Exotic Journeys: A Tourist's Guide to Philosophy

brought to you by Ron Yezzi

Emeritus Professor of Philosophy

Minnesota State University, Mankato

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Topics

Nietzsche

The Last Man

The Will to Power

Leveling of Human Beings

Freedom

Marx

The Social Nature of Human Beings

Alienation

Social Relationships

Material Modes of Production

The Dynamics of Social Revolution

Rejection of Egoistic Freedom

Marx and Nietzsche: A Comparison

Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies

Thought Exercises

Nietzsche, Marx, and The Masses

Sources

(Author's Note: This account is an adaptation from Ron Yezzi, Directing Human Actions: Perspectives on Basic Ethical Issues (Lanham: University Press of America, 1986), pp. 118 - 132.)

Human Nature:

Marx and Nietzsche

Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche were among the most controversial thinkers of the nineteenth century. Their accounts of human nature do nothing to dispel their reputations for controversy.

Nietzsche

Biographical Sketch

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 - 1900 C.E.) was born in Prussia, the son of a Lutheran minister. His father died while he was a young child―after which time he grew up in a household consisting of his mother, sister, grandmother, and two maiden aunts. (His controversial views on women are often attributed to this upbringing in so largely female a household.) He suffered from health problems throughout his life―especially migraine headaches and gastric pains. While serving as a medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian War (1870), he contracted dysentery and diphtheria. At some time, he also contracted syphilis, the final stage causing insanity that persisted during the final decade of his life. (To avoid misunderstanding, we should note that Nietzsche was celibate nearly all his life.)

He was a brilliant student, specializing in classical literature and philosophy at the University of Leipzig. By the age of twenty-five, he was a full professor at the University of Basel, in Switzerland. Largely for health reasons, he gave up the professorship in 1879.

Although the brilliance of his insights is generally recognized, Nietzsche is not a philosopher who is easily understood. (One misunderstanding places him as an intellectual precursor of Nazism.) He did not try to be systematic; but he did try to be daring, shocking, mysterious, profound, and prophetic. His thought ranged over the areas of art, literature, music, ethics, metaphysics, intellectual history, social commentary, philology, and psychology. Beyond Good and Evil, The Birth of Tragedy, The Will to Power, The Antichrist, and Thus Spoke Zarathustra are major works.

With respect to human nature, Friedrich Nietzsche insists that human beings constitute a transitional, not a final, stage of development. Consequently, human beings cannot become too complacent about, or satisfied with, their achievements without endangering their claim to be human. They must constantly strive to surpass themselves, to prepare the way for what he calls "the superman," or "overman"―if they want to avoid slipping back to a subhuman level. In the prologue to Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra says,

Man is a rope, stretched between beast and Superman―a rope across an abyss.

A dangerous crossing-over, a dangerous on-the-way, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping.

What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in man is that he transcends and descends.¹

Risks, suffering, sacrifice, reevaluation of values, indomitable spirit, self-assertion, and a willingness to face life without rancor are evident when true human beings act.

The Last Man

What angers and frustrates Nietzsche however is the fear that we may one day witness the appearance of the last man―when no one any longer strives to surpass oneself, when everyone wants the same things, when no one takes risks or lets their work involve any deep suffering, when everyone seeks pleasures in moderation, when everyone wants to be equal to everyone else, when no one wants to rule or obey, when no one wants to be either rich or poor, when no one wants to quarrel too long or too harshly lest "their digestion might be upset." "No herdsman and one herd! Everyone wants the same, everyone is the same; whoever feels different goes to the insane asylum."²

The Will to Power

The "last man" signifies the suppression of our most fundamental instinct, the will to power, and the triumph of subhuman mediocrity. We cannot deny this instinct's existence or force without denying life itself. "A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength―life itself is Will to Power. "³ More elaborately in Beyond Good and Evil, he insists:

