BruhadAranyaka QA

Answers by Shri Kesava Rao Tadipatri (KT) & Smt.Meera Tadipatri (MT)

In my Sanskrit class, we are currently studying the Brhadaranyaka Upanishad. The unfortunate thing is that instead of using commentaries, people such as myself (with all of 2 years of Sanskrit classes) are asked to translate the text, using a dictionary and no other resources.

KT: Actually your professor has a little self-contradiction here. His advaitic approach must have come from other sources (like advaita commentaries). Or else how can use of only dictionary without other resources make him take that approach? In other words he is setting a different set of rules for him as against others. One valid question, you can pose is “what should be done when more than one meaning is given for a word (which is the case most of the time)”. Even a greater problem (especially applicable to Sanskrit) is “should the split be done first and then the words should be looked up in the dictionary or should the words be looked up first and then the split be done?”.

If the former, how can the split be done without knowing the meaning? If the latter, which words one will look up without the split as the split only gives the words to be looked up. So, it sounds like catch 22. The only way out is proper understanding of the context, etc. and the proper split. Why is proper split important?

For a good example, please see “Yamakabharata” (the postings are there in the Dvaita list archives).

There are references that things are dear not because of the thing itself, but because of Atma, and that he loses himself if he thinks that they are different from Atman. Superficially, they seem to support Advaita,

KT: Let us grant that this interpretation is right and it is advaitic interpretation where only one thing exists. A is dear to B not because of itself (which may be A or B), but because of C (Atma). Now we have to have only one entity. If A and B are same, the question of being dear or not does not arise. If C is different from “what is referred as itself” then we end up with more than one entity. If not, we end up with a statement

“A is dear to B not because of C, but because of C”.

That is absurd. So we end up with more than one entity, which is apasiddhAnta (antithesis).

but how do we know what the correct interpretation of these texts is?

KT: As a starter, we can look for context, consistency and common sense.

na vaa are brahmanah kaamaya brahma priyam bhavatyaatmanastu kaamaaya brahma priyam bhavati Which roughly translates as “Hey, a Brahmin is not dear because of desire for the brahmin, but is dear because of desire for ATMAN”

KT: As a starter, what meaning should be taken for “kAma”. The dictionary gives “wish, desire, longing, pleasure, enjoyment, love, will” (some of them). which one should we take?. Also it does not mandate that we should use the same meaning in both the occurrences above.

“Not also, dear one, by the will of brAhmaNa, brAhmaNa becomes dear, but brAhmaNa becomes dear only by the will of the Atman.”

By no means does this give Advaitic meaning. Further “Atman” also means ParamAtma. If we see the global meaning of the upanishad, the commentary makes the meaning even more beautiful when “brAhmaNa” means the abhimAni devata (brahma). “The brAhmaNa race does not become dear by the will of Brahma (abhimAni devata of brAhmaNa), but brAhmaNa race becomes dear by the will of the Supreme Lord.”

What should we take aatman to mean? If it means oneself, doesn't it support Advaita?

KT: Not at all. It will end up as apasiddhAnta as explained above.

brahma tam paraadaadyo.anyatraatmano brahma veda

A brahmin leaves him who thinks that the Brahmin is different from Atman. Doesn't it appear to be saying that those who think that Atman is distinct from oneself, loses that Brahmin? What should we take anyatra to mean?

KT: YaH aatmanaH anyatra brahma veda, tam brahma paraadaat.h is the anvaya.

Where is the question of losing. From the context, we can see “Atman” means Supreme Lord. “One who thinks that Brahma resides in (takes refuge in) some one other than Supreme Lord, Brahma pushes such a person away (throws in andhatamas)”. This is to stress that one must realize that Brahma takes refuge in Supreme Lord.

The professor repeatedly brings up the example that strife in the world is due to our thinking that we are different from other things (they're not mine, so they don't matter). If we think we are the same as everything else, won't we strive for the good of others as well?

KT: That is strange and impractical too. This seems like “Super Communism”.

All in this world must think that they are God and then they love each other? Krishna K. gave good example in prior posting for the difficulty it leads to.

If Dvaita says that there is no strife between Paramatman Jivatman, can that in a sense be interpreted to mean that there is no 'difference' between them?

KT: The very fact that there is no strife between A and B means that A is different from B. Otherwise why mention about “no strife”?

If one is completely distinct from the other, then would it lead to an attitude that one would not care for God because he is 'different'.

KT: Not at all. The only way one would not care for God because he is 'different' is if he is also independent. But it is very obvious that the jIvAs are not at all independent. Thus the jIva has to care for God or get doomed.

What exactly does it mean for an entity to be different from another?

KT: Separate existence at all times. Even if you take a gold ornament (say weighing a pound) and it is melted and mixed with 5 pound of gold lump, the resulting lump removed the shape of gold ornament. But still the resulting lump is 6 pounds, containing the one pound of ornamental gold. The inability to identify is no indication of its absence.

