A Guide to Iran 2300

Introduction

The Islamic Republic came to power in Iran in 1979AD, displaced the monarchy, and promptly set about rewriting that nation’s constitution. The last requirement of the last article of that constitution contained a subtle foreshadowing, one visible now in the light of hindsight.. Not only did the article deal with the making of changes to the constitution, but among the various officials required to take part in the committee approving changes, the article required the presence of 3 university professors. It did not require these professors to be elected or appointed officials- merely being Iranian university professors was enough. Although the constitution of the Islamic Republic was modified a number of times, and was eventually to pass away with the National Restoration, this requirement was a herald of things to come, although the writers could hardly have known at the time. It was the first time that certain political rights and responsibilities had been affirmed in a modern constitution, to a certain class based solely on scholastic achievement. The idea of seeking advice of distinguished learned men was not new to Iran. Indeed, the Persian monarchy, more than a millennium ago had invented the court position of Wazir. Even before, Persian kings had held their scholars in high regard for centuries. But now it was there in writing- specific duties and powers falling upon the academic class for the first time. From this unnoticed beginning, the modern Iranian system developed. Unique in the pantheon of human governance, the Iranian system today equates political power with educational level, conferring voting rights only upon holders of university degrees, and increasing the weight of an individual’s vote, privilege, and responsibility in accordance with the academic rank he or she has achieved.

Although not completely isolated nor completely isolationist, the Iranians maintain a strong sense of aloofness not easily understandable to visitors from other nations. The Iranians see themselves as custodians of a carefully crafted society, above the crass and boorish cultures around them, yet socially fragile. Their exchanges with foreigners are guarded, at the personal, economic, and diplomatic levels. And yet, the visitor sometimes finds it hard to find things to fault them for. Iran is steeped in history and grandeur and presents itself with dignity. There care of antiquities is meticulous and reverent, a past director of the Academeii de Lincei once noted that had Euopeans had just half of the respect for their antiquities that the Iranians do, that foundation’s primary mission might be entirely unnecessary today.

The Iranians put great emphasis on thought and deliberation. Nothing worth doing is undertaken lightly or in haste. They value knowledge, fact and logic, and respect others for their educational level above all else. Corporations from outside Japan wishing to impress potential Japanese clients have been known to succeed by having the negotiator’s father accompany him on the trip. In Iran, the company would be better off if the negotiator stayed home and the head of the research and development team went in his stead. It is a sign of great respect to an Iranian to introduce him the “brains” behind an operation.

Iranians take great pride in their arts as well. Tehran is an entertainment center, not among humanities largest but certainly impressive. Iranian architecture, poetry, music and film has continued a tradition going back centuries, and, like the rest of society, has found its own ways in the world, unbound by the conventions that hold the rest of the world’s creative spirits. A visitor to Iran has a lot to take in.

Iranian enlightenment has not gone as far as the Iranians would wish. There are still areas in which travel is not safe, particularly near the eastern and northwestern borders. Areas of the nation are still considered backward, with nomadism still a way of life in the south east, and agriculture occupying more than 10% of the working force, a very high percentage when measured against the most advanced nations.

Visiting Iran

Iranians travel abroad infrequently, but welcome visitors from most nations, as Iran is signatory to most of the agreements regarding free travel. There are a handful of countries with which Iran has extremely poor relations, and travel from these nations is severely restricted. Visitors should familiarize themselves with entry requirements, especially customs requirements, and be sure to check their visa status before entering. Iran has a curious censorship policy which has evolved over the centuries. Once, the Iranians were quite hostile to material of morally, theologically, or politically offensive nature. Now, they are tolerant to all of these but have a peculiar hatred of advertisements, particularly those relying on an emotional pitch. They also restrict the entry of firearms, and many drugs. They have very little concern over bionics. Arrivals and their belongings are quite naturally scanned for dangerous biological and electronic media.

The Iranian Ministry of Culture provides information and assistance to travellers. They will also assist in the procurement of licenses and permits, which are needed for a variety of activities, even when the paperwork itself is issued by another agency. For example, they will aid in the acquisition of landing rights for private aircraft, even though the Ministry of Transportation is the actual ruling agency. The Iranian Red Lion is a humanitarian agency, and can be contacted in the event of an emergency. The Ministry of Commerce has offices which provide services to foreigners wishing to conduct business in Iran.

By all means avoid crossing borders away from legitimate crossing points. Border security is a problem in some areas, and the western border as well as the Persian Gulf approaches tend to be hostile territory, due to the very poor relations between Iran and Arabia. The eastern border, especially in the southeast where Iran borders Baluchistan, is not so heavily defended, but prone to penetration by lawless groups, so this are can be even more dangerous. Consult authorities before venturing near border areas.

Money

During the Twilight Era, conventional currency faded from use. Trade was conducted largely by barter or in promissory notes backed by quantities of specific goods, such as petroleum, rice, and camels, or by quantities of electricity. This became unwieldy with the restoration of Iran, but the population was slow to abandon a goods based financial system. The Rial was resurrected and reimposed as national currency in 2111, replacing a system of ad hoc commodity based currencies. By default, the Rial also came into use in Iranian dominated territories, (locally refered to as the Sayeh-e-Iran , or “Shadow of Iran”) Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Pakistan, and Muslim areas in western and northern India. Five decades later, Iranian manipulations of the Rial, to the detriment of the growing and prospering Pakistani banking industry would lead to tension, eventually leading up to the Pakistan-Iran war of 2171. Use of the Rial outside of Iran proper collapsed after that, but was retained for several decades in Iran until steady devaluation forced it out of general use in favor of the Toman, which was, by long custom, a unit equal to 10 Rials. Since 2220, the Toman has been the official currency of Iran, and the general currency still used in Baluchistan and Afghanistan. The 2300 exchange rate against the Livre is 3.2 Toman to the Livre, however, it should be noted that in most Toman using areas, 3.2 Toman commands more purchasing power than a Livre. Banks and government exchanges will convert foreign currencies to Toman automatically, generally extracting ½ a percent service charge.

Iranian workers providing personal services of any sort, waiters, drivers, even private dancers, expect to be tipped for good service, typically 10% of the base cost of the service provided.

