(The eternal loss of Russia 1: 3)

                             

А теперь, для разнообразия, немного статистики.

Жалование военнослужащих Вермахта

1) Военнообязанные

 К этому добавляются, разумеется, бесплатное питание, расквартирование и проезд по железной дороге.

2) Контрактники и кадровые офицеры

Военнослужащие по контракту и кадровые военные получали оклады по так называемому Имперскому порядку оплаты « С », включавшему различные градации, например, в Берлине из-за более высокого уровня жизни выплачивалось и более высокое жалование, чем в небольших городках в глубинке Нижней Баварии. Чаще всего для начисления жалования применялся класс « А », который демонстрирует следующая таблица. Суммы приведены за 1935 год, и до конца войны они почти не менялись.

 

 Оклады военнослужащих в звании от лейтенанта до майора несколько раз понижались, так как из-за особенностей прохождения служебной карьеры именно в этих званиях оставалось много офицеров, например, «зависало» в чине майора. К этому, естественно, в отдельных случаях полагались надбавки как, например, главному фельдфебелю за должность ротного фельдфебеля или авиационному персоналу.

3) Жалованье во время войны.

На войне дополнительно выплачивались деньги на поддержку семьи, денежное содержание и фронтовая надбавка. Фронтовая надбавка была одинаковой для всех военнослужащих независимо от звания и составляла   1 RM (рейхсмарку) в день. Денежное содержание офицеров было:

 Военнослужащие в званиях выше майора получали только фронтовую надбавку. Другие надбавки, например, авиационным экипажам также, естественно, выплачивались.

4) Сравнение военных и гражданских зарплат.

Средняя зарплата промышленного рабочего без вычета налогов ( рейхсмарок в неделю):  1936 год – 24, 94        1939 – 28, 08

Средний оклад служащего без вычета налогов ( рейхсмарок в месяц):  1936 год – 199, 00       1939 год – 231, 00

Среднегодовые цены в рейхсмарках на промтовары и продукты питания:

 

Оклад денежного содержания военнослужащих Красной Армии         (1938 г.)

 

Среднемесячная зарплата рабочих и служащих составляла ( руб/мес ):  1940 год – 341, 00 ( в промышленности );     331,00 – ( остальные ).                                                   Весь месячный доход колхозника составлял около 20 руб.       

 Государственные розничные цены нормированной и коммерческой торговли ( в руб/кг ).  

 

Государственные розничные цены нормированной и коммерческой торговли ( в руб/шт).

                                                                   The eternal loss of Russia 1: 3

                                                                                                                               The moral factor applies

                                                                                                                                     to physical as 3 to 1.

                                                                                                                                                                                Napoleon

You see how the French emperor, in a soldierlike way, briefly and clearly defined the place of the moral and ideological factor and its influence on the combat readiness of the troops. Clausewitz, unlike Napoleon, expressed himself on this issue in his work “On War” in more detail, because he also considered him to be the most important in the war. He wrote: “Again we must return to the subject we touched upon in Chapter III of the 2nd part of this work, because moral values ​​in a war occupy the most important place. These moral forces pervade through all the elements of the military; they have the greatest affinity with the will, for the will is a moral value, and they are closed together with it in advance, and the will is what sets in motion and directs the whole mass of material forces. Unfortunately, moral forces are elusive for book wisdom, for they cannot be expressed in numbers or paragraphs; they can only be observed and felt. "

 I already had to casually touch on the aforementioned topic, when the conversation was about V. Rezun, who does not even stutter about it. Then I noticed that there is nothing surprising in this approach on the part of the "brilliant analyst". For it would be foolish to think of a traitor to the Motherland to talk about moral categories. Here V. Rezun, being a sane person, does quite rightly, considering the ratio of purely material forces. It is surprising that even those people who do not agree with the author of “Icebreaker” follow in his footsteps, completely ignoring the commandments and instructions of the generals, who "had eaten the dog" in matters of the army and war.

                        

None of the current authors are interested in the moral and political state of those of ours and German soldiers, who both clutched at death grip on each other in the summer of the 41st, and did not untie until the summer of the 45th. What made them so fight? What are these forces? Patriots will object to me and they will say that our soldiers and commanders fought heroically from the very first day of that terrible war, sparing neither blood nor even life itself. So, they had no problems with moral forces. As for the Germans, then there is nothing to talk about them, for what kind of morality among the nonhumans. Therefore, I will have to begin this chapter with a refutation of the patriotic look at the course of military operations during the initial period of war. For example, V. Savin pleased us in 2010 with his book “The Key to 1941”. I do not take the word pleased in quotes, since I am sincerely glad that there are new names and books on the Second World War. I am quite sure that the “the more the better” rule applies to the current state of our military history.

 However, one need also measure to know. This, in fact, to Mr. V. Savin only seems that he has found a clue. 

One of his assertions that "the defeated Red Army of 1941 was much more efficient than the victorious Soviet troops at the end of the war," is worth to say a few words about. This statement would not be anything strange if it were a question of the potential combat effectiveness of our army, which met the German attack. But V. Savin, as they say, is trying to convince us in the blue eye of the superiority of our units over Wehrmacht divisions in the summer battles of 1941. He even invented a very simple and clear method for this goal.  A person regards individual battles as chess games (which is quite acceptable), precisely arranging the number of pieces and the position of both “white” and “black” ones. How does he know the exact combat strength of the forces and means of our and German divisions and their disposition? And God knows! It seems to him that he knows, and this is enough for bold conclusions.

Especially touches the conclusion of V. Savin about the tactical superiority of the Red Army over the Wehrmacht. There are dozens of examples in the book, but everything is a carbon copy. On page 231, the attack of our 2 divisions on 3.5 German divisions is described. On the same page is the conclusion: "The result of the attack of two divisions on three and a half divisions is easily predictable: on June 24-25, the Soviet units participating in the counterstroke were actually defeated."  On page 283: “If we take into account the real state of the 11th Mechanized Corps and the 36th Cavalry Division, approximately 2-2.5 calculated divisions of the Red Army, which came against one reinforced German division. The result with such a balance of forces is not surprising - the Soviet troops managed to organize serious complications, but they didn’t crush the enemy ”.

Here is another example: “In addition, only the tank divisions of the 6th Mechanized Corps participated in the offensive, the 29th Motorized Division covered the flank of the corps and did not participate in the battles on June 24. The offensive of the two weakened divisions against one reinforced (even if not counting the units of the 162nd infantry division) even in theory could not lead to anything good. " V. Savin, himself without realizing it, with such examples shows the level of tactical skill of our military leaders. In short, he mixes them up with shit. Mr. Savin, who spent a lot of time and effort collecting and processing such an impressive number of examples, should answer a few simple questions. First, how, having practically equal composition with our Western and North-Western fronts, did the command of the opposing German group manage to organize the superiority of forces in all these episodes? Secondly, why do we almost always attack? Do we need blood from the nose to hang the Red Banner over the Reichstag in June of the 41st? This, in fact, they, the Germans had a plan, where they timed everything and they had to hurry. Where did we go? Why did we rush at them like crazy? Why did not we meet the enemy on the frontiers advantageous for us?

Look at the conclusions that V. Savin makes in the three examples given. There are and "the result is easily predictable" and "even in theory." That is, for Mr. Savin clear in advance, but those commanders of the Red Army, whose tactical superiority he intended to tell us, could never have imagined that attacking a numerically superior enemy was a dangerous business. They, these commanders, did not even guess about the existence of such rules, but at the same time they managed to beat the Wehrmacht in tactical training. It's real nightmare! It is impossible to believe that in the 21st century, people can carry such nonsense not about any battle of Yaroslav with the Pechenegs, but about the events of a very recent past.