In class one of the students brought an example of a metal & plastic clip. Is the plastic the same as the metal? No, because you can easily remove the metal part. But, still one calls the whole thing a clip--that is, in a sense there is no distinction between the two.

KT: Quite contrary. Even if you throw away the plastic casing, still the metal portion is called a clip. Loose usage of terms has nothing to do with identity. Take the coconut with outer fiber, outer shell and kernel. One calls the whole thing a coconut. When the fiber is removed, one still calls that a coconut, but does not call the fiber as coconut. When the shell is separated, one does not call the pieces of shell a coconut any more.

Can we refer to the clip as one entity? Of course we do! We call it a clip!!

KT: But when you separate them, what do you call the plastic?

Is it possible for jIvatman to be separated from paramaatman but still be thought of as one entity?

KT: Why should the dependency be taken as identity?

...justification for why one particular interpretation is correct.

KT: Very simple. Any correct interpretation must not result in self-contradiction and must agree with all other scriptural statements.

Also Krishna K. wrote:

svAtantrye cha vishiShTatve sthAnamatyaikyayorapi | sAdR^ishye chaikyavAk.h samyak.h sAvakAsha yatheShTataH ||

KT: “In independent control, specialty, togetherness wrt place and mind, and in similarity, the statements of unity are well known to be interpretational according to the usages of the world”.

1. When some one has an independent control of some thing, we use expressions of identity like “Bill Gates was Microsoft” or “the king is the kingdom”, etc.

2. When some one has unique talent, we use expressions of identity like “Mr. Buddhimaan is the pundit”, “Mr. ABC is the priest in this big city”, etc. (Though there are other pundits and priests, the whole group is identified with one person).

3. We use expressions of identity wrt place like “Let all the students unite (meaning assemble) in the ground”.

4. We use expressions of identity wrt mind like “Those two fought like cats, but they are one now”. “Wrt the anti-terrorism, all the senators were one”.

5. We use expressions of identity to say similarity like ”The young man is fire”, “He is ice”, “The king is a lion in the battleground”, etc.

To appreciate this, we have to see the next statement Acharya makes:

“avakAshojjhitA bhedashrutirnAtibalA katham.h |”

“How come unequivocal shruti statements propounding difference are not powerful?”

Thus how can Advaita propound its theory of identity with such interpretational statements while completely rejecting the statements of difference from shruti as anuvAdaka and having no strength?

But how do we reconcile statements which appear to contradict Dvaita directly:

yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram jighnati itara itaram pashyati ....yatra vaa asya sarvamaatmaivabhuutkena kam jighnet...pasyet?

Whenever there is a duality , one will conquer/see each other. When there is only Atman , who can perceive whom, see whom?

KT: First to start with, it is “jighrati” meaning “smells” and not “jighnati”.

Why was the term “iva” coolly dropped? Why is not the whole context taken?

Let us see some possible roles “iva” can take.

1. It is used in utprexa (where some thing is mentioned to be the case”as if”. But really that is not the case.

2. Upama (simile) where some thing is compared with some thing else.

3. A simple negation.

The first two also go against advaita interpretation. It is “as if two” and so it is not really two. It is “like two” and so it is not really two. The third really says “it is not two”. In all these cases the nose-dive interpretation will be like “when there is no duality, one will smell/see the other”. This will be by itself a self-damaging statement.

To extricate oneself from all this mess, only way out is to take this “iva” to mean jIva is dependent on Paramatma. It is not really two equal or two independent things. When such duality exists (dependent duality), the dependent being will smell/see the other, etc.

If “sarvamaatmaivaabhuut”, then how can the jIva smell/see etc.

In other words, the mukti itself becomes meaningless.

In fact to understand the whole thing, the entire passage has to be analyzed.

yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaraM pashyatitaditara itaraM jighrati taditara itara.N rasayate

taditara itaramabhivadati taditara itara.N shR^iNotitaditara itaraM manute taditara itaraM spR^ishati

taditara itaraM vijAnAti yatra tvasya sarvamAtmaivAbhUt.htatkena kaM

pashyettatkena kaM jigrettatkena kaM rasayet.h tatkena kamabhivadettatkena kaM

shR^iNuyAttatkena kaMmanvIta tatkena kam spR^ishettatkena kam

vijAnIyAdyenedaM sarvaM vijAnAti tam kena vijAnAyAtsa eshha netinetyAtmA.agR^ihyo na hi

gR^ihyate.ashIryo na hi shIyete.asaN^go na hi

sajyate.asito na vyathate na rishhyati vij~nAtAramare kena vijAnIyAdityuktAnushAsanA.asimaitreyyetAvadare

khalvamR^itatmiti hoktvA yAj~navalkyo vijahAra ||14||

....iti maitreyIbrAhmaNam.h

When there is a different thing [a different one], then that one smells the other, then that one sees the other, then that one hears the other, then that one speaks the other, then that one thinks the other, then that one tastes the other, then that one touches the other, then that one perceives the other. But when (as some say) it is the case in the Mukti which is cessation of avidya only, then by which organ can the sentient jIva smell and what would he smell? Then by which organ can the jIva see and what would he see ? Then by which organ can the jIva hear and what would he hear ? Then by which organ can the jIva speak and what would he speak ? Then by which organ can the jIva think and what would he think ? Then by which organ can the jIva touch and what would he touch ? Then by which organ can the jIva taste and what would he taste ? Then by which organ can the jIva perceive and what would he perceive?

