2020年度

第60回研究会（2020年度第4回）
開催日時: 2021年2月17日（水）16:30〜18:00
開催方法：ZOOMでのオンラインセミナー
報告者：
- - 山﨑尚志氏　（神戸大学大学院経営学研究科教授）
  - 高橋秀徳氏　（名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科准教授）
テーマ：Corporate cash policy: Evidence from the Provisional Fund Control Law
要旨：This study examines the motive of firms to hold cash by using a natural experiment that affects financial constraints. We show that in pre-war Japan firms whose financing was controlled by the government raise their cash ratio twice as much as those whose financing was not controlled. The increase in cash holdings is more pronounced among financially constrained firms, where investment opportunities are likely to exist. These results suggest that firms hoard cash for the precautionary motive. As a way to generate cash, there is evidence of cash management, such as delaying the due date of accounts payable.

第59回研究会（2020年度第3回）
開催日時: 2020年11月2日（月）16:30〜18:00
開催方法：ZOOMでのオンラインセミナー
報告者：髙田知実氏　（神戸大学大学院経営学研究科准教授）
テーマ：How are engagement partners penalized? Empirical evidence in the case of a client’s fraud
要旨：This paper investigates the penalties engagement partners face when fraud committed by one of their clients is revealed. We investigate two types of penalties: whether the partner experiences voluntary turnover and whether the audit firm assigns fewer or zero clients to the partner in the wake of fraud committed by one of the partner’s clients. The results show that fraud-firm partners are penalized in both ways, and more importantly, they are penalized more when their client’s fraud is sanctioned by the authority (SESC) or when their tenure with the fraud firm is longer. Our results indicate that when a client’s fraud is revealed, the penalty imposed on an engagement partner is based on the severity of the fraud and on the partner’s proficiency in detecting and preventing the client’s fraud.
（注意）今回も新型コロナ感染症の拡大防止のため、上記の通り Zoom を使用してオンライン研究会を開催することとなりました。

日時：2020年10月2日（金）10時～11時30分
報告者：柳瀬典由氏　（慶應義塾大学商学部教授）
報告タイトル：Pension Return Assumptions and Shareholder-Employee Risk-Shifting (with S. Goto)
要旨：Firm managers of defined-benefit (DB) pension plan sponsors reveal their primary motives --- risk-shifting or risk-management --- through their assumed expected rates of return (ERRs) on the plan assets. Managers with risk-shifting motives choose high ERRs to exploit flexible internal debt financing from employees via pension underfunding. Those with risk-management motives choose low ERRs to reduce future cash-flow uncertainty by improving the pension funding status. We examine if ERRs provide forward-looking information about the firms' cash-flow allocation between pension funding and investments, in a Japanese sample that mitigates the selection bias concern for the US sample of DB plan sponsors. Using dynamic panel regressions that control for firms' business prospects and unobserved fixed effects, we show that an increase in ERR predicts increases in capital investments, R&D expenses, and net pension deficits, while a decrease in ERR predicts declines in these quantities. The evidence is more pronounced for firms with high external debt financing costs.
場所：Zoomでのオンラインセミナー