 But I must say, V. Savin is not alone. His colleague R. Irinarkhov, in his work “Missed strike”, writes about the same battles of the summer of the 41st approximately the same, only at a different level. If the first places divisions and corps on his chessboard, the second one goes down to the battalions and the companies. How does R. Irinarkhov know about the exact location and condition of the units at a certain point in time? Yes, from the same place, from where V. Savin comes: from memoirs, that is, from all the propaganda waste paper that was stamped on Kremlin patterns. On the pages of the book of R. Irinarkhov, where he describes the "tragedy and heroism" of our troops, there are continuous battles. Day and night, without having a rest. You read all this and think: “How did the Germans get to Minsk with such intense battles?” The frontier guards fought for hours and days, and if they retreated, it was only by order. About the regular units of the Red Army he wrote the same thing. Despite the lack of communication, poor interaction and weak command our soldiers fought to the last drop of blood, died, but did not surrender to the enemy. How Germans after such battles could be near Moscow? It's a lie! They were not there!

  According to R. Irinarkhov, they were destroyed, rebuffed, blown to pieces in Belarus. This is called - hello to comrade Stalin from the 21st century. We say, dear Joseph Vissarionovich, we remember your commandments and will not allow others to forget. Bravo, Mr. Irinarkhov! It may be objected to me in the sense that I somehow easily divide the authors into right and guilty. Who am I to declare V. Savin and R. Irinarkhova Stalinists, communist agitators and trolls? Why should the reader trust me more than, for example, the gentlemen mentioned? Answering these questions is easy, because it’s not about faith, guys, we are not in church. In this difficult task of finding the truth in matters of military history must rely on common sense and arithmetic.

 

Let's open the book “Issues of strategy and operational art in the works of Soviet military leaders of 1917-1940” and read a few lines from the article “Strategy” Alexander Svechin: “Operation is an act of war, during which the efforts of troops without interruption are directed in a certain area theater of war to achieve a specific intermediate goal. ... The three main elements of the operation - strength, time and space in the strategy of crushing are always combined so that the gain of time and space is the means, and the defeat of the mass of the enemy army is the goal ”. From the given passages we see that war consists of consecutive acts, that is, operations. And any military operation includes two absolutely objective elements that are easily identified and fixed. This is Time and Space. An hour consists of 60 minutes, and in 1 km - 1000 m. If, speaking of force, you can cheat, confuse and juggle, then with the last two elements these things do not pass. In relation to them, you can only lie rudely and stupidly. But a gross lie could be quite easily detected and refuted. 

Next, we will open the book in another place and read the work of V.K. Triandafilov "The nature of the operations of modern armies," namely those pages where the author writes about the pace of advance of the advancing armies. We look: “We must assume that as long as the enemy has reserves or the possibility of transferring forces from other sectors of the front, i.e. until its main forces are defeated, from 1/3 to ½ of all the days of the operation there will be days with battles. Under these conditions, the average daily advance cannot exceed 8–10 km per day. ” Remember these numbers, dear readers, they will be useful to us soon. We read further: “With the current state of affairs, a fast pace of offensive is possible after a collision with a finally regrouped enemy, after the defeat of its main forces. Success in such an operation opens up broad prospects for a faster pace of further advancement, it creates the conditions for the development of genuine pursuit with the maximum speed and pace allowed by physical condition of the troops. This period, we must expect a daily advance of 20-25 and 30 km. " So, our Soviet military commander-expert tells us that it is impossible to move more than 10 km per day in conditions of battles with an undefeated enemy. If we move more than 20 km a day, it means that the enemy is not able to resist us, he runs. This is a rout. Remember these numbers!

And now let's see how the situation was assessed at the front in the summer of 1941 by German soldiers and officers. Here are a few excerpts from the memories of the German soldiers: “Do you know how much our intelligence units have advanced today? To the very Memel! We have almost reached Memel, Haltepunkt! This means that on the first day we covered seventy kilometers of enemy territory. ” (G. Haape. The Grin of Death. M., 2009, p. 39). This conversation takes place between the commander of the regiment of the 6th Infantry Division of the Wehrmacht and the battalion doctor G. Haape, the author of the memoirs. “We already wanted the Russians to finally stop somewhere ahead ... We were dreaming about anything, even if it was about fighting - just to break this intolerable monotony, this deadly continuity of our endless procession. The halt was finally announced at the beginning of 12.00 p.m. It was decided to arrange it on a large farm a little off the road. Today we covered more than sixty kilometers. ” (Ibid., P. 76).

Of course, it is impossible to constantly maintain such a pace of the march for the simple reason that people are not horses or machines. Such physical efforts had bad consequences and should have affected the condition of the fighters. We read: “A long line of soldiers lined up to me with carefully washed legs. They all came to me for examination and treatment. ” (Ibid., P. 77). And then follows a detailed description of the procedures for removing of infantrymen's blisters. The rate of advance of tens of kilometers undoubtedly affected, and the German infantry was exhausted from such a speed of travel. Robert Kershaw in his book “1941 through the eyes of the Germans” mentions this division and writes: “By July 1, the 6th Infantry Division operating on the Army Group North section managed to cover 260 km from Memel to Riga - 10 days on disgusting roads, in conditions of constant clashes with scattered enemy units. In the period from July 9 to July 30, the 98th Infantry Division (Army Group “Center”) overcame 40–50 km daily. ”

 

As for the “clashes with scattered parts”, the following can be noticed: a part in Russian is a regiment. If a division encounters a regiment, and even more than once, it will not only master 260 km in 10 days, but also not master 26. These are simply translation problems, at least G. Haape himself, as an eyewitness, describes several skirmishes with small groups of our fighters. The examples above are a bottom-down view. And how did German generals and field marshals perceive what was happening in the summer of 1941? E. Manstein, at that time commander of the 56th tank corps, in his “Lost Victories”, in particular, recalls: “... Before the onset of the offensive, I was asked if we thought and how long to reach Dvinsk. I replied that if it could not be done in 4 days, then we are unlikely to be able to seize the bridges in an intact state. Now we have done it in 4 days and 5 hours, counting from the moment the attack began; we have overcome the resistance of the enemy, having completed 300 km in a continuous raid. ” The pace of advance in this case is almost 75 km.

Remember, dear readers! And let's return from the tankers to the infantry and listen to the commander of the IX Infantry Corps Herman Heyer. Its three divisions, the 137th, 263rd, and 292nd, advanced north of Brest. On the first day, all three compounds advanced 20 km east of the Bug. Well, you see, Savin, Irinarhovs and other Isaevs will start to stir. There were days after June 22, when the Wehrmacht infantry ran 60 km per day. And here on the first day of the fresh forces were only 20 km. So someone detained them? Maybe our border guards, as if fighting to the last fighter, and maybe regular units. Yes, of course, the Germans were held. But not by the border guards, not by units of the NKVD and not regulars, but by the waters of the Western Bug, where each division built its own separate bridge for the crossing. “At about 9 am, the 292nd Division completed the construction of the bridge ... The rest of the bridges were completed a little later. However, this only slightly accelerated the speeding up, since both banks required more serious preparation. The crossing was established only in the afternoon. ” (Heyer H. Mackensen E. From the Bug to the Caucasus. M., 2004, p. 54).

The most amazing thing here is complete silence about any “excesses” during the crossing of the Bug. That is, in reality, nobody prevented the Germans from building bridges. As for the exercises they built without interference without beeing under firing, bridges and went eastward. Agree, my friends, some very strange war draws us a German general. Further these oddities are becoming more and more. We read: “A few kilometers east of the Bug, I found the headquarters of the division. They suspected that enemy units were in front and on the flanks. I ordered to move forward as quickly as possible, without looking back at either the enemy or the neighbors, and today to occupy Bransk. ” (Ibid.) 

And further: "The keyword for this day remained the same -" Forward, without looking at the neighbors. " ... Between us and the XXXXIII Corps there was a gap of 30 kilometers. Perhaps there are significant enemy forces there, and we should not have left this area in the rear. ” (Ibid., P. 58). For such cases, generally speaking, in war, they can easily be put against the wall in any army, because no one is allowed to ignore the elementary rule of establishing an ulnar connection with neighbors. And here, not only is there no contact with the neighboring Corps, but there are also gaps between their divisions. And if in such a breach from the flank, or even from both strikes ... not even a division, but an enemy regiment. What will Herr General do then? To shout "Hitler kaput!" And to raise your hands up? Quite a real ending of such blatant disorder. But he was not afraid of such an outcome, since the first hours of the war had already told him a lot and explained what kind of enemy was against him. He had already encountered such an adversary a year ago in France. H. Heyer writes: “After crossing the Bug the IX Corps passed 210 km in 10 days, and then 380 km in 17 days. We can say that it was not a transition, but a flight! ” (Ibid., P. 36).

