श्री लक्ष्मीहयग्रीवाय नमः
श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थभगवत्पादाचार्यगुरुभ्यो नमः
श्रीमज्जयतीर्थगुरुभ्यो नमः
श्री गुरुभ्यो नमः
In Viśnu-tattva-nirṇaya, Śrīmad Ānandatīrtha bhagavatpādācārya provides a quote from Brahmatarka to draw a fundamental principle of epistemology.
The context is this: Advaitins, following their predecessors in epistemology viz. the Bhāṭṭās, define Pramāṇā as अनधिगतार्थगन्तृ = that which makes an unknown, known. It implies that if the same point is conveyed by multiple Pramāṇās, except the first Pramāṇā, the rest are redundant (because they don’t convey anything new). Therefore having multiple Pramāṇās is a weakness. They prefer novelty over repetition.
Śrīmadāchārya rebuts this misplaced (epistemological) priority by pointing out (though not in the same sequence as mentioned here) that
Novelty is acceptable but only if there is no contradiction with multiple Pramāṇās. If that constraint is not enforced, any absurd tenet becomes acceptable on the grounds of novelty! The Advaitins would have to deal with the unpalatable situation of discarding monistic conclusions in favor of more novel ideas (that are more absurd than advaita) such as ‘the real was produced from the unreal’ backed by the Shruti (असतः सदजायत) itself!
If multiple pramāṇās concur on the same tenet, it leads to conviction about that tenet. Multiplicity is not a weakness.
Also, if a tenet contradicts multiple pramāṇās, it is flawed or invalid.
On the third point, he gives the example of shukti-rajata where the cognition of silver is adjudged as bhramā (illusion) and silver is considered false or asat. On what grounds is this judgement based? It is on the grounds of contradiction to multiple pramāṇās.
Śrī Jayatirtha explains contradiction to multiple pramāṇās: (1) Let’s say such a person who is caught in that illusion is told by a trustworthy person (Apta) that it is not really silver but just a piece of shell. (2) When he gets closer by, he sees it to be a piece of shell. (3) He may infer the same by noticing its brittleness and such non-silver attributes. He realizes that the silver-cognition contradicts multiple pramāṇās and hence concludes its invalidity.
It may be argued that - the silver cognition is rejected as illusion, not because it contradicts multiple pramāṇās, but because that cognition is produced by a defective instrument. That is, the instrument of knowledge (the indriya in this case) is afflicted by defects, such as too much similarity between silver and nacre, without enough lighting to show the dissimilarities also. So contradiction to multiple pramāṇās is not the right reason.
Śrīmadāchārya answers that by going deeper: On what basis did we ascertain those as defects in the first place? It is only because of contradiction to a stronger pramāṇā(s).
Śrī Jayatirtha explains using the Brahmatarka quote given after this: बलवत्त्वं च बाधकप्रमाणस्य उपजीव्यत्व-निरवकाशत्वाभ्यां इव बहुत्वेनापि अङ्गीकरणीयं, सर्वत्रोपजीव्यत्वादेरभावात् । तथाच बहुप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वस्य दोषजन्यत्वेन व्याप्तिः सर्वथा स्वीकार्या: The strength (superiority) of a sublating pramāṇa (the cognition of nacre along with corrective element - this is not silver) should be accepted not only on the grounds of being foundational (upajīvyatva) and niravakāśatva, but also on the basis of multiplicity (bahutva), since relations such as upajīvyatva are not present in every case. Therefore, the vyāpti or the pervasion between ‘contradicted by multiple pramāṇas’ and ‘produced by defective instrument’ must be accepted without exception.
All of this is mentioned in the Brahmatarka quote:
बलवत्प्रमाणतश्चैव ज्ञेया दोषा न चान्यथा
Defects are known only through stronger pramāṇās, and not otherwise.
(But what makes a Pramāṇā strong?)
द्विविधं बलवत्त्वं च बहुत्वाच्च स्वभावतः ।
तयोः स्वभावो बलवान् उपजीव्यादिकश्च सः ।
Strength is of two kinds: arising from multiplicity and from intrinsic nature. Of these two, strength due to intrinsic nature is more than strength from multiplicity.
