Anubhava Quiz

Q & A by Shri Kesava Rao Tadipatri

Anubhava Quiz : Main Question

It is well known that according to tattvavada, Pramanas are of three kinds, viz. Pratyaxa, anumAna and Agama. Anubhava or experience is dependent on Pratyaxa pramAna. It is always emphasized that these have to be nirdushhTa. Thus pratyaxa is parIxita pratyaxa.

There often lurks a question as to what is the position, taken by tattvavada, when there is conflict between Anubhava and Agama.

Let us look at the following situation.

Let E be a set, which is pictorially represented by a circle, as a set consisting of all the things that are known by Anubhava (Experience).

Let G be a set, which is pictorially represented by another circle, as a set consisting of all the things that are known by Agama (Scriptures).

Let us imagine a Venn diagram in which these two circles intersect at two points (say P and Q). Let us denote the common area (the set of common points) as C.

C= Those which are common for both

Let us say C= C1 + C2, where C1 = Those which have conflict with each other (Anubhava conflicts with Agama).

C2 = Those which do not have conflict with each other

C2 does not pose any problem. In case of C1, let S1, S2 etc. are the schools, which believe in the existence and veritability of the Agamas.

S1 = The school which says that in case of C1, G takes precedence and so E has to be ignored.

S2 = The school which says that in case of C1, E takes precedence and so G has to be ignored.

S3 = The school which says that in case of C1, a general rule can not be made and each case should be examined individually.

S4 = The school which says that in case of C1, both have to be accepted.

S5 = The school which says that in case of C1, both have to be ignored.

S6 = The school which says that they don't intersect (nothing is common or C is a null set).

Does tattvavada belong to any one of these categories? If so, which one? If not, what else is possible.

This has to be done with the support of our Acharya's statements along with the commentaries there upon.

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Questions are in Red.. Answers by Shri Kesava Rao

Let us imagine a Venn diagram in which these two circles intersect at two points (say P and Q). Let us denote the common area (the set of common points) as C. C= Those which are common for both

OK, so C constitutes knowledge which can be obtained using either experience or scriptures.

Let us say C= C1 + C2, where C1 = Those which have conflict with each other (Anubhava conflicts with Agama).

Such a conflict can only be a superficial contradiction. Since both Anubhava & Agama are accepted as means to knowledge, they cannot provide contradictory information! Such an apparent contradiction can only be due to a misinterpretation of the text (assuming the text is accepted as an authority--if it isn't then it's a totally different issue), or an incorrect understanding of the experience we are undergoing.

Example 1) Various texts state such things as "Aham Brahmasmi" & "AtmAtattvamasi" which are interpreted by some to mean that the flawless Brahman is one and the same as the jiva, who is subject to ignorance. This is not only a logical contradiction, but it also violates our experience that we are subject to ignorance, which Brahman according to scriptures cannot be.

*HOWEVER*, the text can also be interpreted to show difference between the Jiva & Brahman--Atma atat tvam asi: you are not that Brahman, and aham and asmi can be interpreted as adjectives describing Brahman. (Perhaps someone could make a more elaborate posting on this).

Example 2) In our day to day experience, we may get the experience that we are the absolute controllers of what we do. But there are statements in the Bhagavad Gita such as "prakrteh kriyamANAni guNaih karmANi saravashah ahamkAro vimUdhAtmA kartAham iti manyate" which state that only the foolish out of arrogance consider themselves the doer, when it is in fact prakriti's guNa-s which are responsible (and of course Vishnu acting as the cause behind it). So it *APPEARS* that there is a contradiction between what we experience & what is said in the scriptures.

However, if we stop and take a look at what we do, very often you'll find that though you make certain choices, you make those choices based on your nature, so in fact you are compelled to act based on the presence of satva, rajas, tamas guNas.

