Abstract
In this talk, I argue that so-called subpersonal content is the primary form of mental content, by arguing that it is only kind of content that plays a causal role. I do this by arguing that (a) many causal-explanatory claims invoking subpersonal content have the right sort of modal profiles (the right sort of counterfactuals are true) and that (b) in contrast, when we focus on the distinctive aspects of supposed personal-level content (its robustly normative nature, for example), we see that explanatory claims invoking personal-level content do not have such a modal profile. If there is personal-level content, it derives from or depends upon a more fundamental kind of content, subpersonal content, not vice versa (contrary to a commonly held view about the relation between the personal and subpersonal levels). Thus, given a relatively uncontroversial principle of primacy, subpersonal content is the primary form of mental content.