shrI laxmIhayagrIvAya namaH
shrImadAnandatIrthabhagavatpAdAcharyagurubhyonamaH
shrI gurubhyo namaH hariH OM
An extract of Srimad Acharya's explanation of the concept of apaurusheyatva
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This is a page moved from Yahoo! Geocities. I have not made any changes. The contents need validation and addition for a complete argument on apauruSheyatva.
Date: 4th July 2009
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The purpose here is to introduce the topic of apaurusheyatva, as mentioned by Srimad AchArya (Sri Madhvaachaarya). Apaurusheyatva means unauthoredness. An apaurusheya text is a pramANa (a flawless authority). Vedas are not flawed because they are apaurusheya. Since they expound the nature of God (or Vishnu or Brahman), we believe in the existence of God. It is not possible otherwise to prove or disprove the existence of God. Therefore, this section is important to all Vedantins, esp mAdhva-s. Though the argumentation is aimed at showing why the idea of apaurusheyatva is not a belief, the purpose certainly excludes attempts to convince every atheist or anybody at all (for, the shAstras expound the concept of jIva-traividhya).
The source of this article is Srimad Acharya's 'viShNu-tattva-vinirNaya'. The section on apaurusheyatva was covered to some depth by Shrisha Rao on the dvaita mailing list. The postings are present in the archives (Start with this). Also refer to the FAQ section in Dvaita.org for glossary. A brief summary is presented below. All arguments mentioned by the Acharya and his illustrious commentators are not here. Some of my opinions are interspersed in the mainstream text. Since, it is necessary to distinguish between Acharya's words and mine, my own opinions will be enclosed within /* and */. Another point to note that some of my opinions are actually not mine, but of some commentators on the Acharya's work. The main commentary by Sri Jayatirtha is also not followed in entirety. For a smoother flow of questions/objections and answers, his commentary should be read.
ITRANS is the transliteration scheme used here.
1. Introduction
After offering his salutations to Lord Vishnu, Srimad Acharya enlists his pramANAs (based on Brahmanda Purana)
R^igAdyAbhArataM chaiva paJNchArAtramathAkhilam.h |
mUlarAmAyaNaM chaiva purANaM chaitadAtmakam.h ||
The Vedas, Mahabharata, Mula-ramayana (different from Valmiki Ramayana) and Pancharatraas are held as authoritative and as valid sources of knowledge.
In response to a question regarding the accepting the authority of scriptures,
Srimad Acharya says:
apaurusheyatvAdvedasya -- for, the Vedas [are pramANa, means of valid knowledge, as they] are unauthored.
na cha apaurusheyam vAkyameva nAstIti vAchyaM tadabhAve sarvasamayAbhimatadharmAdyasiddeH |
It should not be held that the very concept of apaurusheyatva i.e., unauthoredness is illogical. /* This objection is answered after highlighting the need for and importance of unauthored texts*/. In the absence of unauthored sentences, entities such as dharma, adharma, heaven, hell and even God cannot be established (on a firm basis).
/* This has certain important implications:
None has ever perceived entities such as dharma/adharma. They are, by definition, atIndriya (imperceptible by senses). Arguing that imperceptibility implies absence is equivalent to insisting that microscopic particles don't exist simply because they are not visible to the naked eye. If it is argued that instruments would need to be used to detect their presence, by the same token, it can be argued that without knowing whether one has the right instrument or not, it cannot be argued that the particle does not exist at all.
God cannot be 'established' (which is different from 'postulating His/Her existence) just on the basis of logic. Every logical proposition in favour of existence of God can be countered by an equally, if not more, powerful one. For example, if it is said that this world, being a complex and finished product like a watch found on a beach or a building, should have a creator, a counter-proposition can be made: Just as many building-contractors are involved in the construction of a building, so too, this world needs many gods as its creators. Moreover, if the analogy were to be extended, God should also be subject to life and death, like the creator of the watch. Also, it would not be possible to answer simple questions, if the means to know God were based on logic: 'Does God have one nose or two? It is very easy to realize that logic cannot give company for long. What results is a guess and not any conclusive evidence for existence of God or otherwise.
