Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy
brought to you by Ron Yezzi
Emeritus Professor of Philosophy
Minnesota State University, Mankato
© Copyright 1986, 2000, 2015, 2020 by Ron Yezzi
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Topics
Hobbes
Origins of Good and Evil
Life in a "State of Nature"
Laws of Nature
Rousseau
Principles of Action within Human Nature
Corruption by Society
Inequality
Savage and Civilized Peoples
Hobbes and Rousseau: A Comparison
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
Thought Excursions
Hobbes, Rousseau, and the Morality of War
Sources
Author's Note: This account is an adaptation from Ron Yezzi, Directing Human Actions: Perspectives on Basic Ethical Issues (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 103 - 118.
Human Nature:
Hobbes and Rousseau
Thomas Hobbes is one of those philosophers who takes such hard, uncompromising stands that many other philosophers dearly want to produce refutations. This tendency is nowhere more evident than in Hobbes' treatment of human nature and the subsequent ethical implications. Jean Jacques Rousseau is one of those who offered a refutation.
Hobbes
Biographical Sketch
Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679 C.E.), an English philosopher, was educated at Oxford University. He then took up work as a tutor for the wealthy, titled Cavendish family. He served as tutor for other families as well and was tutor to the future King Charles II for a brief time. Because of his philosophical interest in politics and his association with wealthy, titled families during an extended period of political strife and civil war in England, Hobbes feared for his personal safety at various times. Eventually however, he became somewhat of an "institution" in England and lived to the ripe old age of ninety-one.
Hobbes began as a classical scholar. He did not take up philosophy seriously until beyond his fortieth birthday. He was drawn to philosophy by a sudden acquaintance with geometry and a desire to apply the method of geometry to philosophical questions such as the nature of physical bodies, human nature, and the nature of a citizen. He hoped that the application of geometrical method to these questions would both solve long-standing problems intellectually and also contribute to the ending of political strife in England. His best known work, Leviathan (upon which the coverage of Hobbes here is based), begins with human nature as a foundation and then deduces the nature of civil society.
Hobbes had a way of stirring up controversy. As mentioned already, he was involved in political disputes. In addition, he managed to be accused of atheism at various times, entered into a decade-long, acrimonious debate with a Bishop Bramhall over the issue of free will vs. determinism, and topped this with a twenty-year debate with the mathematician John Wallis over Hobbes' attempts to "square the circle." Controversy over his philosophical thought has continued over the centuries.
According to Thomas Hobbes, an account of ethics and of social organization must begin with an understanding of human nature. Careful examination of this nature reveals that we are material (physical) beings whose activities, even our ideas, are ultimately traceable to the motions of physical bodies. We have neither an immortal soul (that we can know about) nor a separate faculty of free will.
Origins of Good and Evil
With respect to human nature itself, there can be no objective account of right and wrong. Good is whatever is an object of personal desire; and evil, whatever is an object of personal aversion. Hobbes says, in Leviathan,
But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good, and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no commonwealth; ... 1
People may generally value such abilities as wit, discretion, and prudence; but they do not thereby establish any absolute goods. Even a universal inclination of human beings is not an absolute good, although it describes human nature. Such an inclination is power. He says,
So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.2
Power does not consist simply in the ability to exert physical force; rather it is the presence of the means "to obtain some future apparent good." Accordingly, wealth, knowledge, honor, reputation, eloquence, generosity, friends, practical skills, prudence, "good form," and good luck are all varieties of power.
Life in a "State of Nature"
Hobbes proceeds to describe what life would be like where people live in a state of nature, that is, where they act according to their nature without the presence of a civil government, or commonwealth. Thinking themselves relatively equal in ability with everyone else, persons have equal hopes of attaining their goals. Accordingly, when more than one person desires the same thing and it cannot be shared, they struggle as enemies to satisfy their desire. Given this competitive struggle, persons distrust one another and thus struggle all the more to gain dominance so as to prevent some future injury. Finally as a matter of pride, persons will fight to insure that others show proper respect. Thus, according to Hobbes,
... in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; second, diffidence; thirdly, glory.
