Like Skinner, Gerald Dworkin finds problems in the traditional conception of autonomy; but he arrives at a different conception that preserves freedom and dignity.
Dworkin rejects the traditional notion of autonomy, which associates the concept with a person acting according to self-selected rules. Because of environmental influences and biological endowments, persons do not "self-select" their convictions, motivations, principles, beliefs, desires, habits, emotions, and so forth-what he calls "first order considerations." A self-selecting, or choosing in isolation from these influences and endowments is quite simply impossible. Persons can only make "second-order judgments" in which they reflect upon, and formulate attitudes toward, first-order considerations. Thus they can reflect and form preferences accordingly. To use an example from Dworkin's article, "Autonomy and Behavior Control,"
. . . a person might desire to learn to ski. He might believe he has no further motivation than this straightforward and simple desire, or he might believe that what causes the desire is the wish to test his courage in a mildly dangerous sport. Suppose he is now led to see (correctly) that he desires to ski because he is envious of a brother who has always excelled in sports. Having recognized the source of his desire, he can now either wish he were not motivated in this way or reaffirm the desire [emphasis added].6
Within this process of making second-order judgments resides human autonomy. Moreover, this autonomy is sufficient for persons to take moral responsibility for their actions.
According to Dworkin, autonomy includes both authenticity and independence―or more specifically, procedural independence. Persons possess authenticity when their actions are their actions―that is, when they accede to, and identify with, whatever motivates them to act:
It is the attitude a person takes towards the influences motivating him which determines whether or not they are to be considered "his." Does he identify with them, assimilate them to himself, view himself as the kind of person who wishes to be motivated in these particular ways? If, on the contrary, a man resents his being motivated in certain ways, is alienated from those influences, resents acting in accordance with them, would prefer to be the kind of person who is motivated in different ways, then those influences, even though they may be causally effective, are not viewed as "his."7
Persons may be motivated to stop smoking through recognition of its harmful effects or through a program of aversive conditioning whereby the taste or odor of tobacco becomes nauseating. In either case, they exhibit authenticity, provided that they accede to, and identify with, the motivation. Persons possess procedural independence when their actions are their own actions―that is, when persons identify with whatever motivates them to act without being victims of other persons' manipulation or deception. For example, if government and the cigarette industry were purposely to withhold information about the harm of smoking, then persons' preferences by which they identify with the desire to smoke may no longer really be their own. And, as the extent of manipulation and deception by others increases, a corresponding decrease in independence occurs.
If we grant that autonomy, as Dworkin describes it, exists and is well worth preserving, then significant ethical implications follow. If persons possess autonomy, then they may be said to act freely in some sense and may be held morally responsible for their actions. If we want to preserve autonomy, then we cannot engage in actions that deprive persons of authenticity and procedural independence. Accordingly, we should recognize their dignity and self-respect in a way that precludes use of manipulation or deception, as well as any means which interferes with the capacity to make second-order judgments. It follows that activities such as drugging a person, giving false or misleading information, using extremely manipulative techniques of persuasion, and radically altering an individual's personal identity without informed consent are attacks on dignity and self-respect. Moreover, we should encourage the active participation of persons in actions affecting them as a way of enhancing self-respect and dignity.
Skinner and Dworkin: A Comparison
Although Dworkin does not entirely oppose programs of behavior modification, we can see that his position places definite restrictions on their use. Furthermore, he restores those morally-associated terms (autonomy, freedom, dignity, responsibility) that B. F. Skinner eliminated in his behavioristic position. Rights, virtue, and moral struggle also have a significance that Skinner denies. In effect, Dworkin retains the traditional structure of morality without tying his position to a traditional conception of autonomy that he takes to be insupportable. Rather than give up the concept of autonomy and thereby undermine the structure of moral approaches to life as Skinner does, Dworkin restructures the concept in terms of authenticity and procedural independence so as to preserve the dignity and self-respect traditionally accorded to human beings in principle, if not in practice.
From Skinner's standpoint, Dworkin's position fails to escape from the mistaken framework of an "inner man," since Dworkin's supposed "second-order judgments" lie clearly within the range of uncontrolled, internal states of a person, as traditionally treated. Even if such second-order judgments exist, Skinner would argue that they are no less controlled than the "first-order considerations" that are determined by biological endowment and environmental conditions and hence that his denial of autonomy, freedom, dignity, and responsibility is not affected by Dworkin's analysis. Thus, for Skinner, whether or not someone "accedes to or identifies with" a motivation such as envy is just as much under the control of contingencies of reinforcement as any other variety of human behavior.