Dharma or adharma should not be assumed based on personal preferences. It is not infrequent that one hears people say, "God wants me to be happy. And if I have to be happy, I should have a feast on Ekadasi". When nobody even knows what God is, how can His assent over our activities be ascertained? */
2. The Necessity to accept Dharma and Adharma.
But what is the need to establish the nature of dharma, adharma and such atIndriya entities? Why shouldn't it be held that these atIndriya entities don't exist at all? In response, Srimad Acharya says:
yasya tau nAbhimatau nAsau samayI samayaprayojanAbhAvat.h |
"Such a philosopher should not be considered wise, for, his philosophy would not have any definitive benefit to anybody".
That is because when such entities are proclaimed as non-existing, it's only chaos and anarchy that results. A situation when there are no standards of morality, where anybody can do anything, will not benefit anybody.
/* It cannot be said that the morality consists in "not harming others" or in "whatever is good for humanity". Such points of view bring in subjectivity into moral standards (How can anything be standard, when it is subjective?). With such, all crimes can somehow be treated as moral acts (for example, a murder having a "noble" purpose of sustaining oneself or for the sake of reducing population growth) and the criminal let off. Further thought would definitely reveal that such subjective ideas, though undoubtedly noble, encourage anarchy indirectly. Thus, the possibility of a peaceful society without the notions of dharma and adharma is rejected. */
But, would the utility of acceptance of dharma/adharma be enough justification to assume their existence? Just that a person is thirsty does not mean water exists somewhere. In response, the venerable commentator on Sri Madhva's works, Sri Jayatirtha says, "It is not being contended that dharma and other atIndriya entities exist for sure. The claim that holds a doctrine preaching the absence of dharma/adharma as beneficial is being rejected. In the absence of any pramANa (so far discussed; i.e., perception and logic), there can only be a doubt regarding their existence or otherwise".
In addition, one should realize the limitations of the abilities of our senses. Eyes can only see and but not taste. Ears can only hear, but cannot smell. Given such, it is quite possible that there are entities beyond the grasp of these senses. /* This is not a proof, but a pertinent observation. */
Given that known pramANAs do not help us in determining the existence of definitely useful entities such as dharma/adharma, the apaurusheya Vedas should be looked into.
3. Authored works cannot be the source of knowledge on dharma.
Here, the significance of their being 'unauthored' can be questioned. Given the general acceptance of people like Buddha, Rishabha (founder of the Jaina doctrine) as omniscient, why can't their works be accepted as the sources of dharma and adharma? This is answered as:
na cha paurusheyeNa vAkyena tatsiddhiH aj~nAnavipralambhayoH prApteH |
Knowledge of atIndriya padArthas cannot be obtained from authored sentences on the account of possibility of the authors being ignorant or deceitful. Omniscience as such cannot be proven. It is not possible to conclude another person's omniscience when one oneself is not. Moreover, for authored sentences to be authoritative, it is pointed out that more assumptions, in addition to the one of author's omniscience, viz., absence of any intention of deceit, willingness to give out the knowledge should be assumed. Moreover, the person's capability of conveying the matter (he should not be dumb, he should have no obstructions when he wants the matter to the listener etc) should be assumed. Considering God as the author would not help reduce the number of assumptions, for, God's existence is an additional assumption (at this stage of the argument).
