originally created / last edited in geocities on August 06, 2002

Comparison with other doctrines

Advaita

This is briefly the position:

There is only reality that is Brahman. The Brahman is identical to Atman, the individual self. A common misconception about Advaita is that it considers God to be identical to the Jiva or that the individual soul loses its individuality in moxa. That is not true; this identity is of bare essence and not with qualities the individual soul and God are 'assumed' to possess. The Jiva is said to possess qualities such as limited knowledge, bondage, limited powers, while, God is said to possess qualities such as omniscience, omnipotence. According to advaita, the qualities possessed by both are only empirically true and are not absolute. When knowledge "arrives", the qualities will be known to false and imaginary. The reason for this illusion is avidya or ignorance, an inexplicable entity, which is neither real nor unreal. Curiously, Advaita accepts that Atman is svaprakAsha (self-luminous w.r.t knowledge) and believes in self-inherence of knowledge (svataH prAmANya).

Reality is of three categories - paramArthika (absolute), vyavahArika (empirical) and pratibhAsika (illusory). This world of differences falls in the second category of vyavahArika satya, for it is not eternal. This empirical world is 'superimposed' on Brahman. For people still in this empirical world, there is an Ishvara, mostly referred as Saguna Brahman (yet another being created by the beneficent Avidya) who needs to be propitiated (to get knowledge that one is identical to Him in bare essence.

Analysis

If shruti propounds both Saguna and Nirguna Brahman with equal force, it should be roundly renounced as a pramANa. To reconcile them, it cannot be said that nirguNa shrutis should be accorded higher status, for there is no basis. The position that some shruti statements are empirically true while the nirguNa shrutis are absolutely true also suffers from the same defect -- Assumption of the conclusion (purport of shrutis). (Even statistically speaking too, there are not more than 2-3 scriptural statements that talk, superficially, of nirguNatva of Brahman.)

Also, it is not that saguNa Brahman and nirguNa Brahman are the two sides of same coin (The concept is denounced by Shankaracharya himself). The fallacy is simple - Mutually contradictory attributes in the same entity and assumption of 'sides' (or 'parts') in Brahman, an unscriptural concept.

It is not possible to have the nirguNa Brahman as the substratum of all this illusory experience. Simple questions such as, 'How did ignorance catch hold of the Brahman, who is said to be above 'kAryakAraNabhAva' (cause-effect relationship), What is the actual nature of this ignorance? Is this ignorance real or unreal? What is the locus of this ignorance, i.e., who has this ignorance? It cannot be the nirguNa Brahman that is claimed to be pure thoughtless consciousness (even without self-awareness)" are only waved off with hogwash.

Also, it cannot be said that the qualities of God and Jiva are assumed. Shrutis and smritis confirm the qualities of Brahman and the jIva to be eternal and unchanging.

parA.asya shaktirvividhaiva shrUyate svAbhAvikI jnAnabalakriyA cha |

The powers, knowledge, energy, activities of the Lord are said to be manifold and they are 'natural' to Him. And, if His nature is not eternal what is? See the Kathopanishad statement - nityo nityAnAm (the eternal of eternals).

Shruti opposes the concept of superimposition of everything on the Brahman; for one, consider this from Shatprashnopanishad -

sa yatha somya vayAmsi vAso vR^iksham sampratiShThate

evaM va vai tatsarvaM pare Atmani sampratiShThate ||

Just as the birds find shelter in their abode in the trees, all objects find their shelter in the 'Atman' (notice the locative in the word, 'pare'). Now, how can the attribute-less Atman be the shelter of anything? It needs real twisting of the word, 'sampratiShThate', to mean superimposition!

Also, if this universe were to be superimposed on Brahman, the scriptural statements such as 'sarvaM khalu idaM brahma' (All this is verily Brahman), 'etadAtmamidam sarvaM (This Atma is all this)' would be meaningless. Nobody ever equates the unreal snake to the real rope.

The need for the concept of three degrees of reality in advaita is to have a way to explain the perception of this world in lieu of its tenet of Brahman as sole reality. Thus, it is said that this world should be considered real until the sublating knowledge occurs. The problem is that the domain of this sublating knowledge cannot be determined. Whether this sublating knowledge is empirically real or absolutely real is the moot question. The latter option will upset the non-duality of absolute state (for, then there is Brahman and sublating knowledge that X is not Brahman). The former option will hardly be useful; it is just moving from one illusion to another.