The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons, or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name.3
Left to act according to their nature, without being in awe of any government's power, human beings live in a state of war―fighting actively or always being willing to fight. Hobbes offers the following famous description:
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth: no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.4
For skeptics, Hobbes (writing in the seventeenth century) offers the following sorts of evidence from experience in support of his description: (a) nations exist in a state of war relative to each other; (b) "savage people in many places of America" live this way; and (c) the fact that people arm themselves, lock their doors, and lock their chests even when there are laws and law enforcement officers-shows their opinion of their fellow human beings.
In offering this description, Hobbes does not assert that human nature is evil because, in the state of nature, there is no morality. Ethical notions such as the inviolability of the person, property rights, and justice are simply nonexistent as guides to action. Without some common power to enforce these notions, only fools would respect them.
What can get human beings out of a state of nature is a combination of reason and several, specific passions―namely, fear of death, a desire for comfortable living, and the hope to attain this comfortable living through work. Since they cannot satisfy these passions sufficiently in a state of nature, human beings have some inclination to establish a state of peace. Reason provides the means of establishing this state of peace by making us aware of certain Laws of Nature.
Laws of Nature
With these Laws of Nature and the subsequent government set up, objective moral obligations start to appear. According to Hobbes, an understanding of these Laws of Nature is the "true and only moral philosophy."
Although they set up objective moral obligations, the Laws of Nature clearly rest upon self-interest. That is to say, rational persons with those passions inclining them toward peace find that they can best serve their own self-interest by recognizing the Laws of Nature. No altruism or "love of humanity" is involved. The first three Laws are the most important:
That every man, ought to endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek, and use, all helps, and advantages of war.5
That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself.6
That men perform their covenants made.7
Note the tentative nature of the first two Laws. We are morally obliged to want peace and to will the means to attain it, including a willingness to renounce that right in the state of nature of acting in whatever way we see fit―but only if other people cooperate. The third Law, performance of covenants made, is the basis for justice. A covenant is a contract calling upon the parties to act in specific ways in the future. In this context, the covenant establishing a civil government or commonwealth, is meant. Any breach of the covenant by a party to it is an injustice.
We should be clear however that justice and injustice only have meaning when parties to the covenant are in awe of some common power capable of enforcing it:
Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant; and to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth.8
Given Hobbes' account of human nature, a strong civil authority is necessary for human beings to live in a state of peace. Moreover, no objective moral obligations, beyond the tentative ones stated in the first two Laws of Nature, exist prior to establishment of that strong civil authority.
All the Laws of Nature are rules of enlightened self-interest. That is, we best serve our own interests by bringing about a state of peace if at all possible, rather than by taking the simple, superficially promising course of just fighting on in a state of war. Once he has enunciated his nineteen Laws of Nature, Hobbes has a foundation for judging the moral worth of numerous actions. Thus, injustice, ingratitude, unwillingness to make minor accommodations to the needs of others, vengeance, cruelty, hatred, contempt, pride, arrogance, and insistence upon more than a deserved share, are morally condemnable―because they do not foster those conditions of peace that serve our genuine self-interest. On the other hand, justice, gratitude, modesty, mercy, and equal treatment of others are morally praiseworthy. Remember however the tentative nature of this morality based upon the Laws of Nature―that is, the morality only applies when others are also willing to abide by these rules. If others are unwilling, then a state of war, without any civil government, exists and no moral rules apply.
Hobbes's position has often been attacked (although perhaps the continual need to attack it shows that the position is a strong one). One of the major "attackers" was Jean Jacques Rousseau.