How can the jIva know Paramatma through whose grace he perceives all this ? The Paramatma is neither like Brahma touched with misery nor is like mukta Laxmi untouched by misery. This Paramatma is incapable of being grasped as a whole, for no one has ever been able to grasp Him.

This Paramatma is incapable of wearing out, for He has never worn out. This Paramatma is incapable of coming in contact(with any thing foul), for He has never come in contact (with any thing foul). It is the nature of this Paramatma that He is ever free from bondage, that He never feels miserable and that He is never destroyed. Oh my dear wife(Yajnavalkya says to Maitreyi), how should the jIva perceive his own

self, the real knower ? Thus, you are instructed. Here, hear Dear Maitreyi, this is what immortality of mukta jIva consists of. Having said this,Yajnavalkya went away.

What others interpreted : “Thus has been taught the means of obtaining mukti”. This is wrong.

Madhvacharya's commentary:

priyAm vAchamavardhayadbhavati | bAhAbhyantaravisheshhAbhAvenasarvatra lavaNarasaghana eva| na vA ahamimam vijAnAtIti |

aheyamimaM paramAtmAnaM jivo na vijAnAtItyatraiva bhagavAnmohAntaMmohAkhyaM nAshamApIpipat.h prApayAmAsa |

ato.ahaM brahmAsmI tyAdishhvayahaMshabdo.aheyatvavAchIti siddham.h | anyathAkathamahaM vijAnAtIti yujyate ? |

etAvadvij~nAtuH paramAtmano vij~nAnAdikameva hyamR^itatvaM moxaH |

' vishhNorj~nAnAdikam moxastadabhAve kutaH sukham.hj~neyAbhAvAnna hi j~nanaM j~nanAbhAve hi shUnyatA |

tasmAjj~neyayuto moxaH sukharUpatvataH sadA '...iti brahmatarke ||

Verily, the immortality of ever-conscious jIva consists in thisthat he should know, in Mukti, the wisdom and activities of Paramatma and never be unconscious of Him. There can be noconsciousness without an object of consciousness.

To prove this he quoted an authority from Brahmatarka” Moxa consists in knowing Vishnu and in knowing all objects and enjoying bliss by the mukta jIva. If there were absence of such knowledge, where would there be any happiness in Mukti ? There can be no knowledge in the absence of an object of knowledge. In the absence of knowledge there results shunyatva or annihilation. Therefore moxa is always accompanied by objects of knowledge (in the shape of various forms of the Lord), and its nature is eternal joy and happiness”.

The interpretation from advaita for “dvaitam iva” (meaning”as if two different things”) is that “It is not really two, because it says as if”). But the meaning of the word here ”iva” (as if) is to indicate that jIva is dependent on Paramatma. In other words it is not “two equal or two independent things”.

“vij~nAtAramare kena vijAnIyAt.h” is translated by advaitins as “Atman as a subject of all conscious state can not itself be the subject of its own consciousness”.

This is rejected by Vedantins like Ramanuja and Madhva to whom the self is essentially a knower through self-knowledge.

For them, the jIva should know Paramatma and return to Him in moxa and enjoy togetherness with Him.

“na pretya saMj~nA asti” - We, the unliberated, cannot know the precise nature of jIvAs who once for all left this world and attained moxa (madhva's interpretation).

“na pretya saMj~nA asti” - When one has departed there is no more knowledge or consciousness(Shankara's interpretation).

However, if yAj~navalkya's words “na pretya saMj~nA asti” and its supporting argument “yatra tvasya sarvaM AtmaivAbhUt.h” are to be taken as pure statements (vastusthitikathanam.h), it would lead to obvious self-contradiction with his own categorical statements “avinAshi vA are ayamAtmAanuchchhittidharmA” - indestructible is this jIva and so are his attributes.

There come the three posers - “yatra tvasyasarvaM AtmAvaibhUt.h ... yenedam sarvaM vijAnAti taM kena vijAnIyAt.h vijn~AtAraM are kena vijAnIyAt.h”.

The only way to extricate him from such a predicament is to construe the posers “yatra hi dvaitaM dvaitamiva bhavati...

vij~nAtAramare kena vijAnIyAt.h” as a reductio ad absurdum (Mathematics students will be well aware of this approach where to disprove something, an assumption is made and then it is shown how such an assumption leads to an absurdity), intended to bring out the necessity to accept the survival of self-consciousness and other-consciousness in moxa a worthwhile “Purushartha”.

