Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy

brought to you by Ron Yezzi

Emeritus Professor of Philosophy

Minnesota State University, Mankato

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Topics

Plato

Agencies of Action within Human Nature

Human Nature and Virtues

Freud

Agencies of Action within The Psyche

The Psyche: Ethical Implications

Plato and Freud: A Comparison

Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies

Thought Excursions

Plato, Freud, and Political Leadership

Sources

Author's Note: This account is an adaptation from Ron Yezzi, Directing Human Actions: Perspectives on Basic Ethical Issues (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 92 - 103.

Human Nature:

Plato and Freud

Both Plato and Sigmund Freud have accounts of human nature; they describe three agencies of action within the psyche, which can be taken to mean "mind" or "soul." But they differ on what some of these agencies are, on the relative influence of some of the agencies, and on the moral precepts to be derived. Plato's is the much older position, of course―not dependent upon, or taking account of, the somewhat controversial psychoanalytic techniques developed by Freud in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Plato

Biographical Sketch

Plato (427 - 347 B.C.E.), the most widely read and perhaps most lastingly influential philosopher in the history of Western civilization, was born in Athens, of aristocratic parents. About 407, he came under the influence of Socrates (469 - 399 B.C.E), the ever-inquiring, self-proclaimed "gadfly of the state"―celebrated in Plato's dialogue the Phaedo with these words, "Of all the men of his time whom I have known, he was the wisest and justest and best."

Apparently, Plato had political aspirations in his youth, although he became disillusioned-particularly after Socrates was condemned to death in 399 by the Athenian democracy of that period. Except for some misadventures in Sicily, where Plato tried to introduce rulers there to more technical philosophical thinking, Plato lived the life of a scholar and educator. After Socrates' death, he did some traveling and wrote some philosophical dialogues with Socrates as the main speaker.

In 388, he founded the Academy, an influential center of learning until it was closed in 529 A.D. Plato continued to write philosophical dialogues―of growing scope, subtlety, and complexity. In addition to their great philosophic merit, the dialogues are often great works of literature as well and are engagingly imaginative―all of which combined to produce some richly diverse interpretations of what Plato meant. Our firsthand knowledge of his philosophy rests upon thirty or so dialogues (the exact number not being known because of some disputes over authorship) and several letters. The presentation of Plato's philosophy here is based upon his most famous work, The Republic.

Agencies of Action within Human Nature

According to Plato, the three agencies of action within human nature, or the psyche, are appetite, spirit, and reason. The three primary appetitive drives, or irrational desires, are hunger, thirst, and sexual passion. The appetitive drive is "associated with pleasure in the replenishment of certain wants." It is a blind craving rather than a complex desire arising from some combination of all three agencies of action within the psyche. Thus, for example, when someone is drinking something, we cannot always give a complete account by simply saying, "That's the appetitive drive of thirst showing itself," because a complex desire may be present. Spirit is a combination of enthusiasm, perseverance, and determination. It usually does not function independently within the psyche but rather allies itself with either reason or appetite. Accordingly, we are capable of showing great spirit in acting wisely or lustfully. Reason is the agency of reflection and judgment, the source of wisdom, within the psyche.

Plato's Agencies of Action

within the Psyche

Given these three agencies of action comprising the psyche, or human nature in effect, Plato offers the following moral prescription:

And ought not the rational principle, which is wise, and has the care of the whole soul, to rule, and passionate or spirited principle to be the subject and ally?

Certainly.

And, as we were saying, the united influence of music and gymnastic will bring them into accord, nerving and sustaining the reason with noble words and lessons, and moderating and soothing and civilizing the wildness of passion by harmony and rhythm?

Quite true, he said.

And these two, thus nurtured and educated, and having learned truly to know their own functions, will rule over the concupiscent [appetitive], which in each of us is the largest part of the soul and by nature most insatiable of gain; over this they will keep guard, lest, waxing great and strong with the fulness of bodily pleasures, as they are termed, the concupiscent soul, no longer confined to her own sphere, should attempt to enslave and rule those who are not her natural born subjects, and overturn the whole of man?

