, to me, seems somewhat uncontroversial. The controversy ensues from thinking that these are unchangeable traits once set. That seems a little harsh. So, we go down that road awhile, then he starts to talk about individual virtues.
First comes Courage, the mean between fear and confidence. Aristotle says, "The courageous man then is he that endures or fears the right things and for the right purpose and in the right manner and at the right time, and who shows confidence in a similar way. (For the courageous man feels and acts as the circumstances merit, and as principle may dictate..." Here are the sources for the first part and second part of that quote. To me, that seems so generic and so contextual and so "we'll define it as is convenient for us" as to be almost meaningless. The section on Courage goes on and on and on and on...
He then turns his attention to Temperance (σωφροσύνη), the mean in relation to pleasures (for it is concerned only in a lesser degree and in a different way with pains); and Profligacy (ἀκολασία) also is displayed in the same matters. Now, we get back to discussing Aristotle's views on pleasure and profligacy!
Now, it's interesting that his first inquiry into temperance and pleasure is a look at what he thinks are the differences between pleasures of the mind and pleasures of the body. Epicurus includes all pleasures - both of body and mind - within his spectrum of pleasure. Aristotle doesn't seem to have agreed when he wrote:
"Now we must make a distinction between pleasures of the body (σωματικαί (somatikai)) and pleasures of the soul (ψυχικαὶ (psykhikai)): Take for instance ambition (φιλοτιμία (philotimia) "love of honor or distinction, amibition"), or love of learning (φιλομάθεια (philomatheia)): the lover of honor or of learning takes pleasure in the thing he loves without his body being affected at all; the experience is purely mental. But we do not speak of men as either temperate or profligate in relation to the pleasures of ambition and of learning. Nor similarly can these terms be applied to the enjoyment of any of the other pleasures that are not bodily pleasures: those who love hearing marvellous tales and telling anecdotes, and who spend their days in trivial gossip, we call idle chatterers, but not profligates; nor do we call men profligate who feel excessive pain for the loss of fortune or friends."
So, Aristotle seems fine with pleasures of the mind/soul, generally speaking. But pleasures of the body? That's where problems begin to creep in, according to Aristotle, but not necessarily all bodily pleasures...
"men who delight in the pleasures of the eye, in colors, forms and paintings, are not termed either temperate or profligate, although it would be held that these things also can be enjoyed in the right manner, or too much, or too little. Similarly with the objects of hearing: no one would term profligate those who take an excessive pleasure in music, or the theater, nor temperate those who enjoy them as is right. Nor yet does Temperance apply to enjoyment of the sense of smell, unless accidentally; we do not call those who are fond of the scent of fruit or robes or incense profligate, though we may be inclined so to style those who love perfumes and the smell of savory dishes, for the profligate take pleasure in these odors because they remind them of the objects of their desires. [6] One may notice that other persons too like the smell of food when they are hungry; but to delight in things of this kind is a mark of the profligate, since they are the things on which the profligate's desires are set."
Later on, Aristotle touches on (pun intended) the pleasure of taste and touch: "Temperance and Profligacy are therefore concerned with those pleasures which man shares with the lower animals, and which consequently appear slavish and bestial. These are the pleasures of touch and taste. ... actually enjoying the object that is pleasant, and this is done solely through the sense of touch, alike in eating and drinking and in what are called the pleasures of sex (ἀφροδισίοις (aphrodisiois) "that sacred to Aphrodite")."
Compare the Aristotle list with Epicurus's list in Fragment 67: "I do not think I could conceive of the good without the joys of taste, of sex, of hearing, and without the pleasing motions caused by the sight of bodies and forms." οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἔχω τί νοήσω τἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρῶν μὲν τὰς διὰ χυλῶν ἡδονάς, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς διʼ ἀφροδισίων, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ τὰς διʼ ἀκροαμάτῶν, ἀφαιρῶν δὲ καὶ τὰς διὰ μορφῆς κατʼ ὄψιν ἡδείας κινήσεις.
I also find it interesting that Aristotle gets his dig in at the "lower animals" whereas Epicurus respects the faculties shared among all animals, humans included.
START HERE IN TEXT with Hence the sense to which Profligacy is related is the most universal of the senses;