If we accept self-consciousness of jIva in moxa, then we have to accept his being conscious of the Paramatma whom in all sincerity he was advised to see, hear and meditate upon. At least that part of jIva's sAdhana has to be satisfied in moxa. The state of moxa being alaukika, the enjoyment of mukta jIvas has to be alaukika as well.

By Dvaita, presumably what is meant is some sort of opposition?

KT: By Dvaita, what is meant is “existence of two different things”. No opposition is mentioned here.

By saying all this is Atman, all this is under the control of Atman?

KT: When one speaks of the dependent “jIvAtma”, how can all this be under the control of Atma? Also when Advaita is being spoken of, then there is nothing else other than one Atma. What can be under its control?

Why can't the straightforward Advaita meaning be taken?

KT: I don't see any straightforward Advaita meaning. Even the loose interpretation “Whenever there is a duality , one will smell/see the other.

When there is only Atman, who can smell whom, who can see whom?” gives only dvaita meaning as follows.

1. Only when there is duality, there is scope for one to smell/see another.

2. When there is only one Atman, who can smell whom, who can see whom?

For moxa to be meaningful, the Atma should reap enjoyment by seeing and enjoying the company of a different entity, which is most desirable. Thus to have such scope, the duality is a must. This is not Advaitic meaning.

I can see that this passage can verily easily be used to say that Dvaita isn't really there, all that exists is Atman.

KT: I see that this passage by itself is quite sufficient to prove Dvaita, because it is not at all saying “Dvaita isn't really there” or “all that exists is Atman”. There are two propositional statements ”when there is duality” and “when there is only Atman”. Even in this loose interpretation, why should the latter be taken as true and the former as false?

But what is the deeper meaning that can be given for some quote like this?

KT: In its deeper or loose meaning, only Dvaita meaning is very obvious? One has to do incorrect literary gymnastics to extract Advaita meaning.

And is it possible to say that one meaning makes more sense than the other *in context*?

KT: It is not a question of one making more sense than other, as if that were the case, then it grants that two opposite views make sense, but with relative merit. Such relative merit approach is ludicrous.

What is wrong with seeing each other, and what does this have to do with only Atman being all this?

KT: It is not mentioned that there is nothing wrong with seeing each other.

One seeing other mandates the presence of more than one. See at least the entire MaitreyI brahmaNa as one logical piece.

The verse seems ridiculously cryptic--

KT: Not at all.

I was hoping I could search the Dvaita archives for some info on quotes similar to this, but the search engine doesn't exist anymore (?)

KT: For such quotes, one good source is “Maha tatparya of Mahavakyas and other Advaita shrutis” by Dr. BNK Sharma.

Did Acharya Madhva or anybody else in our parampara write commentary on the 8th adhyaya 4th Brahmana (6.4 as the case may be) dealing with birth of son etc.

KT: Sri Raghavendra swamy has written Khandartha, which is given further below.

Does atikrAmet mean violate physically here ? Also does the verse say beating (upahatya) with

sticks(yaSTya) or(vA) even with hands(pAninA vA) ?

KT: The answers for these can be seen in Khandartha and also noting the prior verses and later verses.

http://www.sub.uni-goettingen.de/ebene_1/fiindolo/gretil/1_sanskr/1_veda/4_upa/brupsb_u.htm

BrhUp 6,4.7

sA ced asmai na dadyAt kAmam enAm avakriNIyAt | sA ced asmai naiva dadyAt kAmam enAM yaSTyA vA pANinA vopahatyAtikrAmet | indriyena te yaSasA yaSa Adada iti | ayaSA eva bhavati || BrhUp_6,4.7 ||

Samkara's Commentary:

sA cedasmai na dadyAnmaithunaM kartuṃ yatputrotpAdanamiti trirAtrAnta jnApayet /

tathApi sA naiva dadyAtkAmamenAM yaSTyA vA pANinA vopahatyAtikrAmenmaithunAya /

SapsyAmi tvAM durbhagAM kariṣ

yAmIti prakhyApya tAmanena mantreṇ

opagacchedindriyeNa te yaSasA yaSa Adada iti /

sA tasmAttadabhiSApAdvandhyA durbhageti khyAtAyaSA eva bhavati

KT: It is not difficult to note that the above commentary from Sankara is very damaging to women and it stresses on sensual enjoyment only.

“atikrAmet” is used for sensual aspect. The beating is mentioned.

As a contrast, let us see – Rayaru's khanDArtha:

“sAevamupAmantritA strI | asmai puMse | kAmaM upahAsaMna dadyAchchet.h enAM striyamavakrINIyAt.h |

sikShAntaraM chAha | sA chediti | atikrAmet.h |

atikrAmya tyaktvA gachchhet.h | gamane vaktavyamAha |'indriyeNa' iti | madIyena indriyena yashasA te

yasha Adade gR^ihNAmiiti vAchyamityarthaH | tataHayashA eva sA bhavatiityarthaH |”

If one reads the prior verse in the upanishad, the context is known. In brief, this applies to a man, who through his tapas shakti, maintains tejas, indriyas, yashas, draviNam (jnAna sampat), sukR^ita (puNya). Such a person treats “strI sanga” as a yaj~na. The anusAndhAna (mode of thinking)that is needed all through is described. Such a person also would be able to perceive when the strI is perfectly fit to conceive a good progeny. With all that ability the man has to approach his strI.