Climate

Iran has a variable climate, and recent trends have made it more so. In the northwest, in the highlands bordering Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, winters are cold with heavy snowfall and subfreezing temperatures during December and January. Spring and fall are relatively mild, with rainfall occurring in swift, heavy downpours. Summers are dry and hot. In the south, winters are mild and the summers are very hot, having average daily temperatures in July exceeding 40° C. On the Khuzestan plain, summer heat is accompanied by high humidity. In general, Iran has an arid climate in which most of the relatively scant annual precipitation falls from October through April. In most of the country, yearly precipitation averages 25 centimeters or less. The major exceptions are the higher mountain valleys of the Zagros and the Caspian coastal plain, where precipitation averages at least 50 centimeters annually. In the western part of the Caspian, rainfall exceeds 100 centimeters annually and is distributed relatively evenly throughout the year, with rainfall increasing towards the western extreme, home to Iran’s small and fairly recently formed coastal rain forest. This contrasts with some basins of the Central Plateau that receive ten centimeters or less of precipitation annually, with extremes of dryness to be found in the east. The rains that once periodically refilled the shjallow lakes int eh far southwest were absent for a century and are now less they were in the 20^th century.

Geography

Iran is a rugged nation, surrounded by a rim of mountains, with a dry central plateau. There is a discontinuous coastal plain along the Caspian Sea, and another along the Persian Gulf. The Persian Gulf lowlands continue inland in the western provinces of Upper and Lower Kuzhestan (Upper Kuzhestan being the name given to the formerly Iraqi territory) . Here there is a broad riverine plain, with shallow lakes, marshes, and extensive cultivated areas. The Caspian Sea coast has shifted with the changing climate. During the 21^st century, over exploitation of water resources and a decrease in regional rainfall severely reduced the size of the Caspian Sea. The resultign concentration of pollutants was devastating to the fishign industry, and left toxins in the silt as the shoreline receded. Despite the pollution, riotous plant growth occurred in some areas along the far west and when the rai patterns shifted again. Material washed down frm the moutnains by intense rains, that would normally have been washed into the Caspian sea, instead was caught by the vegetation. The Caspian Sea recovered much of its area, but there are some 800 square kilometers of Gilan province, now forested, that was under water in 2000 AD.

The moutnainous northwest is still earthquake prone. Severe quakes struck Tabriz in 2088 and 2260, and the rest of the region has been periodically shaken. The Zagros chain along the southwest flank, and the Elburz chain in the north are partly forested. In the southeast, near the border with Baluchistan, some areas where intermittent rainfall once filled seasonal lakes have become dry salt wastes, as close to lifeless as the surface of the earth gets in the subtropics. In 2230, Iranian scientists concluded that the climate shifts that increased the size and intensity of the eastern deserts were directly related to those that helped turn the Sahara green. This hasn’t helped Iranian relations with north African nations.

The People

Demography

The population of Iran peaked at aver 80 million just before the Twilight Era began. Subsequently, due to war, environmental devastation, plague, and the loss of Azeri, Kurdish, and Armenian territory and the populations therein, population fell, reaching a minimum of about 35 million towards the end of the 21st century. The population has since rebounded, (and absorbed some fresh blood from formerly Iraqi territory) reaching 105 million in 2300. Growth rate, high during the 22^nd century and most of the 23^rd, is slowing in concert with the rising standard of living.

About 50% of the population is ethnic Iranian, although lineages were somewhat scrambled by the twilight. Some of Iran’s smaller ethnicities now absorbed into the Iranian identity. Another 20% can be best described as Iranians of mixed descent. 7% of the population is of Arab descent, 3% is Russian, 3% Turkmeni, 3% Azeri, 2% Kurdish, 2% Indian, 2% Gilaki, 2% Afghan, 1% Lur, 1% Mazandarani, 1% Nawar (Dom Gypsy) and 3% other. The “other” category is large and surpising, and includes the remnants of foreign military forces, merchant visitors, refugees, and others who, as they had since Alexander, have been left behind in Iran. There are about 125,000 Iranians of Anglo-American descent, as well as perhaps 100,000 of Japanese decent, and other groups as well. Blue eyes and blond hair is an uncommon combination for an Iranian, and Shiuko is an uncommon family name, but the current Minister of Energy has all of the above. One should not over-generalize the Iranian population.

Substantial shuffling of Iran's ethnic makeup has occured in the last 3 centuries. Some minority groups were lost, others gained as borders shifted. Some were assimilated, and immigrants swelled the ranks of others. The Iranian Jews are vanished entirely. Some 25,000 of them emigrated to Israel in the 2020’s, under a deal that gave a clique of moderate Iranian government leaders access to some advanced Israeli intelligence and weapons. The remainder of their population vanished during the 21’st century, entirely assimilated. Their historic buildings, however, some dating back millennia, are still cared for by the Iranian government. Interestingly, the constitutional provisions of the old Islamic Republic, which continued in force until the advent of the new Republic, still guaranteed a place in the national legislature for the Iranian Jewish minority, even towards the end of the 21^st century, when no applicants could be found for the seat.

One group of about 500,000 people, the Larsi, appear to be a new ethnic group, an amalgamation of

people who abandoned towns in the southeast during the Twilight years and took up the almost forgotten lifestlye of nomadic herding. The overall trend, though, has been a cultural homogenization.