Rousseau
Biographical Sketch
Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712 - 1778 C.E.), a Swiss-French philosopher, was born in Geneva, Switzerland, the son of a watchmaker. He was a largely self-educated person who led a somewhat irregular, semi-nomadic life that included: (1) a brutal apprenticeship from which he ran away at age 16, (2) service as a footman in a powerful family, (3) support through the patronage of various wealthy or powerful persons, (4) a common law marriage with a servant girl that produced five children (all of whom were placed in orphanages), (5) association with the leading intellectual circles in Paris, (6) flights to avoid persecution for his political views, and (7) continual fallings-out with friends and associates.
In 1742, Rousseau set off for Paris wanting to make his mark as a composer, planning to introduce a new system of musical notation. He never achieved great success in music. Nevertheless, he became famous and controversial with his prizewinning essay on the question, "Has the progress of the sciences and arts contributed to the corruption or to the improvement of human conduct?" Rousseau took the stand that civilization has corrupted human nature, which is basically good. At the heart of the corruption are inequalities and artificiality that civilization produces.
Rousseau has been quite influential through his political thought, his social criticism, and his views on education. In addition to his political works (the most famous being The Social Contract), his major works include a novel (Julie, or The New Heloise), a work on education (Emile), and an autobiographical work (The Confessions).
Like Hobbes, Jean Jacques Rousseau thinks that an account of ethics and of social organization must begin with an understanding of human nature. Unlike Hobbes though, he denies any mechanistic description of human beings based ultimately on the motions of physical bodies. Human beings have a soul that survives death; and they possess free will. Free will, more so than intelligence, sets human beings apart from the lower animals.
Principles of Actions within Human Nature
Within human nature, Rousseau finds two fundamental principles of action, self-preservation (or self-love) and compassion. In his Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Human Inequality, he says,
Throwing aside, therefore, all those scientific books, which teach us only to see men such as they have made themselves, and contemplating the first and most simple operations of the human soul, I think I can perceive in it two principles prior to reason, one of them deeply interesting us in our own welfare and preservation, and the other exciting a natural repugnance at seeing any other sensible being, and particularly any of our own species, suffer pain or death. It is from the agreement and combination which the understanding is in a position to establish between these two principles, without its being necessary to introduce that of sociability, that all the rules of natural right appear to me to be derived―rules which our reason is afterwards obliged to establish on other foundations, when by its successive developments it has been led to suppress nature itself.
In proceeding thus, we shall not be obliged to make man a philosopher before he is a man. His duties toward others are not dictated to him only by the later lessons of wisdom; and, so long as he does not resist the internal impulse of compassion, he will never hurt any other man, nor even any sentient being, except on those lawful occasions on which his own preservation is concerned and he is obliged to give himself the preference.9
Note the claim, "In this way, we are not obliged to make man a philosopher before making him a man." Rousseau thinks that our basic moral commands arising from self-love and compassion exist prior to any elaborate reasoning such as that involved in Hobbes' Laws of Nature. Of this compassion, Rousseau goes on to say,
It is then certain that compassion is a natural feeling, which, by moderating the violence of love of self in each individual, contributes to the preservation of the whole species. It is this compassion that hurries us without reflection to the relief of those who are in distress: it is this which in a state of nature supplies the place of laws, morals, and virtues, with the advantage that none are tempted to disobey its gentle voice: it is this which will always prevent a sturdy savage from robbing a weak child or a feeble old man of the sustenance they may have with pain and difficulty acquired, if he sees a possibility of providing for himself by other means: it is this which, instead of inculcating that sublime maxim of rational justice, Do to others as you would have them do unto you, inspires all men with that other maxim of natural goodness, much less perfect indeed, but perhaps more useful; Do good to yourself with as little evil as possible to others. In a word, it is rather in this natural feeling than in any subtle arguments that we must look for the cause of that repugnance, which every man would experience in doing evil, even independently of the maxims of education. Although it might belong to Socrates and other minds of the like craft to acquire virtue by reason, the human race would long since have ceased to be, had its preservation depended only on the reasonings of the individuals composing it.10