Very true, he said.

Both together will they not be the best defenders of the whole soul and the whole body against attacks from without; the one counselling, and the other fighting under his leader, and courageously executing his commands and counsels?

True.¹

Note that reason allied with spirit can control the appetitive drives; but the latter still constitute the greater part of the psyche. So their control requires self-mastery and discipline.

Human Nature and Virtues

Using these three agencies of action, Plato is then able to explain the demands of personal morality in terms of his four primary virtues―wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. Wisdom resides with the rational element in the psyche, courage with the spirited element. Temperance consists in the control of appetites through the rule of reason with spirit. And justice consists in each agency of action performing its proper function without encroaching upon the proper boundary of another. Plato says,

. . . the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another, or any of them to do the work of others,―he sets in order his own inner life, and is his own master and his own law, and at peace with himself; and when he has bound together the three principles within him, which may be compared to the higher, lower, and middle notes of the scale, and the intermediate intervals―when he has bound all these together, and is no longer many, but has become one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature, then he proceeds to act, if he has to act, whether in a matter of property, or in the treatment of the body, or in some affair of politics or private business; always thinking and calling that which preserves and co-operates with this harmonious condition, just and good action, and the knowledge which presides over it, wisdom, and that which at any time impairs this condition, he will call unjust action, and the opinion which presides over it ignorance.²

While Plato clearly calls for the rule of reason in moral action, we should also note carefully that he calls for control, not the suppression, of appetitive pleasures. So we should not tag Plato with an extreme asceticism that condemns and denigrates the satisfaction of all bodily wants.

In practical terms, Plato's insistence upon the need for restraint of appetitive drives such as those leading to drunkenness, drug-use, gluttony, and sexual promiscuity is fairly obvious. The need for restraint to prevent usurpation by the spirited element of the psyche, however, is less obvious. Spirit, as noted earlier, is a combination of enthusiasm, perseverance, and determination. It is often fostered through physical training such as might occur in athletics or dancing. Nevertheless, persons can exhibit an excess of enthusiasm, perseverance, and determination. More particularly, persons can be overly competitive or overly aggressive, wanting to win or get ahead at any cost; they can be overly aggressive or competitive in playing games, in pursuing careers, or in making money. To avoid such excess, they need reason as the primary directing force within the psyche.

Freud

Biographical Sketch

Sigmund Freud (1856 - 1939 C.E.), the founder of psychoanalysis, was born in what is now Czechoslovakia; but he lived most of his life in Vienna, Austria. He studied medicine at the University of Vienna and did research in neurology. About 1885, his interests turned to psychology. In collaboration with Josef Breuer, he worked with hypnotism as a technique for treating hysteria. Later, he turned to free association as a technique for treating patients. Freud placed increasing stress on the role of the unconscious in directing human life, particularly unconscious sexual experiences. As clues to understanding the unconscious, he also emphasized the analysis of dreams and "slips of the tongue."

His early work in psychoanalysis came up against enormous skepticism from the medical profession; and the subsequent development of psychoanalysis is a tribute to Freud's perseverance in the face of adversity. By 1906 however, he was attracting followers; and, in 1908, the first International Psychoanalytic Congress was held. Freud had started a movement. This did not however stop several noted followers from breaking with Freud's interpretations over the years. And to the present day, there are a variety of psychoanalytic theories, none of which enjoys universal acceptance. Indeed the evidence for, and reliability of, many of Freud's interpretations has always been a source of controversy within the scientific community.

Freud was a prolific writer of books, papers, and case studies. The exposition here relies mainly on Civilization and Its Discontents, where Freud applies his psychoanalytic theory to the study of society.

Agencies of Action within The Psyche

In describing agencies of action within the psyche, Sigmund Freud differs with Plato's account primarily by (a) de-emphasizing the importance of reason in controlling human actions, (b) stressing the significance of unconscious agencies, (c) describing the appetitive drives somewhat differently, and (d) substituting what he calls the "superego" for Plato's spirited element.

According to Freud, the three agencies of action within the psyche are the id, the ego, and the superego.

