BOOK: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation
Multi-Author Book edited by Francesco Orilia and Michele Paolini Paoletti. Published by Routledge. Forthcoming in March 2017
Downward causation plays a fundamental role in many theories of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. It is strictly connected with many topics in philosophy, including but not limited to: emergence, mental causation, the nature of causation, the nature of causal powers and dispositions, laws of nature, and the possibility of ontological and epistemic reductions. Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation brings together experts from different fields—including William Bechtel, Stewart Clark, Tom Lancaster, Carl Gillett, John Heil, Robin F. Hendry, Max Kistler, Scott Sturgeon—who delve into classic and unexplored lines of philosophical inquiry related to downward causation. It critically assesses the possibility of downward causation given different ontological assumptions and explores the connection between downward causation and the metaphysics of causation and dispositions. Finally, it presents different cases of downward causation in empirical fields such as physics, chemistry, biology and the neurosciences. This volume is both a useful introduction and a collection of original contributions on this fascinating and hotly debated philosophical topic.
(Contributors: W. Bechtel, M. Bertolaso and M. Buzzoni, L. Boi, S. Clark and T. Lancaster, M. De Caro, S. C. Gibb, C. Gillett, S. Gozzano, J. Heil, R. F. Hendry, F. Jouen and M. Molina, M. Kistler, A. Marmodoro, E. Mayr, U. Meixner, S. Mumford and R. Lill Anjum, F. Orilia and M. Paolini Paoletti, J. Pemberton)
ARTICLE: M. Paolini Paoletti, How Powers Emerge from Relations
Axiomathes, 26(2)(2016): 187-204
I shall explore in this article the metaphysical possibility of powers’ strongly emerging from relations. After having provided a definition of emergent powers that is also based on the distinction between the possession and the activation of a power, I shall introduce different sorts of Relations that Ground Emergence, both external and internal. Later on, I shall discuss some examples of powers that are grounded on their instantiation. Finally, I shall examine the consequences of accepting such relations within a physicalistic ontology and I shall defend them against two objections based on the notion of bruteness.
Link (Axiomathes website) - Penultimate Draft (Academia)
ARTICLE: M. Paolini Paoletti, Formulating Emergence
Ratio. Forthcoming
Emergence is intuitively characterized as dependent novelty. Yet, besides this intuition, several formulations of it were elaborated in the last decades. In this article, after having distinguished between two different varieties of emergence (a weak and a strong one), I aim at providing two formulation schemes for emergence. This could help to explain what emergence is and to clarify and unify the suggested formulations. The general idea behind my schemes is that emergence is partial and qualified dependence of the emergent entities on their emergence bases. After having examined several formulations of emergences and presented my schemes, I shall analyse two interesting consequences of the acceptance of the latter: the in principle compatibility between weak and strong emergence and the idea that micro-physicalism, i.e., the main competitor of emergentism, may actually come in different degrees of strength, more or less in contrast with emergentism. Eventually, I shall briefly compare my formulation schemes with some other relevantly similar proposals.
Penultimate Draft (Academia)
ARTICLE: M. Paolini Paoletti, How I (freely) Raised My Arm. Downward, Structural, Substance Causation
Mind and Matter, 14(2)(2016): 203-228
I develop and defend a model of downward causation denoted as downward, structural, substance causation. This model is based on the idea that higher-level, strongly emergent substances can cause something at lower levels by imposing certain structures on lower-level goings-on. After providing a sketch of the model and of its ontological assumptions, I apply it to the analysis of how free mental causes can structure neural goings-on. I defend three theses following from such an analysis, and I test the empirical plausibility of the model. Finally, I anticipate some objections and replies.
Published Version (Academia)
CONTRIBUTED PAPER: F. Orilia, M. Paolini Paoletti, Three Grades of Downward Causation
In the aforementioned book. Forthcoming in March 2017
Kim has argued that in the layered model of reality shared by nonreductive physicalism and by emergentism, the assumed dependence of the mental level on the physical level leaves no room for downward causation. In his analysis Kim assumes that causal relata are events, conceived of as exemplifications of properties by particulars at a certain time. But if causal relata are conceived of in different ways and causation is appropriately understood, one can find room in the layered model for downward causation with different degrees of strength. A mild form of downward causation somehow arises from the identification of causal relata with tropes. A stronger form comes from an appeal to generic events as causal relata. Finally, an even stronger form emerges from causal relata understood as free exercisings of powers to will.
Penultimate Draft (Academia)
CONTRIBUTED PAPER: M. Paolini Paoletti, F. Orilia, Downward Causation. An Opinionated Introduction.
In the aforementioned book. Forthcoming in March 2017.
Downward causation is a widespread and problematic phenomenon. It is typically defined as the causation of lower-level effects by higher-level entities. Downward causation is widespread, as there are many examples of it across different sciences: a cell constraints what happens to its own constituents; a body regulates its own processes; two atoms, when they are appropriately related, make it the case that their own electrons are distributed in certain ways. However, downward causation is also problematic. Roughly, it seems to be at odds with specific scientific and/or epistemological desiderata: first and foremost, that everything can be reduced (one day or another) to the fundamental, micro-physical constituents and goings-on of the universe, so as to provide a unified explanation of everything and a unification of all the sciences " from the bottom ". Indeed, downward causation (if it is an irreducible phenomenon) introduces special causings not only at the higher levels, but also at the lower ones: if, in principle, we cannot fully understand what happens to the electrons without paying attention to the atoms (at the higher level) and we cannot fully understand what happens to the atoms by only paying attention to the electrons (at the lower level), there is no fully lower-level explanation for both higher-level and lower-level goings-on. In this introduction, we shall try to describe the prospects for downward causation in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. After having delved into the connections between downward causation, emergence and levels (§1), we shall discuss the irreducibility of downward causation (§2). We shall then briefly consider how specific metaphysical and epistemological assumptions bear on our understanding of downward causation and of its possibility (§3) and describe some views according to which downward causation is actually non-causal (or it is a special causal relation) (§4). We shall also mention some problems for the connection between downward causation and mental causation (§5) and some scientific examples of downward causation (§6). Finally, we shall summarize the contents of the contributions in this book (§7).
Penultimate Draft (Academia)