Many Advaitins object to these objections that they are based on confusion between the empirical state and absolute state; that the objections raise one attempts to justify the absolute state with empirical logic; that absolute state is not bound by our limited logic. Here it should be noted that these objections are baseless, if they are made after the concept of degrees of reality are justified and proven. But when the very framework is being questioned, retorting on above lines cannot carry worth. Also, if the empirical state were to be totally disconnected with the absolute state, from where did such knowledge (of disconnection) arrive in the first place?

The principles of Advaita are based on weak and inconsistent interpretation of the shrutis. The word, 'Atma' has been misconstrued in nearly every instance. (A prominent exception is in Shankaracharya's BrahmasutrabhAshya on 1.3.1 where he quotes the VishayavAkya as

• yasmin dyauH pRithivI chAntarikshamotaM

• manaH saha prANaishcha sarvaiH |

• tamevaikaM jAnatha AtmAnamanA vAcho

• vimunchatha amritasyaishha setuH ||

where the seeker is instructed to understand 'Atma' as the being who is the support of (abhimAni devatAs) of AkAsha, prithvi, space, mind and prANa and everything else). How can this 'Atma' be interpreted as 'Self'? Isn't it common experience that this 'Self' lacks none of the above qualities?

Another instance is in the Mandukya Upanishad which talks of 'Atma' as having four quarters (chatuShpAt). If Atma were to be the pratyag Atman (the individual soul), it is simply against experience. It does not help even if 'chatuShpAt' is construed as states of existence, for, in the first state, i.e., waking state, the Atman is said to possess 19 heads, which is again incredulous. Here, Shankaracharya comments on these 19 heads as 'the five jnAnendriyas (cognitive organs), the five karmendriyas (organs for action) etc' which are 'gateways' to external cognition. Even if such interpretation is granted, it fails in the next step where the Atman in the sleeping state is described to possess 19 heads, for it is a well known and accepted fact that the karmendriyas do not touch the soul in sleep or dreamless sleep! Surprisingly not, this problem is ignored. Further in the same Upanishad, the fourth quarter (of Atma), the turIya, wrongly considered the equivalent of nirguNa Brahman by the Advaitins, is praised as 'vibhuH' (creator), 'devaH' (God) etc.

Thus, Advaita that has its only basis in the interpretation of the word, 'Atma' as 'Self' ignores conclusions that contradict basic common sense and more importantly, other scriptural statements themselves.

(Not all problems are listed here).

VishishtAdvaita

Vishishtadvaita is an attempt at reconciliation of bheda (difference) and abheda (identity) shrutis. VishishtAdvaita posits a 'sharIra-sharIri' (body-soul) kind of relationship between the jIva and the Lord. The jIvas and the matter are like a body that is energized and activated by the soul, which in this case, is Narayana. (This is a different flavour of identity-in/and/cum-difference relationships; others being 'dvaitAdvaita' of Nimbarka, 'bhedAbheda' of Bhaskara, Gaudiya achintyabhedAbheda). They are just attributes of the Lord. The Lord and His attributes are inseparable; just as the 'redness' of a red Lotus is inseparable from the Lotus itself. Thus, the soul and the Lord are in a way identical to each other, but different from each other.

Analysis

Whatever be the flavour of the concept of identity-in-difference used, it can be easily observed that difference needs to be posited at the root. Accordingly, Ramanuja accepts in his Vedarthasangraha that the Lord and the jIva are mutually distinct in their nature and attributes and that their attributes cannot be mutually transposed. If difference were to be considered as 'intrinsic' or natural, positing identity is superfluous. Thus, there is no identity to speak of in the first place, to have identity-cum-difference.

The relation between an object and its attributes cannot be explained in known terms of either absolute identity or difference (which are the only two possible relations). The entity cannot be absolutely identical with its attributes, for (among several reasons), the difference between the attributes themselves cannot be explained.

On the other hand, if the attributes, say lotusness, were to be treated as 'different' from the object, it would be difficult to answer this: If the object (X) is said to be different from its attributes (Y), what exactly constitutes 'the object' X? What exactly is implied by the term, 'object' (X)? In a Vishishtadvaitin's conception of the relation of 'aprathaksiddhatva' of object and its attributes, difference should be accepted at the root. Obviously, there is hardly any sense in considering identical entities to be 'non-separable'.