Even stronger experience of the fact that we in fact have absolutely no control over our very own memory, which we use to do every little thing in our lives, can convince us that there is no contradiction between scriptures and our experience. Very often, we find that try as we might, we cannot remember certain things, yet other times, unpleasant memories, which we wish we can forget, often stay imprinted in our minds. Do we have absolute control over our memory? Certainly not! If not, how can we claim to be the controllers of the actions which are performed using our past memories? So in both examples, the contradiction is only on a superficial level, as a correct understanding of your experiences & a correct interpretation of the scriptures do not give conflicting information.

C2 = Those which do not have conflict with each other

Heh, at least some of the issues are nice and clear cut!

C2 does not pose any problem. In case of C1, let S1, S2 etc. are the schools, which believe in the existence and veritability of the Agamas. S1 = The school which says that in case of C1, G takes precedence and so E has to be ignored.

There is a problem here, since if we question our experience, then our experiencing of the scriptures (hearing it/reading it), itself becomes questionable!

S2 = The school which says that in case of C1, E takes precedence and so G has to be ignored.

Generally, you can trust your experience, but I have given an example above where this is not true (jiva kartrtva), at least not true, if you look at your experience on a SUPERFICIAL level.

S3 = The school which says that in case of C1, a general rule can not be made and each case should be examined individually.

This probably makes the most sense, since to make such a rule, what would you consult? Since there appears to be a conflict between experience & scriptures, obviously you cannot use them to make such a rule. You would have to resort to logic possibly, but since logic is *always* founded on one of the two, you'd still be stuck in a rut! However a clear analysis of them (since we're assuming they inherently do not contain any contradictions--that is the definition of pramAna: "means to knowledge", not "means to knowledge barring certain exceptions here and there") would definitely enable us to see where we have made wrong interpretations/assumptions. Thus the superficial conflict is removed. It would be ok to either use pratyaxa or agama or a combination of both, since understanding them clearly would give you the right knowledge.

S4 = The school which says that in case of C1, both have to be accepted.

Which would be a hypocritical stance--accepting 2 opposite things.

S5 = The school which says that in case of C1, both have to be ignored.

Which would be no different from walking around blind, not trusting your experience & not trusting scriptures.

S6 = The school which says that they don't intersect (nothing is common or C is a null set).

But I've given 2 examples of contradictions above.

Does tattvavada belong to any one of these categories? If so, which one? If not, what else is possible.

Though S4 sounds ok, I'm not entirely sure how you'd go about doing this, because scriptures can be given different interpretations. And how do we know which experiences are open to doubt? When we see a coat on a coat rack in the dark, we may think it's a man & even go about convincing ourselves that there is someone there, when in reality there is not. In other words, when certain experiences, such as me being in total control of myself, can be superseded by stronger experiences, couldn't THOSE experiences be contradicted by later ones? It seems like we're placing everything, scriptures and experience, in this field of doubt. How do we ascertain which experiences are correct & which scriptural statements are correct? Though there shouldn't be any contradictions, sometimes we see them (due to our own misunderstanding, IF both scriptures & experiences are to be taken as an authority). If those are open to doubt, then perhaps everything we perceive is open to doubt, which sounds like a waay too cynical approach to life.

This has to be done with the support of our Acharya's statements along with the commentaries there upon.

Whoops. My reasoning sounds ok, but I'm more than welcome to any sort of comments/criticisms.

Let us say C= C1 + C2, where C1 = Those which have conflict with each other (Anubhava conflicts with Agama). Such a conflict can only be a superficial contradiction. Since both Anubhava & Agama are accepted as means to knowledge, they cannot provide contradictory information! Such an apparent contradiction can only be due to a misinterpretation of the text (assuming the text is accepted as an authority--if it isn't then it's a totally different issue), or an incorrect understanding of the experience we are undergoing.