Religion

The most widely followed religion in Iran is Shi’i Islam. Once, Iran was a theocratic state led by a “national Leader”, a high ranking Shi’i cleric, with broad powers over other areas of governemtn and society. The failure of the thewocratic governemtn was two fold. First, the theocracy, like others in other nations, was bitterly jealous of rivals and resorted to severe opproession to maintain power. This had an understandibly adverse effect on the morale of the citizenry. Second, when the chips were down, they failed to produce. Closing a newspaper that prints offensive stories is an easy task. Shoring up an economy, providing jobs, food, and medicine, is much more difficult and the theocratic leaders were not up to the challenge. In the Twilight era, even conservative Iranians turned to those who could offer pragmatic solutions, any port in a storm, of course, and these turned out to be moderates, many of them secular. Still, the theocratic power was not merely going to dissipate like so much smoke. Instead, they saw their hold gradually decay as reform after reform nudged the Iranian government system towards the present one. The Ayatollahs adapted by shifting their attentions, as Christian leaders once did, form the material world to the spiritual. By the early 22^nd century, Shi’i teaching gave up hope of political domination. Instead, it concentrated on the individual. Persian scholars, in ages past, had argued that the “greater Jihad” was a struggle to be won in one’s own heart, and it was this Jihad which the Iranian religious leadership focussed on. (Indeed, the concept of the “greater Jihad” beign a personal, inner struggle was one developed by Persian Sufis over a millenium ago.) Naturally, one could not struggle in one’s heart if one turned to virtue to escape a beating, rather than turning to virtue through good intention. The withdrawal from civic power, in this way, came to be seen as a furtherance of enlightenment, not a step back. Of course, even without a theocratic constitution to back them up, the Shi’i clerics are still a potent force in Iranian society. Their influence today can be compared to the influence of religious leaders in late 20^th century America, or 21^st century Brazil, and they provide religious leadership to the majority or Iranians. They have been able to hold to a vestige of political power in some areas of great historical importance, such as the city of Qom. In these areas, traditional Islamic law is still followed, but this is regarded as local custom for the benefit of the religiously conservative folk who chose to live there. This mirrors the closed religious communes of America, including the Amish, Mennonite, and Orthodox Jewish; it is not a legal system intended for all of Iran.

Sufi traditions have made a return in Iranian culture. Sufism is the “mystic” branch of Islam, although it cannot be said to be a distinct sect, like , Shi’i or Sunni Islam. Iranian Muslims can be found practicing Sufi rituals and still considering themselves Shi’i Muslims, while others might follow most of the Shi’i traditions and consider themselves Sufis only. Numbers are uncertain, but perhaps 15% of the Iranian population follow the ideals and at least some of the practices of Sufism. A small but growing number, perhaps 10%, are Zoroastrians, a religion that has found increasing acceptance by Iranians seeking a national heritage more distinct from the Muslim cultures around them. Some philosophers have tried to link Zoroastrianism with Islam, portraying Islam as a “final version” of the basic religious truths first revealed to Iranians through Zoroaster. There are plenty of Iranians today who mix together a little bit of both. Finally, a few other religions have footholds in Iran, most notably Sunni Islam and Eastern Orthodox Christianity. These are followed by only a few percent of the population. Other traditions exist, but in insignificant numbers. The practioners of the Bahai faith were mostly lost to Iran by way of shifting borders. There are less than half a million now, most of them in an around Tabriz.

Culture

Dress. The variable climate of Iran favors a range of clothing styles. Conventional, cosmopolitan attire as may be seen anywhere floursihes in the cities and suburbs, although often with a Persian style. Formal clothes for the Iranian, male and female, are robes, loose, colorful, and generally having at least two layers of fine fabric. It has become trendy for the most elegant of these costumes to to expand voluminously between torso and floor, causing the wearer to dominate a considerable amount of floorspace with his robe, in the manner of a woman in a gown of Victorian England. Women’s formal clothing is similar to mens, however, it is customary for a woman’s robe to to have a hood. This is a much devolved remnant of the veil once worn with a woman’s chador, a traditional robe still scene only in the cloistered religious communities such as Qom. In some women’s outfits, the hood has become stylized that it can no longer be placed over her head. It drapes down the center of here back merely as adornment. Men and women will frequently wear a mantlet about their shoulders, a mark of their academic status. Colors and symbols on the mantlet indicate the wearer’s school and degree achieved, while the edge is embroidered with the school’s motto. By custom, the relgious schools embroider in gold, and rather than a school motto, use the traditional phrase “Allah Akbar”, or, God is great. Such a mantlet is the Iranian cleric’s equivalent to a priest’s collar. Leaders, exectuves, clerics, teachers and other people of the upper tiers of society are generally seen in these robes, as are office workers, during the business day. (Although, for practicality’s sake, the robe of an office worker will generally be a much more confined affair, not taking up nearly as much floorspace as that of his or her boss.) Other clothing mimics styles seen elsewhere, although the Iranians have a penchant for very loose, bloused shirts, and lots of pockets. In the northwest, leather vests are very common, and in the northeast, a lot of Afghani and Central Asian influence can be seen.

Food: Local preference, reinforced by a government actively seeking agricultural self suifficiency (fromwhat is known, not from the point of view of any strategic or economic advantage, but to mollify the large number of lower class Iranians still employed in a very innefficient agricultrual sector) has not changed much in centuries. Rice is a staple, more now than it was once, partly because the Iranian government has stressed the economic development of Upper Khuzhestan, which is best suited for the growing of rice. Fish stocks in the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf are improving, not so much in numbers (numbers returned within a few decades of the Twilight) but in health. These seas were heavily polluted in the 21^st century, to the point where fish in the 22^nd and 23^rd centuries had toxic levels of metals and chemicals in their bodies. Iranian society has not yet re-accustommed itself to eating them. Fish is looked upon almost as a “scavenger’s food”. Pork is still non-existent in Iran. Beef consumption is high, but eclipsed by poultry, goat, and especially lamb. Meat is eaten in fairly large quantities. Iranians spent a hungry century learning to regard the eating of meat as a sign of wealth and status. Now that it is readily available, it forms a large part of the diet.

Lifestyle: In the Twilight Era, Iranians sought safety from brigands and deserters, and at the same time husbanded their limited resources by gathering together in large groups, abandoning private homes, residential neighborhoods, and small towns, and setting up living quarters in whatever institution they could associate themselves with, universities, factories, or the homes of the wealthy and powerful. In a sense, they “circled the wagons” seeking safety in numbers, making buildings into fortresses. This move towards “functionally organized social groupings” continued. Today it is still customary for Iranians to live in quarters provided by their employer. Hospitals, factories, and office buildings have apartment complexes for their staff, with some of the larger industrial plants having entire communities attached to them. The rich live in huge, palatial buildings and are expected to provide lodging for staff as well as key employees. It is not unusual for a corporation to house a dozen senior executives, their families, and their own retainers in a single massive (and very comfortable) building on broad grounds with many hectares of gardens. About a third of the Iranian population lives in dwellings provided by this system. It has the disadvantage of not providing a psychological boundary between working and non working environments, but at least the commutes are short.

