Section 14. Anti-Competitive Agreements. –
(a) The following agreements, between or among competitors, are per se prohibited:
(1) Restricting competition as to price, or components thereof, or other terms of trade;
(2) Fixing price at an auction or in any form of bidding including cover bidding, bid suppression, bid rotation and market allocation and other analogous practices of bid manipulation;
(b) The following agreements, between or among competitors which have the object or effect of substantially preventing, restricting or lessening competition shall be prohibited:
(1) Setting, Limiting, or controlling production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(2) Dividing or sharing the market, whether by volume of sales or purchases, territory, type of goods or services, buyers or sellers or any other means;
(c) Agreements other than those specified in (a) and (b) of this section which have the object or effect of substantially preventing, restricting or lessening competition shall also be prohibited: Provided, Those which contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods and services or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits, may not necessarily be deemed a violation of this Act.
An entity that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another entity or entities, have common economic interests, and are not otherwise able to decide or act independently of each other, shall not be considered competitors for purposes of this section.
Section 15. Abuse of Dominant Position. – It shall be prohibited for one or more entities to abuse their dominant position by engaging in conduct that would substantially prevent, restrict or lessen competition:
(a) Selling goods or services below cost with the object of driving competition out of the relevant market: Provided, That in the Commission’s evaluation of this fact, it shall consider whether the entity or entities have no such object and the price established was in good faith to meet or compete with the lower price of a competitor in the same market selling the same or comparable product or service of like quality;
(b) Imposing barriers to entry or committing acts that prevent competitors from growing within the market in an anti-competitive manner except those that develop in the market as a result of or arising from a superior product or process, business acumen, or legal rights or laws;
(c) Making a transaction subject to acceptance by the other parties of other obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the transaction;
(d) Setting prices or other terms or conditions that discriminate unreasonably between customers or sellers of the same goods or services, where such customers or sellers are contemporaneously trading on similar terms and conditions, where the effect may be to lessen competition substantially: Provided, That the following shall be considered permissible price differentials:
(1) Socialized pricing for the less fortunate sector of the economy;
(2) Price differential which reasonably or approximately reflect differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from differing methods, technical conditions, or quantities in which the goods or services are sold or delivered to the buyers or sellers;
(3) Price differential or terms of sale offered in response to the competitive price of payments, services or changes in the facilities furnished by a competitor; and
(4) Price changes in response to changing market conditions, marketability of goods or services, or volume;
(e) Imposing restrictions on the lease or contract for sale or trade of goods or services concerning where, to whom, or in what forms goods or services may be sold or traded, such as fixing prices, giving preferential discounts or rebate upon such price, or imposing conditions not to deal with competing entities, where the object or effect of the restrictions is to prevent, restrict or lessen competition substantially: Provided, That nothing contained in this Act shall prohibit or render unlawful:
(1) Permissible franchising, licensing, exclusive merchandising or exclusive distributorship agreements such as those which give each party the right to unilaterally terminate the agreement; or
(2) Agreements protecting intellectual property rights, confidential information, or trade secrets;
(f) Making supply of particular goods or services dependent upon the purchase of other goods or services from the supplier which have no direct connection with the main goods or services to be supplied;
(g) Directly or indirectly imposing unfairly low purchase prices for the goods or services of, among others, marginalized agricultural producers, fisherfolk, micro-, small-, medium-scale enterprises, and other marginalized service providers and producers;
(h) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling price on their competitors, customers, suppliers or consumers, provided that prices that develop in the market as a result of or due to a superior product or process, business acumen or legal rights or laws shall not be considered unfair prices; and
(i) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers, provided that limitations that develop in the market as a result of or due to a superior product or process, business acumen or legal rights or laws shall not be a violation of this Act:
Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed or interpreted as a prohibition on having a dominant position in a relevant market or on acquiring, maintaining and increasing market share through legitimate means that do not substantially prevent, restrict or lessen competition:
Provided, further, That any conduct which contributes to improving production or distribution of goods or services within the relevant market, or promoting technical and economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit may not necessarily be considered an abuse of dominant position:
Provided, finally, That the foregoing shall not constrain the Commission or the relevant regulator from pursuing measures that would promote fair competition or more competition as provided in this Act.
Section 16. Review of Mergers and Acquisitions. — The Commission shall have the power to review mergers and acquisitions based on factors deemed relevant by the Commission.
Section 17. Compulsory Notification. – Parties to the merger or acquisition agreement referred to in the preceding section wherein the value of the transaction exceeds one billion pesos (P1,000,000,000.00) are prohibited from consummating their agreement until thirty (30) days after providing notification to the Commission in the form and containing the information specified in the regulations issued by the Commission: Provided, That the Commission shall promulgate other criteria, such as increased market share in the relevant market in excess of minimum thresholds, that may be applied specifically to a sector, or across some or all sectors, in determining whether parties to a merger or acquisition shall notify the Commission under this Chapter.
An agreement consummated in violation of this requirement to notify the Commission shall be considered void and subject the parties to an administrative fine of one percent (1%) to five percent (5%) of the value of the transaction.