The scriptural text is definitely accepted as full authority by Sri Madhvacharya and his followers. Otherwise, what sense will the statements like "sadAgamaika vij~neyaM samatIta xarAxaram.h" will make. One of the many great favors our Acharya did was to show full consistency among Agama statements by giving right interpretation so that they are fully consistent with other valid pramANAs as well. So the question of "if it isn't" does not arise in Madhva school. Similarly, incorrect understanding of the experience is again not a pramANa as it lacks "nirdushhTatva". It is flawed as it is not "parIxita". The same thing applies to the examples given that "nirdushhTatva" is a prerequisite.

S1 = The school which says that in case of C1, G takes precedence and so E has to be ignored. There is a problem here, since if we question our experience, then our experiencing of the scriptures (hearing it/reading it), itself becomes questionable!

Yes, this is true and this is one of the arguments we put forth in opposing "the anuvadakatva approach" of mithyAvAdis.

S2 = The school which says that in case of C1, E takes precedence and so G has to be ignored. Generally, you can trust your experience, but I have given an example above where this is not true (jiva kartrtva), at least not true, if you look at your experience on a SUPERFICIAL level.

Again "Superficial" level is what gets a person into problems. We must avoid that.

S3 = The school which says that in case of C1, a general rule can not be made and each case should be examined individually. This probably makes the most sense,

Not at all. This takes away "prAmANyata" from both. It is such a random case that a common man will have to wonder which one will be taken as "pramANa". Both the "pramANas" become unreliable. This has the flaws of both S4 and S5.

what would you consult? Since there appears to be a conflict between experience & scriptures, obviously you cannot use them to make such a rule.

We consult both. The key word here is "there appears to be". The apparent conflict comes for an unclear mind. The helpful analysis from j~nanis will resolve the issue.

You would have to resort to logic possibly, but since logic is *always* founded on one of the two, you'd still be stuck in a rut!

Why should the logic be founded on only one? A true analytical mind sees perfect harmony between the two. True to its name "anupramANa" goes along with both in a logical way and makes one see the harmony and will not let one stuck in a rut.

Why? That's a very credulous attitude. There is no way one can grant outright that textual evidence is always on target. After all, we should note that not everyone accepts this to be the case. Given that this is so, some justification has to be given of the non-standard notion; it's not quite as simple as saying two and two equal four.

That is true. It is not as simple. One must give justification as to why Agama is unquestionable and also "parIxita" pratyaxa is also important. For this, the original question itslef has to be split into two parts.

Q.a : Will there be a conflict between Agama and "anubhava" (based on parIxita pratyaxa).

Q.b : If there is a conflict, what should one do?

If we show that the answer to Q.a itself is "there is no conflict", then Q.b becomes irrelevant or it does not arise at all.

Also, we have to note the difference between "parIxita pratyaxa" and "aparIxita pratyaxa" (or bhramAj~nana or delusion). Because "nirdushhTa pratyaxa" alone is prAmANa, automatically E does not contain any such illusory information like "shuktirajatatva (silverness of the shell) or rajjusarpabhranti (mistaking snake for a rope).

Further note that all this is only a symbolic representation. Thus we ignore the subjectivity in what constitutes E. An Aparoxa jnAni's E will be a lot more than that of an ordinary person. As our objective is only to see if there is conflict between Agama and anubhava of any person (based on parIxita pratyaxa), we do not care for the size of E.

In VishhNutattvavinirNaya, our Acharya says:

"na chaanubhavavirodhe Agamasya prAmANyam.h |"

The pratyaya "cha" here means "and also". This means we have to see what has been said earlier also to see the context.