These arguments are not for empty philosophical speculation, but with some spiritual concerns. Consider the famous shruti from Taittiriya Upanishad, 'satyaM jnAnaM anantaM brahma'. Here, it is said that Brahman is said to possess the qualities of 'satyaM', 'jnAnaM' and 'anantaM'. The question encountered, in case it is accepted that object is different from its attributes, is 'what is the exact nature of Brahman (which is different from the majestic qualities such as 'satyam', 'jnAnaM', 'anantaM')? It can be easily seen that it is nothing but an empty abstraction, over which there are infinite royal attributes 'imposed'! Unless, these qualities, though inseparable from the Lord, form the core of Brahman, what purpose can they serve to the spiritual aspirant? Then too, one would be forced to think, should the empty abstract form be worshipped? Or the attributes? Also, what exactly binds these attributes together? Shouldn't that which binds these different attributes also be worshipped? Also, one gets to more abstract questions, 'Is this non-separability also an attribute of the Lord or not?' It can be easily seen that either option is not palatable to the Vishishtadvaitin.

Srimad Acharya posits a new category of 'visheSha' to explain the relation between an object and its attributes. He holds that the postulation of this new category as inevitable and imperative to solve the difficulty in understanding the aforesaid relation. The object is identical to its attributes, but not absolutely. The object is identical to its attribute, through a visheSha. It (visheSha) is the potency of an object (any object), which, despite absence of any real difference, presents difference between the object and the quality and between itself and the object. It is not another attribute, but a new category (because of which it does not make sense to ask questions that implicitly assume it to be another attribute). No other category, but visheSha itself, is necessary to explain its difference from the object and from qualities. It is self-supportive, just as "space cannot be defined by any entity other than space itself" (Science students might note that this quality is true of most of the fundamental units). Thus, the relation between object and its attributes is 'savisheSha-abheda' (identity qualified by visheShas). And this concept, that the Lord is not different from His fantastic qualities, is kept in mind during worship.

In addition, other important concept where difference between the two doctrines is seen is regarding Ananda-tAratamya (hierarchy of souls in liberation), which is not accepted by Vishishtadvaita. It believes that, in liberation, all souls will experience infinite bliss like the Lord. On the other hand Tattvavada holds that, consistent with the fact of differences in rigour and intensity of each soul's sAdhana, this difference is maintained even in liberation. (This concept finds support in Taittiriya and Brihadaranyaka Upanishads).

Achintyabheda-abhedavAda (Gaudiya)

Though this doctrine looks very similar to dvaita, it is only superficial similarity. These are some of the concepts not accepted in the Madhva tradition:

• 1. Differences in avataaras of Lord (Krishna has more 'rasa-tattva' than Vishnu does), The scriptural quote, 'pUrNamadaH pUrNamidaM', talks of Brahman being complete and all his avataras being complete.

  2. Existence of a being by name: Radha. It's only nArada-pancharatra, considered by many as heavily mutilated, that talks of Radha. There is no mention of Radha by name or features in the Vedas, the purANAs, even the Bhagavata, and in other pancharatras. It's the 12th century poet, Jayagovinda whose works gave life to such a character, whose romantic strength has carried it forward.

In addition to this, the Gaudiya group's interpretation of scriptures is so different, both in means and conclusion, from that of Tattvavada that it is hardly sensible to consider them affiliated.

Tattvavada interpretation of some shruti statements

Tattvavada holds that the entire corpus of scriptures praise Vishnu and His difference from the individual souls. The misconception is that Tattvavada gives undue importance to bheda-shrutis and either altogether ignores the abheda shrutis or twists them to suit the Tattvavada position, as has been alleged by modern writers like S.RadhaKrishnan, Vivekananda. These writers also hold that advaita is an upanishadic philosophy, because it is based entirely on the Upanishads, because statements from them only form the basis of the philosophy.

It is a conveniently ignored fact that the same set of five statements, whose conclusions are assumed, is presented in the most of the interpretations. In most of the places, the texts simply extol the 'Atman' (as the support of entire cosmos, as the highest and hence are not conclusive; if at all one has to conclude identity as the purport.) In fact, this act of extolling itself is a proof of difference and of the obvious fact that the word does not apply to one's own self. Despite such patent contradictions, these five statements are pressed into service to forcefully reiterate, emphasize and then conclude that identity is the purport of shrutis. Such is the mark of the upanishadic advaita!

