1945-01-01,Fw 190D-9 Werk # 400207, Brielle

Hött, Karl Fw 3

6/JG-26 (7/44 to 5/45)

Fw 190A-8 Werk # 170978 "Brown 2" (dam),

Fw 190D-9 Werk # 400207 "Black 2" (lost 1/1/45)

EK 1 & 2, Wound Badge, Fighter Operational Clasp

WIA 1 January, 1945, shot down in "Black 2" by his own flak. He bailed from 650 feet and suffered a severe head injury and was taken to a Rotterdam hospital. His D-9 crashed at Stenenbaak Holland, northwest of Brielle (DeSwart). Target Brussels airports of Evere and Grimbergen.

WIA 19 August, 1944 in "Brown 2" during aerial combat with 3 P-51's. His parachute on fire, he was unable to bail out, he missed hitting trees and landed at Epinoy with severe burns.

His three victories;

a Lancaster at Hengelo Netherlands on 23 December, 1944,

a P-47 N of Liege on 24 December, 1944, and a

damaged Spitfire near Elsdorf on 23 April, 1945.

His wingmen, Uffz Rudolf Bellmann (KIA 22 April, 1945), Uffz Johannes Schlimper (KIA 29 April, 1945). His last mission, 4 May, 1945. Flugbuch. Alternate spelling: Hoett.

23.4.1945 6:15 Fw. Karl Hoett 6./JG 26 Spitfire w.b. near Elsdorf JG 26 (Caldwell)

Around 08.45 hours the Ju-88´s passed the turning point at Spakenburg and turned to a cours of 262 degrees for the next leg. For the time being everythig went well and the formation continued peacefully towards Schiedam. West of Rotterdam the german FLAK opened up again and once more aircrafts within the formation were hit. One of them was "Black-2" piloted by 27 year old Feldwebel Karl Hott of 6-Saffel. His aircraft received hits in the left wing and in th engine, which immidiately burst into flames. Fw. Hott pulled his aircraft up to 200 meters and bailed out. His FW crashed near the light tower at Steenenbaak, three kilometers both-west of Brielle and sank into the flooded land.With injuries to his left lower arm and lower chest Fw. Hott was taken to the naval Hospital in Rotterdam. He would not return to his unituntil early March where he continues flying missions until May 4th.

The formation moved south and minutes later crossed the Haringvliet (probably east of Hellevoetsluis) and the Grevelingen, the wide deltas of the rivers Maas an Waal. Here the FLAK opened up yet again and the next aircraft hit was the Ju-88 G6 of Leutenant Lothar Hemmerich. He was able to return his crippled plane on one engine back to Germany where he landed onthe airport of Norhorn-Klausheide.

source: Bodenplatte: The Luftwaffe's Last Hope, by John Manrho,Ron Pütz

Jagdgeschwader 26 (gebaseerd op Werner Girbig en Donald Caldwell en “Green hearts first in combat”, eveneens aanzienlijk ingekort)

Flugplatz Grimbergen – Flugkarten werden erst am Morgen ausgehändigt, Start etwa gegen 0830 Uhr und sammeln über dem Platz!

0814 Uhr! Der gesamte Gefechtsverband – I/JG 26 und III/JG 54 mit 47 Maschinen des Geschwaderstabes und der I/JG 26, 17 Maschinen der III/JG 54 und 3 Fw 190 der Einsatzstaffel fliegen in einer Flughöhe von 50 bis 150 Meter Richtung Zuidersee. Zwischen Utrecht und Rotterdam setzt plötzlich heftiges Flakfeuer ein wodurch vier Maschinen frühzeitig verloren gehen.

(Via Wingstovictory)

above: Leutnant Theo Nibel's W.Nr.210079 Black 12 of 10./JG 54 was downed by a partridge which holed his radiator near the British airfield of Grimbergen during Unternehmen Bodenplatte. This aircraft was the first relatively intact D-9 to be captured, 1 January 1945.