4. No assumption in case of unauthoredness.
On the other hand,
apaurusheyavAkyAN^gIkAre na kinchitkalpyaM |
There is nothing to be assumed if one accepts apaurusheyatva. Apaurusheyatva implies flawlessness. The flaws in a sentence arise solely because of the author. Words as such do not have any flaw in them. It's only the ignorance or other intentions of the composer that bring in flaws in a sentence. Thus there is no flaw in authorless sentences. If it is objected that the very acceptance of apaurusheyatva is an assumption and that it does not have any certainty, it is said,
apaurusheyatvaM cha svata eva siddhaM vedakartR^iraprasiddheH | aprasiddhau cha
kartustatkalpane kalpanAgauravam.h | akalpane chAkartR^ikatvaM siddhameva |
apaurusheyatva is proven of by itself, only because the Vedas are " known not to have any authors/creators ". To contest against that (i.e., Vedas are known not to be authored), one would need to imagine an author(s). But that would attract the flaw of making more assumptions than necessary. To avoid that flaw, if such an assumption is avoided, it establishes that Vedas do not have authors.
/* Note that "known_not_to_have_creators" is different from "authors/creators_are_not_known ". It is only the Vedas that fall in the first category, while folk songs and other anonymous literature come under the second category. For the entities in the first category, knowledge of lack of authors was present at all points of time; Whereas, for the entities in the second category, lack of knowledge of authors is present and is confined to the present time and cannot be held true in all past.
The point here is that pratyaksha, anumAna and Agama cannot _prove_ apaurusheyatva. We don't have any sensory perception of apaurusheyatva of Vedas. Therefore, inference (which is subservient to pratyakSha or Agama) cannot be of help. Trying to prove Agama's apaurusheyatva using Agama itself is a flawed approach. The point of this exercise is to prove that Shruti is a pramANa because of its apaurusheyatva. To prove its apaurusheyatva, if Shruti is used as a pramANa, the flaw of anyonyAshraya (mutual dependence; of apaurusheyatva and vedaprAmANya) is obtained.
But the AchArya says that all that is not needed; apaurusheyatva is proven of itself, without the need for an 'external' pramANa. If the opposite i.e., veda paurusheyatva (i.e., Vedas being authored) is disproven, apaurusheyatva is automatically obtained.If something has the quality of 'known/reputed not to have authors/creators', then it must not have any authors. This is simple deductive reasoning. Vedas have always been known not to have any authors. */
5. The Main objection to Unauthoredness.
But the objector to vedApaurusheyatva would contest that we should apply the 'obvious' rule that applies to all sentences, that every sentence has an author, to the Vedas as well, and conclude that its unauthoredness is a myth?
To that, Srimad Acharya says:
na cha laukikavAkyavatsakartR^ikatvam.h | tasyAkartR^ikatvaprasiddhyabhAvAt.h |
Vedic sentences are unlike the laukika-vAkyas (i.e, ordinary worldly sentences) that always have an author. That is because the laukika-vAkyAs are never known to be unauthored. That is, laukika vAkyAs lack a positive qualification of "known to be unauthored' (Only Vedas have this qualification). Therefore, over-application of the rule to Vedas, which do have that qualification, is wrong. Therefore, there is no 'bAdhaka' (hindrance) to accepting Veda-apaurusheyatva.
/* The idea is this: All arguments directly against apaurusheyatva can be reduced to these: "All texts that we know of have authors. Texts, whose authors are not known, are labelled as anonymous literature, and not as unauthored. That is because, the general rule -- if a sentence, then an author exists -- applies. Anything that violates this general rule is a myth".
In reply, it is pointed out that the general rule -- if a sentence, then an author exists -- is not a matter of deductive reasoning, for there is no strict logical concomitance between sentence-ness and authoredness. A sentence is a sequence of words. To contest that this sequence is the product of a person's effort, one has to invariably use induction. It cannot be said that it is 'intuitively so'. Counter-intuitive ideas are not denounced in science, just on the grounds that they are counter-intuitive. Moreover, it is easy to see that it is only induction, not inuition, at work by raising the question: Why can't a sequence be unauthored? [As an aside, it should be interesting to note that those that reject the Cosmological argument uphold the idea that this Universe evolves on its own, and that this solution is to be preferred over the 'Creator God' argument, because it meets Ockham's razor]. It is simply because all sentences that we know, are not known to be unauthored.
