10. The Dual Algorithm

Wittgenstein said that the foundations of the language game cannot be part of the language. Wittgenstein was always thinking through an issue but gave very little verbal indication about that thought. The conclusions were brought forth but the logical process was left to “thought”. I reinterpret these comments as dividing mental activity into two algorithms. I posit that the foreground activity includes the language game of Wittgenstein. I also posit that the foreground includes picture or graphic references that are more abstract than language, but not as abstract as the true background. With Wittgenstein the background (foundations) is more action or "doing" oriented. The foreground of pictures and language is more structure oriented.

The foreground algorithm is structured in limiting ways so that its operation can be "visible”. This contrasts with Wittgenstein’s “thoughts”. The data in the foreground follows predictable rules as to relationships so that there is a visibility to the processes. The data of the foreground is particularly significant in this characteristic, that is, strong stable relations that make it easy to interpret (be visible) so the processes that occur are relatively obvious.

The background is more abstract and elusive. The data, if it can be called that, is a basis for relationships that are the important part of the algorithm. The background may be just relationships. The relationships are changeable as distinct from the clearly understood and stable relationships of the foreground. The relationships of the background are abstract, they cannot be instantiated. And these abstract relationships can change focus quickly. If a person could "view" this mental background, it would give very little information about its workings. The abstractness of the background must be turned into some foreground "data" in order to be understood at all. This must be done by building the relationships with words and pictures.

Jerome Heath