 

Before that, a brief recollection of the campaign of the past 1940: “My work as commander of the IX Corps began on the Western Front. Six months of positional war in the Palatinate. Two-month reshaping on the Dutch border. Then two breakthroughs from Maas to Dunkirk - 300 km in 26 days, then from Aisna to Aleyer 400 km in 9-11 days and 30 days of battles, during which I rethought everything I learned in peaceful days. ” (Ibid., P. 31). See, Mr. Heyer does not consider the days of breakthrough battles. His Corps spent about 36 days to make two breakthroughs, and the pace of advancement was 19.5 km (700: 36), and in Belarus and Russia it went “with battles” 590 km in 27 days at a rate of 21.5 km. There is either a wrong translation about the fights, or the general confuses something. In other places of his book, he very often mentions the state of our roads: “The main obstacle to movement was still the poor state of the roads.” (Ibid., P. 72). And here again about the “battles”: “We didn’t really need ammunition. Only on June 22, 27 and 28 we had to shoot. ” (Ibid., P. 83).

There is simply remarkable information in the book of H. Heier, what is called involuntary evidence. I mean his order on the Corps of July 2, 1941. It has been 10 days since the Corps "fights" and, it seems, participates in the "battles", but pay attention to what the general's soul hurts and what he is proud of: " "In 10 days, the first large period of the Russian campaign was overcome. The Corps' divisions achieved the following: In 10 days we covered 210 km from Bug to Shchara. Everyone who was aware of this knows what endless efforts it took because of innumerable obstacles and incredible bad roads. Never before the Germans  had to move in such conditions. Even without fighting, this march would require tremendous exertion of forces. This will be confirmed by everyone who had to measure 210 kilometers not with a ruler on the map, but with their own feet on the ground. But we not only marched, we had to fight "(Ibid, p. 50). Really?! Finally he remembered about the "battle". 

Further, in the order, of course, it will be written about trophies, about the huge number of prisoners and about their own losses. Then the book will again discuss the main problem: “The third stage of our campaign (July 10 - 24) was not too different from the second. We marched and marched, trying every day to go as far as possible. On the way, we captured Russians and occasionally engaged in gunfights. However, before we overcame the Dnieper, we had to endure a serious battle, which cost us 800 people, and after which we captured 10 thousand prisoners. Total, counting from June 22 - about 60 thousand. By July 24, the IX Corps covered 700 kilometers - almost two-thirds of the way to Moscow. This meant that in total we traveled from 800 to 1000 km in 33 days, an average of about 30 kilometers per day. And all this with fights along Russian roads and Russian heat. ” (Ibid., P. 84). 

And now, dear readers, let's return to our experts. Imagine that we had an idea to check, say, Comrade Triandafilov, how well he really understands the issues he writes about. Let's fantasize: here we come to him with a puzzle. Given: military conflict; two are approximately equal in strength (red and brown); brown suddenly attack and in 33 days pass 800 - 1000 km. And this is the infantry corps, and, therefore, the infantry moves on its own two feet. Question: how did the events really develop? In other words, according to time and space, we asked an expert to reconstruct the real course of events of a military conflict. Comrade Triandafilov, if he is a consistent person, will begin to argue on the basis of his own theoretical calculations. Although one of the sides attacked suddenly, but because of the equality of forces, the battles had to be heavy, so from 10 to 16 days out of 33 it should be considered as battles, and therefore, at this time the advance of the browns could not exceed 8-10 km per day. Somewhere on the 17th day of the conflict, a decisive battle took place, the Reds suffered a crushing defeat, and browns  began  their pursuit.

But then the expert would be surprised at the pace of pursuit - about 40-50 km. He would say that for infantry it is almost impossible. So that not separate units, but entire divisions and corps would pass almost a thousand kilometers in some two weeks, this is an impossible thing. And this means that there were no battles in the first two weeks, just as there was no decisive battle, but, simply, the Reds immediately refused to fight and ran. And in this case, the pace of advancement of about 30 km is quite consistent with theory. 

This is what the expert would say! And this is how H. Heier explained it: “The equipment we captured also shows that the Russians in our district did not try to provide organized resistance. They had hundreds of tanks and guns and could freely counterattack, but they very rarely took such steps. The IX Corps captured and destroyed during the battles hundreds of tanks and guns. Hundreds of them were left to stand on the main and country roads, in forests and on swamps, on heights and hollows. They were abandoned because of a lack of gasoline, due to technical malfunctions, or for some other reason. It was also captured a lot of ammunition, vehicles, weapons. It was a real dump. If the soldiers abandon their weapons, then they are trying to save their lives and are not going to resist the enemy. ”(Ibid, p. 79). 

All the above statements belong to the direct participants of the 1941 summer campaign. People wrote about what they saw with their own eyes. And they observed only a small part of those grand events. And it is quite possible to assume that in other parts of a huge front the picture was completely different. Let us give the floor to Colonel-General F. Halder, the Chief of the General Staff of the Reich Ground Forces. He certainly had full information about the entire Soviet-German front, which allowed him to assess the situation as a whole. 

I didn’t find any direct data from Halder about how many kilometers the troops covered at one time or another in the summer of 1941. But he, like many German officers and generals, compared the course of the Soviet-German war with the movement of Napoleon’s armies deep into Russia in the summer of 1812. Halder noted that the Wehrmacht was marching with the pace of Napoleon’s army, which was pursuing Russian forces trying to draw them into a general battle. But the Russians carried off their legs, but not because the soldiers refused to fight, but because the plan was like this: drag the Frenchmen through the Russian bumps, stretch their communications, wear them out properly, and then beat them. 

In the summer of 1941, we didn’t have such a plan; our troops simply carried off their legs. F. Halder compared the course of the summer of the 41st to the events of the summer of the 40th in the West. On May 12, 1940, that is, on the third day of the war, he wrote in his diary: “The consumption of ammunition is moderate. Fuel consumption - 1 refueling. " May 15: "Ammunition: Still moderate consumption." But what appears in his diary on June 24, 1941, again on the third day, but the Soviet-German war: “The consumption of combustible and lubricating materials is very high. Ammunition consumption is insignificant. " Here I would like to recall the statements of G. Zhukov at the famous Conference of the end of 1940, where he cited the figures of the “quick march” of German troops in the West - 10-15 km. To which S. Tymoshenko remarked: “When they badly fight”. This refers to the weak resistance of the French. In the East, the Germans marched twice as fast - 20-30 km. How can you call it, gentlemen of Irinarhov, Isaevs, Savinins and those who joined them? It turns out that in the East we did not fight in any way!

If you make a rough estimate, the following picture emerges. By the end of November 1941, the Germans were some twenty kilometers from the capital of our Motherland. For 150 days they went from Brest to Moscow 1,100 km, that is, more than 7 km a day. Back we pushed them for almost 3 years. Brest was taken by the troops of the 61st Army under the command of General P. A. Belov on July 28, 1944. We divide the same 1,100 km by 960 days. It turns out that we actually crawled to the West at a speed of slightly more than 1 km per day. But the speech in this chapter is not about us, but about the Germans. What made them fight with such persistence? What kind of material and moral incentives helped them to resist in such a fight for life and death? 

We still know almost nothing about the socio-economic conditions in Germany from 1933 to 1945. In the USSR, and then in Russia, mountains of historical and fiction were written about the 3rd Reich, but nowhere will you find information about the real life of the Germans at that time. And only with the advent of the Internet, an ordinary citizen of the Russian Federation had the opportunity to at least learn something about this, essentially the main sphere of existence of any nation. The above text on this topic is an excerpt from Leon Degrell's article "How Hitler consolidated power in Germany and began a social revolution." The author, a Belgian by birth, at the age of 35 volunteered for the front, fought as a member of the Walloon volunteers, first as a private, and then as an officer. He served to Standarfenführer. At the end of the war, he commanded the SS Wallonia volunteer brigade. Personally met with Adolf Hitler.