^{Manrho and Pütz 2004, pp. 178, 301. (via Wikipedia)}

An earlier model Fw-190

The plan Bodenplatte

On 14 December Generalleutnant Dietrich Peltz of the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe High Command) initiated plans for a major blow against the Allied air power in northwest Europe. This plan was worked out with the help of all of the Luftwaffe's Jagd-Geschwaderkommodore. It was originally scheduled to support the Battle of the Ardennes, the German Army's offensive, which began December 16, 1944. However, the same bad weather that prevented the Royal Air Force, United States Army Air Force, and other Allied air forces from supporting the ground troops, also prevented the Luftwaffe from carrying out the attack. It was, therefore, not launched until 1 January 1945 in an attempt to help regain the momentum of the struggling ground troops, supporting the second phase of the offensive, Operation North Wind (Unternehmen Nordwind).

The plan of Operation Baseplate called for a surprise attack against 17 Allied air bases in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. The object was to destroy or cripple as many Allied planes, hangars and airstrips as possible. Every fighter and fighter-bomber unit currently occupied with air defence along the Western Front was deployed, and additional units of Junkers Ju 88 and Junkers Ju 188 night-fighters and bombers acted as pathfinders. The strike planes themselves were mostly single-engined Messerschmitt Bf 109 and Focke-Wulf 190 fighters. It was hoped that the speed with which the attack could be carried out would offset the relatively small bomb loads such aircraft could carry. It was also hoped that by flying low and fast to the targets maximum surprise would be achieved. The attack was timed to be carried out at 0920 hours.

In a major oversight, the planners had set flight paths which took many units over some of the most heavily defended areas on the Continent; namely the V2 launch sites around The Hague. These sites were studded by large numbers of Flak units, none of which had been warned about the operation. As a result many of the German fighter units lost aircraft to "friendly fire" before the attacks could be initiated.

Another problem was the fact that many of the Luftwaffe pilots were very poor marksmen and lacked flight skills. By late 1944 there were no safe areas in which pilots could be trained without the possibility of air attack. Aviation fuel supplies were at a premium and there was a lack of experienced instructors. Many of the training units (eg JG 104) were forced to fly front-line operations in order to bolster the front-line Jagdgeschwader. Allied personnel who witnessed the attacks frequently remarked on the poor aim of the strafing aircraft, and many of the Luftwaffe aircraft shot down by Allied anti-aircraft fire were caught because they were flying too slow and too high: "The shooting was atrocious, and the circuit at Evere reminded us of more of a bunch of beginners on their first solos than pilots of front-line squadrons." (Wing Commander Johnnie Johnson).

The units deployed and their targets

See also: Organization of the Luftwaffe during World War II

In all, 1,035 aircraft were deployed from several Jagdgeschwadern (JG - fighter wings) Kampfgeschwadern (KG - bomber wings) and Schlachtgeschwadern (SG - ground attack wings); of these approximately 900 aircraft were fighters and fighter-bombers. Facing the German aircraft were the American strategic Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, as well as the (predominantly British) Second Tactical Air Force (2nd TAF). Most of the airfields used by the Allied air forces had been previously built and used by the Luftwaffe, as a consequence of which the layout of them was well known.

The targets for the various units were:

Aftermath

Allied airfield after the attack.

A total of 495 Allied aircraft were damaged or destroyed. Most of the targeted airfields remained out of action for up to two weeks following the attack. Due to Allied fighter counter-attacks, and surprisingly numerous Allied anti-aircraft guns—intended to prevent V-1 attacks—the Luftwaffe lost 280 aircraft, 271 of which were fighters or fighter-bombers, with a further 69 aircraft damaged. Allied fighters claimed 62 destroyed, Allied anti-aircraft guns claimed 88, and 84 were lost to friendly fire. (Due to the secrecy required for the mission, German flak commanders had not been briefed on the mission and the crews opened fire on their own planes, both on the way to and from the targets.)

While "a bold stroke" that achieved tactical surprise, it was undone by poor execution and low pilot skill. The Luftwaffe lost 143 pilots killed and missing, while 70 were captured and 21 pilots wounded, - the largest single-day loss for the Luftwaffe. Many of the formation leaders lost were experienced veterans, which placed even more pressure on those who were left. Additionally, while it was supposed to "revive" the offensive, it could have preceded the Ardennes attack, without the need to rely on weather. Thus, Bodenplatte was a very short-term success but a long-term failure, for while Allied losses were soon made up (within weeks), lost Luftwaffe aircraft and pilots were irreplaceable, leaving the Luftwaffe "weaker than ever and incapable of mounting any major attack again".