Like Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau thinks that an account of ethics and of social organization must begin with an understanding of human nature. Unlike Hobbes though, he denies any mechanistic description of human beings based ultimately on the motions of physical bodies. Human beings have a soul that survives death; and they possess free will. Free will, more so than intelligence, sets human beings apart from the lower animals.
Principles of Actions within Human Nature
Within human nature, Rousseau finds two fundamental principles of action, self-preservation (or self-love) and compassion. In his Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Human Inequality, he says,
Throwing aside, therefore, all those scientific books, which teach us only to see men such as they have made themselves, and contemplating the first and most simple operations of the human soul, I think I can perceive in it two principles prior to reason, one of them deeply interesting us in our own welfare and preservation, and the other exciting a natural repugnance at seeing any other sensible being, and particularly any of our own species, suffer pain or death. It is from the agreement and combination which the understanding is in a position to establish between these two principles, without its being necessary to introduce that of sociability, that all the rules of natural right appear to me to be derived―rules which our reason is afterwards obliged to establish on other foundations, when by its successive developments it has been led to suppress nature itself.
In proceeding thus, we shall not be obliged to make man a philosopher before he is a man. His duties toward others are not dictated to him only by the later lessons of wisdom; and, so long as he does not resist the internal impulse of compassion, he will never hurt any other man, nor even any sentient being, except on those lawful occasions on which his own preservation is concerned and he is obliged to give himself the preference.9
Note the claim, "In this way, we are not obliged to make man a philosopher before making him a man." Rousseau thinks that our basic moral commands arising from self-love and compassion exist prior to any elaborate reasoning such as that involved in Hobbes' Laws of Nature. Of this compassion, Rousseau goes on to say,
It is then certain that compassion is a natural feeling, which, by moderating the violence of love of self in each individual, contributes to the preservation of the whole species. It is this compassion that hurries us without reflection to the relief of those who are in distress: it is this which in a state of nature supplies the place of laws, morals, and virtues, with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey its gentle voice: it is this which will always prevent a sturdy savage from robbing a weak child or a feeble old man of the sustenance they may have with pain and difficulty acquired, if he sees a possibility of providing for himself by other means: it is this which, instead of inculcating that sublime maxim of rational justice, Do to others as you would have them do unto you, inspires all men with that other maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect indeed, but perhaps more useful; Do good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others. In a word, it is rather in this natural feeling than in any subtle arguments that we must look for the cause of that repugnance, which every man would experience in doing evil, even independently of the maxims of education. Although it might belong to Socrates and other minds of the like craft to acquire virtue by reason, the human race would long since have ceased to be, had its preservation depended only on the reasonings of the individuals composing it.10
In his later thought, this principle of compassion was refined into a concept of conscience, "There is, then, deep in our souls an inborn principle of justice and virtue by which, in spite of our maxims, we judge our actions and those of others as good or bad; and it is to this principle that I give the name of conscience."11
Given the principle of compassion, Rousseau differs sharply with Hobbes on what the "state of nature" would be like. There would be no state of war or continual misery. Rousseau points out that persons in society are more likely to experience misery: savages never think of complaining about their lives or committing suicide; but persons in society do. And he attributes warfare to corruption by society that weakened natural compassion and enhanced social differences:
Hence arose national wars, battles, murders, and reprisals, which shock nature and outrage reason; together with all those horrible prejudices which class among the virtues the honour of shedding human blood. The most distinguished men hence learned to consider cutting each other's throats a duty; at length men massacred their fellow-creatures by thousands without so much as knowing why, and committed more murders in a single day's fighting, and more violent outrages in the sack of a single town, than were committed in the state of nature during whole ages over the whole earth. Such were the first effects we could see to have followed the division of mankind into different communities.12
According to Rousseau, Hobbes "improperly admitted, as a part of savage man's concern for self-preservation, the gratification of a multitude of passions which are the work of society, and have made laws necessary."13 There is no cruelty in human nature itself, society is the great corrupter:
So long as men remained content with their rustic huts, so long as they were satisfied with clothes made of the skins of animals and sewn together with thorns and fish-bones, adorned themselves only with feathers and shells, and continued to paint their bodies different colours, to improve and beautify their bows and arrows, and to make with sharp-edged stones fishing boats or clumsy musical instruments; in a word, so long as they undertook only what a single person could accomplish, and confined themselves to such arts as did not require the joint labour of several hands, they lived free, healthy, honest, and happy lives, so long as their nature allowed, and as they continued to enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse. But from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another; from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable, and vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow up with the crops.14
Of all the evils created by society, inequality is the worst, for Rousseau, because it is the root of most of the others. Inequalities arose when individuals, in coming together socially, substituted: (1) specialization of labor for relative self-sufficiency and (2) private property for common ownership of the earth's bounty. The resulting inequalities produced slavery and poverty, and even more.