Examples of inherently stronger Pramāṇā are the depended-upon (upajīvya) pramāṇa or a niravakāśa pramāṇa.
[An upajīvya pramāṇa is inherently stronger than the dependent i.e. upajīvaka pramāṇa. Similarly, a niravakāśa pramāṇa is inherently stronger than a sāvakāśa pramāṇa.]
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My interest here is regarding bahutva: the strength from multiplicity.
The basic idea is - If multiple pramāṇās concur, then they have this strength from bahutva. Thus, that which has more pramāṇās is stronger than that with fewer pramāṇās.
Given that we are used to ideas like democracy, majority wins etc., this may appear acceptable. But a little inspection will make this idea very questionable:
The exception (apavāda) is usually fewer in number but stronger than the norm (utsarga). After all, they prevail despite the opposition / difference from the norm. Nobody dismisses the exceptions simply because they lack multiplicity.
Similarly, geniuses or experts are rare or few in number. Their ideas may be quite radical and different from the majority’s. So here too, majority’s ideas don’t prevail.
Further, we consider ourselves to be independent in most instances. Only during some times (like in some helpless situations like sickness) do we realize our absence of independence (or if lucky, we will consider it, dependence on God). Here too, purely from a frequency point of view, there are more instances of feeling independent rather than the other way around.
So when is strength from multiplicity really a positive factor? If so, in what circumstances?
The answer is in two parts.
One is to understand that this principle of maximum concurrence is used only in epistemology i.e. matters related to Pramāṇās or the sources of knowledge. Therefore it is not same as democracy and such matters which are based on opinions, prejudices etc.
The second part, rather the main answer is in the subsequent phrase in that quote - तयोः स्वभावो बलवान्. Of the two - inherently strong and strength from multiplicity - the former is stronger than the latter.
The cases of exceptions, geniuses, experts come in this category. Their advices or ideas would be ‘svabhāvataḥ prabala’ (inherently strong). Ofcourse, there needs to be strong independent evidence that they truly are experts and geniuses (without the same prejudices and biases of normal people). Without such strong evidence, there is no way to distinguish them / their advice from an errant person’s opinion.
Similarly, our experience of lack of independence (or of dependence) during few helpless situations is supported by the logic that true independence cannot vanish at any time. So the former, even if less frequent, is stronger than the experience of independence (limited independence) even if more frequent. So bahutva is not a factor then.
Śrīmadāchārya has answered that by using the word गुणसाम्य in his Brihadaranyaka Bhāṣya. The whole context will be provided later. The relevant point is that multiplicity contributes to strength only when the sources of knowledge are of equal quality. For example, if an expert’s advice is opposed by multiple experts who concur on one point and if all of them are of equal expertise, then the majority wins.
What happens to the tenets with weaker sources?
There are two end-states:
If the weaker sources are liable to flaw, then the tenet is rejected altogether. Śrīmadāchārya says this in Viśnu-tattva-nirṇaya: बहुप्रमाणविरुद्धानां दोषजन्यत्वनियमात्, and this in Brihadaranyaka Bhāṣya: बहुमानविरुद्धं यन्न तन्मानं विदो विदुः That which contradicts many / more sources of knowledge is not a Pramāṇā. The illusory silver, serpent etc. are such cases.
If the weaker sources are infallible (Veda or any svataḥ pramāṇā source), then they are reinterpreted. In all cases below, the weaker one is reinterpreted. It also aligns with the idea of economy of reinterpretations. That is, fewer reinterpretations are preferred.
For example, the abheda-vākyas i.e. vedic statements that convey (or seem to convey) identity between jīva and Ishvara are weaker because they are sāvakāsha, will attract the flaw of upajīvya-virodha and are also fewer in number compared to the much larger set of counter-pramāṇās i.e. bheda-vākyas (vedic sentences which declare jīva and Brahman to be different from each other), Pratyakṣa and other such anumāna. Hence abheda-vākyas are reinterpreted.