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(1) Skinner's Rejection of the Function of Thought in Human Actions
An innate capacity to reflect consciously and decide upon a course of action is an essential characteristic of human beings. All of us are well aware of this capacity for thought, and we are also aware of the way this thought is necessary to explain our behavior. For example, a scientist might observe our behavior carefully over a twenty year period without detecting an unrevealed, guiding purpose, consciously decided upon, that makes sense of our actions and is also more useful for many important needs than the scientist's voluminous observations. Or, to take another example, we consume a fair portion of our waking hours in private reflection upon our experiences and directions in life; and we can correctly label as nonsense any attempt to deny the relevance and importance of this reflection in making sense of, and directing, our lives. Regardless how we settle the issue of free will vs. determinism, we cannot eliminate the real function of thought in explaining human actions without denying fundamental facts of our experience.
Skinner's rejecting the importance of private thought in explaining behavior because it does not lend itself easily to scientific observation is especially unfortunate at this time in human history. In the presence of the great manipulative powers made possible by science and technology, we cannot afford to sacrifice, for the sake of scientific convenience, a conviction about the importance of thought that is fundamental to our dignity as human beings.
A Possible Reply: The persistence of both verbal accounts of mentalistic phenomena and reciting of introspective arguments is evidence that the verbal accounts are positively reinforcing. However we should not assert the existence of mental realities. We can grant that the "covert behavior" referred to in these verbal accounts is quite complex and requires much more scientific study without weighing ourselves down with needless and misleading mentalism. Given past contingencies of reinforcement supporting traditional verbal accounts, there is nothing unusual in their prevalence. In time, as the scientific study of human behavior continues though, the scientific view of human beings will replace the prescientific one because it will prove to be more reinforcing.
In an ever more threatening world, the advantages of a science and technology of human behavior will overcome the negative responses due to conditioning favorable to the traditional literature of freedom and dignity. Moreover, the new terminology will be less threatening once it is clear that the traditional literature is acceptable in ordinary, everyday discourse, so long as it does not interfere with the scientific study of human behavior.
(2) Skinner's Faustian Bargain
B. F. Skinner's behaviorism offers the prospect of some short-term gains in dealing with assorted human problems through programs of positive and negative reinforcement. Any success with these programs should not be surprising since, underlying the technical terminology, is a sound guiding principle of action quite familiar to pragmatic philosophers: persons guide their actions according to what has satisfactory or unsatisfactory consequences. Furthermore, the behavioristic terminology does facilitate to some degree the scientific study of behavior.
These gains however must be weighed against what is given up. Skinner casts away the traditional structure of morality based upon freedom, dignity, rights, responsibilities, virtue, goodness, and moral struggle; he also reduces to insignificance our private consciousness and, in particular, our purposes and and judgments. These losses provide serious cause for alarm.
The bright future to be produced through application of a science of human behavior could easily turn into a nightmare.
First, the conception of human beings as moral agents having purposes and making judgments that have important bearings on their lives is fundamental to traditional assertions about the worth of being human. Any denial of these capacities runs a very serious risk of reducing human beings to something less than they are, or are capable of being―for we are not going to develop and expand our capacities as moral agents, as purposive beings, or as judging beings once we accept behaviorist assumptions.
Secondly, in the process of denying autonomy and dignity, Skinner legitimizes the manipulation of human beings in ways that are quite threatening. While he personally wants to manipulate to create better environments, we cannot be sure that others will manipulate this same way. We cannot even be sure that a follower of Skinner will not manipulate to our detriment because of an insensitivity to the dignity and worth of human beings. Skinner's claim that detrimental manipulation produces aversive stimuli and, consequently, countercontrols on errant manipulators is more impressive in theory than in practice. A great deal of damage can be done before measures of countercontrol occur. And given the enormous power of advancing science and technology, the damage done may even turn out to be irreparable and the development of countercontrols nearly impossible (or, at the least, very costly in human suffering).
Thirdly, Skinner fails to appreciate properly the difference between manipulating a person and showing respect. Because any interaction with other persons is likely to change their behavior in some way, Skinner classifies all such interactions as manipulation and therefore sees nothing inappropriate in manipulation itself. After all, if we are manipulating people anyways in interacting with them, according to Skinner, we may just as well manipulate through a program of behavior control that produces better environments. What is missing however is awareness of the difference between influencing persons while showing respect for their dignity and exerting power over them as things in the environment to be manipulated. For example, when we congratulate a person for an achievement, we can do so as a matter of showing respect for an accomplishment rather than as a matter of manipulating the person to increase the likelihood of a repetition of the performance, as Skinner actually maintains.8 Even if we are trying to influence persons to change their actions, showing respect in the process precludes the use of various techniques―such as lying, brainwashing, withholding information, torture, and extreme punishment―that the concept of manipulation itself does not exclude. Consequently, Skinner's failure to distinguish clearly between manipulation and showing respect raises dangerous prospects.