Now the meaning of the above khaNDArtha:

“Thus the woman has to be approached by the man. If she is not willing, the man has to offer pleasing things to her and approach. If she still does not concede, just leave herand go. While going the man just says 'using my indriya shakti (power of indriyas), I draw out your fame' – meaning 'sinceyou refused to have a good progeny, which I was willing to offer you, you lose the fame of having great progeny'.”

Thus the stick or hand are mentioned as symbolic means of drawing out the fame. There is no question of physical abuse. The man implies “if a sanga is given, through my indriya-s capable of handing over yashas (fame), I can place yashas (fame giving progeny) in you.” Thus they get the fame of having famous progeny.

Further on B.U. goes on explaining how the wife and husband are like “golden fire woods”, which are rubbed by the Lord forms “Rama and Krishna”. The husband says “We place in your womb the fruit of this yaj~na. Just as the earth holds fire in its womb, the heaven holds Indra in its womb, the directions hold the wind in their womb, you carry the womb.The glorious thoughts are many more, which have to be understood, keeping in mind the context, purpose and the grandeur of the upanishad.

Thus the stick or hand are mentioned as symbolic means of drawing out the fame. There is no question of physical abuse. Could you please elaborate on this a little? From what you quoted from the Khandartha, Raghavendra Svami does not comment on the phrase “yaShTyA vA pANinA vA upahatya”. This could be because the meaning is self-evident.

KT: Such aspect of “self-evidence” can also be stated in case of “ahaM bahmAsmi” and “tattvamasi”. At least they are more difficult to handle and needed a lot more explanation. In this case, the Upanishad itself is giving a hint of the correct meaning and indicating the possibility of misconstrued meaning. How?

1. The root word “upahan” has several meanings (pls see any standard dictionary) - “to beat, strike, touch, stick on, take hold of, seize, take out, impede, etc”.

It is strange that people want to take only the obvious meaning ignoring the context, the purport and all that goes in.

2. The Upanishad says

“sA ched asmai naiva dadyAt.h kAmaM enAM yashTyA vA pANinAvopahatyAtikrAmet.h |”

Then right away clarifies the meaning as if warning the deserving souls about the possible misunderstanding. The Upanishad is saying what this means:

“indriyena te yashasA yasha Adada iti”

This is like warning “Hey, don't take the obvious looking meaning of beat or strike or hit, but take the meaning of 'seize or take out'.”

1. If it is to be taken symbolically only and not literally, would he not have mentioned this?

KT: As explained above, the BU. Itself is saying what the meaning should be. If people still didn't get it, Rayaru is further explaining it. Rayaru did comment on the explanation that is given by the Upanishad itself.

“Adade” = gR^ihNAmiiti vAchyamityarthaH |

If Rayaru meant to take the obvious meaning of beating or striking or hitting, then he would have written -

“gamane kartavyamAhA” (the thing to be done before or while going away) and not “gamane vaktavyamAha” (the thing to be told...)

2. How is drawing out fame symbolized by the phrase “beat with hand or stick”?

KT: This can easily be seen if one perceives the obvious flaw that one is committing by taking the incorrect meaning of “beating or hitting or striking” despite the clarification that the Upanishad itself is giving.

How can hand or stick be used to take out the fame? Why does this aspect of 'saying something' arise?

3. Further, if it is symbolic only, in what way does it add any meaning to the verse beyond what is already stated in the rest of the verse?

KT: If what is stated in the verse itself is grossly misunderstood ignoring the context and purpose, how can symbolism be seen here? If what is stated itself is not seen, where is the question of seeing beyond?

It would have been better to leave it out altogether.

KT: This is tantamount to saying. It is better to leave out all the so called “mahavakya-s”. Why should that be left out when a beautiful meaning of good name and good progeny is what is explained here?

4. Why are two examples given in the symbolism (if the beating is intended to be a symbolism) - 1. hand or 2.stick?

KT: Why not two? Is there any restriction that symbolism is to be stated with only one item? It can be stated with one item or two items or even hundred items. In fact, the one purpose I can see is “paroxavishhayA vedAH”. It is quite obvious that such usage as above can really throw the people off quite a bit. Thus the separation of deserving and undeserving becomes much more effective and that is the purpose of the Vedas.

I have been reading a debate on a similar issue pertaining to women in the Quran (4.34).

KT: If the context there in Quran also is such that the sanga itself is treated like a yaj~na and the two partners have been compared to two golden fire sticks indicating equal importance in that aspect, then the comparison is worth considering. As far as I know, such concept in there is as easy to find in that source as a hare's horn.

