Practical information
Thursdays, from 2pm to 4pm
Office hours by appointment, in room 234, Ludwigstrasse 31, second floor
About the 4 essays (max 5 pages each)
1. Are redundantists views on truth incompatible with robust accounts such as Russell's or Walker's? 30.11
2. Do Tarskian definitions achieve Tarski's goals? Deadline: 21.12
3. Is there a natural language use of the truth predicate not accounted for by the equivalence between each sentence A and "A is true"? 8.2
4. According to the deflationist standpoint, is truth a property? 19.3
Course description
Several modern philosophical accounts of truth will be explored, including correspondentism, coherentism, verificationism, and deflationism. While the latter focuses on the concept of truth and the meaning of the truth predicate, the former are positions about the property or essence of truth. This difference is crucial and will be stressed. Moreover, several formal accounts of truth will be introduced, including Tarski’s, Kripke’s, and the axiomatic approach.
Preparing for the course
Contents
1. Introduction
The problems of truth, truth bearers, a panorama of the state of the matter
2. Substantive Theories of Truth
The correspondence theory, the coherence theory
3. Road to Deflationism
The redundancy theory, deflationism about truth
4. Interlude: Tarski and his Critics
5. Road to Deflationism Continued
The redundancy theory, deflationism about truth
6. Modern Deflationism: Objections and Challenges
Verificationism, modern deflationism, challenges
7. Deflationism and Formal Theories of Truth
Fixed-point models, axiomatic systems
Bibliography