From the title of the article it is clear that Degrelle considers the changes made by the Fuhrer of the German nation in the socio-economic sphere revolutionary. It shows that Adolf did not feed his people with promises of a bright future, did not promise that in 20 years the Germans would live under developed socialism, but simply took and brought Germany to the first place in Europe in terms of standard of living. Here is a short excerpt from the mentioned article. Those who wish to read this work will find it entirely on the Internet in The Journal of Historical Review, Fall 1992, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp.299-370.

“By the beginning of 1933, the poverty of the German people was virtually universal. At least 6 million unemployed and hungry workers wandered aimlessly through the streets, receiving miserable unemployment benefits, which were less than 42 marks a month. Many of those who did not have a job, had families that needed to be fed, and thus, In total , it turned out that about 20 million Germans, i.e. a third of the country's population were forced to survive on 40 pfennigs per person per day. Moreover, unemployment benefits were paid only for 6 months. After that, the person received only scanty beggarly pocket money, which was distributed through charities.

 

Even before the end of 1933, Hitler succeeded in building 202,119 houses. For four years, he provided German citizens with almost 1.5 million new dwellings. The demographic problem Hitler solved as follows. The focus was on supporting young families. They were guaranteed interest-free loans to buy their own homes with a repayment of 10 years. At the birth of each child, one-fourth of the debt was canceled. Four children, with a normal birth rate once every 2.5 years, were enough to pay off the entire loan debt.

Once, during a conversation with Hitler, I expressed my amazement about this policy. “But then you will never get back the full amount of your loans?” I asked. “Why?” He smiled in response. "During the ten-year period, a family with four children will bring into the treasury much more than the amount of our loan, taking into account indirect taxes on hundreds of different things that such a family will acquire." It was decreased degree of exploitation of workers. The monthly housing rent for a worker could not exceed 26 marks or one eighth of the average salary in the industry.If the worker received a higher salary, then for him the maximum payment for housing did not exceed 45 marks.

Hitler’s entire economic policy was based on the following formula: he risked enormous sums to undertake ambitious public works and to stimulate renewal and modernization of the industry, and then receive back invested billions through invisible and painless tax revenues. Germany did not have long to wait for the visible results of Hitler’s economic recovery formula.

Under Hitler, every worker had the legal right to paid vacation . Formerly paid holidays usually did not exceed 5 days, and almost half of young workers did not have any leave  at all. Perhaps, first of all, Hitler took care of young workers, the youngest of them received longer vacations. It was humane and rational: young people needed more strength and fresh air for the full development of their strength and energy. And so they enjoyed the full annual paid leave of 18 days.

Today, more than half a century later, these figures have already been surpassed, but in 1933 they far exceeded European norms. Standard vacation was 12 days. Then, starting from the age of 25, he rose to 18 days. After 10 years of work in one enterprise, the worker received a longer vacation — 21 days, which was three times the vacation that the French socialists provided to their worker in 1936. Hitler introduced the standard 44-hour work week.As for overtime work, they began to be paid at higher rates, which at that time was nowhere on the continent. And since the eight-hour working day has become the norm, the ability to work overtime has increased.

As for other innovations, the break at work has become longer: two hours instead of one, which provided a great opportunity for workers to relax and take advantage of sports facilities, which the large enterprises were required to have . The election promises given by Hitler at that time did not remain an empty rhetoric. National referendums followed one after another: in 1933, 1934, 1936 and in 1938, not counting the Saar plebiscite of 1935, which was held with the participation of international observers. Voting was secret and voters were not obstructed. No one could prevent the Germans from voting against if they wanted. 

And, in fact, a certain number of voters voted against in every plebiscite. Millions of others could well do the same. However, the percentage of votes "against" remained surprisingly low - usually less than 10%. In the Saar region, where the plebiscite of January 1935 was held from beginning to end under the supervision of the victorious powers in the 1st World War, the results were the same as in the rest of the Reich: more than 90% voted for unification with Nazi Germany! Hitler was not afraid of such secret polls, because the German people constantly supported him. ”

And now, for a change, some statistics.

The salary of Wehrmacht soldiers

1) Military service

To this are added, of course, free meals, accommodation and travel by rail.

2) Contractors and personnel officers

Contract servicemen and personnel soldiers received salaries in the so-called Imperial payment system "C", which included various grades, for example, in Berlin due to a higher standard of living, higher salaries were paid than in small towns in the depths of Lower Bavaria. Most often, the class “A” was applied to payroll, which is shown in the following table. The amounts are given for 1935, and until the end of the war, they remained almost unchanged.

The salaries of servicemen in the rank of lieutenant to major were lowered several times, since, due to the nature of their career, it was in these ranks that many officers remained, for example, "hanging out" with the rank of major. To this, of course, in some cases remunerations were relied on, such as, for example, the chief sergeant-major for the position of company sergeant-major or aviation personnel.                                                                 

3) Salary during the war.

During the war, money was additionally paid for family support, cash support and front-line allowance. Front-line allowance was the same for all military personnel regardless of rank and was 1 RM (Reichsmark) per day. Cash payments to officers were:                                                                

Servicemen in the ranks above the major received only front-line allowance. Other allowances, for example, to air crews, were also naturally paid.

4) Comparison of military and civilian salaries.

The average salary of an industrial worker without taxes (Reichsmarks per week): 1936 - 24, 94 1939 - 28, 08

The average salary of an employee without deduction of taxes (Reichsmarks per month): 1936 - 199, 00 1939 - 231, 00

Average annual prices in the Reichsmark for manufactured goods and food: 

                                                           

Salary of the Red Army soldiers (1938):

The average monthly salary of workers and employees was (rubles / month): 1940 - 341, 00 (in industry); 331.00 - (the rest). The entire monthly income of a collective farmer was about 20 rubles.

Government retail prices of standardized and commercial trade (in rubles / kg):

Government retail prices of standardized and commercial trade (in rubles / piece):

 Pan

 14

 25

So, the German soldier had something to protect and for which he gave his life. He was shod and clothed, fed to satiety, properly trained and armed. From the above tables it can be seen that even a Wehrmacht rookie received 15 Reichsmarks a month. For this money, he could buy a choice of about 40 loaves of bread, 150 kg of potatoes, more than 7 kg of veal, 65 liters of whole milk or 22 liters of beer. But since the soldier lived, as they say, on everything ready, he could spend money not on beer, but, say, on the purchase of a car.

“In 1934, Ferdinand Porsche received an order to develop the concept of a four-seater passenger car capable of speeds of 100 km / h and costing no more than 1 thousand Reichsmarks. The German automobile industry considered such a requirement impossible. In the past, such projects have failed due to high production costs or poor quality. However, F. Porsche managed to create such a car. A prerequisite for fulfilling all the criteria could only be a modern automobile plant, which made it possible to combine the requirements of high quality and low production costs.

Porsche copied the conveyor production method of the American concern Ford. Only thanks to this, as well as advance payment, it was possible to keep the price of the car below 1 thousand Reichsmarks. Hitler commissioned the German Workers Front (union of trade unions - A. Yatsev) to build the largest automobile manufacturing plant in Europe. Especially for this purpose, a new city was designed and built from scratch: Wolfsburg became the center for the production of KDF cars. KDF is an abbreviation of the German “Kraft durch Freude”, which means “Strength through Joy.” 

This was the name of the program carried out by the German trade unions to solve the demographic problem. Entertainment, tourism, sports have become affordable and popular among German citizens. And already, starting in the mid-30s, the Germans constituted the largest group of tourists sailing in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas.

Wolfsburg is located at the intersection of road, rail and river routes, making it an ideal place for the planned production. In 1938 Volkswagen  was established. Since August of that year, advertising of KDF cars has already begun - the original name of Volkswagen.

