COMPLETED PROJECTS:

On the principles that serve as guides to the ontology of quantum mechanics: Is the ontology of non-relativistic quantum mechanics three-dimensional or high-dimensional? This paper discusses two principles, proposed in (North 2013) and (Emery 2017) that are usually employed to answer this question. The first, the dynamical matching principle (DMP), states that the fundamental structure of the world should match the structure of the dynamical laws of the theory, in this case the Schrödinger equation. The second, the minimal divergence norm (MDN), states that insofar as we have multiple empirically adequate theories, we ought to choose the one that minimizes the difference between what the theory says the world is like and how the world appears. While the former is used to argue in favour of a quantum 3ND-ontology and the latter to argue in favour of a quantum 3D-ontology, I show that both principles can in fact be used to support either view. This casts doubt on their role and legitimacy as meta-ontological principles that can guide us in the decision between a commitment to 3ND-ontology or a commitment to 3D-ontology. I suggest instead that they are best regarded as useful principles to construct and ‘regiment’ the space of plausible quantum ontologies.

Super-Humeanism (II): Humeanism started life as a metaphysical program that could turn out to be false if our best physical theories were to postulate ontological features at odds with Humean ones. However, even if this has arguably already happened, Humeanism is still considered one of the strongest and most appealing metaphysical theories for describing the physical world. What is even more surprising is that a radical Humean thesis—Super-Humeanism—which posits an extremely parsimonious ontology including nothing more than propertyless matter points and their distance relations, is said by its proponents to follow from an attentive reading of our best physical theories. Given its close relationship with physics, Super-Humeans argue that their doctrine (i) conforms to Scientific Realism, (ii) offers the ontology that best explains physics’ empirical evidence, and (iii) is a naturalistic theory. This paper investigates the strategies that Super-Humeans have adopted to defend these three claims and, more generally, its alleged closeness to physics. I will show that, contrary to what advocates of Super-Humeanism claim, some of its commitments have inevitably created a gap between itself and physics that is difficult to overcome. While it is laudable that Super-Humeans have adopted various strategies to close this gap, no strategy has yet fully succeeded. [paper]

Super-Humeanism (I): The doctrine of Super-Humeanism holds that the worlds’ mosaic consists only of permanent matter points and changing spatial relations, while all the other entities and features figuring in scientific theories are nomological parameters, whose role is merely to build the best law system. Normally this doctrine is criticized for alleged incompatibility with what current physical theories tell us about the world. In my paper (forthcoming in Synthese) I raise a different objection, which regards the metaphysical apparatus of the theory, pointing out that on the one hand this doctrine adopts the Best System account of lawhood, on the other hand it is vulnerable to and does not have the resources to solve the well-known problem of immanent comparisons, which renders it impossible to establish which law system is actually the best. For this reason, the concern is that the doctrine is incoherent. [paper]