Should the Commission deem it necessary, it may request further information that are reasonably necessary and directly relevant to the prohibition under Section 20 hereof from the parties to the agreement before the expiration of the thirty (30)-day period referred. The issuance of such a request has the effect of extending the period within which the agreement may not be consummated for an additional sixty (60) days, beginning on the day after the request for information is received by the parties: Provided, That, in no case shall the total period for review by the Commission of the subject agreement exceed ninety (90) days from initial notification by the parties.
When the above periods have expired and no decision has been promulgated for whatever reason, the merger or acquisition shall be deemed approved and the parties may proceed to implement or consummate it. All notices, documents and information provided to or emanating from the Commission under this section shall be subject to confidentiality rule under Section 34 of this Act except when the release of information contained therein is with the consent of the notifying entity or is mandatorily required to be disclosed by law or by a valid order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or of a government or regulatory agency, including an exchange.
In the case of the merger or acquisition of banks, banking institutions, building and loan associations, trust companies, insurance companies, public utilities, educational institutions and other special corporations governed by special laws, a favorable or no-objection ruling by the Commission shall not be construed as dispensing of the requirement for a favorable recommendation by the appropriate government agency under Section 79 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines.
A favorable recommendation by a governmental agency with a competition mandate shall give rise to a disputable presumption that the proposed merger or acquisition is not violative of this Act.
Section 18. Effect of Notification. — If within the relevant periods stipulated in the preceding section, the Commission determines that such agreement is prohibited under Section 20 and does not qualify for exemption under Section 21 of this Chapter, the Commission may:
(a) Prohibit the implementation of the agreement;
(b) Prohibit the implementation of the agreement unless and until it is modified by changes specified by the Commission.
(c) Prohibit the implementation of the agreement unless and until the pertinent party or parties enter into legally enforceable agreements specified by the Commission.
Section 19. Notification Threshold. – The Commission shall, from time to time, adopt and publish regulations stipulating:
(a) The transaction value threshold and such other criteria subject to the notification requirement of Section 17 of this Act;
(b) The information that must be supplied for notified merger or acquisition;
(c) Exceptions or exemptions from the notification requirement; and
(d) Other rules relating to the notification procedures.
Section 20. Prohibited. Mergers and Acquisitions. – Merger or acquisition agreements that substantially prevent, restrict or lessen competition in the relevant market or in the market for goods or services as may be determined by the Commission shall be prohibited.
Section 21. Exemptions from Prohibited. Mergers and Acquisitions. – Merger or acquisition agreement prohibited under Section 20 of this Chapter may, nonetheless, be exempt from prohibition by the Commission when the parties establish either of the following:
(a) The concentration has brought about or is likely to bring about gains in efficiencies that are greater than the effects of any limitation on competition that result or likely to result from the merger or acquisition agreement; or
(b) A party to the merger or acquisition agreement is faced with actual or imminent financial failure, and the agreement represents the least anti-competitive arrangement among the known alternative uses for the failing entity’s assets:
Provided, That an entity shall not be prohibited from continuing to own and hold the stock or other share capital or assets of another corporation which it acquired prior to the approval of this Act or acquiring or maintaining its market share in a relevant market through such means without violating the provisions of this Act:
Provided, further, That the acquisition of the stock or other share capital of one or more corporations solely for investment and not used for voting or exercising control and not to otherwise bring about, or attempt to bring about the prevention, restriction, or lessening of competition in the relevant market shall not be prohibited.
Section 22. Burden of Proof. – The burden of proof under Section 21 lies with the parties seeking the exemption. A party seeking to rely on the exemption specified in Section 21(a) must demonstrate that if the agreement were not implemented, significant efficiency gains would not be realized.
Section 23. Finality of Ridings on Mergers and Acquisitions. – Merger or acquisition agreements that have received a favorable ruling from the Commission, except when such ruling was obtained on the basis of fraud or false material information, may not be challenged under this Act.
Section 29. Administrative Penalties. –
(a) Administrative Fines. – In any investigation under Chapter III, Sections 14 and 15, and Chapter IV, Sections 17 and 20 of this Act, after due notice and hearing, the Commission may impose the following schedule of administrative fines on any entity found to have violated the said sections:
First offense: Fine of up to one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00);
Second offense: Fine of not less than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) but not more than two hundred fifty million pesos (P250,000,000.00).
In fixing the amount of the fine, the Commission shall have regard to both the gravity and the duration of the violation.
(b) Failure to Comply With an Order of the Commission. – An entity which fails or refuses to comply with a ruling, order or decision issued by the Commission shall pay a penalty of not less than fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) up to two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) for each violation and a similar amount of penalty for each day thereafter until the said entity fully complies. Provided that these fines shall only accrue daily beginning forty-five (45) days from the time that the said decision, order or ruling was received.
(c) Supply of Incorrect or Misleading Information. – The Commission may likewise impose upon any entity fines of up to one million pesos (PI,000,000.00) where, intentionally or negligently, they supply incorrect or misleading information in any document, application or other paper filed with or submitted to the Commission or supply incorrect or misleading information in an application for a binding ruling, a proposal for a consent judgment, proceedings relating to a show cause order, or application for modification of the Commission’s ruling, order or approval, as the case may be.
