Editors:
Features:
The first book to gather research in philosophy of astrophysics in one volume
The only book that can be used as a textbook for courses in philosophy of astrophysics
Combines novel, breakthrough contributions with insightful overviews of current discussions
This book is open access, which means that you have free and unlimited access
Description:
The volume you have before you is the first edited collection specifically devoted to philosophy of astrophysics. Our primary aims in producing this volume have been to gather contemporary research in philosophy of astrophysics together in one place as both a reference resource for scholars already working in this subdiscipline and as an introduction to curious newcomers. Several contributions in this volume will also likely be of interest to philosophers working on topics such as idealization, validation, and analogy, which extend well beyond the specificity of philosophy of astrophysics. This introduction provides some background on the rise of philosophy of astrophysics as a distinct subject area, brief summaries of the contributions, and closes with a few suggestions for future work.
Fixed Point Realism, the Hubble Trouble, and the hypothesis of Early Dark Energy
The discrepancy in the values of the Hubble constant obtained through different measurement methods has led to various possible solutions, one of which is the hypothesis of early dark energy. Proponents of this hypothesis argue that our model of the universe must include an additional ingredient, early dark energy, in order to resolve the so-called “Hubble trouble”. I emphasize that we must carefully assess how this hypothesis would resolve the tension. If early dark energy models address the discrepancy by incorporating the data of Hubble measurement results, the debate should center on whether one should adopt a realist or anti-realist stance toward these measurements. I argue that fixed-point realism, a philosophical perspective commonly employed in astrophysics, would suggest an anti-realist view of the Hubble constant measurement results, thereby inviting skepticism about how early dark energy models often resolve the tension. This underscores the deep connection between the epistemic justification of our beliefs about measurement results, our metaphysical commitments to these results, and the viability of our scientific hypotheses. (This study extends the findings of an earlier project on replicability and the Hubble constant undertaken with McCoy: Matarese, V., & McCoy, C. D. (2024). When “Replicability” is More than Just “Reliability”: The Hubble Constant Controversy, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science)
According to the standard ΛCDM cosmological model, approximately 70% of the universe is composed of dark energy. Given that this is our most successful model to date, one might argue for realism about dark energy, according to which dark energy is a genuine physical entity pervading the universe. However, there remains a profound challenge, which is the problem of underdetermination. How can one be realist about something one cannot even definitively characterize? In this talk, I will present the arguments for and against dark energy realism. I will then propose a more nuanced, cautious, middle-ground approach, which is informed by fictional realism and which acknowledges the fact that dark energy bears multiple interpretations. According to this view, dark energy should be regarded as a real yet fictional entity, introduced as the best possible candidate for physical reality, but which may or may not have a physical counterpart. This framework offers, to my mind, a more fruitful and intellectually honest metaphysical characterization of dark energy, bridging the gap between realism and anti-realism