श्री लक्ष्मीनरसिंहाय नमः
श्रीमदानन्दतीर्थभगवत्पादाचार्यगुरुभ्यो नमः
श्री जयतीर्थगुरुभ्यो नमः
श्री गुरुभ्यो नमः
Only Sadāgama (good scriptures) is the evidence for God’s existence. This is the position taken in the Brahmasutra (1.3 - शास्त्रयोनित्वात्) and Acharya’s works like Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya. Shri Jayatirtha, the amazing commentator on Acharya’s works, explains how inference is incompetent to establish God’s existence conclusively. This is done both in Nyāyasudhā and in the Ṭīkā on Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya.
The Naiyyāyika gives around 8 arguments (p.s.1) that establish a Creator (or a Sustainer). The first of them is the regular watchmaker argument: The world is a product, therefore it must have a producer. The Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya and its Ṭīkā reject this as inconclusive, since it can also imply multiple other possibilities - multiple creators, temporary creators, embodied creator etc. - all of which is unpalatable. For more details on the full thread of argument, Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya Ṭīkā and Nyayasudha need to be read. This section concludes with a fundamental tenet - That God is establishable only on the basis of sadāgama ('good scriptures') and not through inference.
However, there is an interesting set of arguments to the contrary elsewhere. In his commentary on Ṭattvasaṅkhyāna and Tattvaviveka, Shri Jayatirtha makes compelling arguments to establish the existence of only one truly Svatantra Being.
Svatantra is defined as that which does not depend on an another, for its nature (svarūpa), how it is known (pramiti) and how it acts (pravrtti). Asvatantra is that which is dependent on another for any of these.
The possibility of everything being svatantra is rejected on the following grounds:
Contradicts experiences of pāratantrya (dependence), hita-akaraṇa (avoiding the beneficial activities), ahita-karaṇa (doing that which is not beneficial).
one should have been permanently blissful. Nothing can block one’s own self / svabhava (ananda) if one is svatantra.
One, if svatantra, should be able to remove duhkha.
The possibility of everything being dependent is rejected on the following grounds:
It leads to anavasthiti (infinite regress): A depends on B for sattādi, B depends on C, C depends on D.
It is impossible also. When there is no qualitative (in terms of dependence) difference between one dependent and another, how / why can A depend on B?
There is contradiction from Scripture too - which do declare everything to be one Being’s control.
(Tattvaviveka Ṭīkā rejects another argument:) The possibility of mutual dependents, complementing and aiding each other, like the blind carrying the lame and the lame guiding the blind - is rejected on the ground that their mutual contact itself needs the assumption of a Being who puts them together:
The possibility of more than one svatantra is not explicitly rejected in these works but it is not difficult to argue thus:
Multiple Independent Beings would lead to chaos due to differences in wills and wishes of those Independent Beings; but such chaos is not observed. That they all work in unison would be an additional assumption and similar to a narrow sense of Independence.
True Independence cannot be time-bound or situation bound or conditional. Independence, in the true sense, can neither be granted nor be taken away; nor be a matter of agreement.
It is contradicted by the scriptures such like ‘eko vaśī sarvabhūtāntarātmā’ (kaTha Upanishat 2.2.12).
Thus, with all other possibilities eliminated, the conclusion is that there can be only one svatantra.
As Acharya himself in Mahābhārata tātparya nirṇaya (22.94): true independence and limitless strength are equivalent: निस्सीमशक्तिर्हि यतः स्वतन्त्रः and goes on to assert that Independence implies guṇapūrṇatva (infinitude of virtues) and doṣhadūratva (lack of blemishes) - स्वतन्त्रत्वात् सुखसज्ज्ञानशक्तिपूर्वैर्गुणैः पूर्ण एषोऽखिलैश्च । स्वतन्त्रत्वात् सर्वदोषोज्झितश्च and also दोषास्पृष्टौ गुणपूर्तौ च शक्तिर्निस्सीमत्वाद् विद्यते तस्य यस्मात् .
So, we seem to arrive at the stance that there is only one Svatantra, who has infinite virtues and no blemishes. This is done purely on the basis of logic. Even if one ignores the “scriptural contradictions” part in the above arguments, one can arrive at the same conclusion. Here’s a video from a person of different religion with (partially) similar argument.
How then does Tattvavada assert that God is Sadāgamaika-vijñeya?
Wrong solutions:
The first instinctive response to above question is that the reasoning presented above is sambhāvanā yukti; not nishchāyaka. That is, they are plausibility arguments, meant to demonstrate some sort of plausibility in admitting the conclusion. They are not conclusive arguments.
Response: Without indicating the flaw in the above arguments, it is difficult to label any argument as sambhāvanā yukti and not as nishchāyaka yukti. Further, the “all cannot be dependent” part of the argument comes from the Brahmasutra (anavasthiterasambhavāchcha netaraH). Brahmasutras give nirṇāyaka yuktis (according to siddhānta). it cannot be dismissed as a sambhāvanā yukti.
