Preferences and Beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma:
A Within-Subjects Analysis.
Mariana Blancoa, Dirk Engelmannb, Alexander K. Kochc, Hans-Theo Normannd
Abstract
In game theory, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent ingredients of bestresponse
behavior. However, beliefs and preferences themselves are likely to interact and this
has important implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social
dilemma experiment allows to separate di.erent interaction channels. We .nd that the frequently
observed correlation between .rst- and second-mover behavior primarily originates via an indirect
channel, where second-mover decisions in
uence beliefs via a consensus e.ect, and the .rst-mover
decision is a best response to these beliefs. Speci.cally, beliefs about second-mover cooperation
are biased toward own second-mover behavior, and most subjects best respond to stated beliefs.
However, we also .nd evidence for a more conventional direct, preference-based channel. When
.rst movers know the true probability of second-mover cooperation, subjects' own second moves
still have predictive power regarding their .rst moves.