Here one must think profoundly to the very basis and resist all sentimental weakness: life itself is essentially

appropriation, injury, conquest of the strange and weak, suppression, severity, obtrusion

of peculiar forms, incorporation, and at the least, putting it mildest, exploitation;--but

why should one for ever use precisely these words on which for ages a disparaging

purpose has been stamped? Even the organisation within which, as was previously

supposed, the individuals treat each other as equal--it takes place in every healthy

aristocracy--must itself, if it be a living and not a dying organisation, do all that towards

other bodies, which the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will

have to be the incarnated Will to Power, it will endeavour to grow, to gain ground,

attract to itself and acquire ascendency-not owing to any morality or immorality, but

because it lives, and because life is precisely Will to Power. On no point, however, is

the ordinary consciousness of Europeans more unwilling to be corrected than on this

matter; people now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about coming

conditions of society in which `the exploiting character’ is to be absent:--that sounds to

my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all

organic functions. `Exploitation’ does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and

primitive society: it belongs to the nature of the living being as a. primary organic

function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to

Life.--Granting that as a theory this is a novelty--as a reality it is the fundamental fact of

all history: let us be so far honest toward ourselves.4

Consequently, he attacks all philosophical or religious positions that advocate suppression of the drive for power. This drive can exhibit itself in many different ways―in war and government, of course, but also in preaching from a pulpit, in writing prose or poetry (as Nietzsche does), in achieving self-control, in punishing children who defy parental desires, in taking risks, or in educating oneself. Accordingly, Nietzsche does not use the will to power as the ground and limit of a universal moral code. Instead, he exhorts us to respect this instinct, give it its proper due, and allow it opportunity for expression.

Leveling of Human Beings

Given his interpretation of human nature, Nietzsche attacks all types of "leveling" of human beings that produce what he calls "slave morality." Middle-class values, Christianity, democracy, socialism all exhibit this leveling that he abhors. With each of them, there occurs a distortion of justice by which it becomes associated with equality. Equality is a "poisonous doctrine" that commands us to treat unequals equally and thereby destroys the truer notion of justice based upon merit.⁵ Within society, there must be an order of rank so that inferior people, the herd, do not think of themselves as equal to their superiors. "Democracy," according to Nietzsche, "represents the disbelief in all great men and in all elite societies: everybody is everybody else's equal. 'At bottom we are all herd and mob.'"⁶ The parliamentary government and freedom of the press, upon which democracy prides itself, "are the means whereby cattle become masters."⁷ Socialism, "the tyranny of the meanest and most brainless,"⁸ denies life itself by cutting off growth―either (1) by preventing needed decay or (2) by attacking the desire for more possessions. Regarding needed decay, in The Will to Power, he says,

Decay, decline, and waste, are, per se, in no way open to objection; they are the natural consequences of life and vital growth. The phenomenon of decadence is just as necessary to life as advance or progress is: we are not in a position which enables us to suppress it. On the contrary, reason would have it retain its rights.⁹

It is disgraceful for socialist thinkers to envision a future society which would eliminate vice, disease, prostitution, crime, and poverty. "Failures and deformities" are a normal accompaniment of bold and energetic social advancement. For Nietzsche, any socialist attempt to restructure society by restructuring its institutions so as to create a better life for all is as impossible as it is life-denying. Institutions lack the power to create a utopia; and even the attempt stunts the growth of life. Regarding the desire for more possessions, Nietzsche says,

... there will always be too many people of property for socialism ever to signify anything more than an attack of illness: and these people of property are like one man with one faith, "one must possess something in order to be some one." This, however, is the oldest and most wholesome of all instincts; I should add: "one must desire more than one has in order to become more." For this is the teaching which life itself preaches to all living things: the morality of Development.¹⁰

Any socialist attempt to restrict the accumulation of possessions so as to redistribute the goods of society more equally, again, is a denial of life because wanting to have more is an essential element in the growth of life.

Freedom

Although Nietzsche's interpretation of human nature leads to an attack on equality and on the leveling of human beings, he does not want to do away with freedom. But he demands an authentic freedom, not a phony freedom of universal equality. Noble persons, the superior persons, should be free to take risks, to strive for great accomplishments, to suffer and even sacrifice themselves. Yet freedom of this sort, authentic freedom, cannot be extended to everyone without cheapening it―because the herd is incapable of being truly free.

Nietzsche―just like Plato, Freud, Hobbes, and Rousseau―describes human nature as it exists within each person as a separate individual. Not everyone, however, agrees that human nature is describable this way. Karl Marx, for example, stresses the social nature of human beings instead.