The next and most frequent response is to say that the above reasoning can establish One Being as svatantra, Guṇapūrṇa and doṣhadūra, but cannot get us more specific details. Only Agama can give us more specific details about the identity and other qualities of such Svatantra entity. That’s why, the phrases have ‘vijñeya’ (instead of jñeya) or ‘samadhigamya’(instead of just adhigamya) (in ‘Sadāgamaika-vijñeya’ and ‘Śhāstraika-samadhigamya’). The prefixes ‘vi’ and ‘sam’ mean ‘vishesheNa’ or ‘samyak’ - showing that Agama is needed for more specific details about Supreme Being.
Response: Acharya has very explicitly asserted that even the basic notion of Ishvara (svatantra being) is not possible without Agama: आगमं विना ईश्वरस्यैव असिद्धेः (Viṣṇu-tattva-vinirṇaya). Please note the context: The Advaitin contends that jIva-Ishvara-bheda is pratyakṣa-siddha; hence scriptural statements declaring difference between jIva and Ishvara are merely repeating what is already known to us; hence bheda-vākyas are of lesser value than aikya-vākyas. It is in response to this that Acharya says - without Agama, Ishvara himself is not known. This context is not about ‘more specific details about God or his identity’. Therefore this response is not a solution.
Solution:
Consider the definition of svatantra as that which does not depend on another for its nature (svarūpa), how it is known (pramiti) and how it acts (pravrtti). The asvatantra is the opposite of above. The above arguments are made, assuming a certain definition of svatantra and asvatantra. But if those definitions are changed, the above arguments do not hold.
The above definitions combined all three - svarūpa, pramiti and pravritti - to classify the world etc. into svatantra and asvatantra. But what if there is no dependence on another in ‘svarūpa’ but only in ‘pravritti’? That’s how most cases are, in our experience. Would the above arguments apply?
Further, purely on rational / experiential grounds, it is not necessary to take the two extreme positions to define svatantra and asvatantra. Why not a middle ground? For example, we experience ourselves to have reasonable scope for volitive action: we raise our hands when we wish to. In fact, all forms of injunctions (‘do this’) and prohibitions (don’t do this’) presume we have the agency to act on such instructions.
That implies we have some partial independence in performing some actions, atleast at some times. True, we may not have this partial independence at all times (like in paralysis or old age) but that does not imply there is no such state at all.
It is quite plausible to explain a world with such multiple partially dependent entities.
The following possibility can also be argued for:
There can be more than one svatantra and there is no need for chaos. For ex, A is svatantra or self-dependent. It controls itself and no one else. It is not interested in controlling others. If needed, it will control others and if not, that is fine. Similarly there is B just like that. A would not control B and B would not control A. Both are self-dependent and do not care about controlling others. A and B can negotiate and control mutually exclusive two divisions. Thus no scope for chaos or conflict. This can be eternal too.
Here Svatantra only implies "Self-reliant" or "Self-controlling" i.e. not controlled by any one else and not dependent on any one else. It has no bearing on whether it controls other entities or not. Whether it controls other entities or not, is obtained only by Agama, and not obtainable purely by logic.
Thus, it is possible to have more than one svatantra.
Further, the illustration of blind and lame people, which demonstrate mutually dependent entities working together - was rejected on the ground that the very contact of such utterly dependent entities, is untenable. But that argument assumes
absolute dependence in every activity. There is dependence only in one aspect on the other.
a very non-random / deterministic system. A random or probabilistic system can very well raise the possibility of such contact.
The summary is that the arguments given in Ṭattvasaṅkhyāna Ṭīkā and Tattvaviveka Ṭīkā are valid in a limited context i.e. for pūrvapakshis (objectors) who accept some of the above definitions. On the contrary, those arguments will not work for a pūrvapakshi who disagrees with those definitions of svatantra and asvatantra or for one who considers partial independence to be plausible, or for one, who is not sure that it is indeed a deterministic world. Hence those arguments are indeed sambhāvanā yuktis (plausibility arguments), intended to show the plausibility. Since there are alternate explanations, they are not nishchāyaka yuktis (definitive or conclusive arguments).
At this stage, we must assess what kind of pramāṇa can help us validate the existence or identity of the Svatantra Being?
Pratyaksha or anubhava leads us to believe that there are many partial-svatantras but they are not Svatantra in the truest sense because their independence is time-bound, conditional and limited in any case.
Can inference help us?
Inference depends on vyāpti (pervasion). Vyāpti is of the form: if X then Y. For us, we need to know which X (hetu) implies Independence. X cannot be any of Omnipotence, Omniscience, Omnipresence etc. Unless we are ourselves omniscient, we cannot know any of those, to infer Independence in some being. We may admit a person to have abnormal strength but it still is not sufficient to conclude infinite, unfailing strength.