"pratyaxAderAgamasya prAbalye.api nopajIvyapramANavirodhe prAmANyam.h | vishhayAbhAve svasyaivAprAmANyaprApteH | tenaiva hyanumAnAdinA.a.agamasya vishhayaH siddhyati tatpaxe.api | anumAnena hyanuvAditvapaxa Ishvaro boddhavyaH pratyaxeNa chA.agamaH | atastayorvirodhe prAmANyaM na syAt.h | anumAnasiddheshvarAchcha bhedo.anubhavata eva siddho jIvasyAsarva\- kartR^itvenAnubhavAt.h ||"

Even though the scriptural evidence is more powerful than the evidence of direct perception and reasoning, it does not have verifiability when it contradicts the supportive evidence or upajIvyapramANa(Pratyaxa which gives the subject matter to the case under consideration). [This is due to] the possibility of its own non-verifiability on account of lack of subject matter. Even according to the objectioner (pUrvapaxa), Pratyaxa and anumAna provide subject matter to the scriptural evidence. Thus if those two conflict, there exists no validity. Because of the jIva's experience of the inability of universal accomplishment, it experiences its being different from Paramatma, which is through logical reasoning.

I guess you are expecting us to ignore the subjectivity in what constitutes C1. An Aparoxa jnAni's C1 could be more than that of an ordinary person.

Actually, it is E and also consequently C of Aparoxa jnAni which is far more than that of an ordinary person. As far as C1 is concerned, the goal will be to show that C1 is actually a null set for a common man (who ia a believer in Agamas and the 'correct' interpretation of Agamas) as well as for an aparoxa j~nAni. In other words there exists no conflict and thus C = C2 itself.

Let us say C= C1 + C2, where C1 = Those which have conflict with each other (Anubhava conflicts with Agama). Does tattvavada belong to any one of these categories? If so, which one? If not, what else is possible. This has to be done with the support of our Acharya's statements along with the commentaries there upon. The statement from the Vishnu-tattva-vinirnaya: na cha anubhava virodhe Agamasya prAmANyam.h is pertinent. That and the subsequent one: AgamapramANyAnubhavasya api aprAmANyaprApteH are reasons to understand why Srimad Acharya's school cannot be classified under S1 (accept Agama only), S3(generic solution not possible), S4(accept both) and S5(reject both) categories.

In fact, based on Acharya's explanation and TIkAchArya's TIka, one can see that all the categories (S1 thru S6) are invalid. This will be explained in the subsequent postings.

For a school under S6, which says that there is no intersection between anubhava and Agama, Agama would be useless. For Agama to be useful, at the very least one common object is needed, i.e., the self (to whom all the injunctions apply); else the whole Agama would be like a fairy tale. Since Srimad Acharya holds Agama to be useful (sadAgamaika vij~neyam, j~nAnenaiva param padam ityAdeH), tattvavAda does not come under S6.

Yes. And most importantly all the "bhedavAkyAs" (statements declaring the difference between jIva and Ishvara) come under C. The jIva expereinces all the time "asarvakartR^itva" (absence of omnipotence). Ishvara is omnipotent. As no amount of explanation can extricate one from this situation, the proponents of "jIvabrahmaikyavAdis" call these "bhedavAkyAs" as simply "anuvAdaka" (restatements that have to be ignored).

Tattvavada is a school whose position is this: knowledge from Agama cannot invalidate knowledge from anubhava (which is verified by sAkshi). In what instances would there be attempts at invalidation? If the Agama posits an attribute in an object, which is denied by anubhava or vice-versa, i.e., it denies an attribute which is approved by anubhava. 'mridabravIt.h', 'yajamAno prastAraH' ityAdau. Since Tattvavada says it is possible to harmonize all shrutis within themselves and with anubhava (uktaH samanvayaH sAkShAdavirodho.atra sAdhyate.. AV 2.1.1) without rejecting any of them, it does not belong to S2 (which *ignores* Agama).

In simple words, Tattvavada emphasizes that rejecting any part of Agama owing to either another part of Agama or Pratyaxa is unacceptable. It is to be noted that such rejection will take away the reliability of Agama itself. Being Apaurushheya, Agama is flawless and so it will not conflict with any "nirdushhTa pramANa".

Thus, Tattvavada is a new category.

The need for the new category can be seen from realizing that all the given categories have an underlying presumption that there are points of conflict (apparent conflict is not real conflict), which are irreconcilable.