The pursuit of wealth, social standing, and conquest―all of which result in loss of virtue―is traceable to the recognition of inequality as a fact of life along with a refusal to accept a lower station than others. Individuals feel generally equal to others and are unwilling to accept socially created inequalities that confer lower status upon them, because this lower status threatens their self-esteem. Thus, social inequality succeeds in shifting their sense of self-esteem from what they think of themselves to what others think of them. To impress others, at any cost in any way they can, they must make money, have what others have, be fashionable in their tastes, and be members of a "better" class. The net result is a triumph of artificiality, appearance, and vice at the expense of natural inclinations, virtue, wisdom, and real happiness.
Savage and Civilized Peoples
Rousseau tries to capture the effects of society, or civilization, on human beings in the following passage:
. . . The savage and the civilized man, differ so much in the bottoms of their hearts and in their inclinations, that what constitutes the supreme happiness of one would reduce the 'other to despair. The former breathes only peace and liberty; he desires only to live and be free from labour; even the ataraxia of the Stoic falls far short of his profound indifference to every other object. Civilized man, on the other hand, is always moving, sweating, toiling, and racking his brains to find still more laborious occupations: he goes on in drudgery to his last moment, and even seeks death to put himself in a position to live, or renounces life to acquire immortality. He pays his court to men in power, whom he hates, and to the wealthy, whom he despises; he stops at nothing to have the honour of serving them; he is not ashamed to value himself on his own meanness and their protection; and, proud of his slavery, he speaks with disdain of those, who have not the honour of sharing it. What a sight would the perplexing and envied labours of a European minister of State present to the eyes of a Caribbean! How many cruel deaths would not this indolent savage prefer to the horrors of such a life, which is seldom even sweetened by the pleasure of doing good! But, for him to see into the motives of all this solicitude the words 'power' and 'reputation' would have to bear some meaning in his mind; he would have to know that there are men who set a value on the opinion of the rest of the world; who can be made happy and satisfied with themselves rather on the testimony of other people than on their own. In reality, the source of all these differences is, that the savage lives within himself, while social man lives constantly outside himself, and only knows how to live in the opinion of others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgment of others concerning him. It is not to my present purpose to insist on the indifference to good and evil which arises from this disposition, in spite of our many fine works on morality, or to show how, everything being reduced to appearances, there is but art and mummery in even honour, friendship, virtue, and often vice itself, of which we at length learn the secret of boasting; to show, in short, how, always asking others, what we are, and never daring to ask ourselves, in the midst of so much philosophy, humanity, and civilization, and of such sublime codes of morality, we have nothing to show for ourselves but a frivolous and deceitful appearance, honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, and pleasure without happiness. It is sufficient that I have proved that this is not by any means the original state of man, but that it is merely the spirit of society, and the inequality which society produces, that thus transform and alter all our natural inclinations.15
Hobbes and Rousseau: A Comparison
Whereas Hobbes relies upon reason and the threat of powerful, centralized authority to provide an ethical and social system that controls human nature, Rousseau trusts human nature and advocates opportunity for its free expression. Rousseau thinks that society suppresses the good, natural feelings in our nature and reason often constructs elaborately artificial rationalizations that smother our sense of compassion and justify horrendous acts. He does not oppose the use of reason itself; but he opposes this smothering of feelings for the sake of being rational. The origin of morality lies simply in our natural feelings, prior to any exact reasoning; and reason is as likely to become a tool of social corruption as it is likely to become an instrument for good. For Rousseau, being able to will freely what we want to do, taking our natural feelings into account, makes for a happy, healthy, moral person. Hobbes, on the other hand, does not trust natural feelings. Natural feelings incline human beings to be self-interested power-seekers, quarrelsome by nature, covetous for what others have, and petty about their reputations. Give these feelings free rein and the result is a state of war. Reason and governmental power are our best protection from the dangerous tendencies within our own nature.