Id

The id is associated with appetitive drives, primarily the love instinct and the death instinct. Most fundamentally, the love instinct consists in sexual love that "has given us our most intense experience of an overwhelming sensation of pleasure and has thus furnished us with a pattern for our search for happiness."³ The death instinct consists in aggressiveness, of which Freud says, in Civilization and Its Discontents,

... men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness.⁴

This aggressiveness tempts them to exploit others instead of viewing their neighbors as helpers or companions; so it may lead to infliction of pain, rape, torture, humiliation, theft, and even murder. As instincts, sexual love and aggressiveness never disappear as agencies of action, although their energy may be channeled in various ways. For example, sexual love, originally indiscriminate in its desire for sexual objects, may be channeled into an "aim-inhibited love" of a single partner for purposes of security; and aggressiveness may be channeled into the competitive acquisition of private property.

Ego

As a first approximation, the ego can be associated with the conscious self―with its perceptions, feelings, and thoughts (including rational ones)―that seems to separate us as an autonomous entity from everything else that exists. In actuality, according to Freud, there is not always a sharp dividing line between the ego and the other agencies of action or between what is conscious and unconscious.

Superego

The superego is associated with conscience, that is, a socially developed source of moral commands internalized within the psyche. The superego usually develops through the influence of parents first and then the society later.

Freud's Agencies of Action

within the Psyche

In the interaction of id, ego, and superego, the ego (including rational thought) is not a supreme master. Rather it finds itself buffeted by conflicts arising from the relentless drives of the id, the moral commands of the superego, and the realities of the external world. Thus, external realities such as other people may prevent the satisfaction of appetitive drives; and even when they are satisfied, they may produce a sense of guilt in the ego because of a conflict with the commands of the superego. In many cases, the conflict between id and superego is great enough to require repression from consciousness so that the conflict proceeds unconsciously, showing itself in neurotic behavior of one sort or another, for example, obsessional behavior or nervous coughing. Because of this role of the unconscious, Freud places great stress on the interpretation of dreams and "slips of the tongue" as clues to unconscious experience.

The Psyche: Ethical Implications

Hedonism

Freud's account of the psyche has various ethical implications. He begins from the standpoint of psychological hedonism, that is, the position that human beings are so constituted by nature as to pursue pleasure and avoid pain, thereby achieving happiness. Nevertheless an understanding of the id, ego, and superego must provide the basis for directing psychological hedonism. Thus, for example, we need to take care in educating young people―better equipping them for the roles of sexuality and aggressiveness in human life. More particularly, we need to avoid setting ethical demands that require too great suppression of our instincts and to avoid unrealistic portrayals of human virtue.

Sexuality

The "misuse" of ethical demands produces a superego that creates guilt and mental illness. Accordingly, we ought to modify the development of the superego so as to lessen conflict between it and the id. In particular, society should allow more outlets for expression of sexuality. Note well however that Freud is not an advocate of complete sexual freedom as the path to happiness. First, to seek happiness solely in sexual love renders us dangerously dependent upon external, chosen love-objects, thereby exposing ourselves to extreme suffering in the face of rejection, unfaithfulness, or death. Secondly, the needs of civilization require some sublimation of narrow sexual love.

Civilization, Love, and Death

The advance of civilization rests upon the need to work together as a means of surviving within the environment and the need to love as a means of bonding together in communal living. Accordingly, the love instinct (Eros) must expand beyond the narrow focus upon a sexual object to include many more human beings. Freud says,

. . . civilization is a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind. Why this has to happen, we do not know; the work of Eros is precisely this. These collections of men are to be libidinally bound to one another. Necessity alone, the advantages of work in common, will not hold them together. But man's natural aggressive instinct, the hostility of each against all and of all against each, opposes this programme of civilization. This aggressive instinct is the derivative and the main representative of the death instinct which we have found alongside of Eros and which shares world-domination with it. And now, I think, the meaning of the evolution of civilization is no longer obscure to us. It must present the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. This struggle is what all life essentially consists of, and the evolution of civilization may therefore be simply described as the struggle for life of the human species.⁵

Civilization, for Freud, is impossible without the suppression of strong instincts (and hence there will always be "discontents"). Yet we cannot rationally argue these instincts out of existence or do away with them through a strong superego. Only the love instinct is powerful enough to overcome the death instinct; and it must be a sublimated love instinct directed toward love of humanity, not toward sexual passion.

