Downward Causation and Naturalism (M. De Caro)

Abstract

One of the main objections against the same idea of downward causation is that is supposed to be incompatible with the naturalistic view of the world (Kim 1999). In this paper I will claim that this is not the case; more specifically, I will grant that downward causation is incompatible with the stricter form of naturalism, which is often called “scientific naturalism.” However, I will also argue that, at least in some formulations, downward causation, is compatible with some more liberal forms of naturalism that encompass causal pluralism (De Caro 2010 & 2015; also O’Connor 2000; Baker 2013). In this paper, I will (i) maintain that the forms of liberal naturalism that are compatible with downward causation do not violate the essential requirements for being naturalist conceptions (as is instead argued by many of its adversaries, such as Neta 2007); (ii) investigate what role downward causation plays in these conceptions; and (iii) argue that there are several good reasons for preferring liberal naturalism (in its different versions, including those that are compatible with downward causation) to scientific naturalism.