While in actuality Tattvavada shows no partiality to 'bheda' shrutis (for, all shrutis are bheda shrutis!), the allegation is only a disgruntled remark. The following passages explain why the Tattvavada interprets the shrutis differently.

It should be noted that identity of Brahman and jIva is ruled out as being the purport of shrutis. It is not out of affection to difference, as some obstreperous writers seem to think, but because it is illogical. As such, Identity (abheda) has to depend on shrutis as a pramANa, as other pramANAs i.e. pratyaksha and inference contradict Identity. And all philosophers agree that the shruti cannot contradict experience (anubhava). Now, experience denies identity, be it with nirguNa brahman or saguNa brahman. The very basic irrefutable experiences such as 'I am', 'I am happy', 'I was sad (for whatever reason, illusory or real)' oppose identity with the ever-blissful, all-knowing Saguna Brahman and thought-less undifferentiated pure nirguNa Brahman. Therefore, the very few shrutis that are supposed to proclaim identity have to be interpreted otherwise.

That being the case, all the so called identity statements can be explained in one of the following terms: (i) the Lord being motivator and inner-controller of all beings (ii) same location: the Lord being present in and permeating the Jiva.

aham brahmAsmi

The general interpretation of this Brihadaranyaka Upanishad statement is 'I am Brahman'; apparently showing identity between the jIva and the Brahman. The flaws are:

1. The speaker is Brahman in the first place. Ofcourse later, Vamadeva Rishi says that, but he says he is identical to many others like Surya, who are said to be afraid of Brahman (RgVeda). That itself should be a clue to abstain from following the straightforward meaning.

2. This Brahman cannot be the Nirguna Brahman of Advaita. Knowledge, even Self-awareness, is not possible with pure thoughtless nirvisesa consciousness, for, that will bring in the duality of the thought and the thinker.

3. This interpretation is grammatically incorrect. The meaning of the sentence is, "Brahman knew of itself as -- I am Brahman". (It should have been 'Brahman knew of itself as 'Brahman') This is the problem with taking 'aham' and 'asmi' with the conventional meanings.

Tattvavada interpretation:

aham -- aheyatvAd aham. That which cannot be given up is 'aham'. Without whom one cannot be is 'aham'. Note that the earlier brAhmaNa in the same upanishad talks of 'aham' as a name, instead of the pronoun.

brahma - brihanto hi asmin guNaH - that with innumerable qualities, each infinite in themselves.

This phrase teaches one important quality of Vishnu -- that He has the knowledge of all His qualities at all times. It's not that He does not know what He is. It's not that there are so many qualities all stored in some inventory unknown to the owner of those qualities. He is ever conscious of Himself, i.e., His qualities.

On the other hand, the Jiva has two kinds of ignorance. One about the nature of paramatma and other about his own self as a dependent being. Also, the knowledge a jIva possesses about God is said to be much limited. Vishnu does not have that deficiency.

"tat tvam asi" OR "atat tvam asi"

This extremely popular Chandogya Upanishad statement occurs in a monologue by the sage Uddalaka to his son, Shwetaketu. The general interpretation is that this statement conveys absolute identity of Brahman and the individual soul -- Thou Art That. The wordings of the statement (sa AtmA'tat tvamasi shwetaketo.) can be split either as "tat tvam asi" or "atat tvam asi". The latter reading is preferred in the dvaita tradition.

The episode starts with a boastful Shwetaketu returning from studies to his father, sage Uddalaka. Realizing that the former has not learnt the core and gist of the scriptures, the latter subjects his son to a hard ordeal of staying in water. Shwetaketu fails to repeat his lessons, when his father asks him to do so. After this, the sage gives nine illustrations, each depicting our absolute dependence on the Lord, His Lordship over everything else, His extreme "subtle-ness" etc. Ofcourse, the context itself is suited for such a reading, as shall be seen.

Consider the first example of a bird, tied by a rope to a tree branch, seeks rest and refuge on the same branch after attempting to fly in different directions. The incorrect assumption of independence and freedom on the jIva's part is highlighted here. In the background of a proud student being chided by a teacher, this interpretation makes much sense. Identity is nowhere in the picture, more so, when the word 'Atma' can correspond to nothing but the branch on which the bird "rests".