Our Acharya says:

"na chAnubhavavirodhe Agamasya prAmANyam.h | AgamaprAmANyAnubhava\- syApyapramANyaprApteH | bahupramANasaMvAdashcha darDhyahetureva | bahUnAM vachane tasyaiva darshane darDhyasyaiva dR^ishhTeH |"

If the first sentence is parsed as "anubhavavirodhe Agamasya prAmANyam.h na", then it means

"In case of conflict with experience, Agama cannot be pramANa"

If it is parsed as "Agamasya prAmANyam.h anubhavavirodhe na", then it means "The pRAmANya of Agama can not be in conflict with experience".

The latter is the position of tattvavada.In case of first parsing also, what tattvavada holds is :

"In case of conflict with experience, [the interpretation of] Agama [if interpreted against experience] cannot be pramANa"

If the pUrvapaxa insists on its interpretation and rejects the very experience (as in the case of jIvabrahma aikya) of difference (between jIva and Brahman), then Acharya says:

"Then the very experience of aikyAgama can acquire aprAmANya (invalidity). Concurrence of many pramANa-s is for the sake of re-inforcement only. If many mention something and if the same thing is confirmed by observation, it is meant for re-inforcement only".

It has been said earlier that "Anubhava and Agama" cannot conflict. Does it mean that this is punarukti (or repetition)? Not at all.

Sri Jayatirtha says:

"pUrvamupajIvyatvena prAbalyamAshrityaikyAgamasya sAxyanubhava\- virodhenApramANyamuktam.h | idAnIntUpajIvyatvAnapexaprAbalyam\- Ashrityochyate |"

"Earlier, based on the strength of upajIvya, it has been said that aikyAgama is invalid for being against the experience of sAxi. Now it is being explained without using the concept of upajIvyatva."

"sAxyanubhava virodhenaikyAgamasyAprAmANyaM kuta iti chet.h, na tAvadviruddhayorubhayoH prAmANyamapramANyaM vopapadyata ityuktam.h | tato.anyatarasyaivApramANye.avashyamaN^gIkaraNIye na tAvadaikyAgama\- virodhena sAxyanubhavasyApramANyamaN^gIkartumuchitam.h |"

"By conflicting with experience of the sAxi, the aikyAgama is invalid. How come? When two things conflict, proper validity or invalidity has to be established. Then, as it has to be agreed upon that one has to be invalid (both cannot be valid). For being opposed to aikyAgama, the experience of sAxi has to be agreed upon to be invalid"- [This is for the pUrvapaxa].

Thus, the pUrvapaxa has double disadvantage that it ends up rejecting part of experience (bhedAnubahva) as it is against aikyAgama. Also it ends up rejecting a major part of Agama as it is against aikyAgama. [It does the latter calling bhedAgama as anuvAdaka].

The experience of sAxi is the factor that determines the validity of all the pramANas. If it is taken as invalid in case of jIveshvarabheda, then the very validity of abhedAgama is questionable because where is the guarantee of the validity of experience of the sAxi as regards to abheda. Thus the very experience of "abhedAgama prAmANya" has to be rejected.

Thus, pUrvapaxa will end up in "no man's land" or a "groundless state".

If it is parsed as "Agamasya prAmANyam.h anubhavavirodhe na", then it means "The pRAmANya of Agama can not be in conflict with experience". The latter is the position of tattvavada.But surely this is not always true.

If it is not, then one of them has to be rejected. Which ever gets to be rejected turns out to be undependable.

What about the experience of being absolutely in control of oneself- svatantra kartrtva.

This is not much different from one claiming to experience the silver in the shell. One must differentiate between delusion and fact. First of all what is experience (or anubhava). Acharya defines it as "svadR^ik.h chAnubhavaH smR^itaH". It just means "svadR^ik.h" or the knowledge of sAxi.