This is what the AchArya points out and says that the general rule -- if a sentence, then an author exists - applies only if that sentence (or the text) is not known to be unauthored. Thus, the objector is extending the rule that applies to [texts that are not known to be authorless] beyond its legitimate domain [i.e., to Vedas, which are known to be authorless]; which is a flaw. Without extending that rule, the objector cannot write it off as a myth (without making any extra assumptions). Therefore, it is incorrect to denounce apaurusheyatva as a myth.
Thus, the 'direct' logical problems to apaurusheyatva are addressed. There are other issues of concern, because they have an indirect bearing upon apaurusheyatva (such as 'internal evidence from the Vedas against apaurusheyatva. But I will not write about them here, because the answers to those are very well-known and can be found in other works also).
Here an objector might retort that, by this style of argument, any myth can be given the status of a real. Consider the case of a hare with horns. Though it is well agreed that such are non-existent, its existence can be made a reality by arguing on the following lines: "To contest that a hare does not have horns, one should apply the general rule that hare-ness implies horn-less-ness. But this rule cannot be applied here, because the rule is based on inductive reasoning that all hares we know of, do not have horns. The over-application of this rule is a flaw and therefore there is no reason to denounce a hare with horns as a myth". So, how is this different from the argument given for Veda-apaurusheyatva? It cannot be contended that while the Vedas exist, the horns of a hare do not. If the latter is denied existence because of lack of pratyakSha to that effect, the former's apaurusheyatva too must be denied, as it was already accepted that apaurusheyatva is not available to pratyakSha.
We note that w hen something such as 'horns of a hare' is labelled as non-existent, it is not because there is something inherently illogical about it (in the same way as a 'round square', 'son of a barren woman' is). That is, the correct reason for doing so is indeed that no case to the contrary has ever been observed and not because there is any strict logical concomitance between hareness implies horn-less-ness. If by some mixed-breeding, a hare with horns were to be created, it wouldn't be 'non-existent' anymore. However, if a claim were to be made that hares with horns exist, unless the claimant shows an instance of hare with horns, the claim can be discarded, for it being against the general perception.
It should be noted that, in the case of Veda-apaurusheyatva (i) unauthoredness translates to non-existence of something (i.e., abhAva padArtha) and (ii) this idea is in line with the way the information about the Vedas have been passed across generations (I will refer to this as 'tradition'. Do not confuse with the general meaning given to the word). This implies that if existence or non-existence of something, contrary to the tradition, were to be claimed, the burden of the proof lies on the person making the claim. To deny apaurusheyatva, contrary to the tradition, authors must be presented. Such 'presented authors' cannot be of this generation, and must be of bygone era. If somebody other than Rishi must be presented as the author, one would need to reject the paramparA without a compelling reason to do so. In fact, the objector has no other option (so as to have economy of assumptions) but to present the Rishi of the Vedamantra as the author of the work [Incidentally, this is the only objection to apaurusheyatva that is treated by Sayana and others]. This aspect is treated later.
Coming back to the case of 'horns of hare', if the claimant brings up a proof of a tradition in some corner of the world, though hitherto unknown to us, which upheld the existence of hares with horns, one must accept their existence, though they are not seen now. Ofcourse, this is after verifying the actual existence of such a paramparA. Ofcourse, one should be suspicious about accepting any information, however sensible or mythical it appears. Scientific evidence should be used in denouncing myths. We will see later if the big bang theory and theory of evolution pose a problem to apaurusheyatva. To bring out solid scientific evidence against apaurusheyatva, not even time-travel into the past would help!
In summary, there should be good reason to dismiss the information that has been passed across generations, be it regarding Vedas or anything else. The only reason to denounce veda-apaurusheyatva as mythical was based, more on our knowledge of texts, rather than any logical concomitance between textness and authoredness. */
6. Spurious authored works cannot become unauthored.
Now, Srimad AchArya deals with the possibility of spurious works attaining the status of 'Veda':
na cha kenachitkR^itvA 'veda' ityuktaM vedasamam.h, paramparAbhAvAt.h |
It is not possible that sentences that have been authored by somebody be called as 'veda', for, there is a lack of paramparA to that effect.