Marx

Biographical Sketch

Karl Marx (1818 - 1883 C.E.), born in what is now Germany, spent most of his life in exile because of his political views. He studied law for awhile but later turned to philosophy, getting a doctorate at the University of Jena in 1841. He became editor of a newspaper, Rheinische Zeitung, which was suppressed by the government in 1843. He then moved to Paris, where he began a lifelong friendship and collaboration with Friedrich Engels. (Although they jointly authored several works, both regarded Marx as the guiding figure.) Marx moved to Brussels, after being expelled from France in 1845. He and Engels produced The Communist Manifesto, one of the more influential documents in human history, in 1848. Expelled from Brussels, Marx moved back briefly to Paris and then to Cologne, where he was expelled in 1849. He then moved to London, where he spent the rest of his life.

Marx never held regular work for any extended period of time. He did serve for awhile as a journalistic correspondent of the New York Tribune. For the most part however, he was continually dependent upon Engels for financial support. He lived much of his life in poverty, dedicated primarily to extensive research advancing the cause of socialism. Marx himself suffered chronic illnesses, and three of his children died.

With time, the fame and influence of his works grew, until Marx became the leading theorist and prophet of European socialism. He was not much of a political activist however. In 1864, he helped establish and then dominated the International Working Men's Association (which came to be known as the "First International") although he then pretty much destroyed the Association in a bitter controversy with the Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin. Political activism was not well-suited to Marx' often vitriolic temperament and his tendency to take "hard-line" positions.

The Communist Manifesto and Kapital are Marx' two most famous works. Of particular philosophical interest however is The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.

The Social Nature of Human Beings

According to Marx, any description of human nature in terms of separately existing individuals distorts reality with disastrous consequences. It creates the delusion of an egoistic, independent individual functioning apart from other persons or the community; as a result, it produces a social structure in which alienation is the common human experience.

Such individualism allows us to presume, as the starting-point for the construction of civil society, egoistic individuals with private interests, needs, work-objectives, and values―which then become the basis for asserting fundamental rights such as freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, freedom to do whatever does not harm others, freedom to engage in trade, freedom to acquire, hold, and dispose of private property. Society "appears as a framework exterior to individuals, a limitation of their original self-sufficiency [emphasis added]."¹¹ The citizen is taken to be an abstraction in contrast with the egoistic individual who has a sensuous, immediate, individual existence.

Alienation

Given the social structure based upon this distorted description of human nature, or more particularly, given the subsequent institutionalization of private property, alienation enters into human experience. The freedom to acquire, hold, and dispose of private property, over time, leads to existence of a relatively small class of wealthy persons and of a much larger class composed of the great mass of people in the society. In an industrialized society, capitalists constitute the relatively small class and the workers, or proletariat, constitute the larger one. The workers sell their labor to the capitalists who, in turn, own and dispose of the products of their labor.

As a result of this process, according to Marx, workers experience four types of alienation―alienation from (1) the products of labor, (2) the laboring activity, (3) themselves, and (4) other human beings. Alienation from the products of labor occurs because the objects produced by labor do not belong to the workers and because their power and importance decrease in proportion to the increase in the objects produced. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, Marx says,

. . . the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful becomes the alien world of objects which he creates over and against himself, the poorer he himself-his inner world-becomes, the less belongs to him as his own.¹²

Alienation from the products of labor entails alienation from laboring activity as well:

. . . labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his essential being; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at home when he is not working, and when he is working he is not at home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is shunned like the plague. . . . Lastly, the external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another.¹³

To the extent they produce objects viewed to be alien to them and to the extent they regard their laboring activity as a means to subsist rather than as the satisfaction of an internal, essential need, workers experience alienation from the laboring activity itself. They feel that they are only truly human, and themselves, when they are not working.

Since their work constitutes probably the major part of their activity in life while awake however, workers cannot experience alienation from laboring activity without also experiencing alienation from themselves.

Finally, when workers' conscious activity becomes merely a means to subsist, that is, a means to preserve their physical existence, they experience alienation from other human beings because their consciousness, the essential species-characteristic that differentiates humans from other animals, becomes too confined to express the full range of its potentialities―for reflection, for evaluation, for beauty, for envisioning non-immediate, diverse interests. In effect, this severe reduction in workers' conscious activity alienates them from their own essence as human beings and, in so doing, alienates them from other human beings as well.

The solution to the problem of alienation, for Marx, requires the elimination of private property which, in turn, requires a correct description of human nature-one that stresses the social, not the individualistic, nature of human beings.