The issues raised there and the attempted reconciliations keeping in mind modern sensibilities seem similar to the issue we are discussing.

KT: Similar accusation can also be brought in for Mahavakya-s, but the evidences for the correct interpretations of Mahavakya-s are rather overwhelming unlike mere logical deductions. Similarly here, the context and the purpose and the statements in the BU themselves drive the point made. So, my take on that is that we are only comparing apples and oranges, in bringing in Quran.

Note in particular the attempts to symbolize the action is not the traditional interpretation but modern:

KT: Which traditional commentators of Madhva school have interpreted the above to mean that it conveys a man beating a woman with a stick or hand? Is Rayaru to be taken as traditional or modern? The very premise that there is difference between the traditional commentary and modern commentary in the BU verse is baseless.

This is why I have these questions. I don't mean to offend anyone here, I am merely interested in the interpretation of the verse as historically intended.

KT: History will always have interpretations of many kinds -some correct and some not. If the historicity is of primary concern rather than the accuracy, then we have to let in the incorrect interpretations as much as the correct ones. In other words, the mutually contradicting statements need to find an acceptable place in the minds of “any open-minded person”. I feel that this approach is dangerous.

There is no reason for Shankaracharya to himself hold such views of such punishment for women who refuse to give in to their husbands – he seems to be constrained by the language of the text itself.

KT: As much as the language in the mahavakya-s. After all it is the same light that passes thru the diamonds, green stones or dark corals – however the effect of the light on those are different.

While the interpretation of “atikrAmet” of Raghavendra Tirtha certainly looks plausible, the phrase “yaShTyA vA pANinA vA upahatya” (on which he has not commented)

KT: You are missing the connect between the two, because you picked the wrong meaning of the word “upahatya”.

That is why -

still leaves unanswered questions about the purpose why it is there. It would be good if this can be addressed.

KT: It had been addressed. Let me reiterate that this has been addressed by BU itself and Rayaru further clarified.

Just imagine that when a sage uses his “daNda” or water from the kamaNDala while uttering the words of curse.

Is that daNDa or water from kamaNDala necessary for his words to come true? It is the power in his words that matters. In this case also if the man does not have power, his words have no effect. One has to read the entire portion to get proper understanding rather than stripping a small portion and giving the surface meaning without its serving any purport.

If the crude meaning is the purport of the BU words, then the BU is committing the blunder, which even an average intellect person does not commit – By beating his wife with a stick or hand, he is not bringing disfame to her (as what Sankaracharya stated), but quite contrarily, he is bringing a great disfame upon himself. Unlike Quran, where they had to rely on external sources, the Upanishadic statements have svataH prAmANya, and self-sufficiency. The need for the commentaries arise from the fact that the vedas are “paroxA” only and the meaning in them is hard and hidden, but not defective or lacking.

I can't but help notice that modern explanations of these texts by modern pravachanakaras often tend to be farfetched in their attempts to be politically correct. While the attempt to change some of the social norms that don't make sense to our vision today is laudable from a practical perspective, historically speaking, it does not do justice to the original interpretation of the text.

KT: I don't understand the purpose or meaning of these statements. Which pravachanakara-s are we talking about and why should we even worry about those? This whole discussion about “modern” and “non-modern” seems meaningless as

1. They are relative terms (X is more modern than Y)

2. Is 'modern' about existence in time or is it about the outlook? If it is former, then what was modern a few centuries ago is not modern today.

What is modern today won't be modern after a few centuries.

If it is latter, then it becomes subjective. What is modern in one person's perspective may not be so in another person's perspective.

3. Why to chase the wrong tail? We have to worry about what is right and what is not. We should not worry about what is modern and what is not.

PurANamityeva na sAdhu sarvaM na chApi kAvyaM navamityavadyam

santaH parIkshyAnyataradbhajante mUDhaH parapratyayaneyabuddhiH

All that's ancient is not necessarily good; Nor a composition be treated as bad just because it is modern. The wise analyze both and accept what is right. The unwise are lead by the understanding and beliefs of others.

4. Even after a person comes to terms with the selection criteria for 'modern', where is a line drawn or what demarcates modern and non-modern?

5. Even after a demarcation is found, how do we know if the (so called) modern commentator is using what has been told by non-modern or it is really modern?

6. It is also strange that in order to denounce the so called “modern commentaries”, a “modern write up” is used to denounce the traditional commentaries.

Also too many issues are clubbed into this discussion. It is better to remain focused and discuss one issue at a time.

For this BU verse, which are all the ancient commentaries and which are all the (so called) modern commentaries that need to be considered?

What really is the problem in what has been explained already?

I don't understand the purpose or meaning of these statements. Which pravachanakara-s are we talking about and why should we even worry about those?

Let me take two examples from Sri Bannanje Govindacharya's lectures:

Ex 1: When explaining the verse from BhAgavata Purana ...etc...