We should remember that Freud is not advocating a total sublimation of the love instinct. Its sexual focus is much too strong to make possible total sublimation. While we can advocate a sublimated love of humanity, of art, of beauty, of knowledge, such sublimation does not come easily. It happens however that the future of civilization rests upon our achieving some considerable degree of sublimated love.

Plato and Freud: A Comparison

What is especially striking as a contrast in the thought of Plato and Freud is the difference in power assigned to reason and appetitive drives. Whereas Plato constructs a consciousness-centered morality based upon the rule of reason over appetites, Freud constructs a morality based upon channeling appetitive drives so as to maximize happiness. For Plato, reason can control appetites; for Freud, it cannot. Thus, Freud hopes that happiness is achievable by allowing freer expression to the love instinct, both with respect to sexuality and to a sublimated love for humanity. Plato, on the other hand, thinks that a conscious effort at self-mastery and discipline directed by the rule of reason, helped along by personal inclination and social training, can control appetitive drives.

Freud views happiness in terms of personal pleasure and, more particularly, sees sexual love as providing the primitive "pattern for our search for happiness." Plato, on the other hand, does not focus upon pleasure; instead he views personal happiness as a proper harmony and balance among the agencies of action within the psyche, characterized by the exhibition of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. In addition, he places personal happiness within the wider, more noble context of the state as a whole. That is to say, for Plato, the goal of life is not merely personal happiness but rather the happiness of the state as a whole―which provides the foundation for, and nurtures, personal happiness in a good society. While Freud, instead, stresses personal happiness, we should remember that an essential means to attain this personal goal is the advance of civilization through a sublimated love for humanity. Hence, in practice although not in theory, Freud and Plato may not be that far apart in their concern for the welfare of society generally.

Upon deeper analysis, there are even some seeds of similarity in their views of reason. For example, Freud speaks well of a sublimated love for knowledge (a love well exhibited in his own personal life) akin to Plato's love of wisdom. And despite his stress upon the unconscious, Freud was still a rational person using rational methods in psychoanalysis as a means of improving the human condition.

Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies

(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)

In so far as they have different positions, Plato and Freud are critics of each other with respect to human nature and any subsequent ethical implications. So we can formulate some objections simply by comparing the two accounts. But here we take up two different objections.

(1) Plato's Denial of Human Nature

While Plato supposedly calls for control of appetitive drives by reason and rejects extreme asceticism, the regimen necessary to reason adequately is so strict as to minimize the satisfaction of appetitive drives. Yet quantitatively, appetitive drives constitute the greater part of the psyche. Thus Plato insists upon a denial of the greater part of our nature. Instead of a morality based upon human nature, we end up with a morality in opposition to it.

A Possible Reply: In so far as reason is part of our nature, and the better part at that, there is no denial of human nature in insisting upon the rule of reason. Furthermore, there is no denial of appetitive drives as part of human nature; there is just an insistence upon their proper control. Finally, while the regimen for training someone to apprehend the highest good (that is, the Form of The Good) leaves little time to satisfy appetitive drives, we should remember that only those best suited by nature and interest go through this regimen. So they are not acting contrary to their nature.

(2) Expanding the Role of The Ego

Although Freud harps about the greater power of the unconscious, of the id, and of the superego at the expense of a rationally conscious ego, all of his work and all of his directives offer information and advice for the benefit of the ego. Freud is quite rational in his approach to problems; his exploration of the unconscious brings this subject within the realm of consciousness; and the ethical implications he draws from his analysis of the psyche are directives that a rational, conscious being ought to follow. It must be the case therefore that the ego's importance in human actions is much greater than Freud admits. Otherwise, he would not, or should not, be trying to inform and influence anyone.

