Cooperation in PD games: Fear, greed, and history of play
T.K. AHN1, ELINOR OSTROM1, DAVID SCHMIDT2, ROBERT SHUPP2
& JAMESWALKER
Public Choice 106: 137–155, 2001
Abstract. The impact of the cardinal relationships among pecuniary payoffs, and of social
history and reputation, on the choice of strategies in four one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma games
is experimentally examined. The results suggest that normalized payoff values linked to “fear”
and “greed” are important as predictors of behavior in the PD games. Success in coordinating
on the payoff dominant equilibrium in previous plays of coordination games also increases
the probability of cooperative play in the PD games. The effect of past play is strongest when
individuals are matched repeatedly with the same person in previous play, as contrasted to
being matched randomly with another player.