Social Relationships

According to Marx, ". . . the essence of man is not an abstraction inherent in each particular individual. The real nature of man is the totality of social relations."¹⁴ Thus nothing is truly human until it is understood through its social relationships. Language, thought, freedom, and crime are all social products rather than properties of an egoistic individual. In effect, the individual's thoughts and feelings constitute a subjective expression of society's existence. Marx says,

[Even] when I am active scientifically, etc.,―when I am engaged in activity which I can seldom perform in direct community with others―then I am social, because I am active as a man. Not only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product (as is even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being.¹⁵

Thought is not the private prerogative of freely willing, individual persons. Thought and the products of thought―such as religious, ethical, scientific, and legal ideas―instead are a reflection of material (physical), social existence. Accordingly, for Marx, we do not find human nature through introspection; rather, we find it by observing the physical activities of human beings functioning in social relationships. When the social relationships change, the description of human nature changes as well.

Material Modes of Production

Ultimately the social relationships are determined by the material modes of production―that is, the relations of labor, capital, industry, technology, means of subsistence, reproduction, and distribution of material goods. Consequently, any institutions or thought within a society derive their particular form and content from the underlying economic processes present. So human beings can best understand how to act through a historical understanding of changes in the modes of production, with their associated effects.

Now how does this social interpretation of human nature solve the problem of alienation? It does so by doing away with the individualistic interpretation that makes possible the claim that the freedom to acquire, hold, and dispose of private property is a fundamental right. Denial of the claim's legitimacy then paves the way for abolition of private property and hence an end to alienation. According to Marx however, we cannot conclude that an intellectual argument will change human consciousness so that people will then decide to eliminate private property. "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."¹⁶ Change in the productive forces, the material modes of production, within a society is the actual instrument that ends the alienation. Marx describes such a process this way:

At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or―what is but a legal expression for the same thing―with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic―in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what he thinks of himself, so can we not judge of such a period of transformation by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production. No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself.¹⁷

Instead of an alienating system of private property whereby human beings enjoy or dispose of possessions arbitrarily without regard for other persons and view others as instruments or competitors in the process of production, there will develop a human system of production whereby human beings function as species-beings and develop the full range of their potentialities. Of this human system of production, Marx says,

Let us suppose that we had produced as human beings. In that event each of us would have doubly affirmed himself and his neighbour in his production. (1) In my production I would have objectified the specific character of my individuality and for that reason I would both have enjoyed the expression of my own individual life during my activity and also, in contemplating the object, I would experience an individual pleasure, I would experience my personality as an objective sensuously perceptible power beyond all shadow of doubt. (2) In your use or enjoyment of my product I would have the immediate satisfaction and knowledge that in my labour I had gratified a human need, i.e. that I had objectified human nature and hence had procured an object corresponding to the needs of another human being. (3) I would have acted for you as the mediator between you and the species, thus I would be acknowledged by you as the complement of your own being, as an essential part of yourself. I would thus know myself to be confirmed both in your thoughts and your love. (4) In the individual expression of my own life I would have brought about the immediate expression of your life, and so in my individual activity I would have directly confirmed and realized my authentic nature, my human, communal nature.¹⁸

The Dynamics of Social Revolution

Rejection of Egoistic Freedom

In asserting the social nature of human beings, Marx does not want to do away with human freedom. True human freedom however cannot be associated with egoistic individuals because, in practice, such egoistic freedom only exists for the few, not the many. The freedom to acquire, enjoy, and dispose of private property means nothing to the worker who is struggling barely to survive. The freedom to get an education or to travel means nothing to persons with little or no money. Egoistic freedom is based on "separation of man from man" rather than on "the union of man with man." Consequently, human beings see others as a limitation on, not a realization of, their own freedom;¹⁹ and they struggle with one another. For Marx, true human freedom must be based on the social cooperation that the social nature of human beings makes possible. For example, the freedom to work in a society must be a cooperative enterprise where everyone can work, and not just a freedom to compete with other workers for scarce jobs. The rallying cry, "From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!"²⁰ becomes an instrument of human freedom, not a denial of it.

Marx says very little about freedom of thought and conscience―partly, no doubt, because they tend to be associated with egoistic freedom. More importantly however, he does not regard thought and conscience to function independently. Remember that social being (existence), which is determined ultimately by the modes of production, determines consciousness. Thus, if true human freedom is established with respect to the modes of production and social organization, no special attention to freedom of thought and conscience is necessary. In a similar way, for Marx, no special attention to ethics is necessary. Ethics is just the ideological form in which persons become conscious of the conflict between the modes of production and a particular set of social relationships. The modes of production, not morality, constitute the fundamental instrument of social change. Accordingly, Marx regards a scientific description of transformations in the material modes of production as a much more valuable guide to the directing of human life than any set of moral exhortations.