/* The objection that it is likely that the case of forgotten authors has been converted to a more respectable idea i.e., the case of 'non-existent authors' is also met here.
Every Vedic mantra has three entities attached to it -- Rishi, chandas and devatA. The etymology of the word, 'Rishi' is given by Yaskacharya in his nirukta as: R^iShiH darshanAt.h. The word Rishi comes from the fact that he is a 'seer' of mantra (as opposed to 'author of mantras'). Therefore, the Rishi of the mantra cannot be its author. Chandas is the meter and devata, the presiding deity of the mantra. They have to be mentioned (actually, more than that) prior to chanting a Vedic mantra. In addition to this information, a teacher passes the following to a student, when teaching the vedic mantra: how he had obtained it and that this text carries a positive qualification that it is not authored. This unbroken record is another of the qualifications of a Vedic text. Note that these 3 parameters of Rishi, Chandas and devata are not unique to the Vedas. There are other texts also that have corresponding Rishi, Chandas and devatA, but they will not have the qualification of 'being known as authorless'. The point of mentioning this non-unique qualification is to rule out the possibility of authored sentences attaining the status of Veda.
This information helps in ruling out the contention that the Vedas obtained the status of apaurusheya over time, though actually these Rishis are the authors. The Vedic mantra with the above information has been carefully preserved for thousands of years till now, with very little error (keeping in mind the large timescale and no. of generations involved). It is unreasonable to hold that our ancestors were able to preserve all of that, except the information regarding authors.Secondly, the fallacy of rejecting apaurusheyatva becomes obvious when one works backward in time. If the Rishi was the author and known as such, it is unreasonable to expect that the concept of apaurusheyatva (which, according to the contenders, is chronologically preceded by the mantras themselves) could have gained momentum. Would, after, say 2000 years, Kalidasa be considered as the Rishi of 'Meghadoota' and not its actual author?
The point here is that, if an authored text were to attain the status of Veda, the above information cannot be provided. The details of Rishi, Chandas and devata might be cooked up, but whence will the paramparA, that traces right till the Rishi, be created out of the fly? It is precisely this that would contain the transformation of a spurious work into a Vedic text. */
7. The Laxanas of a Rishi.
But why can't it be that somebody today actually authors a text but claims to be its Rishi, i.e. to have 'seen' it? Wouldn't such a text become a Vedic text?
To that, Srimad AchArya quotes Brahmanda Purana that defines the qualities of a seer of a Vedic mantra:
viMshallaxaNato.anUnastapasvI bahuvedavit.h |
veda ityeva yaM pashyet.h sa vedo j~nAnadarshanAt.h ||
This requires the Rishi to possess 20 or more qualities (These physical qualities are mentioned in other works of AchArya based on laxaNa-shAstras. A height of 96 inches is one of them), should be a rigorous ascetic, a knower of many branches of Veda. If he sees a mantra, and he 'sees' the mantra as a 'vedic mantra', that becomes a Veda.
Other objections are not discussed here, but are covered in Srimad Acharya's 'Vishnu-tattva-vinirnaya' and 'Gita bhAshya'. They have to be read, compulsorily with Sri Tikacharya's commentary.
/* The following information regarding the Vedas should be evaluated against the possibility of the Rishi being the author. However, it should be noted that these are only 'empirical evidence' for an event of the past (say, like the documents that contain information about an event in the past, say, like the British Invasion):
a. There are many sUktas in the Vedas that have multiple 'Rishis'. For example, both Bhrigu and Manyu himself are said to be seers of the well-known manyu-sUkta. There are sUktAs that have seven rishis. Some sUktAs (such as R.V.9.66) have 100 Rishis for 30 Riks. R.V. 8.34.16-18 has 1000 Rishis for just 3 Riks. It is only unreasonable to think that all of them copied from another's texts without getting charged for the plagiarism. Even if the Rishis were to be located in different places, it is unreasonable to hold that they write the exact text.