The serial model was planned to be sold at 990 Reichsmarks, and convertibles at 1050. To this were added 200 Reichsmarks for two types of insurance, including CASCO, as well as 60 Reichsmarks for transportation to the regional center of the region where the client lived. The car had to be paid through regular installments: at least 5 Reichsmarks per week, and for young people at least 5 Reichsmarks per month. The person who paid the fee was given a card or postcard on which stamps were pasted. All this was carried out by local trade union organizations. It was necessary to stick 50 stamps on one card, each of which corresponded to the 5 Reichsmarks paid as a contribution. Total 250 Reichsmarks per card. If one card was stamped, a new one was issued. On the third one was already put the regional order number, and on the fourth - state's. Then, in the order of the national number, that is, the queue, a car was delivered to the client.

In the USSR, too, there was a similar "stamp" system of trade. I myself remember how in the mid-60s my parents received small books in consumer cooperation, paid dues and pasted stamps. Having stamped a certain number of pages with stamps, one could acquire scarce things: a table, a cupboard, or a radio. Of course, ordinary workers and collective farmers did not even dream about cars in those years, and German citizens could actually buy a car in the early 40s.

So, back to the German rookie soldier who decided to buy a car. Since he, unlike the Red Army, was fed to the dump, he could well make his 15 Reichsmarks monthly as contributions. And for two years of service, a person paid a third of the cost of a car. And this, mind you, is a rookie. And some idle corporal-over-conscript after a year of service could safely ride a Volkswagen. I’m not even talking about officers.

But let's temporarily leave the German soldiers and officers, let them "bastards" ride around on their Volkswagens. Let’s see how the Red Army soldiers  lived. Our rookie received 8 rubles 50 kopecks  in 1938 per month. With that kind of money, he could buy 5 loaves of bread from 2nd grade wheat flour or 4l of milk or a pound of pork. Compare our five loaves with their “fascist” forty or 4 liters of milk and 65 liters. And try to compare the salary of an private and, say, the regiment commander by them and by us. In the Wehrmacht, the colonel received more than 60 times more than a rookie. And in the Red Army, this difference was 140 times! We are all equal, they have gentlemen and all kinds of von barons there, and the income gap between the military in the country of triumphant equality and fraternity is more than two times greater than that of “nonhumans” and “scum of humanity”. How to understand it?

And why did any division commander in war  get to his usual salary "combat" surcharge in one Reichsmark, exactly the same as an ordinary soldier? And we have a division commander, whose salary was more than 1600 rubles., added 25%. That is, in reality, he received “combat” in the amount of more than 400 rubles, and for the ordinary Red Army soldier these same “combat” surcharge were only 8.5 rubles, if we proceed from the standards of monetary maintenance in 1938. So the Germans are all equal in battle, and some of Russians  are “equal” to the others 50 times. Or how?

Here I want to stop and remind dear readers that the topic of this chapter is the influence of the moral factor on the combat effectiveness of the army. Of course, the ordinary Red Army fighter in 1941 did not know anything about the prices and salaries of military personnel in Germany. And all the above figures about German well-being and well-fed life could not negatively affect his moral condition. It's clear. But it is also clear that he knew prices and salaries in his own country and was aware of the conditions under which he and his family lived. But it is very important what thoughts the soldier’s head is occupied with when he thinks about his wife and children.

To more specifically imagine the sentiments  of the Red Army soldiers, it’s enough to read, for example, the following lines: “Once I am sitting in the office of the director of the radio plant named after Lenin, where I ended up on official business. A knock on the door interrupts our conversation. The secretary sticks her head and reports: “Serdyukova in the reception. Will you let her in or let her wait?” Serdyukova timidly enters the office. Her smeared face makes it difficult to determine how old she is. ... “Serdyukova, why didn’t you go to work yesterday? - asks the director. - This is a major crime and is punishable by the laws of wartime. You know what you rely on.”  “I was sick, comrade director. I couldn’t get out of bed", Serdyukova answers in a cold voice. ... "I can not do anything. Law. So we are all sick.” Serdyukova's face is distorted. “Is everyone so sick ?! - she screams and takes a few steps to the director's desk. - Everyone?! Have you seen this ?!” Tears flow down her face, but she herself does not notice it. In a fit of impulsive rage, standing in the middle of the office, she lifts the hem of her skirt. This is no longer a human being, not a woman - this is a hunted creature, seized by the courage of despair. "Everyone? Everyone? Is everyone so sick ?!” I see a blindingly white female body against the cold background of the gray walls of the office. These are not the slender legs of a woman, these are two shapeless swollen pillars where the border between the knees is not visible, where the bend of the leg is not visible. Round garters from the scraps of a red car tire cut deep into swollen meat bulging at the edges of a doughy bluish mass. Hungry swelling of the legs. " (Klimov G. Song of the winner. Krasnodar, 2002, p. 594-595).

And here’s another picture, which is much broader in scope, but also concerns women: “As a result of an ill-considered solution to the issue of pensions for families of ordinary military personnel, the number of women working in industry decreased by 500 thousand people by March 1940. As a result of the revision of this issue, by the end of 1940 it was again possible to raise the number of working women to the previous level and even slightly exceed it. ” (Muller-Gillebrand. Internet site). Germany has been fighting for almost a year, but this does not concern women. And this is completely normal ... in a normal country. And is it possible in the "peace-loving" Soviet Union? No way! There, a woman has long been “equalized” in rights with a man, and she is obliged to work. Even for absenteeism, and not just for refusing to work, she was threatened with a prison in those days when it wasn't any war.

Knowing all this, in what state of mind was the bulk of the Red Army men? It is clear in what. Our citizens, dressed in soldiers' greatcoats, knew that most of their compatriots were forced to spend the lion's share of their time and energy in search of a piece of bread and a roof over their heads. That is, in this sense, Comrade Stalin equated them with representatives of the wild animal world. Were our grandfathers and great-grandfathers ready in such circumstances to sacrifice their lives for that bestial regime that had cast them to the level of draft animals? Did our soldiers , who were driven into the attack, really shout in the hot summer of 1941: “For the Motherland! For Dzhugashvili! "? Or is it all the inventions of the "red-feather" political instructors-agitators?

The outbreak of war showed that our ancestors were, at a minimum, no more stupid than us. Yes, they were humiliated and insulted to the loss of human dignity, but the instincts of self-preservation worked fine for them. And they did absolutely right, refusing to fight for satanic power. That's why the Wehrmacht marched in a marching order to Moscow itself. The Germans considered themselves a race of masters. And I must admit: they had reasons for this. Truly, only superhuman efforts could raise a defeated and humiliated country with a crisis economy in one five-year period and bring it to first place in Europe, and even in the world, in terms of living standards. The objective reality given to the Germans, like all of us, in a sense, told the citizens of Germany that they had every right to be proud of themselves and their government.

Therefore, with the moral factor, with the desire to follow the orders of the command, with discipline in the German army, everything was in order. If you look, for example, the pre-war charter of the armored forces of the Wehrmacht, it becomes clear how relations were built between the military in the country of really victorious socialism. I remind readers of the name of the party of A. Hitler - NSDAP, which in German means the National Socialist German Workers' Party. Here are a few points from the aforementioned charter: - “The most important quality of a boss is his willingness to take responsibility on time. -The value of a soldier during a war, along with the level of his physical and combat training, is also determined by his spiritual and moral forces. ...The spirit of camaraderie should help ensure that the unit in any situation is a united team.”  They can object to me, saying, you can write anything, paper can endure everything. Of course. But in Germany, the words were followed by real deeds. It is clear that the military unit can most easily be made cohesive if it is formed according to the territorial principle. And in the German army there were Austrian, Bavarian, Berlin, Saxon and other divisions. It is always easier for people from one land or region to find a common language and, therefore, quickly become a united team.

In our country, it was impossible to even think of such a thing. I remember how I personally flew in 1977 with the deputy political officer of our regiment from Moscow to Chimkent for conscripts. From an economic point of view, transporting recruits from Kazakhstan to the central lane of Russia and vice versa from the center of the country to Kazakhstan is absolute idiocy. But in the Kremlin they could sleep peacefully: no one would rally and bayonet the "secretaries".

A few more examples of how the slogan of equality and fraternity came to life in Germany: “Then I was a guest of the headquarters. All officers were happy when someone arrived here, because then they were allowed to drink a bottle of schnapps prepared for guests of honor. Himmler was very strict. He himself did not drink alcohol. And everyone, from lieutenant to general, had to peel potatoes for lunch. ” (Carius O. "Tigers" in the mud. M., 2004, p. 231). “At that time, Germany was the first country in the world in which the food supply standards were the same for both officers and soldiers.” (Scheiderbauer A. War on the Eastern Front. M., 2008, p. 138).