Social Graces: The visitor should be aware of the what constitutes polite behaviour in Iran and what is rude. And ancient, pre Twilight presumptions will not help: Iranian society has developed along its own path, with its own customs. Proper ettiquette in conversation is important. In Iran, interrupting a speaker is very disrespectful. Emotional outbursts of any sort in public are considered barbaric. Any open excess of emotion in public is considered crude: couples should kiss in private. And never be too quick to answer a question. While a swift and to the point response might satisfy an impatient American, to the Iranian it indicates disrespect: you did not consider him worthy of a well thought out response. In informal conversation, and answer may be more quickly given, but if an Iranian teacher were to ask a child his age, a response such as “Ten” would be rude. “I am ten years of age this year” is good, while “Since I was born in 2290, I am now 10 years old” is better because it indicates a path of logic. The fact that the path was obvious is irrelevant, the fact that it was presented honors the asker. Much of tradition remains: Hospitality, when offered, should not be refused. And religion is a bad topic for conversation with new acquaintances

The Iranian Government

In Iran, only the educated vote. One needs a college degree to become a registered voter, and as one attains more advanced degrees, one also receives much greater voting power. A “Parostad”’s vote can equal a whole village of basic bachelors degree holders. This version of humanity, unique amongst humanity’s governments, colors the entire structure of the Iranian government, down to the decision making processes of the individual office holders. The educational establishment’s highest tier, the National Academic Council, has the authority to assign, modify, and remove academic credentials, thus determining the right to political representation. The Ministry of Education has gone beyond merely being an executive body, it is a fourth branch of government.

Despite limitations on suffrage, Iranians are deaf to western criticisms. The idea, to them, theat each and every person deserves equal representation through universal suffrage is an illogical fantasy that places an ideology above the practical path towards optimal government. To the average Iranian, what a government produces is what matters- ideology is just religion in another guise. To the Iranian, universal suffrage produces a system in which 10 uneducated, illiterate bumpkins will outvote 5 learned professors, and thus the country descends to the median level of its citizens’ intellectual abilities. What is worse, they believe, is that, in a universal system, an unscrupulous person can win power by offering simplistic promises and obviously illogical rhetoric to those 10 bumpkins, while the 5 professors, able to see through the glitter of the scoundrel’s appeal, con do nothing to stop it. The Iranians believe they have a system in which this does not and cannot occur, they view western leaders as people elected through their control over emotion-driven mobs. They view the western ideal of universal suffrage to be sadly misguided, and have naught but disdain for Westerners who will defend such a system as though it is the god given right of an uneducated fool to select his nation’s leadership.

Iranians are capable of sober assessments of their system, and do understand that even with voting weighted to give power to education and not mere numbers, the leaders they elect are humans, not machines, and subject to human vices. Iranian politicians, though, are aware that they must answer to an electorate given to deep analysis, who tend not to accept the easy answers and distractions the government can offer. Thus, they tend towards more subtle and inventive scandals than are commonly seen in the west. Iranian politics is a field of puzzling intrigues and calculated strategies. This extends to their dealings with foreigners. The aloof and isolationist Iranians are every bit as protective of their economic interests as the French are of theirs, but they use different means. While the French will be blunt, and through crude bureaucratic barriers in the way of competitors to benefit a French corporation, the Iranians are more likely to support their interests by setting up and guiding subtle chains of events that provide them, in the end, with the desired benefit.

Structure

There is a strong central government. The executive wing is led by a president with limited powers, the constitution placing most power in the National Assembly, the Majlis. This body has grown over the years. It now numbers exactly 777 representatives. 700 are elected to 5 year terms, in an extremely compex system designed to distribute representation geographically, and capture the ethnic diversity of the country. 70 representatives are selected by the National Academic Council, through their own electoral system open only to the upper scholastic ranks. This tends to further stengthen the power of the academic elite. The remaining 7 representatives, as a vestige of the pre-Twilight theocracy, are selected by the leading Islamic clerics. The Majlis meets in Tehran, and compared with many other legislatires, their schedule is a grueling one. Political debate in Iran is an intense affair, marked not by rhetoric but by research and analysis. A single point of fact may be backed up by hours of introduced evidence, and sessions often run into the early hours of rhe morning. On the brighter side, The Majlis rarely has to rely on outside consultants or expert opinions. Most of them are drawn from the upper ranks of Iran’s academic system, so they represent what is most likely humanity’s most erudite legislature.

Provincial governments

Iran is divided into 24 Ostanha, (singular-ostan), which are the Iranian equivalents of Provinces or States. Most decisoin making power is vested int eh National Assembly, or Majlis, which tends to micromanage governemtn functions throughout the nation. Iranian Ostanha are typically administrative in nature only, with little of the autonomy afforded American, Caribbean, or Brazilian states. This befits a nation who’s economic affairs center around the capitol city, Tehran, which has about a quarter of the Iranian population living in its vicinity. Not only is the bulk of the nation’s finance located here, but, since the Twilight, Tehran has been the center of a sphere of control from the Tigris-Euphrates valley to the Indus, and beyond. In terms of its being the cultural center of the nation, its relative status only increased with the loss of the Azerbaijani population, who looked elsewhere. Tehran is the heart of Iran. Economic, political, and social controls emanate outward from the capitol to the Ostanha, which are;

Bakhtiari in the Zagros mountains between Lower Khuzestan and Esfahan,

Bushehr, in the southeast, along the Persian Gulf coast,

Buyer Ahmadi, a small and religiously conservative area in the Zagros mountains in the southwest, between Fars and Lower Khuzestan

Esfahan in the central area around the city of Isfahan, The pronunciation of the city and surrounding Ostan is the same, the difference in spelling is a convention adopted int eh west to bettter distingiush them.

Fars, southe central south of Esfahan,

Gilan in the northwest along the Caspian Sea, homeland of the Gilaki people.