In case of "silverness of the shell",

"shuktikAM rajatatvena dUrAt.h pratItya 'nedaM rajataM kintu shuktikaiva' iti AptavAkyaM shR^inoti | tataH samIpaM gataH pratyaxenApi shuktireva itipashyati | pATanadahanAdiliN^gena tathaiva anuminoti | tato bahu\- pramANavirodhena ekasya apramANyameva nishchinoti |"

"Seeing the silverness in the shell from a distance, one hears a sentence from [knowledgeable] well-wishers 'this is not silver, but only a shell'. Then [the person] approaches it and [on examination] sees it as shell only. Then [the person] deduces the same thing by performing analysis through cracking, burning, etc. There by [the person] concludes the invalidity of one thing (shell-silverness) for its being opposed to many pramANa-s".

Silver is a metal and is known to be ductile and malleable. The material in the shell, not being so, fails the test of being silver.

How can anyone claim of svatantra kartR^itva in spite of witnessing with enormous helplessness many disasters. Even the westerners, whose philosophical thinking has not reached much depth use expressions like "many a slip between the cup and the lip" and "man proposes and God disposes".

Even if one happens to be carried away by the delusion "svatantra kartR^itva", a little bit of self-analysis and the realization of "total helplessness" in terms of many factors like "what if one loses one's sight in next second", "what if an earth quake happens in next minute" must help in removing such delusion. If those who have such delusion only realize that they are not masters of their own birth and death, atleast it gives a starting point.

We don't have the experience that someone else is controlling us.

Is that so? Acharya syas in very simple terms:

"yadi nAma paro na bhavet.h sa hariH kathamasya vashe jagatedabhUt.h | yadi nAma na tasya vashe sakalaM kathameva tu nityasukhaM na bhavet.h |"

"If Hari is not all-supreme, how come this entire universe is under His control. If it is not under His control (everyone is absolutely in control of oneself) how come everyone is eternally happy?". It is very well known that everyone wants only happiness and not a bit of sorrow. If everyone is absolutely in control of oneself, everyone must succeed in having only happiness and blocking the sorrow completely. But we do see sorrow in this world. That alone is good enough to reject svatantra kartR^itva of not only all the human beings, but all the beings except Sri Hari. This fact about "the human beings (by kaimutya nyaya other beings on earth also)" can be seen through pratyaxa and anumAna and confirmed by Agama. This fact about the "gods" is available only through Agama-s, atleast for common men like us.

We do have the experience that we perform actions independently, without the control of someone else.

One must differentiate between the delusion and real experience.

That would mean statements which declare the absolute kartrtva of Vishnu are to be rejected on the basis of our experience!!

Leave alone that delusions don't have more prabalya than Agamas, they don't even have any validity.

Or is experience here to be understood as something deeper?

Certainly, as explained above.

One may have the experience of something real being present in an illusion, but that initial experience is not true.

A delusion cannot be true.

Likewise, maybe our perception of independent doership is not going deep enough.

Realizing one's weakness is a starting point for learning.

It seems that experience needs to be defined more clearly.

It has been. One must only spend time to read and understand.

Some experiences are true, while others are not.

A delusion or illusion is not an experience. If one claims that the person can experience water in the mirage, the obvious question that follows is "can that person quence his/her thirst from the mirage?"

But if experience as a whole is invalid, then we can't be sure of anything!!

If it were the case then there is no need for any discussion and there is no need for shAstraj~nAna. Experience is given lot of importance.

If we accept the existence of a Sakshi whose experiences are always true, then even then, we need to be able to tell what the Sakshi experiences and what experiences are simply superficial [not true].

We do accept such sAxi. Every sAxi knows what its experience is.

An Advaitin could argue that the experience of being different from Brahman is merely superficial and is not actually perceived by the Sakshi.

