Abstract
By focusing in particular on the hypothesis that the mental is an emergent phenomenon, Kim has argued for the implausibility of a relation of downward causation linking emergent and basal level entities. Kim’s arguments appear to rely on (i) a conception of emergence as supervenience, (ii) a view of causation as nomological sufficiency or as grounded on counterfactuals, (iii) the idea that causal relata are events understood as exemplifications of properties by particulars at a certain time. There are however other, possibly more interesting, accounts of causation, such as those based on transference, interventionism or powers of agents or substances, and, depending on the choice of the approach, the nature of causal relata may sensibly vary. It is interesting to study some of these alternative approaches with the goal of evaluating whether they are more hospitable to downward causation than Kim’s presuppositions. More specifically I would like to focus here on substance or agent causation.
According to the supporters of substance or agent causation, substances or agents are causes. According to the supporters of event causation, causes are events. Some philosophers have defended substance (or agent) causation in order to provide a libertarian account of free will, which seems in tune with viewing the mind as an emergent phenomenon and mental causation as downward causation. It seems to me however that there is an argument, analogous to Armstrong’s truthmaker argument in favor of states of affairs, that speaks against substance causation. In response to it one can perhaps propose a compromise view, a “multiple relation theory of causation,” analogous to Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement. In a simple case, such as that of a ball y’s being caused to move by its being hit by ball x, we can view causation as a five terms relational fact with two properties and two objects (one of them “taken twice”) as relata: C(H, x, y, M, y), i.e., x by hitting y causes y to move. (interestingly, at least from my point of view, such an account fits nicely with a version of presentism that I have defended elsewhere, namely “moderate presentism”).