Embedded Files
Non-parametric Test of Time Consistency: Present Bias and Future Bias,
by Kan Takeuchi, Games and Economic Behavior, 71(2), pp.456-478, 2011.
In this paper, I present the very novel theory to characterize any kind of time inconsistency. Introduce the equivalent delay function as follows.
Definition (Equivalent Delay Function): For X<Y, the equivalent delay, T(X,Y), makes the following two options equally valuable, (1) Receive X now, and (2) Receive Y with the delay of T(X,Y).
Theorem: A decision-maker exhibits present bias, if and only if, T is sub-modular (and Future bias, if and only if, T is super-modular).
Remark: Note that this characterization of time inconsistency is completely non-parametric and independent of the form of the utility function. T is sub-modular means, T(x,y)+T(y,z) < T(x,z), in a simple case.
Takeuchi (2011GEB) Non-parametric test of time consistency Present bias and Future bias (preprint).pdfPreprint version
Takeuchi(2011GEB) Instruction.pdfInstruction
Multi-object auctions with package bidding: An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA,
by Yan Chen and Kan Takeuchi, Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), pp.557-569, 2010.
The use of package auctions for complex resource allocation has been rapidly increasing in recent years. In this paper, we study two package auction mechanisms in a laboratory setting, a sealed bid Vickrey auction and an ascending version of Vickrey, the iBEA auction. Unlike the single-unit Vickrey auction, where bidders tend to overbid in the laboratory, most of our bidders either underbid or bid their true values. Furthermore, at the aggregate level, while the Vickrey auction generates significantly higher revenue than does iBEA, the iBEA auction generates significantly higher bidder profit and efficiency. Additionally, a significantly larger proportion of iBEA auctions achieves 100% efficiency than does the Vickrey auction. We also find that human bidders learn from their robot opponents when the robot strategies are (myopic) best responses.
Chen and Takeuchi (2010GEB,preprint) Multi-object auctions with package bidding An experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA.pdfPreprint version
iBEA_MR1.pdfiBEA Instruction
Sealed_MR1.pdfVickrey Instruction
Scheduling with Package Auctions,
by Kan Takeuchi, John C. Lin, Yan Chen, and Thomas Finholt, Experimental Economics, 13(4), pp.476-499, 2010.
In scientific collaborations, technologies have broadened access to scarce scientific and engineering resources. While broader access is often applauded, little attention has been focused on the problem of efficient and equitable resource allocation. This paper presents laboratory experiments designed to compare different allocation mechanisms for access to joint research facilities. Specifically, we study the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction, a simultaneous ascending auction (the Resource Allocation Design, RAD), and a mechanism based on submitted rankings (Knapsack). Experimental results show that RAD and VCG are both more efficient than Knapsack, while Knapsack achieves a more equal distribution of resources than RAD or VCG. The findings highlight the need for systematic exploration of allocation mechanisms within collaboratories.
Takeuchi et al. (2010ExpEconPreprint) Scheduling with Package Auction.pdfPreprint version
Vickrey_instr.pdfVickrey Instruction
Knapsack_instr.pdfKnapsack Instruction
RAD_instr.pdfRAD Instruction
Time Discounting: The Concavity of Time Discount Function: An Experimental Study,
by Kan Takeuchi, Journal of Behavioral Economics and Finance, 5, pp.2-9, 2012.
Note, in 2012, I used "time lottery" and observed "Risk Averse over Time Lotteries" (Both of terms appear in DeJarnette et al., 2020). I simply interpreted the result as the evidence for concavity of time discount function or the inverse S-shaped time discouting.
Takeuchi (2012) Time Discounting The Concavity of Time Discount Function.pdfGoogle Sites
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