Even in cases of Vyatyāsa, the sentence is reinterpreted. Vyatyāsa is a method of narration where one term is replaced by another. Śrīmadāchārya mentions about such methods in his MBTN 9.127-135. He gives an example for vyatyāsa: Bhagavan Krishna promises Draupadi that Duryodhana etc. will be killed by Bhībhatsu i.e Arjuna (बीभत्सुशरसंछन्नान् शोणितौघपरिप्लुतान्). But the details of the war that follows tell us that Bhima was the one who killed all Kauravas and most of their armies: भीमसेनहतास्ते हि ज्ञायन्ते बहुवाक्यतः | This is a case of vyatyāsa in the person’s name (pum-vyatyāsa).
Krishna’s sentence, which mentioned Arjuna’s name, is not discarded; instead is reinterpreted as referring to Bhimasena.
In Bhāgavata Tātparya Nirṇaya, Śrīmadāchārya points out that vyatyāsa is detected by this rule of contradiction to multiple sentences: बहुमानविरोधे तु व्यत्यासः शब्दतोऽर्थतः |
Bhāgavata 10.16.23 mentions that Śrī Krishna, during a game, lost to Śrīdama and hence carried him around: उवाह कृष्णो भगवान् श्रीदामानं पराजितः. This could have been interpreted as Lord letting his devotee win, but the event is reported differently in multiple sources (including Harivamsha). Harivamsha states that Śrīdama lost. Bhāgavata itself states that Vishnu alone is jayī (victorious) at all times and naturally. Many other Pramāṇās declare him to have infinite strength. We reckon from contradiction to multiple sources that this Bhāgavata line is a case of ‘vibhakti-vyatyaya’ (Interchanging of first and second declensions in this case), rather than dismissing it as apramāṇā.
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Having understood how multiplicity works, it is interesting to observe the different ways in which Śrīmadāchārya has used this bahutva.
The tenet which has bahutva i.e. is supported by more pramāṇās overwrites that which is conveyed by fewer pramāṇās. In addition to the 3 illustrations (abheda sentences, Krishna’s sentence in MBh and Bhāgavata’s sentence) above, here is another from Brahmasūtras to illustrate the point:
Consider this from first adhyaya, first pāda, last adhikaraṇa. The Pūrvapakṣin contends that Prāṇa mentioned in ‘ता वा एताः शीर्षन् श्रियः श्रिताश्चक्षुश्श्रोत्रं मनो वाक्प्राणः (Aitareya Aranyaka. 2-1-4) is not Vishnu / Brahman. He bases his position on one liṅga (indicator): the mention of Prāṇa along with other indriyas.
The Siddhantin holds that it is Vishnu indeed because of other indicators in subsequent and preceding passages. Therein, it is said that (i) this Prāṇa is worshipped by Devatas (ii) this Prāṇa is the subject of all vedas and (iii) the body (our body) is like a chariot to this Prāṇa. All these 3 indicators (lingas) are invariably of Parabrahman and not an indriya. The siddhantin thereby adduces 3 lingas while the Pūrvapakṣin has only one. Thus, given the multiplicity of the lingas, the Siddhantin prevails.
Śrīmadāchārya gives an interesting argument in his commentary on Brihadaranyaka Upanishat. It may initially seem simplistic and even flawed, but the last few lines makes it a complete and compelling line of reasoning. He gives the following quote from Bhavishyat Parva:
प्रामाण्यं स्वीकृतं यैस्तु वेदानां आगमा हि ते ।
शतकोटयः पञ्चरात्रं पुराणं तावदेव च ॥
रामस्य चरितं तावत् तावदन्यच्च सर्वशः ।
अनन्ताश्च तथा वेदाः साङ्गोपाङ्गाश्च सर्वशः ॥
सर्वाधिक्यं यत्र विष्णोः तात्पर्यात् समुदीर्यते ।
विंशदेव सहस्राणि श्लोकानां समुदीरितम् ॥
बार्हस्पत्यं तथा बौद्धं भावाभावमतं तथा ।
शिवशक्त्यादिकं यच्च किञ्चित् प्रामाण्यसंयुतम् ॥
त्रिंशत्कोट्येव तत् सर्वमतो मानं न तत् स्मृतम् ।
बहुमानविरुद्धं यन्न तन्मानं विदो विदुः ॥
गुणसाम्येऽपि किमुत गुणाधिकविरोधि यत् ।
यथा बहूनां ज्ञानानां समानां गुणतोऽपि च ॥
विरोधि एकं तु यज्ज्ञानं न मानत्वं गमिष्यति ।
It mentions the counts of verses in different texts from different philosophical schools.