In his later thought, this principle of compassion was refined into a concept of conscience, "There is, then, deep in our souls an inborn principle of justice and virtue by which, in spite of our maxims, we judge our actions and those of others as good or bad; and it is to this principle that I give the name of conscience."11
Corruption by Society
Given the principle of compassion, Rousseau differs sharply with Hobbes on what the "state of nature" would be like. There would be no state of war or continual misery. Rousseau points out that persons in society are more likely to experience misery: savages never think of complaining about their lives or committing suicide; but persons in society do. And he attributes warfare to corruption by society that weakened natural compassion and enhanced social differences:
Hence arose national wars, battles, murders, and reprisals, which shock nature and outrage reason; together with all those horrible prejudices which class among the virtues the honour of shedding human blood. The most distinguished men hence learned to consider cutting each other's throats a duty; at length men massacred their fellow-creatures by thousands without so much as knowing why, and committed more murders in a single day's fighting, and more violent outrages in the sack of a single town, than were committed in the state of nature during whole ages over the whole earth. Such were the first effects we could see to have followed the division of mankind into different communities.12
According to Rousseau, Hobbes "improperly admitted, as a part of savage man's concern for self-preservation, the gratification of a multitude of passions which are the work of society, and have made laws necessary."13 There is no cruelty in human nature itself, society is the great corrupter:
So long as men remained content with their rustic huts, so long as they were satisfied with clothes made of the skins of animals and sewn together with thorns and fish-bones, adorned themselves only with feathers and shells, and continued to paint their bodies different colours, to improve and beautify their bows and arrows, and to make with sharp-edged stones fishing boats or clumsy musical instruments; in a word, so long as they undertook only what a single person could accomplish, and confined themselves to such arts as did not require the joint labour of several hands, they lived free, healthy, honest, and happy lives, so long as their nature allowed, and as they continued to enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse. But from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another; from the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable, and vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate and grow up with the crops.14
Inequality
Of all the evils created by society, inequality is the worst, for Rousseau, because it is the root of most of the others. Inequalities arose when individuals, in coming together socially, substituted: (1) specialization of labor for relative self-sufficiency and (2) private property for common ownership of the earth's bounty. The resulting inequalities produced slavery and poverty, and even more.
The pursuit of wealth, social standing, and conquest―all of which result in loss of virtue―is traceable to the recognition of inequality as a fact of life along with a refusal to accept a lower station than others. Individuals feel generally equal to others and are unwilling to accept socially created inequalities that confer lower status upon them, because this lower status threatens their self-esteem. Thus, social inequality succeeds in shifting their sense of self-esteem from what they think of themselves to what others think of them. To impress others, at any cost in any way they can, they must make money, have what others have, be fashionable in their tastes, and be members of a "better" class. The net result is a triumph of artificiality, appearance, and vice at the expense of natural inclinations, virtue, wisdom, and real happiness.
Savage and Civilized Peoples
Rousseau tries to capture the effects of society, or civilization, on human beings in the following passage:
. . . The savage and the civilized man, differ so much in the bottoms of their hearts and in their inclinations, that what constitutes the supreme happiness of one would reduce the 'other to despair. The former breathes only peace and liberty; he desires only to live and be free from labour; even the ataraxia of the Stoic falls far short of his profound indifference to every other object. Civilized man, on the other hand, is always moving, sweating, toiling, and racking his brains to find still more laborious occupations: he goes on in drudgery to his last moment, and even seeks death to put himself in a position to live, or renounces life to acquire immortality. He pays his court to men in power, whom he hates, and to the wealthy, whom he despises; he stops at nothing to have the honour of serving them; he is not ashamed to value himself on his own meanness and their protection; and, proud of his slavery, he speaks with disdain of those, who have not the honour of sharing it. What a sight would the perplexing and envied labours of a European minister of State present to the eyes of a Caribbean! How many cruel deaths would not this indolent savage prefer to the horrors of such a life, which is seldom even sweetened by the pleasure of doing good! But, for him to see into the motives of all this solicitude the