b. Some portions of the Veda are duplicated (across the Vedas); for example, the puruSha sUkta. It is unreasonable to hold that nobody in the tradition, including the index makers (i.e. the anukramaNikakAras) would not care for removing the duplicates (if the works were actually authored).
c. Most objections in the past to acceptance of Vedas as a pramANa seem mostly from the perspective of not attaining the promised results, rather than apaurusheyatva. It is only easier to denounce a text for being human-authored, rather than holding that the promised results are not obtained.
d. There is a legend in the shrutis that a queen refuses the marriage of her daughter to a person, who is not a mantradraShTA (seer of a Vedic mantra). The boy in question undergoes a rigorous penance and is finally blessed with the vision of mantras (related to Maruts). He returns home, sends a sample of the text to the queen. The Queen examines the verses, asserts that the boy is inded a mantradraShTA. These point out that the idea of apaurusheyatva was not only fairly ubiquotous, but also that one mantradraShTA could recognize another.*/
Other writers too have explained the concept of apaurusheyatva. Sayanacharya's bhAShya-bhUmika to the samhitAs and Dayananda Saraswati's RgVeda Bhashya bhumika can be referred in this regard. However, they do not anticipate all objections. They take up merely the objection of Rishi being the author (which is originally answered in the mImAmsA sutras). Moreover, they concentrate on the 'eternality' (nityatva) aspect of the vedas. Some recent advaitins hold that knowledge is eternal and therefore Vedas are apaurusheya. This is not only against what is conveyed by their tradition (see Shankaracharya on Brahmasutra 1.3.29, for example), but also brings in the possibility of flaws in Vedas.
It is only Srimad Anandatirtha who expounds the apaurusheyatva of vedas (Notice that apaurusheyatva directly implies flawlessness, but eternality does so indirectly and through aparusheyatva), considers all other objections and answers them convincingly.
8. Summary and Conclusion: Most denounce the idea of apaurusheyatva because it appears fantastic. But it can be seen above that it depends more on our knowledge of the types of texts, rather than there being any fantasy element in the concept. Even if a person is totally oblivious to the idea of apaurusheyatva, the above reasoning should convince that it is only his lack of knowledge regarding the Vedas that prevents him from accepting the concept, rather than the idea being mystical. Now, the implicit expectation there is regarding his being reasonable; that is, he is not unreasonable to mistrust the entire tradition (simply by building a conspiracy theory against the tradition; that they told lies, that so many generations have built up on lies; that somewhere, all people got fooled when an authored text was paraded as an unauthored work) only because the concept appears fantastic; and even when there is no scientific evidence against it.
The well-accepted theories of Big Bang and of Evolution do not deal with Consciousness. Consciousness is a fundamental entity, fundamentally different from matter. For more details, see this. In the later portions in his work, Srimad Acharya quotes a pramANa that the entire Vedas are in Vishnu (Who is not made up of matter). This pramana shows that a consciousness, which is eternal, can hold data, which too is eternal (Therefore, it is anyway incorrect to hold that a sequence of words should be the product of a person's effort).
The apaurusheyatva of Vedas differentiate them from scriptures of other religions. Most of them depend on texts delivered by prophets or saints. They hold that these saints have delivered the word of God. As reasoned above, God's existence itself is an assumption and involves an element of faith.
There is no element of faith or belief in holding that the Vedas are not flawed, as they are apaurusheya. Since the Vedas delineate a God, God exists. This God is, not an impersonal one without a name or a form but one, of infinite forms and infinite qualities: Vishnu.
The Paingi shruti says:
sarvotkarShe devadevasya viShNormahAtAtparyaM naiva chAnyatra satyam.h |
avAntaraM tatparatvaM tadanyatsarvAgamAnAM puruShArthastato.ataH ||
shrImadhveshakR^iShNarpaNamastu
Created 29th March 2003 Modified: 13th April 2004 (Chaitra krishna Ekadashi)