Hamadan in the west,

Hormozgan along the strait of Hormuz in tot he extreme southeast,

Ilam along the Iraqi frontier, north of Upper Khuzestan and west of Lorestan,

Kerman in the southeast facing Baluchistan (the border with this neighboring nation is indistinct and at times dangerous, though more for local brigandry than national conflict.)

Kermanshahan ont eh Kurdish frontier north of Ilam,

Khorasan, in the northeast, mostly desert range land.

Lower Khuzestan, which is identical in area to the old area simply known as Khuzestan (the name change was a political manuever- calling part of what used to Iraq by a name traditionally part of Iran made annexation seem more geographically correct)

Larestan in the south along the Gulf coast between Hormozgan and Bushehr,

Loristan in the Zagros moutnains north of lower Khuzestan,

Mazandaran in the north along the Caspian sea, homeland of the Mazandaran ethnic group.

Qazvin, east of Tehran between Tehran and Zanjan

Qom, a religiously organized area around the city of the same name,

Semnan in the desert region east of Tehran;

Tehran, the heart.

Upper Khuzhestan, once Iraqi territory, consisting of the eastern portion of the Tigris-Euphrates alluvial plain,

Urmiah in the extreme northwest, consisting of that area of the former Ostanha of Azarbayjan-e Gharbi and Azarbayjan-e Sharqi not taken over by Azerbaijan

Yazd, in the south central area.

Zanjan in the northwest between Gilan and Urmiah

About 75% of the old Ostan of Kordestan was absorbed by Kurdistan, the eastern remnant was absorbed into the Province of Hamadan. Most of what used to be Sistan va Baluchestan now belongs to the nation of Baluchistan.

The Iranian Military

The armed forces of Iran are oriented around the defense of national territory, with extra-regional operations on Earth getting very little attention, and only small forces committed to colonial defense. National military doctrine calls for a small but professional force, capable of defeating its adversaries through skill, as well as superior tactics and strategy. Each of the foreign borders facing Iran is assigned a Military District. The Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf shores are also Military Districts. The central area of the nation, as well as the colonies, are Military Districts. The forces assigned to each district are tailored to the conditions and opposition facing that district. Although there are conventionally differentiated services- Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, in wartime, District Commands would control elements of each.

The Iranian armed forces have not been used in a major effort since 2275, the last conflict between Iran and Arabia. Tensions remain, however, and there are occasional counter-guerilla operations on the Baluchi frontier, and elsewhere. Iran has also hired foreign forces, particularly Americans (who have practically turned their Marines into a "rent-a-troop" organization), for use in the smaller on going attrition struggles that would wear down local forces. This slowed tremendously after the war of 2275, and the American forces departed in 2279, after 3 years of no action other than guard duty on the eastern frontier. The Iranians hired the Marines again to help them secure their neutral status during the Central Asian War, but the Americans haven't been in the employ of the Iranians for 5 years now.

Iran is not a major manufacturer of military equipment, except for artillery rocket systems and hovercraft. The current state of the art assault hovercraft combines both: the “Zolfaqhar” can carry a squad of infantry, and support them with fire from a multiple cell rocket launcher. The “Walyildan-III” is a larger rocket system, carried on ships, hovercraft, and ground vehicles. Walyildan rockets are designed to defeat countermeasures by releasing swarms of submunitions early int eh flight path, the types and mix of submunitons being chosen by the artillerists. These can include guided and special purpose munition. Once this occurs, interception would involve destroying hundred of small targets piecemeal. The Walyildan-III system has been sold to several other nations. The Walyildan-IV is not a follow-on, it is a much larger weapon, carried on trucks or kept in fixed hardened installations, mostly in thte Zagros Mountains, within range of targets in Iraq and Arabia.

The Iranian military is all-volunteer, but has no problem finding ample numbers of recruits, given the educational opportunities available in the military. The Iranian military is a traditional ladder for social advancement.

The Iranian Army

The Army was reorganized in decades following the National Restoration. All conventional ground forces in Iran were place in a single service in 2121, with the Marines coming into existence as a separate element later, in 2132. The Army is organized in Brigades, each of which includes one or more tactical Regiments and assorted support units. Many Brigades retain very old names, remnants of a time when different ground forces were recruited in parallel by different agencies. These names have nothing to do with modern organization, they are historical only. Units designated “Pasdaran” “Mojahedin”, and “Basij” all belong to the regular Army, and are manned, trained, and equipped just like any other unit.

In 2300, the Iranian Army included the following:

Infantry Brigades: 1^st, 2^nd, 5^th, and 7^th Infantry Brigades, 1,st and 2^nd Basij Brigade, 1,st and 3^rd Pasdaran Brigade, and 2^nd Mojahedin Brigade.

Assault Brigades: (Heavy Armored) Pasdaran Assualt Brigade, 2^nd Brigade of Immortals, and 1^st Tank Brigade.

“Mobile” Brigades (Armored with an emphasis on Hovercraft) 1^st Mojahedin Brigade, 1^st Brigade of Immortals

Commando Brigades: (Elite light infantry with some organic aviation) Hormuz Brigade, Tehran Brigade, and Qods Brigade.

Desert Brigades: (Each has a single Infantry Regiment with organixc transport, amrored, reconnaisance, and aviation squadrons, artillery, and an abnormally large organic logistics force, for extended operations far from freidnly lines of supply) 1^st, 2^nd, 3^rd, and 4^th Desert Brigades, and the Iranian-Afghan Brigade. Each Desert Brigade also has several “Patrol Squadrons” associated with it, generally locally recruited, tasked with border security.

Colonial Brigades: Three, each similar to the desert Brigades, deployed off world.