Both Hobbes and Rousseau regard self-interest as a fundamental element in human nature. For Hobbes, all voluntary actions are naturally directed in the service of self-interest; accordingly, all his moral and socio-political recommendations are directed toward an "enlightened" self-interest. Thus peace is not desirable for the sake of humanity; rather it is desirable because it serves each individual's own self-interest. Hobbes never issues altruistic exhortations! But Rousseau does. While he grants the important function of self-preservation, or self-love, he tempers the significance of this function by recognizing also the place of compassion and conscience as principles of action in human nature. Provided that society has not corrupted our sense of self-interest to the point where it becomes ravenous in its demands, the principles of compassion and conscience offer ample incentives to serve the interests of our fellow human beings.
Whereas Rousseau locates the origin of morality in human nature itself, Hobbes locates it in the more complex functions of reason, cooperative agreement, and governmental power. The existence of moral rules, effective in practice, requires specific sorts of social relationships. There is no morality embedded in human nature. Accordingly, Hobbes admits a condition of amorality, namely, a state of war, in which no moral rules apply and "anything goes." He does not admire this condition of amorality; indeed he strives mightily to eliminate it. Yet he thinks that we must start with the recognition that human nature, left to itself, produces―instead of moral progress―lives that are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." For Rousseau, on the other hand, no condition of amorality truly exists. The demands of compassion and conscience always remain within us. In the interest of self-preservation, and self-love, we have the right to take those steps necessary for our protection, freedom, and basic wants. And taken together―self-preservation, self-love, compassion and conscience comprise the principles of morality inherent in human nature.
Given their differences with respect to human nature, we are not surprised by their consequent differences regarding the state of nature, the effects of society, and the proper directing of human life.
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)
As was the case with Plato and Freud, the positions of Hobbes and Rousseau are so different that each is a critic of the other. Here we shall concentrate on just three objections with respect to their positions.
(1) Hobbes' State of Nature As a Misrepresentation
When we examine the evidence Hobbes offers in support of his "description" of the state of nature, we find it pretty weak. His claim that many Native Americans lived in the state of nature just shows the shallowness of seventeenth century anthropology. People lock their doors and chests because they fear a small minority, not because they fear human beings generally. And nations recognize some principles of international law and morality. Few people in the contemporary world would agree with Hobbes that no standard of morality can be applied to relations among nations. Thus there is scant reason to accept his account of the state of nature.
A Possible Reply: If society were to remove its laws and system of law enforcement, you would start to find it approximating more and more closely to the state of nature as described by Hobbes. We observe this trend occurring whenever there is a breakdown of "law and order." As there is a breakdown in the structure of civilization, the law of the jungle starts to prevail. We only have to witness the great rise in crime and violence in subcultures where law enforcement is ineffective.
While nations pay "lip service" to all sorts of noble principles, what they do in practice occurs according to the amount of power they possess and can achieve. Nations will never respect any principles of morality contrary to their national interest until there is a common power capable of enforcing morality. In other words, an international government is necessary for a state of peace and the rule of morality among nations.
(2) Rousseau's Neglect of Aggressiveness
Besides compassion and self-preservation, we also find aggressiveness to be a basic principle within human nature. People sometimes feel compassion; but sometimes they also revel in the sufferings of others. Rousseau may attribute such reveling to social influences; but the aggressiveness in human beings―with its accompanying cruelty, insensitivity, and satisfaction in dominance―is too basic an element in human experience to be due to society alone. Society may create conditions that provoke more aggression; but the principle of aggression already exists as a fundamental element in human nature.
If Rousseau still insists that aggressiveness is a socially produced phenomenon, we can assert just as strongly that compassion is a socially produced phenomenon, too.
