Internal Displacement: the Dynamics

Did violence shift nature of the 'Kenyan character'

Published on 06/10/2011

by Maurice Maina

"Much of the debate on post-election violence is focused on political dimensions of the crisis, notably the issue of holding the perpetrators to account. The question of long-term consequences of the violence has not attracted much attention..."

This prophetic statement is lifted from a September 2010 report, just after the referendum, report by KPTJ (Kenyans for Peace and Truth and justice), a coalition of citizens and organisations that came together after the January 2008 post-election violence (pev).

KPTJ comprises of Bunge la Mwananchi, Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Centre for Law Research International and couple dozen organisations working in human rights, governance and legal areas, with the support of Africa Centre for Open Governance.

Sadly, the report is probably one of the many that end up where they don’t belong, gathering dust. It provides useful insights into the folly that is the way the Kenyan community responds to challenges. Unfortunately, they always come around.

The study focuses on Rift valley, the epicenter of pev. It traces the trend of election violence not as a creation of multipartysm, as has been popularly portrayed, but as a pre-colonial phenomena that has twice been suppressed without addressing the real problem.

The report draws to attention the political events immediately preceding and succeeding Independence thus: "In the end Kanu relented and Kenya became independent on a majimbo Constitution."

There had been a tussle pitting the so-called big tribes led by Kanu and Jomo Kenyatta, against the minority tribes led by Kadu and Daniel Arap Moi.

First mistake

The minorities feared losing what they considered their "ancestral claims." Referring to the threat posed by ‘economic immigrants’ from other (non–‘native’) densely populated provinces occupying their ‘ancestral land.’

They won the argument.

But look at what happened: "Kenyatta and Kanu went on to win the independence elections hands down. The overwhelming mandate emboldened Kanu to dismantle the majimbo Constitution. Within a year, Kadu dissolved itself...and joined Kanu."

They lost the battle.

This was the end of the agenda for ancestral fears, or was it? That may have been the first mistake since plurality was killed. The second came, not when plurality was restored in 1991, but when, in 2002, events proceeding and succeeding the election followed a similar trend to those of Independence elections.

"This departure from previous forms of violence — the ones that came with re introduction of plurality — is underlain by three grievances that built up since 2003. The first was the failure of pre election pact. On assuming power Kibaki backtracked on the (infamous) MoU."

Following this thread, you observe the absence of conflict after Independence as a result of Kenyatta-Moi dalliance. This was repeated in the Kibaki-Raila dalliance, with similar results.

These events denied citizens the voice. Moi prevailed upon his people to support Kenyatta. Raila did likewise for Kibaki.

Both events produced relative calm, but without addressing core issues underlying the fundamentals of the Kenyan community.

According to the report, "food security and long-term capital flight, brain drain and discouragement of investment...may even be more significant in future than historical factors that precipitated violence."

Beneath the surface

This statement can be amply illustrated by the present fixation with the ICC proceedings against a backdrop of hunger, depreciating shilling, inflation, inept institutional performance, rising unemployment rates and docile civil society.

During the Pev, properties and businesses were devastated, agricultural production nosedived, families terrified, and divestment replaced investment.

The implications (of the violence) are three-fold: Economic distress will continue to be a precursor to violence; rapid urbanisation will be the new frontier of potential conflict, and most importantly; the effects of these two to the ‘nature and character of the Kenyan state.’

Perhaps, this could guide current thinking and action