The Iranian Marines

In most military organization, Marines are associated with ship-bourne infantry. In Iran, they are associated with hovercrafts. Use of the hovercraft in the military has a long and distinguished history

in Iran, and where other nations tend to think of it as either a very fast specialized boat or a very fast specialized wheel-less ground vehicle, the Iranians have an appreciation for the hovercraft as a vehicle type of its own. Iranian hovercraft units operate in coastal areas and areas with flat terrain. They are well suited to the southwestern approaches to the nation, where marshes, shallow waterways, and flat deserts and cropland are intermixed, and the shallow Persian Gulf has many areas unreachable by conventional ships. The Hovercraft Regiments maneuver across all these types of terrain, including the gulf, with equal ease. Friction between the Army and Navy, with “turf disputes” arising from a militrary froce equally at home on land and sea, has been reduced by assigning the units to the Iranian Marines, which, like the United States Marines, is an independent force longer under the shadow of the navy. Unlike the American example, the Marines never were a component of the Navy. They were created in the early 22^nd century specifically to end inter-service dispute over Hovercraft control. The Iranian Marines have over 500 combat hovercraft, ranging from hover versions of tanks and infantry carriers to hover transports and naval patrol craft. In the war of 2275, Iran withdrew the larger naval patrol craft from the Gulf and used them in an attack well inland near Bagdad. It was an unconventional tactic, but it surprised the Iraqis and their Arabian allies, and is used as an example of tactical flexibility by hovercraft proponents. The Iranians use hovercraft from several foreign sources, as well as their own indigenous “Blaz” (Hawk) series light attack hovercraft. This is a small and very quick two-seater used for raiding in cavalry fashion. For eight years, a civilian version of the Blaz has been available. Funcitonally it lies between a hovercycle and a Swift Songbird. Iranian hovercraft tend not to have as much of a “jump” capability as their foreign cousins do. In the areas in which they are used, there isn’t much to jump over, and in the other national frontiers, there is too much to jump over.

The Marines are organized into independent Regiments, of which there are 9. Six are Hovercraft Regiments, two are garrison Regiments (which defend mainland coastal properety as well as a few islands in the Persian Gulf and Straits of Hormuiz) and one is an amphibious assault Regiment. This latter unit is similar to a Hovercraft Regiment, excpet that the hovercraft are bigger, and the unit is specialized in dismounted close assault. Iranian military doctrine in the event of an Arabia-Iran war calls for attacks across the Persian Gulf by Marines following bombardments by missiles and aircraft. Much of the heart of Arabia would be very exposed in such an event, while the Iranian heart lies far away behind a mountain range.

The Air Force

Headquartered at Khatami Air Base near Esfahan, the Iranian Air Force is the largest Air Force in the region. They have some 220 tactical aircraft, and an equal number of transports; Iranian doctrine anticipates that in a war with Arabia, routes across the Zagros mountains would be interdicted, and air resupply of forward units would be a necessity. With two exceptions, there are no major air force commands other than the administrative ones, as tactical air forces would be allotted to the districts in wartime. The exceptions are the Air Transport Command and Strategic Command. The Iranian Air Force fields the following types of squadrons:

Close Air Support Squadrons, 12 squadrons, tasked with the support of ground forces.

Interceptor Squadrons, 2. One at Abadan, one at Khatami Air Base, they defend the interior of the nation from long distance attacks.

Interdictor Squadrons, 3, stealthy aircraft whose main function is to strike targets far from national borders.

Combat Supprot Squadrons have utility, communications, and electronic intelligence aircraft. Each district has 1, and the force mix varies. In the Southeast District, the combat support squadron includes a flight of multi-role rotary winged aircraft, used to deliver Army patrols to the vicinity of border incursions.

Marine Patrol Squadron, of which there is only 1, operates long range patrol aircraft (mostly over the Indian Ocean, and a few survey aircraft.

Light Transport Squadrons, 12, flying short range transport and utility aircraft

Heavy Transport Squadrons, 4, operate longer ranged cargo aircraft

Colonial Squadrons, of which there are 3, are mixed forces, mostly utility aircraft, deployed to off world territories.

The Iranian Navy

The smallest of Iran’s armed forces has a few submarines, a score of small vessels that operate in the Persian Gulf, a half dozen attack craft based at Hormuz, and 2 destroyer squadrons that operate on a rotating basis in the Indian Ocean. There are also a small number of support vessels, and a transport. The Iranians take great pride in their two destroyer squadrons. The newest ships, the “Piruzi” (Victory) class, numbers five vessels and is thoroughly state of the art. The ships have been deployed on “show the flag” type missions throughout the Indian Ocean. There seems to be a ready acceptance of the fact that the destroyers do not fit well into Iranian military plans. They would be of little use in a battle with Arabia, nor can they project any real power overseas (an act that would violate some major tenets of Iranian political philosophy.) There isn’t that much of a fishing fleet to protect, and the ships are too few to patrol the sea lanes beyond the reach of land based air, although they built for long endurance missions. They seem to exist, mainly, as show pieces. The Iranian Navy has patrol and survey craft in the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea.

SAVAMA

Not actually a part of the military, Savama is the national intelligence agency. Iran focuses most of its intelligence attention on its neighbors, particularly Arabia, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, and Russia. Iran is believed to have a well developed HUMINT (Human Intelligence) network in all these countries, as well as some efforts in more distant locales. SAVAMA is not permitted to operate inside Iran. Internal security is the role f the military secuirity and civilian police organizations.

IN field work, SAVAMA makes particular use of cybernetic technology. Like the military and civilian Iranian security groups, they have often relied on cybernetic exploitation of animals. This is a proprietary and closely guarded area of Iranian technology (See section in Science and Technology). SAVAMA and militray intelligence units have deployed birds and rodents with ultra-sophisiticated miniature instruments, as well as providing artificial enhancements to human agents. When the latter is done, it is generally with foreign agents working indirectly for the Iranians. The Iranians know better than to provide an obvious identifier to an agent, and foreign governemtns, when they catch a spy, seem to be particulary paranoid about spies with cybernetic implants. Still, when Iranian agents make use of the technology (at least, when they’ve been caught at it) their implants have been of extremely high quality and cleverly concealed.

Iranian agents are generally concerned with the more classic military and political spying. Economic and scientific spying tends not to interest them, as it implies that Iranian know how is lagging. Their agents tend to be “universal” in their contacts. Iranians have no qualms about working with Provolution, or other agencies of shady reputation when it suits them. Iranians can justify these relationships with logic that is at times strained but always precise.

Iran’s International Relations

Most nations have embassies in Tehran, and a few have consulates in other cities. Iranians believe in the value if maintaining communication, even with nations that are unfriendly. Thus, the Arabians have a large embassy compound in Tehran. Even when the tensions are at their worst, the Arabian delgates will be treated with the greatest courtesy. Negotiations are never cut off. What is the point, after all, of negotiating with someone you already agree with? In Iranian political philosophy, the wider the breach, the greater the impetus to talk.