A Possible Reply: What distinguishes compassion from aggressiveness as principles of action is the fact that compassion is a primary, original feeling in human beings whereas aggressiveness is a secondary, produced feeling due to human inequality. Human beings are not naturally aggressive. Left to act according to their natures, they only do what is necessary in the way of violence to survive. But when they perceive themselves to be victims of unjust inequalities or when they succumb to the artificial wants created by society's elaborate system of social stratification, then they turn to aggressiveness.
(3) Contra Hobbes and Rousseau
A basic flaw in the theories of both Hobbes and Rousseau is their failure to take into account the social nature of human beings. Even if they grant that the state of nature never actually existed as they describe it, they still think it possible to project how human beings would act prior to the establishment of a social structure. Thus, they presume that human beings are autonomous entities who can be described apart from their relations to others. In Hobbes' case, this autonomy resides in an individual's inescapable pursuit of self-interest in all actions; in Rousseau's case, the autonomy resides in an individual's free will. They both presume that society emerges out of a state of nature, or at least legitimizes itself, through a social contract entered into by autonomous, sovereign individuals. In fact however, there is no human nature separable from a social context. Human beings are not the independent entities that Hobbes and Rousseau presume; they possess a nature created, in large part, by social conditions. Because of this basic flaw, Hobbes and Rousseau exaggerate the importance of the individual in developing a moral point of view.
A Possible Reply: Whether we attribute our actions to self-interest or free will, we always think of ourselves as autonomous entities. No matter what the degree of social influence, we always conceive of ourselves as having "selfhood," some sense of individual self-identity. So there exists no basic flaw in describing human nature as it is present in each person as a separate, self-directing or autonomous entity.
5.20 Hobbes talks about power as a general inclination of human beings. Are you ready to grant, as he does, that wealth, knowledge, honor, reputation, etc. are indeed varieties of power? If not, explain why not? If so, consider whether there is anything you consider valuable that does not involve seeking power.
5.21 In the passage describing the state of war, it may be helpful to have some "translations' of Hobbes' English prose. "Industry" = "work," "culture of the earth" = "agriculture," "instruments of moving and removing" = "technology,” “account of time” = "history." Is he right about the state of war?
5.211 Do you think that Hobbes' description of human nature and the state of nature describes men more accurately than women? Justify your answer. If the description were not very accurate for women, what conclusions, if any, would follow?
5.212 What percentage of persons, do you think, would agree with Hobbes' description of human nature and the state of nature? Do you think that persons in some occupations―for example, police officers and career military officers―would be more likely to agree? Would you agree?
5.213 Hobbes cites three types of evidence in support of his description of the state of nature. Evaluate the adequacy of this evidence. (In replying, you should take into account the Objection and Possible Reply dealing with this issue.)
5.214 Can you list any examples of situations at the present time that tend to support Hobbes' description of human nature and the state of nature? Examples that tend to refute the description? Are your examples sufficient to make a sound judgment about the adequacy of Hobbes' description?
5.215 Consider the role of the passions, reason, and self-interest in getting us out of the state of nature, according to Hobbes. Then consider the role of the Laws of Nature? Is Hobbes on the right track?
5.22 Suppose someone asserts that an irresolvable conflict lies at the base of Rousseau's position, namely, that the principle of self-preservation (self-love) is incompatible with the principle of compassion. How might Rousseau reply? Would you be satisfied with the reply?
5.221 Using Rousseau's terminology, do you see any difference between compassion and conscience? Can the one be used to explain the other? Again using his terminology, can you think of any situations where the demands of compassion might differ from the demands of conscience?
5.222 Consider in some detail how Rousseau tries to show, in refutation of Hobbes, that society rather than human nature is the cause of misery. Rousseau mentions many ills attributable to society, in his judgment. If you were asked to make up a list of benefits conferred by society, what would you include? To what extent do you agree with Rousseau's judgment about the corrupting influence of society?
5.223 How might Rousseau explain the American phenomenon of "keeping up with the Joneses"? Would he be correct? If so, should we be concerned?
5.23 Can you think of any major movies or TV series that tend to represent the positions of either Hobbes or Rousseau?