The Pañcarātrās (which convey Vishnu’s supremacy) comprises 100 crore verses. The Vaishnava Puranas are from the same Pancharatras. Similarly the Mūlarāmāyaṇa too contains 100 crore verses. Other related texts are of similar measure. (For example, the unabridged Brahmatarka is 50 crore verses). The Vedas and the auxiliary texts (i.e. Vedangas) are infinite. In all these texts, the primary purport is Vishnu’s supremacy.
On the other hand, the texts from Brihaspati’s doctrine (the atheist chārvāka school) are 20,000 verses in extent. The Bauddha texts are similar in extent. These and texts from the Shaiva, Shākta and other schools, including the acceptable portions, add up to a total of only 30 crore verses. Since all these texts of different schools contradict the (conclusions of) much larger corpus (Vedas + Pañcarātrās + Mūlarāmāyaṇa + other texts like Brahmatarka + Vedanga texts), they are not pramāṇā at all.
Conflict with larger corpus, even of equal quality, is problematic; what then to say of conflict with corpus of higher quality?! Just like one piece of knowledge, when in conflict with multiple pieces of knowledge (though of same quality), is not considered as valid, in the same manner, these texts which are in conflict with multiple texts (that too of higher quality) are not valid.
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The idea is this:
Each of these texts have the basic quality (guṇa) of being a text. If one compares the first set with the second text, solely on the basis of textness, the first set rules over the second on the grounds of being larger in size. If one considers other qualities (guṇa), there are more positive attributes (guṇādhikya) in the first set than in the second.
The first set has two parts: the Veda, which is apauruṣeya and the set of authored texts like Pañcarātrās, Mūlarāmāyaṇa, Brahmatarka, which were authored by the infallible, omniscient Vishnu for the sake of eligible people. The authors in the second set are not infallible.
Thus the Vaiṣṇava texts (Vedas + Pañcarātrās + Mūlarāmāyaṇa + other texts like Brahmatarka + Vedanga texts) have more prābalya (strength) - on both grounds - svabhāvataḥ (they have more positive factors) and bahutvataḥ (their extent is infinite) - than the non-vaiṣṇava texts.
Ofcourse, the above passage, while making a new argument based on quantity and quality, presumes the following conclusions: 1. Veda-apauruṣeyatva. 2. Vedas teach Vishnu’s supremacy. 3. Rudra and other deities (who are the authors of non-vaiṣṇava texts) have flaws or limitations.
Each of these conclusions are established / derived in other Sarvamūla works. For example, Śrīmadāchārya has mentioned, in his Rgbhashya, that Rudra cannot be the Supreme Being because the Veda (Rgveda 2.38.9 - na minanti rudraḥ) refers to his ignorance about the Creator’s acts i.e. vratam.
Given these presumptions, this argument can be viewed as an additional or supplemental one to justify Vishnu-sarvottamatva.
One may wonder if ‘document length’ as a yardstick is really a new type of usage OR is it just a corollary to the first type?
I think it depends on the perspective. The previous type of usage was about number of sentences or pramāṇās for a given tenet. This one is broader and focussed on the overall purport (tātparya) rather than each sentence. In that perspective, it is not a corollary.
However, the overall purport of a text is not independent of most sentences in it, so it may be seen as a corollary to the previous principle.
This is the most non-obvious and fascinating usage of bahutva. The principle is this: If a word has multiple meanings, the entity, where more meanings are applicable, is denoted primarily by that word, rather than that entity, where fewer meanings are applicable.