words 'power' and 'reputation' would have to bear some meaning in his mind; he would have to know that there are men who set a value on the opinion of the rest of the world; who can be made happy and satisfied with themselves rather on the testimony of other people than on their own. In reality, the source of all these differences is, that the savage lives within himself, while social man lives constantly outside himself, and only knows how to live in the opinion of others, so that he seems to receive the consciousness of his own existence merely from the judgment of others concerning him. It is not to my present purpose to insist on the indifference to good and evil which arises from this disposition, in spite of our many fine works on morality, or to show how, everything being reduced to appearances, there is but art and mummery in even honour, friendship, virtue, and often vice itself, of which we at length learn the secret of boasting; to show, in short, how, always asking others, what we are, and never daring to ask ourselves, in the midst of so much philosophy, humanity, and civilization, and of such sublime codes of morality, we have nothing to show for ourselves but a frivolous and deceitful appearance, honour without virtue, reason without wisdom, and pleasure without happiness. It is sufficient that I have proved that this is not by any means the original state of man, but that it is merely the spirit of society, and the inequality which society produces, that thus transform and alter all our natural inclinations.15
Hobbes and Rousseau: A Comparison
Whereas Hobbes relies upon reason and the threat of powerful, centralized authority to provide an ethical and social system that controls human nature, Rousseau trusts human nature and advocates opportunity for its free expression. Rousseau thinks that society suppresses the good, natural feelings in our nature and reason often constructs elaborately artificial rationalizations that smother our sense of compassion and justify horrendous acts. He does not oppose the use of reason itself; but he opposes this smothering of feelings for the sake of being rational. The origin of morality lies simply in our natural feelings, prior to any exact reasoning; and reason is as likely to become a tool of social corruption as it is likely to become an instrument for good. For Rousseau, being able to will freely what we want to do, taking our natural feelings into account, makes for a happy, healthy, moral person. Hobbes, on the other hand, does not trust natural feelings. Natural feelings incline human beings to be self-interested power-seekers, quarrelsome by nature, covetous for what others have, and petty about their reputations. Give these feelings free rein and the result is a state of war. Reason and governmental power are our best protection from the dangerous tendencies within our own nature.
Both Hobbes and Rousseau regard self-interest as a fundamental element in human nature. For Hobbes, all voluntary actions are naturally directed in the service of self-interest; accordingly, all his moral and socio-political recommendations are directed toward an "enlightened" self-interest. Thus peace is not desirable for the sake of humanity; rather it is desirable because it serves each individual's own self-interest. Hobbes never issues altruistic exhortations! But Rousseau does. While he grants the important function of self-preservation, or self-love, he tempers the significance of this function by recognizing also the place of compassion and conscience as principles of action in human nature. Provided that society has not corrupted our sense of self-interest to the point where it becomes ravenous in its demands, the principles of compassion and conscience offer ample incentives to serve the interests of our fellow human beings.
Whereas Rousseau locates the origin of morality in human nature itself, Hobbes locates it in the more complex functions of reason, cooperative agreement, and governmental power. The existence of moral rules, effective in practice, requires specific sorts of social relationships. There is no morality embedded in human nature. Accordingly, Hobbes admits a condition of amorality, namely, a state of war, in which no moral rules apply and "anything goes." He does not admire this condition of amorality; indeed he strives mightily to eliminate it. Yet he thinks that we must start with the recognition that human nature, left to itself, produces―instead of moral progress―lives that are "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." For Rousseau, on the other hand, no condition of amorality truly exists. The demands of compassion and conscience always remain within us. In the interest of self-preservation, and self-love, we have the right to take those steps necessary for our protection, freedom, and basic wants. And taken together―self-preservation, self-love, compassion and conscience comprise the principles of morality inherent in human nature.
Given their differences with respect to human nature, we are not surprised by their consequent differences regarding the state of nature, the effects of society, and the proper directing of human life.
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)
As was the case with Plato and Freud, the positions of Hobbes and Rousseau are so different that each is a critic of the other. Here we shall concentrate on just three objections with respect to their positions.