Marx and Nietzsche: A Comparison

With respect to human nature, Marx and Nietzsche differ quite sharply. Nietzsche's individualist view turns life into a personal struggle, whereas it is a social struggle for Marx. In a real sense, both of them are revolutionaries, although in different ways. Nietzsche advocates internal revolution within the individual, while Marx describes what he takes to be the inevitable process of social revolution. Advocating internal revolution without considering social conditions, for Marx, is a typical, illusionary exhortation generated by a false, individualistic view of human nature; and it serves merely to impede the process of historical development.

Nietzsche attaches no special significance to the material modes of production, including technological change, in describing human nature and the human condition. The individual person, particularly a person's will, far transcends the influence of any such factor as the modes of production. While granting that social conditions have some influence, Nietzsche views these influences as being harmful at the present time: contemporary social conditions are all too effective in producing attitudes conducive to the appearance of the last man. Nietzsche would see the alienation described by Marx as the bewailing rancor of the mediocre majority. He would regard Marx' "human system of production," with its elimination of competition and struggle, as reduction to a subhuman level. And Marx' complaints about exploitation of the proletariat is a denial of life's most fundamental instinct, the will to power. Finally, for Nietzsche, the emancipation of everyone, "freedom for all," is a contradiction in terms.

Marx, on the other hand, would view Nietzsche's individualistic interpretation of human nature as a tool of capitalistic modes of production, which are about to be superceded in the historical process. As a result, Nietzsche's philosophy becomes the reactionary raving of a dated elitist, quite out of touch with the realities of practical life and suitable only for burial in the coming social revolution. For Marx, Nietzsche's egoism, far from pointing in the direction of the "superman," is simply a defense of selfishness, quite contrary to the social nature of human beings.

(Note About Objections and Possible Replies: You should look upon the objections and possible replies as opportunities for further thought rather than as definitive statements. Holders of the original position are not likely to be overwhelmed by the objections; and critics of the original position are not likely to be convinced by the possible replies. These objections and possible replies accomplish a proper goal if they push you to think more deeply about an issue, leading you to seek more clarity and justification in drawing your own conclusions.)

Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies

(1) Nietzsche's Elitism

Nietzsche's elitism, in practice, guarantees the stifling of human potentialities. Regardless of his intentions, any social system based upon the extreme inequalities he accepts leads to an entrenched minority class that suppresses the development of talented individuals among the other classes. Moreover, any failure to appreciate and encourage the abilities of common people very likely leads to less development of their talents. Hence the net result of Nietzsche's elitism I s the suppression of human potentialities.

A Possible Reply: Truly talented individuals are only stifled by social systems and ideologies that fail to recognize and appreciate their superiority. Therein lies the danger of middle-class values, Christianity, democracy, and socialism. Acceptance of inequalities is a prerequisite for recognition and appreciation of superiority.

(2) Nietzsche's Misrepresentation of Human Nature

By insisting that only individuals who struggle to surpass themselves are truly human, Nietzsche simply ignores contributions of most of the human race. Human achievements are not just the work of leaders and trendsetters. Wars are not won by generals alone; the sacrifice and dedication of the troops are essential. Captains of industry would manufacture few goods without the efforts of workers. Nobel Prize-winning scientists build upon the work of numerous forgotten researchers. In every area of successful human endeavor, except perhaps in lonely acts of aesthetic creation, achievements are impossible without the contributions of quite ordinary people. These ordinary people play a fundamental role in human history, even though historians never record their names or deeds.

A Possible Reply: The sentimental attempt to ennoble the ordinary work of common people is a sign of softness in thought and action. Excellence and superior achievement of necessity must be extra-ordinary and uncommon. If we are truly human, we must strive for the best that we are capable of. To settle for less makes us less than human beings.

Besides, this position does not wholly deny the contributions of ordinary soldiers and workers; it only requires that they recognize their proper place.

(3) Marx' Destruction of the Private Individual

Marx' rejection of an individualistic description of human nature in favor of a social one destroys the private individual. Individuals lose their private identities and become tools of the social whole. Ill-considered self-sacrifice for the sake of the whole takes the place of individual freedom, growth, and satisfaction. This destruction of the private individual is both undesirable and contrary to human nature.