A Possible Reply: Freud's work can be looked upon as an attempt to strengthen the ego in relation to the id and superego by making us more aware of the realities it must deal with and by lessening its burdens. This attempt to strengthen the ego however requires liberation from traditional presumptions about the enormous power of rationality and consciousness, promoted so often by philosophers, intellectuals, and moralists. Once we get beyond these traditional, false presumptions, we can move forward with a more authentic expansion of the role of the ego in human actions.

Furthermore, we must not place too great hope in expanding the ego's role in human actions. The unconscious always remains with us. The most that most of us can hope for through the techniques of psychoanalysis is the relief of guilt or other symptoms of mental distress through the cathartic effect achieved in recognizing consciously the hitherto unconscious sources of our distress.

Thought Excursions

5.10 Make up a list of ten persons you most admire. Then consider the degree to which each measures up to Plato's view of a good person, based upon his analysis of human nature. If anyone on your list does not measure up well, would you drop that individual from the list? How would you yourself measure up?

5.11 Evaluate the following cynical judgment of Plato's position: "Plato's analysis of human nature with its accompanying conception of a good person has a noble, but hollow, ring. People always pay 'lip service' to his sort of position. But when we look at the real world we find a different situation. In the real world, Plato's 'good person' strikes people as being rather dull and ineffectual. The most successful persons―for example, athletes, entertainers, business people, and politicians―very seldom exemplify the traits Plato talks about. These successful persons are much more likely to exhibit excess on the side of spirit and appetites than Plato wants. Being aggressively competitive to get ahead and satisfying appetitive drives are their major preoccupation. Moreover, these persons have the lifestyles that other people admire and want to imitate."

5.12 Does Freud properly assess the relative importance of the id, ego, and superego? (How much technical information do you think you need to know to answer this question? Do you think that the technical information is available? Do you have it?) Do the ethical implications really follow?

5.121 Would you agree with Freud's insistence upon aggressiveness being a fundamental instinct in human beings? Why or why not? What about love as a fundamental instinct? Instead of trying to answer these questions in terms of what sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, or sociobiologists might say, consider your own personal experiences. What can you say about the love instinct or the death instinct in your own life?

5.122 Why is Freud not an advocate of complete sexual freedom or the pursuit of sexual pleasure as the main interest in life? Is he correct or incorrect in taking this position?

5.1221 According to Freud, love for humanity is sublimated sexual love. Indeed he regards all love to originate ultimately in sexual desire. Would you agree with him? Or can there be other origins of love? What can we say about Christian love or brotherly love or "Platonic" love? (Those especially interested in what Plato has to say about love may want to read his dialogue, entitled Symposium.)

Plato, Freud, and Political Leadership

. . . we should not forget that Wilson had the qualities of his defects: if his passivity to his father was excessive, his activity, developed by his reaction-formation against it, had become even stronger and enabled him to act with harsh masculinity; if his unconscious conviction that he was God raised him above reality, it also produced a powerful self-confidence; if his Narcissism made him unattractive as a human being, it caused a concentration on himself which made him able to preserve his slight supply of physical strength and use all that he had for his own advancement; if his enormous interest in speech-making was somewhat ridiculous, it created an ability to sway crowds by his spoken word; if his Super-Ego tortured him by demanding impossible achievements, it drove him to considerable accomplishments. Yet a neurosis is an unstable foundation upon which to build a life. Although history is studded with the names of neurotics, monomaniacs and psychotics who have risen suddenly to power, they have usually dropped as suddenly to disgrace. Wilson was no exception to this rule. The qualities of his defects raised him to power; but the defects of his qualities made him, in the end, not one of the world's greatest men but a great fiasco.

Freud and Bullitt, Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study

Given their analyses of human nature, what advice would Plato and Freud offer a person with political aspirations?