(1) Hobbes' State of Nature As a Misrepresentation
When we examine the evidence Hobbes offers in support of his "description" of the state of nature, we find it pretty weak. His claim that many Native Americans lived in the state of nature just shows the shallowness of seventeenth century anthropology. People lock their doors and chests because they fear a small minority, not because they fear human beings generally. And nations recognize some principles of international law and morality. Few people in the contemporary world would agree with Hobbes that no standard of morality can be applied to relations among nations. Thus there is scant reason to accept his account of the state of nature.
A Possible Reply: If society were to remove its laws and system of law enforcement, you would start to find it approximating more and more closely to the state of nature as described by Hobbes. We observe this trend occurring whenever there is a breakdown of "law and order." As there is a breakdown in the structure of civilization, the law of the jungle starts to prevail. We only have to witness the great rise in crime and violence in subcultures where law enforcement is ineffective.
While nations pay "lip service" to all sorts of noble principles, what they do in practice occurs according to the amount of power they possess and can achieve. Nations will never respect any principles of morality contrary to their national interest until there is a common power capable of enforcing morality. In other words, an international government is necessary for a state of peace and the rule of morality among nations.
(2) Rousseau's Neglect of Aggressiveness
Besides compassion and self-preservation, we also find aggressiveness to be a basic principle within human nature. People sometimes feel compassion; but sometimes they also revel in the sufferings of others. Rousseau may attribute such reveling to social influences; but the aggressiveness in human beings―with its accompanying cruelty, insensitivity, and satisfaction in dominance―is too basic an element in human experience to be due to society alone. Society may create conditions that provoke more aggression; but the principle of aggression already exists as a fundamental element in human nature.
If Rousseau still insists that aggressiveness is a socially produced phenomenon, we can assert just as strongly that compassion is a socially produced phenomenon, too.
A Possible Reply: What distinguishes compassion from aggressiveness as principles of action is the fact that compassion is a primary, original feeling in human beings whereas aggressiveness is a secondary, produced feeling due to human inequality. Human beings are not naturally aggressive. Left to act according to their natures, they only do what is necessary in the way of violence to survive. But when they perceive themselves to be victims of unjust inequalities or when they succumb to the artificial wants created by society's elaborate system of social stratification, then they turn to aggressiveness.
(3) Contra Hobbes and Rousseau
A basic flaw in the theories of both Hobbes and Rousseau is their failure to take into account the social nature of human beings. Even if they grant that the state of nature never actually existed as they describe it, they still think it possible to project how human beings would act prior to the establishment of a social structure. Thus, they presume that human beings are autonomous entities who can be described apart from their relations to others. In Hobbes' case, this autonomy resides in an individual's inescapable pursuit of self-interest in all actions; in Rousseau's case, the autonomy resides in an individual's free will. They both presume that society emerges out of a state of nature, or at least legitimizes itself, through a social contract entered into by autonomous, sovereign individuals. In fact however, there is no human nature separable from a social context. Human beings are not the independent entities that Hobbes and Rousseau presume; they possess a nature created, in large part, by social conditions. Because of this basic flaw, Hobbes and Rousseau exaggerate the importance of the individual in developing a moral point of view.
A Possible Reply: Whether we attribute our actions to self-interest or free will, we always think of ourselves as autonomous entities. No matter what the degree of social influence, we always conceive of ourselves as having "selfhood," some sense of individual self-identity. So there exists no basic flaw in describing human nature as it is present in each person as a separate, self-directing or autonomous entity.
Thought Excursions
5.20 Hobbes talks about power as a general inclination of human beings. Are you ready to grant, as he does, that wealth, knowledge, honor, reputation, etc. are indeed varieties of power? If not, explain why not? If so, consider whether there is anything you consider valuable that does not involve seeking power.
5.21 In the passage describing the state of war, it may be helpful to have some "translations' of Hobbes' English prose. "Industry" = "work," "culture of the earth" = "agriculture," "instruments of moving and removing" = "technology,” “account of time” = "history." Is he right about the state of war?