Ex 2: When explaining verse 2.14 from Gita, his ...etc...

KT: Both have nothing to do with BU and hence irrelevant.

This whole discussion about “modern” and “non-modern” seems meaningless as

1. They are relative terms (X is more modern than Y) By modern, I mean later in time.

KT: How later? One year, 10 years, 100 years, 1000 years? It is clear that the definition itself is vague.

2. Is 'modern' about existence in time or is it about the outlook? If it is former, then what was modern a few centuries ago is not modern today. What is modern today won't be modern after a few centuries.That is fine. I don't think that has any bearing on what I was trying to say.

KT: It does in more than one way. Firstly, I am indicating that the definition is vague. Secondly, it has no bearing on correctness. Thirdly, due to its being relative, the argument has vyabhichAradosha.

3. Why to chase the wrong tail? We have to worry about what is right and what is not. We should not worry about what is modern and what is not. But what is right and what is not may depend on what is modern!

KT: Absolutely not. They are totally unrelated factors. There is no vyApti from one to the other. First of

all, it is not even clear as to what kind of vyApti, you like to imply.

A. The thought “X” is “modern” == X is right

B. The thought “X” is not “modern” == X is right

C. The thought “X” is “modern” == X is wrong

D. The thought “X” is not “modern” == X is wrong

Do you like to hold any one of the above? Or you have an altogether different kind of vyApti?

If you say that being modern or not has no correlation with being right or wrong, then there is no need to talk about modern or not. If you go with any kind ofvyApti, that is even a bigger trouble because - note my prior quote from Kalidasa “purANamityeva na sAdhu sarvaM...”

He referred to his time period as modern and that is now actually ancient.

Thus it has two messages

1. The modern ceases to be modern and something that is ancient was modern at some point of time.

2. modern things have both right and wrong and as a corollary, ancient things also have both right and wrong.

We have more than ample evidence for both of them.

Notions of right and wrong change. Today, we cannot justify polygamy (men can marry many wives but women cannot marry many husbands) or Veda-adhikAra or caste by birth using modern arguments. All these seem wrong or unjustifiable. But 500 years ago, polygamy and Veda-adhikAra and caste by birth were issues that were naturally accepted and seemed right too.

KT: You are mixing up human laws and divine laws. There is polygamy even today in some tribal and other small isolated communities. They are defined as right or wrong by humans.

The vedic truths are eternal only. It is not that God gives moxa to sAttvika jiva-s now and after afew million years He changes the law and decides to give moxa to tAmasika jIvas!

There are other cases where the socio-philosophical things are considered and in such cases, yuga-dharmas are mentioned. That is totally different.

They are not on sliding scale, changing continually within small time frames. In other words they are not ephemeral truths, changing over short periods.

The very fact that some shAstric text said or allowed something was sufficient proof for most people.

KT: What is that “something” matters a lot. How they interpret the shastric text matters even more.

4. Even after a person comes to terms with the selection criteria for 'modern', where is a line drawn or what demarcates modern and non-modern? Since modern is defined as later in time, the demarcation is simple.

KT: It is the most complex. How later in time? The time is a continuous function. If you ask “later than what?”, you cannot answer with a specific value.

Suppose one says everything after 1000 CE is modern, then for those who are in 100 CE, it is future. For us it is long back.

5. Even after a demarcation is found, how do we know if the (so called) modern commentator is using what has been told by non-modern or it is really modern? By checking with texts that are older in time.

KT: Three things – 1. How older?

2. What if the older texts are not available?

3. Even if a check is made and a very old text is found, which contains it, is that sufficient to call it “true”? (For ex, today, some one writes a

commentary,which can be verified by an old advaitic commentary, is that sufficient to say that this commentary is absolutely right?)

6. It is also strange that in order to denounce the so called “modern commentaries”, a “modern write up” is used to denounce the traditional commentaries.

The modern write-up (by BNK Sharma and SK Bhavani) takes into account the fact that social norms and society structure change over time, a phenomenon that anyone can observe in any society.

KT: Reiterating the fact that we should not mix up social norms and vedic truths.

It is also more consistent with what we know from history.

KT: Social norms and society structure are part of history, vedic truths are not.

Modern commentaries that neglect history are the problem, not all modern commentaries per se. Those that especially consider history (like Prof BNK Sharma) can shed very useful light on old issues.

KT: Can you give an example of historical consideration from Dr. BNK Sharma's book on Nyayasudha?

Historical considerations are done, where possible and where appropriate.

For this BU verse, which are all the ancient commentaries and which are all the (so called) modern commentaries that need to be considered? What really is the problem in what has been explained already?

As far as the phrase “yaShTyA vA pANinA vA upahatya” is concerned, one need not even go into what is ancient/modern. It would be sufficient if there is ONE Sanskrit commentary that has commented on this phrase.