Regional

Afghanistan : Relations have been good, in the last half century. Iran has supported Afghanistan's struggle to stay aloof from the various Central Asian fracasses, and the two nations are trading partners. Despite the much lower quality of education in Afghanistan, the Iranians don't seem to hold the Afghans in the same low esteem that they do cultures of similar educational levels. Afghanistan and Iran have recently signed an accord permitting Afghani use of Iranian space operations facilites, as well as the maritime port at Bandar Abbas. Afghanistan has an Embassy in Tehran and consulates in Meshed and Bandar Abbas.

Arabia Bitterness between the two nations goes back the Twilight Era. Each nation considers itself the rightful dominant power in the area, and each nation's diplomats can easily recall the long list of the other's misdeeds. There are numerous grievances between the two, some territorial, others not. Although no shots have been fired in decades, relations are tense and the two nations maintain military forces on the alert. Travel by Arabians is restricted, but as noted above, Arabia has a major embassy in Tehran.

Azerbaijan has friendly and open relations with Iran. Although there are still many Azeris in Iran, there is no irridentist pressure among them. it is commonly understood that Iran gave up all the territories it had to regarding Azerbaijan. This had the effect of greatly improving relations between the two countries during a time of need. Iran and Azerbaijan have long standing cooperative business arrangements, and have worked together to restore the environmentally ruined Caspian Sea. Many industrial corporations are bi-national, based in both countries, and communications and airfilm traffic between Tehran and Baku is busy. Azerbaijan has a consulate in Tabriz in addition ot its embassy in Tehran.

Baluchistan. Iran has understandably difficult relations with this neighboring nation, once viewed as a renegade province to troublesome to keep. The Iranian government is frustrated by Baluchistan's inability to secure its border, and the lawlessness that pervades the region. There are no serious ideas in Tehran of retaking the impoverished region, but Baluchistan is a security concern, albeit a distant second after Arabia. Baluchistan has an embassy in Tehran and a consulate in Bandar Abbas, but neither seems to actually represent the quirky Baluchi government, and the two diplomatic posts, as well as the Baluchi foreign office, often give conflicting reports.

Central Asian Republic. For decades, the Iranians have seen this nation as a playground for foreign interests. Isolationists, they denounced both sides in the Central Asian War and kept to strict neutrality. Today they are condescending toward the CAR, suspicious of its leadership, worried that a revitalized CAR would challenge Iranian regional authority, and concerned over the destabilizing effect it could have if it again invites interventions by distant governments. Iran would like to see the CAR broken up in to smaller nations, like India. They would at least be easier to deal with that way.

Indian States. These represent how Iran would, ideally, like to see its neighbors: fragmented, weak, and respectful towards Iran. In truth, not all the Indian states are that respectful. Punjab is, Bihar isn't.

Despite its general isolationist tendencies, Iran often involves itself here. The Indian States are seen as the main arena where enlightened Iranian attention can have positive effects. Besides, given the hostility between Iran and the Islamic states to the west, it makes sense to concentrate on the Islamic states to the east.

Iraq. Old grudges die hard, especially since the province of Upper Khuzhestan, was once Iraqi territory. Nominally, Iraq is a neutral buffer state between Iran and Arabia, but in reality, the Iraqis are squarely in the Arabian camp. Iran views it as a slightly independent client state of Arabia, and searches for wedges it can drive between the two nations. Relations are icy. The Iraqi embassy is located, by Iranian intent and over Iraqi objections, In Tehran but far from the Arabian compound . The Iranians apparently like to watch the traffic between them.

Kurdistan is another buffer state, but while Iraq leans towards Arabia, Kurdistan leans towards Iran. Relations between the two nations are good, with free trade, (which mainly benefits the Iranians) and educational cooperation (mainly to Kurdish benefit). The two nations hold joint military exercises, which are routinely denounced by the Arabians and Iraqis. Kurdish friendship with Iran is founded on the creation of the Kurdish state, an event orchestrated in part by Iran, which voluntarily sacrificed territory.

Pakistan was once an ally of Iran, having been decimated in war in the early 21st century. Iran tried to manage the pieces and keep civilization alive in the way the French did in Europe. France got the Empire, Iran had the "Sayeh-e-Iran", the "Iranian Shadow", extending from the Tigris to the Indus and beyond, but the Pakistanis ended up just as unhappy with the situation as the Germans came to be later, and started pressuring the Iranians to withdraw in the mid 22nd century. Eventually, Pakstani bankers, chafing under Iranian restrictions which were preventing several promising, profitable foreign partnerships, provoked outright rebellion, and the Iranian-Pakistani war lasted from 2171 to 2175. Relations today are still somewhat edgy. Iran is disdainful of Pakistani, and considers it a backwards state dominated by greedy, scheming financiers. The Pakistanis feel the benefits of access to the Iranian markets justifies tolerance of Iranian snobbery, and take most of the insults in stride. One might say that Iranian relations with Pakistan are better than Pakistani relations with Iran.

Palestine is friendly to Iran, an arrangement that greatly disturbs the Arabians. This connection goes back a long way, with Israeli-Iranian cooperation beginning long before it was politically correct to openly admit it. Israeli/Palestinian reconciliation in the 21st century meant that Iran could drop its pretense of absolute opposition to Israel, and begin profiting from a "new" friendship. For their part, the Israelis, by supplying progressive, moderate Iranians with military and technological aid, helped these secular Iranian leaders slowly steer away from theocratic control. Palestine today is a wealthy nation, but small, and they take friendship with Iran seriously. For their part, the Iranians appreciate the “enlightened” outlook prevalent in this small country.

Turkey is considered friendly, although the Kurdish issue once drove a severe wedge between the two nations. The Turks have long since accepted Kurdistan, and Iranians no longer make jokes about Turks. Turkey, with Palestine, Kurdistan, and Iran. is considered a member of the loose grouping of nations that consider Arabia, and its associates Iraq and Syria, as threats. Iran no longer borders Turkey, but friendly relations with Azerbaijan assure convenient access, and Azerbaijan and Turkey both benefit from being on the overland trade route between Iran and Europe, as they have for millennia. Turkey has a consulate in Tabriz in addition to their embassy in Tehran.