5.211 Do you think that Hobbes' description of human nature and the state of nature describes men more accurately than women? Justify your answer. If the description were not very accurate for women, what conclusions, if any, would follow?
5.212 What percentage of persons, do you think, would agree with Hobbes' description of human nature and the state of nature? Do you think that persons in some occupations―for example, police officers and career military officers―would be more likely to agree? Would you agree?
5.213 Hobbes cites three types of evidence in support of his description of the state of nature. Evaluate the adequacy of this evidence. (In replying, you should take into account the Objection and Possible Reply dealing with this issue.)
5.214 Can you list any examples of situations at the present time that tend to support Hobbes' description of human nature and the state of nature? Examples that tend to refute the description? Are your examples sufficient to make a sound judgment about the adequacy of Hobbes' description?
5.215 Consider the role of the passions, reason, and self-interest in getting us out of the state of nature, according to Hobbes. Then consider the role of the Laws of Nature? Is Hobbes on the right track?
5.22 Suppose someone asserts that an irresolvable conflict lies at the base of Rousseau's position, namely, that the principle of self-preservation (self-love) is incompatible with the principle of compassion. How might Rousseau reply? Would you be satisfied with the reply?
5.221 Using Rousseau's terminology, do you see any difference between compassion and conscience? Can the one be used to explain the other? Again using his terminology, can you think of any situations where the demands of compassion might differ from the demands of conscience?
5.222 Consider in some detail how Rousseau tries to show, in refutation of Hobbes, that society rather than human nature is the cause of misery. Rousseau mentions many ills attributable to society, in his judgment. If you were asked to make up a list of benefits conferred by society, what would you include? To what extent do you agree with Rousseau's judgment about the corrupting influence of society?
5.223 How might Rousseau explain the American phenomenon of "keeping up with the Joneses"? Would he be correct? If so, should we be concerned?
5.23 Can you think of any major movies or TV series that tend to represent the positions of either Hobbes or Rousseau?
Hobbes, Rousseau, and the Morality of War
To this war of every man, against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues.
Hobbes, Leviathan, Ch. 13
War then is a relation, not between man and man, but between State and State, and individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of their country, but as its defenders. Finally, each State can have for enemies only other States, and not men; for between things disparate in nature there can be no real relation.
Rousseau, The Social Contract, Bk. 1, Ch. IV
In a state of war, for Thomas Hobbes, no binding morality on the participants exists. Anything goes. Moreover, this state of war exists whenever no overarching government with sufficient power to keep the peace is present. Accordingly, in the state of nature, no governing morality is present; neither is it present in international relations. There are no moral rules forbidding aggression, atrocities, or inordinate destruction. Nations may invade their neighbors at will whenever it suits their interests. Charges about use of immoral weapons or mistreatment of prisoners are not to be taken seriously. We cannot conclude however that Hobbes is a warmonger. A better interpretation would be that he hopes, by describing the state of war along with its absence of morality, to show the need for establishment of government, and the rule of law. In the context of the contemporary world, given the number of nations in the world and their potential to cause destruction, Hobbes' position makes an excellent case for the need to establish a world government.
Rousseau views all this differently. The state of nature is not a state of war, because war is "a relation between State to State" and no States (organized political entities) exist in the state of nature. Under such conditions, where human beings live independently and act according to the fundamental principles of self-preservation and compassion, they are not natural enemies and they have a basic morality. Even when violence does break out it bears scant resemblance to the scale of slaughter usually evident in the wars among nation-states. Furthermore, for Rousseau, there is no "right" of conquest, because "might does not make right." The exhibition of power can incite the exercise of greater power; but it cannot establish a moral claim. There also is no "right" to kill conquered soldiers, because they cease to be enemies as soon as they lay down their arms. For Rousseau, the demands of compassion and conscience never leave us, regardless of circumstances. The "national wars, battles, murders, and reprisals; which shock nature and outrage reason" constitute sad and continually tragic evidence for the degree to which the natural demands of compassion and conscience are overwhelmed through the influence of society. For Rousseau, war is a horror that society, not human nature, engenders; and it signifies a failure of morality, not a state of amorality.