(This is not Parama-mukhya-vṛtti).
Here, the multiplicity of applicable meanings- arthabāhulya - is used to determine the primary referent i.e. mukhyārtha of a given word. Though this is not about strength of pramāṇās (which was the original scope of the Brahmatarka quote), it is included here because the underlying idea seems to be the same. Here too, multiplicity implies prominence.
There are three such instances:
Gītā-tātparya-nirṇaya on 2.17.
Acharya says that अविनाशि therein refers to Vishnu only because He alone is devoid of all (4) types of nāśha (loss): anityatvaṃ = being temporary like pot etc. (where the object is destroyed), dehahāniḥ = having loss of a body (like us sentients), duḥkhaprāpti (obtaining pain), apūrṇatā (loss of some completeness). All others have one or the other form of loss. Therefore Vishnu is the primary referent in 2.17. The subsequent verses are interpreted in terms of Vishnu being the only referent.
This point was supplied by Dr. Srinidhi V.
The Viyadadhikaraṇa
It is the first adhikaraṇa under 2nd adhyaya, 3rd pada. The point of contention is about creation of uncreated entities like space etc. Shrutis like अनादिर्वा अयं आकाशः mention that space is uncreated where Shrutis like 'आकाशो नीलिमोदेति', 'आत्मनः आकाशः सम्भूतः', 'नाभ्या आसीत् अन्तरिक्षं’ mention creation of space. This conflict between shrutis is used by the Pūrvapakṣin to assert unreliability of shruti as a Pramāṇā or to reduce the scope of shrutis like 'स इदम् सर्वं असृजत' (He created all this) to exclude uncreated entities like space, jīva etc..
This Adhikaraṇa spanning 7 sutras justifies creation of space in 2 ways:
there are 2 Ākāśas - one which is essentially created (bhūtākāśa) and another which is essentially uncreated.
To be created = to obtain new qualities, which are bestowed by Supreme Brahman and are in His control (Parādhīna-viśeṣa-avāpti).
Śrī Vyasaraja’s Tātparya Chandrika on this adhikaraṇa justifies the Dvaita school’s acceptance of Bhūtākāsha on the grounds that scriptures refer to our bodies being made from Pancha-bhūta (the 5 bhūtas - Ākāśa, Vāyu, Agni, Waters and Prithivi), while Ākāśa is truly not subject to any vikāra (modification). Please refer to Chandrika for more details.
Of relevance here is the 3rd sutra गौण्यसम्भवात् . Here, Śrīmadāchārya says - (Ākāśa's) utpatti vākyas (i.e. statements declaring Ākāśa's creation = creation-sentences) should be considered in their mukhyārtha (direct meaning). Anutpatti-vākyas (statements declaring Ākāśa being uncreated = no-creation sentences) should be considered in gauṇi-artha (secondary meaning). Otherwise it would be impossible (asambhava) to account for bāhulya (multiplicity) of utpatti vākyas.
Our first instinct is to interpret this bāhulya as number of creation-sentences is more than number of no-creation sentences.
However, Śrī Jayatirtha gives a different meaning, which is hinted in Śrīmadāchārya’s Nyāyavivaraṇa.
The Ākāśa word refers to multiple entities:
Bhūta-ākasha
Avyākṛta-ākasha
The abhimāni devatā of Bhūta Ākāśa = Gaṇapati
The abhimāni devatā of Avyākṛta Ākāśa = Lakshmi.
The word creation (utpatti) has many senses / meanings:
Acquiring a new attribute or quality, hitherto absent, which makes that entity truly functional. This is Parādhīna-viśeṣa-avāpti. Śrī Vyasaraja substantiates, in his Chandrikā, that this is the fundamental or the primary sense of Creation. It can be seen that the meanings mentioned below are more specific or can be subsumed under this type of creation.
Abhūtvābhavana: Created in essence (in that form and name) (like a pot from mud).
Obtaining a new body. This is a special case of above type of utpatti.