A sizable portion of Plato's Republic considers the nature and development of a philosopher-ruler in an ideal state. For Plato, being a good person is the first major prerequisite for being a good political leader, and his analysis of human nature makes clear the characteristic qualities of a good person. Reason must ally with spirit to control appetitive drives; and the virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice must be evident. Ideally, the potential political leader is motivated not by personal ambition or desire for personal gain but by a recognition of being the best qualified to serve the interests of the state. Only after acquiring and demonstrating the qualities of being a good person should one move to the next stage of gaining the practical experience needed in governance. Finally, having gained this practical experience, one is ready to take on positions of political leadership. (In Plato's ideal state, this occurs at about fifty years of age.) Clearly, Plato would frown upon the twenty year old who leaps into party political activities and then seeks election to political office at an early age. Failures in political leadership are the likely result when persons are blinded by their ambition and desire for gain; but intelligence and experience are also not enough to avoid failures. Successful political leadership rests, first of all, on one's good qualities as a person, according to Plato.

During the 1920s, Freud collaborated with the diplomat William C. Bullitt to produce a psychological study of President Woodrow Wilson, the leader of the United States in World War I and in the peace conference culminating in the Treaty of Versailles. The result is a far from flattering portrait. For the most part, they attribute his diplomatic failures at the peace conference, his failure to get the U. S. Senate to approve the League of Nations, and other failures to psychological handicaps arising through his relationship with his father―a robust, loving, strong-willed Presbyterian minister with a great gift for preaching. This relationship was characterized both by a constantly suppressed aggressiveness and by an overt, loving submissiveness. The loving submissiveness led to his identification of his father with God, to whom he wanted to direct total submission, and to identification of himself with Christ. The aggressiveness led to identification of himself with God, as a way of supplanting his father, and to hostile reaction against various individuals seen as father-figures. Unconsciously, according to Freud and Bullitt, Wilson desired to be both God the Father and God the Son, the result being the development of a very powerful and demanding superego. His extremely powerful superego was often the source of enormous determination and self-righteousness; his extremely demanding superego was often the source of disappointment with any accomplishment and of a need to distort hard-to-face facts. From the standpoint of Freud and Bullitt, Woodrow Wilson was a neurotic personality.*

The neurosis showed itself in physical breakdowns at various times during his life. But it also showed itself in Wilson's political actions. Thus, in bringing the United States into World War 1, he envisaged himself as the "Prince of Peace" and the "Saviour of the World"―the one person who would lead the world to absolute peace and justice. At times, he would be submissive in situations demanding aggressiveness, and aggressive in ones demanding submissiveness. For example, in dealing with leaders of Britain and France at the peace conference after World War I, he failed to achieve his goals of peace and justice because, at critical times, he exhibited a conciliatory, Christlike submissiveness in the face of their self-serving, nationalistic demands. Consequently, the Treaty of Versailles proved to be a starting-point in the direction of World War II. Moreover, in dealing with his failures, Wilson resorted unconsciously to distortions of fact in order to soothe his demanding superego. The result was "a great fiasco" rather than great political leadership.

What political lesson should be drawn from this psychological study of Woodrow Wilson? For Freud apparently, the first condition for successful political leadership is freedom from neurosis and psychosis. Unconscious conflicts that produce excessive self-righteousness, "Godlike" visions of moral superiority, distortions of reality, repressed hostility, and delusionary submissiveness constitute a poor foundation for political success.

Excursions: How practical are Plato's judgments about political leadership? For example, is he overly "idealistic?" Given Freud's psychological study of President Woodrow Wilson, do you think that voters before an election are entitled to a psychological profile of major political candidates? For example, should Presidential candidates be required to submit to psychological testing and to make the results publicly available? (To what extent does an adequate reply require technical information about the scientific reliability of psychological testing?) Try to make up a list of potential benefits and dangers.

*Readers should note though that many historians regard Woodrow Wilson quite highly as a U. S. President and would be quite skeptical about the reliability of Freud's study.

5.13 Suppose that you are a teacher asked to work out a class module, at the fourth grade level, that exposes students to the views of Plato and Freud on human nature, along with their associated values. How would you proceed? Which view, Plato's or Freud's, would you find most valuable in working with the students? Why? Suppose that you are working on a module at the twelfth grade level. Would you deal with these questions differently?

Sources

Footnotes

1. Plato, Republic, 441e

2. Ibid., 443d

3. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), p. 29.

4. Ibid., p. 58.

5. Ibid., p. 69

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