KT: Why should one mention it? Suppose, while eating food, someone says “saindhavamAnaya”. It is obvious that one goes and gets salt and not a horse. It does not befit to say “there was a big guy, who brought a horse while eating food and unless some one else gives a commentary'saindhavam = lavaNam', I feel that it means only horse. May be the person means to eat the meat of the horse. I like to think it as salt, but the big guy brought horse and I need another big guy to counter it.”.

Seeing the context, where such noble thoughts of yaj~na are mentioned, it is ridiculous even to imagine that “upahatya = by beating”.

If 'historically' (for those who do not believe in the apurushheyatva of upanishads) that was a norm, then there have to be several such statements (strong ones like beating, thrashing, torturing, etc.) in that upanishad itself.

So far, we have only Shankaracharya. I am not disputing what Raghavendra Tirtha wrote, but your way of explaining his words is akin to a sub-commentary on his words.

KT: Not at all. The word “upahatya” or “uphata” are used in other sense in lot of places and in fact that is quite common too. For ex. Look at “lobhopahata chetasA”, (in Gita)

“kArpaNyadoshhopahatasvabhAvaH” (in Gita)

“tAnyeva bhAvopahatAni kalkaH ..Mbh # 1.1.210”

chhinnamUlAnparibhraShTAnkAlopahatachetasaH 1.41.26

“pratyayAddhAstina pura.n shokopahatachetanaH .. 1.94.53.

“kAmopahata chittA~NgIM bhajamAnAM bhajasva mAm ..1.139.24.

“putra janma parIpsanvai shokopahatachetanaH 1.155.2

The above from just first Parva of Mbh. There are tons in Mbh and tons from various other places. None of them have the meaning of beating.

So, I have taken the obvious meaning of “seizing” here. Why Sankaracharya did not take and why he ignored the context? I don't know. While talking of yaj~nakArya, why suddenly jump-ship?

What I wrote is the obvious meaning from the khaNDArtha. Your translation has completely skipped the “yasha”(fame) part, which is present both in the upanishad itself and the khaNDArtha. If one is so concerned about yashas, why would

such a person resort to such an act?

Vede rAmAyaNe chaiva purANe bhArate tathA |

AdAvante cha madhye cha vishhNuH sarvatra gIyate |

That being the case, it is even inconceivable to think such a meaning as what Sankara gave.

For example, here is what Prof. BNK Sharma says about the Chandogya/BU Upanishads (HDSV, page 38)

Chapter title: POST-VEDIC PERIOD: EPICS, PURANAS, PANCHARATRA AND GITA

<Quote

So far, the truths of the Vedas and Upanishads had been confined to the higher orders of Brahminical society. The brahmanas had hardened caste. The Upanishads could not entirely break away from the bonds of the caste system, even though they made occasional attempts to throw the gates of spirituality open to all without distinctions of caste and sex. But examples of a Maitreyi here or a Satyakama Jabala there or even a Janashruti Pautrayana (termed a Shudra) were few and far between.

MT: Just to clarify, Janashruti Pautrayana is not a shudra by jati. He is a xatriya.

He is addressed as “shU-dra” -- one having dukha.

Janashruti is a king[Acharya says”rAja pautrayaNa”] and maha-tejasvi following kritayuga dharma in tretayuga.

Such men are rare indeed.

He approaches Raikva with great dukha [”shuchA dravaNAch Shudra” padma purana vachana quoted by Acharya # 4.1]

for not knowing “Samvarga-vidya”.

BU 4.5.1 where we are told that of the two wives of Yajnavalkya, Maitreyi alone was philosophically-minded (brahmavAdinI) while KatyAyanI remained “like most other women” (strI-praj~nA).

MT: I don't see anything wrong in this statement.

</quote

Prof. BNK Sharma here accepts that in this period, most women were not considered philosophically-minded (a social opinion that would be considered sexist by today's outlook,

MT: Why so? Most of the men are also not “philosophically-minded” like Maitreyi. It is meant to uphold Maitreyi and not downgrade Katyayani. Note that there is no good English equivalent for even common shAstric words hence authors supply original word so that readers may get the right idea. Maitreyi is a BrahmavAdini, and the likes of her caliber are definitely few in number. Even most men are not like her!

Further down, he says:

<quote

The absolute exclusion of these [women, shUdras and dvija-bandhUs] from the highest knowledge might give a handle to the enemies of the Vedic religion who were, by this need of the hour, making their first appearance (haitukas).

</UNquote

MT: I don't see what is the issue here.

Prof. SK Bhavani in the context of Gita 9.32-33 writes:

<quote

All the same, one finds women, Vaishyas and ShUdras spoken of in the text as “of sinful birth”

(pApayonayaH) as distinguished from Brahmins and devoted royal sages who are called puNyAH (of holy birth).

MT: That is Ramanuja's view and not that of ours. One has to read the comm. On Madhva Bhashhya to note what is pApa-yoni. I do not understand what relevance these have to the topic, and why confuse the members into thinking that our siddhanta calls women, shudras and Vaishya-s aspApa-yoni (in the above sense)?