Now, consider the creation-sentences. These statements apply to all 4 referents of the word Ākāśa:
Bhūta-ākasha - is essentially created.
Avyākṛta-Ākāśa - is created in the sense of Parādhīna-viśeṣa-avāpti. Avyākṛta-Ākāśa now has a new viśeṣa of ‘having an association with objects that have physical form’.
Abhimāni devatā of Bhūta-Ākāśa = Gaṇapati - is created in the sense of getting a new body and abhimānitva (becoming the presiding deity).
Abhimāni devatā of Avyākṛta Ākāśa = Lakshmi - is created in the sense of Parādhīna-viśeṣa-avāpti. She has a new viśeṣa viz. sisṛkṣā (the desire to create the Universe etc.)
Further, the type of Parādhīna-viśeṣa-avāpti creation applies even to Bhūtākāśa and Gaṇapati.
On the other hand, the anutpatti-vākyas i.e. no-creation statements apply only to 2 of those meanings (Avyākṛta and Lakshmi) and only in the sense of being uncreated in essence. They too are created, in a different sense.
So, given the higher number of meanings to which creation is applicable, than the number of meanings, to which no-creation is applicable, the creation-sentences have to be understood in their direct meaning and the no-creation-sentences have to be understood in their secondary sense.
Śrī Vādirāja observes: उत्पत्तिपक्षेऽपि एकामेव श्रुतिं मुखत उदाहृतवतो भाष्यकारस्य इदमेव बाहुल्यं अभिमतं इति ज्ञेयम् । Given that the Bhāṣyakāra has provided only one utpatti shruti (creation-sentence) (in the previous sutrabhāṣya), we must know that this bāhulya (of applicable meanings) is verily intended (not of number of shrutis).
Aitareya Bhāṣya:
The Upanishat says - अः इति ब्रह्म तत्रागतं अहमिति. Śrīmadāchārya interprets thus - the seer (of the text) i.e. Mahidāsa (sākshāt Vishnu) declares himself to be ‘akāravāchya' (denoted by the letter ‘a’) as it implies pūrṇatva (completeness); Only He is absolutely complete.
That is, the word 'a' denotes Parabrahman. After justifying (using other Pramāṇās) his interpretation of 'a' = Vishnu, Śrīmadāchārya says the referent cannot be śūnya (absence in general). He writes:
न च शून्यस्य 'अ'शब्दार्थता | शून्याङ्गीकारे ह्यकारस्याभावताख्य एक एवार्थ इति सिद्ध्यति | विष्णोरङ्गीकारे तु (१) अभावता (२) अन्यता (३) विरोधितेति त्रयोऽप्यर्थाः सम्यगेव सिद्ध्यन्ति | तस्मादकारस्य भगवानेव मुख्यार्थः | न शून्यम् | एकदेशार्थत्वात् | तस्मादमुख्यार्थत्वादन्ययुक्तेनैवाकारेणाभाव इत्येव तदुच्यते .
He reasons thus - The letter 'a' generally indicates 3 meanings in regular worldly usage: anyatā (difference: a-mānuṣa means different from human), niṣedhatva (absence: a-pauruṣeya means absence of composedness) and viruddhatva (opposition: a-sura is sura-virodhi).
śūnya satisfies only one meaning: niṣedhatva (absence). And even in that sense, generally absence is stated of some specific entity. A generic absence is not in vogue.
Vishnu satisfies all 3 meanings: He is different from jīva-jaḍa-jagat; He has absence of the limitedness that is present in jīvas and jaḍa. He is opposed to qualities like alpatva (finiteness) of qualities found in jīva and jaḍa. Hence he is the referent of the letter 'a'.
Here too, the principle is - whichever entity satisfies maximum meanings of a given word, is primarily denoted by that word.
These instances demonstrate that Śrīmad Ānandatīrtha Bhagavatpādācārya is very consistent in his principles of epistemology and in his interpretations. May he and his guru Śrī Vedavyāsa bless us with proper knowledge and more such fascinating insights into their interpretational framework.
श्री मध्वेशकृष्णार्पणमस्तु