You try to imagine, brethren, as a general of the NKVD, but what is there, the general, even a lieutenant, is peeling potatoes for lunch. Have you tried? That's it! Rather, the Volga, as well as the Dnieper and the Don will flow back than our soldiers and officers will be supplied at the same rates. Not for that, we committed a coup in 1917! And how is it for you: “Vacation is granted evenly in the order of priority personally established by the unit commander. Only in special cases, for example, in connection with the Christmas holidays or after the birth of a child, it was possible to give preference to married. A serious illness of family members or damage incurred as a result of the bombing could also serve as an argument for an extraordinary vacation. ” This is an excerpt from the already quoted charter of armored forces of the Wehrmacht. There are no comments here.

And there is nothing surprising in the fact that for such laws and rules, for such conditions, German soldiers stood to death in that war. They had something to lose, and there was something to protect. And what did the Soviet soldier need to protect? Collective farms, the Gulag, "black raven"- cars , coupons for foodstuffs and collective farm ticks for a workday? You must admit that no normal person will lay down his life for such “values.” And so, by the end of 1941, the Red Army  personnel almost completely surrendered or fled, not wanting to fight for the interests of Comrade Dzhugashvili and Co.

Here I will allow myself to make a small digression and touch on the topic of losses in the Second World War. This question is extremely sensitive and important, because you can rant about the advantages of the social system, about the leading role of the party, but if your country has lost ten times more than the enemy, you can put these "advantages" together with the "leading role" in one place. The Kremlin "political officers" understood this and have always carefully monitored it and are now monitoring data on military losses and are trying in every way to refute data on the multimillion losses of our army. Even independent writers such as Y. Mukhin and M. Solonin adhere to the point of view that, they say, it was a lie on both sides. Therefore, all the numbers coming from the opposite side, about the enemy's loss of human or material should be divided into three. Of course, it is impossible to refute such a point of view, but to express a slight doubt is quite appropriate. The fact is that this topic (German data on the losses of the Red Army) arose immediately after the outbreak of war. Goebbels’s office worked actively and reported on the successful Blitzkrieg in the summer and fall of 1941 in all possible ways. The press, radio, and cinema trumpeted on the whole world about the victorious tread of the Wehrmacht, about the encirclements and hundreds of thousands of prisoners.

Here Adolf speaks on October 2, 1941 with an appeal to the soldiers of the Eastern Front and calls the numbers: "More than 2,400,000 prisoners of war. Over 17,000 tanks. More than 14,200 aircraft. Over 21,600 guns. ” From his speech in Munich on November 8 of the same year: “3,600,000 prisoners of war. More than 15,000 aircraft. Over 22,000 tanks. Over 27,000 guns. ” All these figures were spread around the world and caused a corresponding reaction, that is, they were not believed. And this is understandable: what a normal person would believe in these millions. Okay, thousands, well, tens of thousands. But here we are talking about exorbitant amounts that history has not yet known. And the Fuhrer of the German nation had to poke on all doubters. He was literally told the following: “If the German military department calculated something, then there can be no mistake. This is not to you the calculations of some exchange swindler. All these data (about the losses of the Red Army-Yatsev A.) are as accurate as the data on the French prisoners. "

So, when Messrs. Mukhin and Solonin write about the deliberate overstatement of our losses by the German side, they most likely judge by themselves. In Russia, people to this business (ascribe a wand or a toe) are very, very familiar. This is not considered out of the ordinary. Moreover, we periodically live in situations when our life really depends on “sleight of hand”. Moreover, cheating was necessary not only to ordinary people, but also, naturally, to people from theSo, when Messrs. Mukhin and Solonin write about the deliberate overstatement of our losses by the German side, they most likely judge by themselves. In Russia, people to this business (ascribe a wand or a toe) are very, very familiar. This is not considered out of the ordinary. Moreover, we periodically live in situations when our life really depends on “sleight of hand”. Moreover, cheating and cheating was necessary not only to ordinary people, but also, naturally, to people from the high society for whom the word “honor” was not an empty phrase. Read, for example, the memoirs of S.M. Golitsyn “Notes of a homeless person”, and you will see how a representative of an old noble family had to survive in Soviet conditions, how he “drove bullshit”, and how “stone pressed his soul”. upper layers of society for whom the word “honor” was not an empty phrase. Read, for example, the memoirs of S.M. Golitsyna's “Notes of a soldier without shoulder straps”, and you will see how a representative of an old noble family had to survive in Soviet conditions, how he “drove bullshit”, and how “stone pressed his soul”.

The Germans had no need to lie, especially at the beginning of the war. Why would a man who considered himself a representative of a higher race humiliate his dignity with lies? Moreover, soon the whole world, as he thought, would lie at his feet. And if this attributed toe is discovered? The end of his supermanhood. Obviously the game was not worth the candle. Thus, there is no good reason to doubt the German data on our losses. And these almost 4 million Soviet soldiers really refused to fight for the murderous power. “But isn’t you giving a simple explanation?” Some will ask. So M. Solonin, already quoted many times, seems to think that this is a “caricatured simplified” approach to the events of the outbreak of war. He writes: “And is it possible to divide these categories — skill and desire, qualification and motivation — in such a kind of activity as war, where a person is required to overcome the basic instinct of self-preservation every minute? It is the fundamental inseparability of the concepts "did not want to fight" and "did not know how to fight," and not the desire for the notorious "political correctness" does not allow us to reduce all the causes of the military catastrophe of the 41st year to the caricatured simplified formula "the army refused to fight for Stalin." (Solonin M. June 23: "day M". M., 2007, p. 433).

To finally clarify Mr. Solonin’s level of skill as a “dialectic,”  let’s imagine a situation like this: an investigator at a crime scene is interviewing a witness. The witness - a young man tells how it was. It turns out that a man with a knife suddenly broke into his house in the early morning. Threatening the man with knives, the criminal took the money, expensive things, and even behaved towards the wife of the owner of the house, to put it mildly, not in a gentlemanly way. Having finished all affairs, the attacker also suddenly disappeared. To the investigator’s question why he didn’t use improvised means somehow: a baseball bat or a tourist hatchet lying on the windowsill to protect his family, the young man replied that he did not have enough professional knowledge of the items mentioned. In other words, his qualifications are not enough to handle them. Mr. Solonin, do you yourself understand what you wrote? To help you in such a difficult matter as untangling "dialectical embroidery", I will give a real historical example. The scene is Finland. The time is the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940. The Winter war, of course.

“The Finnish army lacked equipment, uniforms and modern artillery systems. At the time of the war in November 1939, the Finns had only 112 obsolete anti-tank guns. The situation in the Red Army was completely different. Despite participating in the Polish campaign, Stalin could put up a sufficient number of soldiers against the Finns, because his regular army at that time numbered 1,250,000. In the Winter War, Russia put up 45 divisions with 18,000 soldiers each. That made a total of 810,000 people, which amounted to almost a quarter of the total population of Finland. In fact, over the entire period of hostilities, the Russians involved in one form or another 1,200,000 people. The Russians also used 1,500 tanks and 3,000 aircraft. While the Finns had difficulty supplying their troops with ammunition, the Russians had unlimited supplies and a significantly better communications system. But the Red Army had two main weaknesses. The first is the weakness, sketchiness and lack of initiative of the middle and junior command staff. The second - because of the short winter days, the Soviet Air Force was also limited in helping ground troops. When the Russians used the aircraft, they suffered heavy losses, which reached 800 aircraft — more than 25% of all aircraft used in the war.

The Finns bought fighter jets in Italy, France, Britain and the USA. The Italians provided the planes very quickly, but then faced difficulties when Germany refused to allow cargo on its railways. The planes had to be returned to Italy in order to be reloaded there by ships and sent around Europe to the final destination - Sweden. There they were brought to a state of readiness and already from there flew under their own power to Finland.