Of course, "could", same way as one about "svatantra kartR^itva". Suppose there is a heavy weightlifter, who got a bump on his head and forgot that he is a heavy weight lifter. But still he must have the ability to lift heavy weights. If an individual is Brahman and does not perceive it, such a one must be able to exercize his/her ability and use the powers of Brahman. The same argument which says "the difference is superficial and not perceived by sAxi" will also have to entertain "the identity is superficial and not perceived by sAxi". It will have to push itself into the quagmire of "superficial and not perceived by sAxi" and take some approach. "vimataM mithyA dR^ishyatvAt.h". "Just because, I see that silverness in the shell is an illusion, everything I see is an illusion. I see this universe and so this must be an illusion. I see that I am different from Brahman and so it must be an illusion."

If you ask that person "well you see that silver in a silver ornament is true. Why don't you start from there?", perhaps the answer will be "well that is the path of others. I want to be different. So I start from mithyA." The problem is with "their kind of vyApti".

"If we take a lake, the bed of mud at the bottom of lake can not have fire on it (that is inside lake). The muddy surface can not have fire on it. The top of a mountain cannot have fire on it as the top has muddy surface."

One can see obvious flaw in such arguments.

If certain experiences can be false, then couldn't others be false as well? Surely, there is some way of ascertaining which experiences are true and which are not, or alternatively, which experiences are experienced by the Sakshi & which are not.

In the example, the silver in the silver ornaments is true and the silver in the shell is false. In all other matters also, sAxi is the best judge. If one ignores the sAxi also as in the case of Advaitin, then the difficulty springs up. One must differentiate between perception and experience. Perception can be "flawed" or "flawless". If it is flawless perception, the experience will be true also. If it is flawed, the experience is false.

"Seeing the silverness in the shell from a distance, one hears a sentence from [knowledgeable] well-wishers 'this is not silver, but only a shell'. Then [the person] approaches it and [on examination] sees it as shell only. Then [the person] deduces the same thing by performing analysis through cracking, burning, etc. There by [the person] concludes the invalidity of one thing (shell-silverness) for its being opposed to many pramANa-s". "If Hari is not all-supreme, how come this entire universe is under His control. If it is not under His control (every one is absolutely in control of oneself) how come every one is eternally happy?".

Correction, sorry. It must read "...How come every one is * not * eternally happy?"

With the above analogy,

"One may think, [due to ego or ignorance], that one has svatantra kartR^itva. One reads sentences from [knowledgeable] well-wishers like Vedavyasa (who else can be more Apta), our Acharya and the subsequent commentators 'Hari is the controller and svatatntra, the rest are all dependent on Him'. Then one approaches the issue of svatantra kartR^itva and [on examination] notices one's helplessness. Then one deduces the same thing by performing analysis through events like birth and death and many uncontrollable events, etc. There by one concludes the invalidity of one thing (svatantra kartR^itva) for its being opposed to many pramANa-s".

If certain experiences can be false, then couldn't others be false as well? Surely, there is some way of ascertaining which experiences are true and which are not, or alternatively, which experiences are experienced by the Sakshi & which are not. In the example, the silver in the silver ornaments is true and the silver in the shell is false. In all other matters also, sAxi is the best judge. If one ignores the sAxi also as in the case of Advaitin, then the difficulty springs up. One must differentiate between perception and experience. Perception can be "flawed" or "flawless". If it is flawless perception, the experience will be true also. If it is flawed, the experience is false.

So, it definitely is true that certain perceptions are true, and others are false. But someone seeing the silver in ornaments will assume it is silver, just as someone seeing the silver in shell will assume that is silver as well. The question still is, how do we know which perceptions are true and which are not? That is, how do we know which perceptions are "flawed" and which are "flawless". We do not need to verify every single perception, yet still there are perceptions which should be tested (such as the silver in the shell). The person perceiving this at first assumes it is flawless perception, but *later* realizes otherwise in the case of illusions. Even with the existence of a Sakshi to judge which perceptions are true and which are not, how do we know which ones are experienced by the Sakshi and which ones are simply perceptions, that is, there is a risk that they may/may not be true. I guess it boils down to differentiating between perception and experience.