Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 1986, 2000, 2015 by Ron Yezzi
Return to Philosophical Issues Page
Author's Note: This account is an adaptation from Ron Yezzi, Directing Human Actions: Perspectives on Basic Ethical Issues (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 163 - 165.
Human Nature:
Summation
One point of common agreement throughout this survey of human nature is the view that we cannot decide what human beings ought to do, what their values and obligations should be, apart from an understanding of human nature. Considerable differences exist over the issue of what that nature is. But the importance of the issue as a foundation for discussion of ethics is not a matter in doubt. Even with attempts to de-emphasize the importance of morality, as is the case with Marx and Skinner, the underlying justification for the attempt takes off from a view of human nature.
What holds here, however, is not universally held by all philosophers. Some philosophers assert that no fact, about human nature or anything else (for that matter), could establish a value or an obligation. According to this view, it is fallacious reasoning to infer values from facts. We shall take up this view in more detail elsewhere, especially in the coverage of logical positivism.
Nature, Nurture, and Autonomy
Differences about human nature tend to revolve around the "nature vs. nurture" controversy. Do we act the ways we do primarily because of nature or nurture? Nature is variously associated with instincts, innate drives, innate structure, inborn inclinations or principles of action, natural appetites, impulses, heredity, genes, or biological predispositions. Nurture is variously associated with social conditions, environmental conditions, social influences, customs, socially developed habits, or contingencies of reinforcement. Within the scientific community, stands are often taken on the nature vs. nurture controversy. Note that the positions with a strong scientific orientation considered here―namely, those of Freud, Marx, Wilson, and Skinner―tend to deal with human nature in the light of this controversy.
We should note, however, that philosophers tend to enter a third contender into the controversy, one that we can label moral autonomy. In addition to innate structure and environmental conditions as directing forces in human actions, there may also be moral autonomy, a self-directing force operative when we function as moral agents. In other words, in the process of making moral judgments and taking moral responsibility for our actions, we may act in ways not simply reducible to, or explainable in terms of, nature or nurture. Scientific advocates of nature or nurture tend to identify this alleged moral autonomy with untenable, outdated notions of free will. Not all philosophers, however, would agree to such an identification.
Below, you will find a "bare bones" summary of the relative importance assigned to nature, nurture, and moral autonomy for the positions on human nature. (If you have any problems with the summary, you may want to reread the earlier sections.) All the positions stressing moral autonomy add a moral dimension to human life which takes on great importance. Moreover, only Rousseau's position joins this moral dimension to a simple concept of free will. In thinking about all this, you should try to determine how important the moral dimension is for human life. Does scientific advancement increasingly show that moral autonomy is a relic, or vestigial remain, of past human thought? Or do scientists often tend to overlook, in their eagerness to dispute Nature vs. Nurture, the ineradicable existence of moral autonomy as an element in human nature?
The enormous influence of science and technology in contemporary life raises serious questions about maintaining a conceptions of human dignity and self-respect, for many thoughtful persons. Are we becoming “things” to be manipulated according to the latest advances in science and technology? Are we becoming “pleasure machines” where our chief purpose becomes the production of immediate gratification, making use of science and technology? Is our willingness to view life within a moral dimension and to develop moral character being eroded by overly scientific (scientistic?) attitudes? Consider how you would answer these questions. If you think there is a problem here, consider whether or not a workable concept of moral autonomy would be helpful in solving it.