Other illustrations follow the same lead; a robber, who attempted to steal the king's treasure, being punished, the subtlety of the nyagrodha fruit, etc. - none of them can indicate identity. Even the illustrations of juices from different flowers forgetting their source and that of rivers merging in the sea and forgetting their identity, do not help as the sage immediately warns that those who forget or repudiate their source or origin will be born as lowly animals.

It can be seen that these interpretations can be obtained even with the normally accepted splitting of the compound by constructing the equation in terms of locative case, ablative case -- 'tvam tasmin asi', 'tvam tasmAt asi' etc. This method is followed when even interpreting certain texts like, 'sarvam khalu idam brahma' (all this is verily Brahman), where obviously a bare identity between the illusory world (in advaitic terms) and the real Brahman cannot be explained.

"neti neti"

With the context kept out, this text, 'not thus, not thus' (again wrongly interpreted by many as 'not this, not this') would appear to deny attributes in Brahman. The words, 'thus' indicate that Brahman's attributes are negated not in wholesale but with respect to some objects/qualities referred earlier (praja (men indicating the Jivas) and vitta (wealth indicating prakriti) in this case).

"prapancho yadi vidyeta"

This Mandukya Upanishad verse and the one following it are supposed to indicate the illusoriness of the world. The verses are:

prapancho yadi vidyeta nivarteta na sanshayaH |

mAyAmAtramidaM dvaitaM advaitaM paramArthataH

vikalpo vinivarteta kalpito yadi kenachit.h |

upadeshAdayaM vAdo JNAte dvaitaM na vidyate

If anything, this is the only verse that comes closest to teaching advaita; the panchamahAvAkyas need a lot of interpolations and convenient forfeiture of context, grammar and other interpretational rules.

Shankara interprets this verse to claim the illusoriness of this world. If the world were to exist, without doubt, it would have withdrawn. (Therefore, the world does not exist in factuality.) This world of duality, like an unreal snake superimposed on a real rope, is perceived merely due to mAyA. It is the non-duality that is absolute. If it were imagined (by someone), it would disappear. This argument, a teaching, when known, duality would not be seen.

• 1. The statement, 'if the world were to exist, it would have withdrawn (disappeared)' tries to draw a concomitance between Existence and Withdrawal (disappearance), i.e., it imagines a rule that anything that exists would disappear, which is not plausible. By the same token, even the Atman, which is accepted as existing, should also disappear. This problem would persist even if the word, 'vidyeta' were to be interpreted as 'perceived'.

Therefore, Srimad Acharya interprets this word as 'created'. The verse would then mean, 'if the world were to be created (out of nothing), it would have definitely disappeared. This is not anybody's imagination'. See the corresponding thought in the earlier verses of the same Upanishad, where an opinion that assumes the creation to be an illusion is overruled with the statement that it is the Lord' nature to create.

What does the word, 'advaita' mean here? It refers to the Turiya form of the Lord. In the first verse describing the Turiya,

nivriitteH *sarvaduHkhAnAmIshAnaH* prabhuH avyayaH |

advaitaH sarvabhAvAnAM devasturyo vibhuH smR^itaH ||

These terms, 'prabhu', 'devaH', 'vibhuH', cannot, by any stretch of imagination, refer to a Nirguna Brahman, which the advaitins make out the turIya form to be. After all, It definitely refers to the Lord Himself, who controls the jIva in all his states; waking, dream, deep-sleep and finally the fourth.

The preceding verse contrasts the Jiva and the Lord. The former is spoken of 'supta' (sleeping), while the latter is spoken of 'anidraM' (without sleep). Advaita says that this difference is removed when the Turiya form of 'Atman' is comprehended. Unfortunately for them, there is no text to that effect. The text, when translated would mean, 'whenever the jiva, who is 'asleep' due to eternal mAyA is known, then the Advaita, who is unborn, sleep-less is known'. With the background of the discussion on the Turiya state, this would mean that in the final state, both these entities and more importantly the difference between the two is known. Srimad Acharya interprets the term 'advaita' (which refers to a Being and not to the doctrine) as 'He who gives correct knowledge'. The other forms of the Lord, vishva, taijasa and prAjna, do give some incorrect knowledge at times, but the turIya form of the Lord never gives wrong knowledge, for, that is the state of moksha.

shrI bhAratIramaNamukhyaprANAntargata shrIkriShNArpaNamastu