Finally, behavioristic terminology, when taken to be descriptive of what human beings do rather than just a convenient tool for limited scientific purposes, is uselessly dehumanizing. It is dehumanizing in that it denies our stature and worth as human beings possessing dignity; it is uselessly dehumanizing in that it is usually unnecessary. Skinner would have us believe that behaviorist description ("jargon") is far superior because it suggests what environmental conditions should be changed, as if an internal state description simply freezes us in a state of inaction. Yet, in ordinary human interaction over the centuries, internal state descriptions have always been very suggestive and fruitful in bringing about change.
A Possible Reply: Broken down into its simplest form, this entire objection reduces to two claims: (a) a reassertion of human autonomy, freedom, and dignity; and (b) an identification of manipulation with exploitation. As for the first claim, it is simply contrary to what the science of human behavior shows. And the second claim is just a mis-identification because manipulation need not be exploitative. Unfortunately these objectors label behaviorism as "dehumanizing" when, in fact, they themselves are increasing the likelihood of a dehumanizing future for human beings by placing obstacles in the way of programs of behavior control. The ultimate dehumanization lies in the failure to solve problems such as the threat of nuclear war, overpopulation, pollution, wasting of resources, and poverty. These are problems that programs of behavior control can solve.
(3) Is Dworkin's Autonomous Person Really Autonomous?
Although Dworkin defines autonomy in terms of authenticity and procedural independence, his conception of it rests, ultimately, upon the distinction between first-order considerations and second-order judgments. Through second-order judgments, we reflect upon and form attitudes toward such first-order considerations as motivations, desires, habits, and emotions. Dworkin never makes clear however why the second-order judgments are any less dependent upon biological endowment and environmental conditions than the first-order considerations. Even if we grant that they constitute a different level of experience, we need not conclude that they establish existence of any genuine autonomy. The second-order judgments can be just a different level at which the controlling influences of biological endowment and environmental conditions operate.
By failing to establish genuine autonomy, Dworkin fails to establish a basis for dignity and moral responsibility in human beings.
A Possible Reply: Second-order judgments are much more the expression of an integrated sense of selfhood than are first-order considerations. The latter occur largely because of external controls impinging upon the self, whereas the former are more truly an expression of what the self is. In this sense, a second-order judgment can possess authenticity in a way that a first-order consideration cannot. We can identify with our second-order judgments because they are expressions of ourselves. We can even identify with actions we cannot change―as happens, for example, in the case of a drug addict who may exhibit authenticity in desiring to be an addict, quite apart from the fact that he cannot give up his physiological cravings for a drug. Of course, this example is by no means ideal. But it does show that we can possess autonomy even in the presence of extreme circumstances.
We should not make the mistake of confusing autonomy with the traditional concept of free will. If we avoid this mistake, we can construct a conception of autonomy that accords well with facts, establishes human dignity, and preserves moral responsibility.
5.50 Discuss some of the similarities and differences among the positions of John Dewey, Edward 0. Wilson, and B. F. Skinner with respect to human nature. Why does Skinner side more with Dewey than Wilson on the issue of the relative importance of innate structure and social influences?
5.501 How would Skinner and Wilson view aggression differently? Which view do you prefer? How would you go about deciding whether or not your preference is well-grounded in fact?
5.51 Consider the prescientific and scientific views of human nature, as Skinner sees them. Why does Skinner prefer the latter? How would you go about deciding for yourself which view, or some other one, is correct? Would you agree pretty much with Skinner's position here?
5.511 Consider Skinner's use of the following terms: autonomy, "inner man," positive reinforcement, negative reinforcement, contingencies of reinforcement, repertoire of behavior, and the literature of freedom and dignity? Can you give some examples of positive and negative reinforcement. Why are food, money, hard work, and sex often positive reinforcers? Why are hangovers, embarrassing situations, and failed exams often negative reinforcers? Do you think that what constitutes a positive or negative reinforcer is itself dependent on environmental conditions? That is, Can environmental conditions affect what persons find positively or negatively reinforcing? If environmental conditions do have such effects, do you see any possible advantages or dangers arising with respect to programs of behavior control?
5.52 Why does Skinner claim that our future survival and well-being require a turning away from traditional moral language? Be sure to consider his position with respect to freedom, dignity, rights, responsibilities, virtue, moral struggle, moral praise and blame, and the terms "good" and "bad.” Do you agree or disagree with his critique of moral language?
5.53 Read over the two objections and possible regarding Skinner's position. Then evaluate the adequacy and force of the objections, giving justification.
5.54 Consider Dworkin's conception of autonomy, particularly how it differs from the traditional conception and also the meaning of relatively important terms such as first-order considerations, second-order judgments, authenticity, and procedural independence. What consequences with respect to morality follow from Dworkin's conception of autonomy? To what extent do you agree or disagree with his position?