For the same reason, miracles do not imply Svātantrya (Independence). Today's miracles are cases of fraud or have a plausible explanation (including coincidence). In the remote case, where the possibility of fraud or exaggeration or sheer coincidence is removed, i.e. if a miracle has truly passed, it still does not imply the person who conducted the miracle has unfailing, unconditional capabilities without a time-limit (esp when we ourselves are not omniscient). Therefore too, Svātantrya cannot be implied.
This should help the (really logical) atheists ponder: In general, falsifiability is a good tool to check one's own confirmation bias (and other types). "Under what circumstances will my theory become false" - is a good tool to keep one's biases in check, safeguarding oneself from jumping to conclusions. Karl Popper articulated this to distinguish pseudo-science from science. Centuries prior, Shri Madhvacharya and his commentator suggested that one must actively seek negative instances of pervasion to invalidate positive instances (सहदर्शनमात्रेण न व्याप्तिः अवसीयते । यदैव अव्यतिरेकस्य). Just by observing X always with Y is not sufficient to infer that X implies Y invariably. One must articulate conditions / negative cases where this concurrence of X with Y is broken, and actively seek such conditions. Only upon not finding them, can one accept the pervasion of X with Y. The idea of falsifiability is quite close to this.
Now, can an atheist frame the falsifiability conditions? what kind of miracles or events would falsify their idea of God's non-existence. It is not possible to articulate one such event. Let's say an atheist declares his idea of God's non-existence will be falsified if all suffering is removed instantly. But this falsification criterion is unreliable: how can one sure of that suffering has ended forever? And it has ended for all? Our own lack of omniscience will render such falsification criteria useless. Even "God granting omniscience", "make each of us trust in God" are not good falsification criteria, because they too are susceptible to the same doubt (prior to God actually granting it). Therefore no miracle or event can help falsify God's non-existence. Thus, an atheist's position is just another non-falsifiable conspiracy theory (like 'Invisible, undetectable fairies live in my garden') - fashionable but useless.
Can we not infer Svātantrya by absence of dependence? Agreed that one's own dependence is experiential, but to establish the same in an another being is difficult. Ofcourse, it is possible to enlist many 'X' (hetu: reason) to infer dependence. For example, ignorance or limited strength imply dependence. But one gnawing doubt cannot be erased: What if the Being under consideration is truly Independent but just acting ignorant or weak? How do we know that it is not misleading us? (See p.s.2 for a similar thought). We dvaitins accept that, for instance, Shri Rama's actions of weeping and wailing for Sita were intentionally misleading; so this possibility of misleading is not new. So without removing that, inference from absence of dependence is also not possible.
The last resort is the Agama. Only Agama can help us with all sorts of pūrvapakshis (reasonable ones!) that conclusion that there is Only One Svatantra, by whose will does every other entity gets its svarūpa, pramiti and pravritti. Hence, it is correct to hold that Paramātma Vishnu is Sadāgamaika-vijñeya i.e. God can be established only through scriptural authority. Since such Agama tells us that Bhagavān Vishnu does not take avatāra in Kaliyuga, we may be statistically or mostly correct to infer dependence in others and act accordingly. If and when He appears in some form to us, we must pray that He also give us inner sight to identify Him as Paramatma, instead of misleading us to treat Him like any other dependent being.
श्री मध्वेशकृष्णार्पणमस्तु
I am thankful to Shri Kesava Rao Tadipatri and Shri Vijayananda for providing a new argument and feedback.
P.S.
कार्यायोजनधृत्यादेः पदात् प्रत्ययतः श्रुतेः । वाक्यात् सङ्ख्याविशेषाच्च साध्यो विश्वविदव्ययः (Udayana's Nyayakusumanjali 5.1): The existence of an omniscient, unchanging God is inferred from : 1. the world being a product must have a Creator; 2. Atoms (of the Nyaya school) must be instigated by a Sentient Being; they are inherently incapable of action; 3. the world being held together must be similarly the effect of intentional effort etc. etc.
Stephen Hawking in his 'A Brief History of Time - from the Big Bang to Black holes' (Chapter 1):
"In such a scheme it is reasonable to suppose that we might progress ever closer toward the laws that govern our universe. Yet if there really is a complete unified theory, it would also presumably determine our actions. And so the theory itself would determine the outcome of our search for it! And why should it determine that we come to the right conclusions from the evidence? Might it not equally well determine that we draw the wrong conclusion.? Or no conclusion at all?"
He later gets out of this by relying on Evolution to hold that Intelligence survives (cf. "intelligence and scientific discovery have conveyed a survival advantage"). Whether this optimism is justified because it is based on some evidence or if this optimism is irrelevant to the problem at hand and just a cover-up for the absence of a logical argument is left to the reader's perspective 🙂