(d) Any other violations not specifically penalized under the relevant provisions of this Act shall be penalized by a fine of not less than fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) up to two million pesos (P2,000,000.00).
Provided that the schedule of fines indicated in this section shall be increased by the Commission every five (5) years to maintain their real value from the time it was set.
Section 30. Criminal Penalties. – An entity that enters into any anti-competitive agreement as covered by Chapter III, Section 14(a) and 14(b) under this Act shall, for each and every violation, be penalized by imprisonment from two (2) to seven (7) years, and a fine of not less than fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) but not more than two hundred fifty million pesos (P250,000,000.00). The penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the responsible officers, and directors of the entity.
When the entities involved are juridical persons, the penalty of. imprisonment shall be imposed on its officers, directors, or employees holding managerial positions, who are knowingly and willfully responsible for such violation.
RA No 7653 | The New Central Bank Act
Section 34. Refusal to Make Reports or Permit Examination. - Any officer, owner, agent, manager, director or officer-in-charge of any institution subject to the supervision or examination by the Bangko Sentral within the purview of this Act who, being required in writing by the Monetary Board or by the head of the supervising and examining department willfully refuses to file the required report or permit any lawful examination into the affairs of such institution shall be punished by a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) nor more than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) or by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
Section 35. False Statement. - The willful making of a false or misleading statement on a material fact to the Monetary Board or to the examiners of the Bangko Sentral shall be punished by a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) nor more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000), or by imprisonment of not more than (5) years, or both, at the discretion of the court.
Section 36. Proceedings Upon Violation of This Act and Other Banking Laws, Rules, Regulations, Orders or Instructions. - Whenever a bank or quasi-bank, or whenever any person or entity willfully violates this Act or other pertinent banking laws being enforced or implemented by the Bangko Sentral or any order, instruction, rule or regulation issued by the Monetary Board, the person or persons responsible for such violation shall unless otherwise provided in this Act be punished by a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) nor more than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000) or by imprisonment of not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10) years, or both, at the discretion of the court.
Whenever a bank or quasi-bank persists in carrying on its business in an unlawful or unsafe manner, the Board may, without prejudice to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraph of this section and the administrative sanctions provided in Section 37 of this Act, take action under Section 30 of this Act.
Section 37. Administrative Sanctions on Banks and Quasi-banks. - Without prejudice to the criminal sanctions against the culpable persons provided in Sections 34, 35, and 36 of this Act, the Monetary Board may, at its discretion, impose upon any bank or quasi-bank, their directors and/or officers, for any willful violation of its charter or by-laws, willful delay in the submission of reports or publications thereof as required by law, rules and regulations; any refusal to permit examination into the affairs of the institution; any willful making of a false or misleading statement to the Board or the appropriate supervising and examining department or its examiners; any willful failure or refusal to comply with, or violation of, any banking law or any order, instruction or regulation issued by the Monetary Board, or any order, instruction or ruling by the Governor; or any commission of irregularities, and/or conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner as may be determined by the Monetary Board, the following administrative sanctions, whenever applicable:
(a) fines in amounts as may be determined by the Monetary Board to be appropriate, but in no case to exceed Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) a day for each violation, taking into consideration the attendant circumstances, such as the nature and gravity of the violation or irregularity and the size of the bank or quasi-bank;
(b) suspension of rediscounting privileges or access to Bangko Sentral credit facilities;
(c) suspension of lending or foreign exchange operations or authority to accept new deposits or make new investments;
(d) suspension of interbank clearing privileges; and/or
(e) revocation of quasi-banking license.
Resignation or termination from office shall not exempt such director or officer from administrative or criminal sanctions.
The Monetary Board may, whenever warranted by circumstances, preventively suspend any director or officer of a bank or quasi-bank pending an investigation: Provided, That should the case be not finally decided by the Bangko Sentral within a period of one hundred twenty (120) days after the date of suspension, said director or officer shall be reinstated in his position: Provided, further, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the director or officer, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
The above administrative sanctions need not be applied in the order of their severity.
Whether or not there is an administrative proceeding, if the institution and/or the directors and/or officers concerned continue with or otherwise persist in the commission of the indicated practice or violation, the Monetary Board may issue an order requiring the institution and/or the directors and/or officers concerned to cease and desist from the indicated practice or violation, and may further order that immediate action be taken to correct the conditions resulting from such practice or violation. The cease and desist order shall be immediately effective upon service on the respondents.
The respondents shall be afforded an opportunity to defend their action in a hearing before the Monetary Board or any committee chaired by any Monetary Board member created for the purpose, upon request made by the respondents within five (5) days from their receipt of the order. If no such hearing is requested within said period, the order shall be final. If a hearing is conducted, all issues shall be determined on the basis of records, after which the Monetary Board may either reconsider or make final its order.
The Governor is hereby authorized, at his discretion, to impose upon banking institutions, for any failure to comply with the requirements of law, Monetary Board regulations and policies, and/or instructions issued by the Monetary Board or by the Governor, fines not in excess of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) a day for each violation, the imposition of which shall be final and executory until reversed, modified or lifted by the Monetary Board on appeal.