As part of small groups of 4 people, the Finns, using logs, jammed the tracks of enemy vehicles, stopped them and, using the Molotov cocktail, set fire to and exploded the fuel tanks of the tanks. More than 2,000 Soviet tanks were destroyed by this method. After effectively containing the Soviets during December, the Finns won a stunning victory on the Raam Road near Suomusalmi in early January 1940. Encircling the Soviet 44th Infantry Division (25,000), the Finnish 9th Division, under the command of Colonel Nyalmar Siilasvuo, was able to divide the enemy column into small parts, which were then destroyed. More than 17,500 were killed. The Finns lost about 250 people in this battle. ” (Website “militaryhistory.about.com/winterwar.htm)

Yes, you can call the Soviet soldiers who met the “Blitzkrieg” in the summer of 1941 as insufficiently qualified. Of course, our gunners in terms of education and training were inferior to the German. Yes, we had problems with ammunition. But are there really few forests in Belarus? You can not find logs there? Why mobilized Finnish peasants, hunters, workers and students were able to invent a method of fighting tanks, but ours could not? And what do you think, Mr. Solonin, that four Finns who poked a log into the chassis of the tank had a self-preservation instinct? Or were they robots? It seems to me that with the instincts of the Finnish soldiers everything was in order. It was the instinct of self-preservation that told them how without cannons and shells you can fight tanks. They clearly understood what a "bright communist future" shone for them and their children. But our soldiers in the summer of 1941 had no idea what the Germans had come for. Probably dances with Russian young ladies to drive. So or not, Mr. Solonin?

And here we come to the most important question in the history of that war: how did we manage to win? If, contrary to M. Solonin, the simplified formula “the army refused to fight for Stalin” is admitted, then why did our Red Banner appear above the Reichstag, and not their red banner above the Kremlin? To paraphrase Mr. Liddell Garth, one can formulate the question more precisely: how did Comrade Stalin manage to organize the victory? M. Solonin has an answer in which, referring to Joseph Vissarionovich, he considers the Fuhrer of the German nation to be the main "culprit" of our victory. We read: "... Hitler’s stupid policy turned the peoples of the USSR into sworn enemies of today's Germany." Everyone can find these words of Mr. Solonin in his books: “June 22, ...” or “June 23:“ Day M ”

To prove Stalin's thought, M. Solonin gives examples of the barbaric attitude of the Hitlerite authorities towards the civilian population of the occupied regions and prisoners of war. The mass death of our prisoners in the first military winter, the "modernized" collective farm system, the "nightmare scenes of the Jewish genocide" - all this led to the fact that "... every day more and more millions of people began to realize that war, on which they have to fight and die, it’s not for the sake of releasing yet another “class brothers” in Zanzibar, not for the sake of the ultimate triumph of the ever-living teachings of Carla Marla, but simply so that they, their families, their children can live and hope for a better future. " (Solonin M. June 22 ..., M., 2005, p. 484).

I don’t know if the people who lived under Stalin for nearly two decades could have hope for a better future during his reign, but I have a couple of specific questions for Mr. Solonin. How, for example, could information about a disaster with our prisoners reach a resident of Moscow, Leningrad, Murmansk, Novosibirsk or Voronezh? It would be foolish to wait for Joseph Vissarionovich’s permission to print in Pravda or Izvestia that of the 4 million captured Red Army soldiers, about 2 million died in winter. Could Comrade Stalin give out such a state secret? After all, this meant recognizing the mass surrender of our soldiers in 1941. It is still unknown what would frighten Soviet citizens accustomed to the harsh Soviet reality - 2 million who died of starvation or 4 million who surrendered. Starvation death in the USSR in those days was unlikely to shock anyone.

So official sources of informing their citizens about the situation in the occupied areas are no longer there. The word of mouth mentioned by M. Solonin, at first glance, could play the role of a means of disseminating such rumors. However, this is only at first glance. If, for example, a surviving prisoner of war from a camp or a local resident from the area where such an “institution” is located crosses the front line, then there are huge doubts that they will be given a platform for public speaking. Competent people will talk to them so much that they won’t even say a word about what they’ve seen and experienced even in a whisper to their neighbor in gaol.

As for the impact of the ongoing genocide of Jews on “more and more millions of people,” Mr. Solonin himself writes literally the following: “The minority is actively on the side of the Germans, the majority are quietly gloating (“ the Jews themselves are to blame ”). The best ones are outraged by the passivity of the Jews, but they themselves are sitting in the city and are not going to leave for partisans ("Germans do not touch us"). (Solonin M. June 22 ..., M., 2005, p. 417).

This means that in Minsk, Vitebsk, Smolensk and elsewhere in occupied cities, Soviet citizens are not from the radio, newspapers and magazines, not from the grandmother in the bazaar, but with their own eyes see how the Germans treat Jews. But no one wants to go into the woods and fight so that "their families, their children can live and hope for a better future." Or does M. Solonin think that in Novosibirsk, Murmansk or Voronezh, Russian people would react to all this differently? Why so? After all, he himself writes about the working methods of political propaganda of the Germans, firmly linking the concepts of “Jews” and “Soviet power”.

 How this same power acted with its citizens, M. Solonin described separately, devoting to this issue the whole chapter “Twenty Years in a row” in the book cited above. Soviet power is a vague concept, but the composition of the first Lenin's government is very specific. Why shouldn't Mr. Solonin publish it? And what kind of babble is this: “Jews were responsible for these atrocities (although by the 41st year Jews from the NKVD were almost completely“ cleaned out ”).” How do you know about “cleaning”? Do you have reliable information, or are you sharing your own feelings? So I will give you an example of "personal feelings", saying just exactly different. We read: “Selfless workers were led by all kinds of bosses: authorized, specially authorized, cultural workers, agitators, political workers, commissars, and all sorts of other chief officials. There were many headquarters, and countless Jews sat in all these headquarters. I have never seen such a huge number of representatives of the “chosen people” gathered together.

The headquarters were increasingly located in schools, and the sons of Israel sat squeezed at their desks, or paced along the ditches with field bags, or drove around in cars. Thick, thin, red, black, curly, bald, they saw a certain quiet haven on the defensive lines.

The Fifth Directorate (Sychevsky) dominated the districts. There were about 10 such directorates on the Western Front. They were subordinate to the Main Directorate of Defensive Work of the Glavgidrostroy NKVD, whose headquarters were in Gzhatsk. Among the authorities there were many Chekists and 50% of Jews. ” (Golitsyn S. Notes of a soldier without shoulder straps. M., 2010, p. 31-32). This is Sergei Mikhailovich who describes the situation in the summer of 1941, when he worked on defense work near Sychevka. As you can see, speaking of “almost cleaning the Jews from the NKVD,” Mr. Solonin is engaged in crude propaganda, that is, to put it mildly, he’s lying

Now let's look through the eyes of a contemporary, the same S.M. Golitsyn, on the living conditions of collective farmers on the German and Soviet side of the front, almost said the zone of occupation. Here is the late autumn of 1942, the Saratov region. “By November, the collective farmers of Ozerkovsky somehow removed the rye and wheat, but they did not ripen the millet to harvest, as it snowed. It was strictly forbidden for village children and old women to rub millet manually for themselves, let good perish in the snow. ” (Ibid., P. 179).

And here’s another passage on the same topic: “I have already mentioned that under the Germans the local population in the Chernihiv region took three crops in three years. The Germans took when it was impossible to hide, and if there was a way to hide, the peasants easily deceived the dumb-headed invaders. The Germans wrote the strictest orders. And when it came to practically taking the bread, the elders showed them numerous ricks with unfrozen bread and proved that there was no one to thresh, because there were only old people, women and children. So the peasants preserved the entire grain harvest for three years.

When our troops liberated Chernihiv and military executives saw browned ricks where gold wheat was stored in the middle, they said: “Uh, no, you won’t  fool us!" And then they remembered the existence of our valiant UVPS (Office of Military Field Construction - A. Yatsev) and an order was issued on the 1st Belorussian Front: “Get the wheat!” (Ibid., P. 314).