Suppose that we now try to apply the positions of Hobbes and Rousseau to a more specific, contemporary issue, nuclear war.
Problem: In a nuclear confrontation between the United States and another nation, suppose that one side launches a massive, first-strike nuclear attack on the other side. The attack dooms the other side, although it is still capable of retaliating in kind before doom occurs. Suppose however that such retaliation very likely will cause the total destruction of humanity―not necessarily in the sense that all human life on earth will end but at least in the sense that total destruction of all those values, and valued ways of life, created by human beings over the course of many centuries will occur and no reasonable plan of reconstruction is foreseeable. Can the other side justify “retaliation in kind” ethically?
From Hobbes' standpoint, we first should note that, without some overarching government to establish peace and the rule of law, a massive, first-strike nuclear attack is not immoral: "Force, and fraud, are in war the two cardinal virtues." Prudence, not morality, however may dictate that such an attack is not really in a nation's self-interest because of the the prospect of retaliation. (Hobbes probably would be a firm advocate of deterrence, in the absence of a world government.) Furthermore, once the attack is launched, the other side has no moral obligation to refrain from retaliation even though it would cause the total destruction of humanity. In the state of war, there are no moral obligations; retaliation simply for the sake of revenge, regardless of the destruction to others, is just as worthy as any other values. Thus, for Hobbes, no moral rule exists to ban either the first strike attack or retaliation in kind. Remember though that he regards such a result as the strongest indicator of the need for an overarching government to establish peace, assert the rule of law, and thereby lay the foundation for recognition of acts of injustice.
From Rousseau's standpoint, we first should note that the threat of nuclear war is itself an indictment of society. We would not have to worry about the use of nuclear weapons, if society had not severely corrupted our natural inclinations. (In passing, we should remember that Rousseau is not a pacifist, opposed to all war on moral grounds. He would grant that a nation-state has the right to fight to defend itself, as an extension of the principle of self-preservation present in every human being. Yet the existence of wars and their enormous destructiveness are traceable to the corrupting influence of society.) As for the launching of a massive, first-strike nuclear attack, it obliterates compassion as much as it obliterates lands and peoples; it defies our innate sense of justice; and it contributes nothing to self-preservation, if retaliation in kind occurs. Such an attack is clearly immoral. As for retaliation in kind by the other side, such action contributes nothing to self-preservation, given the dooming nature of the first attack; it shows no compassion for the suffering and deaths inflicted on hundreds of millions of people; and it unjustly fails to discriminate the innocent from the guilty. Finally, the thought that citizens can look upon their participation in nuclear war as a matter for duty and honor would be morally abhorrent to Rousseau.
Excursion: Consider some area of contemporary conflict, for example, the Middle East, in the light of their positions. Do the actions of the parties to the conflict tend to bear out the position of Hobbes, or Rousseau? Justify your answer. To what extent can an example of conflict help us to decide between the positions of Hobbes and Rousseau?
Sources
Footnotes
1. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan in Edwin A. Burtt, ed., The English Philosophers From Bacon to Mill (New York: Modern Library, 1939), pp. 149-150.
2. Ibid., pp. 158-159.
3. Ibid., pp. 160-161.
4. Ibid., p. 161.
5. Ibid., p. 163
6. Ibid., pp. 163-164.
7. Ibid., p. 168.
8. Ibid., p. 168.
9. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and the Discourses (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1913), pp. 157-158.
10. Ibid., pp. 184-185.
11. Rousseau, The Creed of a Priest Savoy, (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1957), p. 40.
12. Rousseau, The Social Contract and the Discourses, op. cit., p. 206.
13. Ibid., p. 181.
14. Ibid., p. 199.
15. Ibid., pp. 220-221.