Non-Regional

America is considered an unruly but amusing place full of hyper-emotional people, but Iranians respect the strange American sense of honor- their commitment to ideology, any ideology, as long as its an ideology. In Iranian eyes, Americans seem to take whatever they do as a sort of holy mission. Their businessmen will gush about the virtues of free markets, their warriors have a fierce pride and an admirable ethical code- aside from their being available for rent. So, the Iranians tolerate Americans and consider them, while not allies, useful partners, students capable of enlightenment, a source of reliable fighting men when the chips are down, and a wealthy if dangerous (in economic terms, as American buyers are whimsical, opportunistic, and unpredictable) marketplace.

Australia is respected as the Indian Ocean’s “other” great source of stability, and as a nation that knows its place in the world, engaging in international affairs by pulling more than pushing. The Iranians do not appreciate the legendary Australian informality. They feel it detracts from the dignity of society’s important undertakings- how can a professor take himself seriously, and expect students to take him seriously, if he dresses as if he were on a picnic! So, the Australians are considered good, trustworthy, generally well educated and right minded folk, but a major threat to world decorum.

Brazil, like Iran, is a country that has a history of strong religious influence in government. The Iranians feel compelled to warn the Brazilians often: Don’t try the theocracy thing, no matter how tempting it may seem. That way lies paralysis, and it just isn’t worth it. The two nations agree on many matters, having populations with similar conservative Judeo-Christian-Islamic moral codes. However, circumstances being as they are, Brazil and Iran do not interact that often. An exception is the coffee trade: Brazilians supply, Iranians drink, and both think it vital to their national well being. (Although, in truth, Iran imports most of its supply from Africa.)

Canada. Iran has a deep respect for the Canadian education system. Iran has strong proffessional links to Canadian universities, as well as British and German universities. Holders of degrees from any of these nations generally have an easy time having their credentials accepted in Iran. Iran also respects Canada's avoidance of adventurism.

Canton. The nervy, aggressive businessmen of Canton make Iran uneasy. The Cantonese, in the Iranian view, move too quickly and with too little forethought, and do not respect traditional morals. The result is a destabilizing influence in South Asia. (Stability, in the view of the Iranian Foreign Office, is the state of affairs in whicih events move slowly enough for the subtle, indirect strategies of Iran to have good effect.) Canton wouldn't be a major Iranian consideration were it not for the fact that both seek profit through rival investments in the Indian States. Iran sees Canton as an economic competitor, even though the two countries have very different raw materials. Both understand: it's not whether you own fish farms in Canton or pistachio fields in Iran or tea plantations in India, it's whether your corporate office tower is in Tehran or Hong Kong.

East African Cooperative: Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Somaliland. This is an area where Iran, through investment and development, sees a future of expanding influence. Iran has tried to move closer to this association in the last few decades, and the East Africans have responded, seeing in the

Iranians a source of assistance not otherwise tied to African power politics. Iranian naval warships visit East African ports frequently. Iran and the East Africans are trade partners, with the latter suppling most of Iran’s coffee needs, and Iran’s businesses providing industrial goods.

France is everything the educated Iranian is supposed to be against- big, arrogant, commercial, amoral, powerful, greedy. The Iranian sees France as the same old problem of history- the biggest guy in the room cannot help the impulse to occassionally throw his weight around. Iranians seem to regard opposing France (politically, and never militarily) as an issue of historical inevitability. The most powerful nation is always the bad guy. The Greeks, Romans, Mongols, British and Americans were all, in their heydey, opposed by Iran, so naturally, the French are today. Iranians deplore French intervention and hegemonism, and it is all the worse for a lack of any observable raison d'etre entering into French political thought, other than "everything to maximize the French commercial advantage". It would be better, from the Iranian position, if the French at least had the pretense of a moral or philosophical ideology behind their obvious ambitions. Despite it all, the two nations have normal, if strained, relations. Iranians do business in France often, which is the major destination for exported Caviar. France has an embassy in Tehran, and consulates in Tabriz and Meshed. The latter is on ground leased from the Iranians under a rather pricey agreement. It is widely suspected of being a French intelligence center. As long as it stays oriented towards Central Asia, the Iranians seem to tolerate the arrangement. It would surprise no one if the Iranians, for all their difficulties with the French, openly cooperated in this regard.

Freihaven is the only off world nation to have an embassy in Iran, although others do have official relations, Wellon, for example, through the British embassy. The Iranians seem greatly impressed by this, although there is little interaction between Freihaven and Iran.

Germany is the spacegoing power closest to Iran, having provided the Iranians assistance, and territory, in return for Iranian economic and political support. Relations have always been close for over a century, although prior to unification, Iran dealt with the separate German states as individual nations.. Officially, Iran was neutral during the German reunification, but they were quick to recognize a German government. The Iranians always seemed to know just how far they could push their neutrality, and in the French Arm, both France and Germany took advantage of Iranian neutral territory adjacent to German colonies. Germany has consulates in Shiraz and Bandar Abbas in addition to their embassy, and have consulates in each of Iran’s off-world settlements as well.

Indonesia would be a rival for power in the Indonesian Ocean, but for the Indonesian concerns with more local rivals, Canton and Australia. This focus leaves a vaccuum in the western Indian Ocean the Iranians are happy to fill, and reward the Indonesians with good relations- this, at least, is the current view from Tehran. Indonesia is treated as something of a Pariah nation by many other powers, but the Iranians don't see the issues as simple, and maintain fair relations with the Indonesians. This may be because the Iranians spent some time in Pariah status themselves.

Japan is seen as a vacilating state, unable to make up its own mind. Iranians would like Japan to stick with its tendency towards withdrawn, internally focussed politics. That, to the Iranians, is how a state should behave. But then, every now and then, the Japanese go and stick their noses where they don't belong, and this never goes over well in Tehran. Their involvement in Central Asia is taken as exceptionally insulting. Even so, the two nations have good overall relations.