A few more observations by S.M. Golitsyn at the time of his stay in the Voronezh and Kursk regions. “We stopped in the village of Golodnaya Kamenka. Since collectivization, such an ear-cutting epithet has been officially canceled. But, alas, that summer he was quite fit. Last fall and winter, our leading edge passed here, and the soldiers ate everything to the last chicken. It’s hard to write, but for additional products we sent to the right, former German, bank of the Don. ” (Ibid., P. 264).

“Due to the poverty of local residents, almost no local preparations were made in Ikorets, and the peasants from the opposite right bank of the Don, where the Germans had been for several months, lived far richer and managed to save both bread and cattle. Such was the policy of the Germans in these places, they hoped that they would return, retreating, the huts did not burn and sought to leave a relatively good memory after themselves. ” (Ibid., P. 277).

“In one village, my host was an old man with a large beard, like a boyar. His surname, like that of other inhabitants of the village, was Listoforov. The old man proudly explained that they were all nobles and came from a certain colonel of Tsar Peter. Once, sitting with him at a pint of moonshine, I asked him: “Well, how did you, grandfather, live with the Germans?” Sweat came out on the old man's forehead. He blissfully closed his eyes and sighed: “As with Nicholas.” (Ibid., P. 282).

Such are the things, Mr. Solonin. The former prince tells us completely different stories, unlike your speculation about the life of Soviet citizens in the German zone of occupation. Why all these examples? Because that the Stalin's words about Hitler’s "stupid politics" should not be taken seriously. Joseph Vissarionovich was not such a person to rely on the mistakes of others. He personally made the main contribution to the organization of our victory. This can be read, for example, in the book of Joachim Hoffmann, “The Stalinist War on Destruction ...”, where it is very correct, relying on documentary evidence, it is shown by what methods Comrade Stalin forced his subjects to start the “Patriotic War”. At first, citizens decided in such a passive way (refusing to fight) to free themselves from the "fatherly" guardianship of the best friends of athletes. Joseph Vissarionovich solved this simple technique and made it clear that it would not be possible to get rid of it so easily.

A specific set of tools used to force their people to war, everyone can find in the chapter "To the battle through terror. Soviet soldiers were driven into the fire ”of the above-mentioned book. The German historian does not invent anything, does not share his personal feelings, but simply analyzes the orders of the GKO, Headquarters, fronts, armies and divisions. And the reader has an unpretentious but very convincing picture with Comrade Stalin pronouncing phrases about events on the fronts as in that song, they say, "some people here and there sometimes" show cowardice. Accordingly, these "some" were put against the wall and it was reported to the whole army and country, as it were, as a warning. But, alas, the desired effect was not achieved, the soldiers took their overcoats and went somewhere: home, into the woods, to surrender. Then they turned from point terror to mass terror, and at the same time reminded the "refuseniks" of their wives and children. In mid-August 1941, Order No. 270 appeared, in which, in addition to terror, the theme of hostages appears. However, the army still does not want to fight. The matter takes a serious turn, so serious that it does not even take a month from the appearance of the mentioned order No. 270, as Stalin and Shaposhnikov “speak out” in Headquarters order No. 001919: “There are numerous elements on all fronts that even run towards the enemy and even when they touch, they drop their weapons and drag others along ..., while the number of persistent commanders and commissars is not very large.” If we switch to the normal language from the language of Soviet military propaganda, it will turn out simply: everyone runs and surrenders, there is no one to fight. Mass terror, being only relatively recently initiated, stil gives no desired results.

I. Hoffman could also mention the main “shooter” of the Red Army, G. Zhukov, who, being the commander of the Leningrad Front, sent code 4976 to the armies in September 1941: “Explain to all personnel that all families of fighters who surrendered to the enemy will be executed and upon returning from captivity they will also be shot. ” (Suvorov V. I take my words back. Donetsk, 2005, p. 399). True, Suvorov-Rezun reports that this order was canceled by Malenkov, but here the fact of the appearance of such a murderer’s order is important. Zhukov very accurately captured the mood of both Stalin himself and the entire ruling elite and understood that he would not be blamed for excesses in this matter. Therefore, he should not embarrass himself and  can shoot everyone to the seventh knee.

It is clear that such punitive methods of fomenting a "Patriotic" war could not bring results immediately. And in the summer of 1942 the same story was repeated: the troops were fleeing, the leader of the world proletariat threatens with every conceivable punishment. But gradually, apparently, personal impressions and "word of mouth" convinced the servicemen that Comrade Stalin and Co., mentioning wives and children in the execution orders, were by no means going to throw words in the wind. At first, it can be assumed that people with "warm hearts" began to really "deal" with the families of the captured generals and officers, and then the turn had to come to the rank and file. And here the majority of military personnel simply had to work out the instinct of saving their own families from the punishing hands of the Soviet government. And most of the soldiers had to seriously harness themselves into this war, which now almost directly concerned their wives and children. So, not Hitler’s stupid policy, but timely and accurately verified words of the orders of the “Kremlin Highlander”, heavy as “pound weights,” and their strict execution led us to victory.

This chapter is called “The Eternal Loss of Russia 1: 3”. Everything that has been written before is proof of loss. And why it is eternal, I will explain now a couple of examples. At the beginning of 2011, another “hot” topic was discussed on many Russian television channels. It was about our youth hockey team, who won the world title at a tournament in the United States. But the noise in the homeland rose not so much because of a strong-willed victory in the final, but because of the scandal associated with the departure of the newly made champions home. It turned out that when boarding a plane at night or in the early morning, young people either screamed too loudly, or screamed and raged. Be that as it may, television, of course, could not get past such an “interesting” topic. Our audience, as usual, split into two parts. Some demanded to punish the youths for such cheeky behavior, others justified the young hockey players, they say, the holy thing is to celebrate the victory according to Russian tradition. And in these two loud-voiced choirs of supporters and opponents, several lonely voices almost drowned. These "voices" did not make complaints against hockey players, but against sports officials who had to take care in advance and choose not a night flight, but a day one, so that the athletes could rest after a difficult final match. In which they, I recall, beat the Canadians.

These timid claims against our Russian bosses reminded me of a story. Here it is: “My return trip turned out to be unremarkable, apart from the fact that it passed through an unfamiliar country, which in itself was an event. But the main event for me was Paris. At that time, an order was in effect, according to which any Wehrmacht soldier who had officially arrived in Paris or was traveling there was allowed to stay in the city for 48 hours to inspect its sights. ” (Sheiderbauer A. War on the Eastern Front .... M., 2008, p. 134)

Such is the situation. It is April 1944. Germany is struggling with almost all the forces of the world. Here every fighter counts, every hour is expensive. And in the Wehrmacht there is an order that allows any soldier or officer who finds himself in Paris for two days to enjoy the beauties of this city. Wandering the Champs-Elysees, staring at Notre Dame, walking around the galleries of the Louvre - in short, joining the beautiful. That is, the leadership of the Wehrmacht considered their soldiers to be people and therefore tried to use every opportunity for the development of their subordinates aesthetic taste. Now let's ask, what tastes did our sports leaders develop in their wards? In the courtyard of the 21st century! There is no war. Our youth team won the hardest and most prestigious tournament. Many of the guys have never been to this American city of Buffalo, and maybe to the USA. They became champions. So give them the opportunity to at least get enough sleep and a couple of hours to get to know the city! I understand that no one will give them two days. Even such a thought cannot arise in a Russian person. Here you are not the Wehrmacht. What the hell is aesthetics, why should someone be attached to it? We arrived, gave all our best, got medals and went home. After all, officials are not bothering about their own pockets; they are saving a “state penny”. Yes? They would save so much on themselves!

Therefore, dear readers, do not be surprised that our football players or the same hockey players do not “die” in matches of national teams, as Czechs, Americans, Canadians, Finns and various other Swedes do. You better honestly admit how you will behave if, God forbid, a real conflict occurs. As they say, the truth, the truth alone and nothing but the truth. Take an example from Soviet citizens who in the spring of 1941 openly answered similar questions like this:

“It must be very cold in the houses

Tall, uncomfortable, uninhabited.

Likely ... it’s very difficult to realize

That it’s impossible to get warm in the house,

And, if you suddenly have to fight,

There’s nothing to lean on with your hand. ”