A Possible Reply: Far from destroying the private individual, the social description of human nature lays out the conditions under which true individuality is possible. The egoistic description that turns individuality into a luxury to be enjoyed by the few with great holdings in private property does not develop or protect individuality for human beings as a whole. Only a description taking account of existing human relationships can do that.

(4) Marx' Economic Reductionism

Marx' contention that every aspect of human life is ultimately explainable through economic processes is incorrect. Interests and attitudes are influenced by social conditions, including economic ones. But rationality and creativity are not merely tools molded by changes in the material modes of production; and consciousness has a real impact on the course of events. The influence of Marx' own thought is proof of this. His ideas have changed the course of history. There is no sound reason to suppose that history would have proceeded in just the same way without his ideas, simply because of the material modes of production present.

A Possible Reply: The bearing of economic processes upon every area of human life, even consciousness, is a fact established through scientific study of historical evidence. We cannot deny the fact itself. Moreover, rationality and creativity never function in a vacuum; they always function in relation to something―namely, practical life, which is just another way of referring to the modes of production. Even when rationality and creativity seem most removed from practical life, in highly abstract scientific or aesthetic work, they still function as a tool of practical life―either as a means of escape from it or as a means of preserving the existing power structure in a society.

Regarding influence of the thought of Karl Marx himself, only the existing state of the modes of production made that particular thought possible. (For example, Marx' works could not have been written during the Middle Ages.) And the productive processes themselves, not his writings, are the real cause of change in the course of history.

Thought Excursions

5.30 Evaluate Nietzsche's attacks on democracy and socialism.

5.311 Nietzsche says, "one must desire more than one has in order to become more." Do you agree with him here? How would you apply the statement to the accumulation of possessions? For example, does the statement entail a never-ending pursuit of affluence as a necessary condition for personal growth and betterment?

5.32 Evaluate the two objections to Nietzsche's view of human nature mentioned. Would you have other objections? If so, what are they? In evaluating objections, be sure to consider the possible replies.

5.33 How does the individualistic view of human nature lead to alienation, according to Marx? What are the four kinds of alienation and how does each develop? How does the social view of human nature pave the way for elimination of alienation? Does Marx exaggerate the alienation among workers either in his own time (the nineteenth century) or in our time? Judge the adequacy of his account of alienation.

5.331 Why does Marx de-emphasize the importance of consciousness and thought in human activity? Judge the adequacy of his position, being sure to take into account the alternative explanation of human activity that he provides.

5.341 We often speak favorably of the following: the right to freedom of speech and of the press, the right to freedom of religion, the right to freedom of conscience, the right to acquire and dispose of private property, the right to privacy, the right to an education, the right to work, and the right to health care.

But how would Marx and Nietzsche evaluate each of these "rights"? Why? Do you have any fundamental disagreements with any of their evaluations? If so, explain why.

5.342 One rather striking difference between the positions of Marx and Nietzsche is their treatment of technology. Nietzsche gives technology little attention, whereas Marx describes it as a fundamental element in social change. Whom would you side with more, Marx or Nietzsche? In answering, you may want to consider the significance or non-significance of such technological advances as automobiles, airplanes, automation, birth control pills, computers, and nuclear weapons. Has Nietzsche made a glaring omission in his thought here? How do you think he might reply?

Nietzsche, Marx, and The Masses

Much has been achieved when the sentiment has been at last instilled into the masses (the shallowpates and the boobies of every kind) that they are not allowed to touch everything, that there are holy experiences before which they must take off their shoes and keep away the unclean hand―it is almost their highest advance towards humanity.

Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil

. . . Who, then, is the adversary of the Spirit? Spiritlessness. For the mass [the masses] is defined only as the 'Opposite' of the spirit, as spiritlessness or to take more precise definitions of spiritlessness, 'indolence', ‘superficiality', and 'self-complacency.' What a fundamental advantage over communist writers it is not to have traced spiritlessness, indolence, superficiality, and self-complacency to their origin but to have branded them morally and exposed them as the opposite of the spirit, of progress!

Marx, The Holy Family

What class you belong to, for Nietzsche, depends upon the type of person you are. Persons show themselves to be noble or slavish, aristocratic or common; accordingly, they assign themselves to a social class. The great mass of human beings exhibit mediocrity and shallowness; these are precisely the reasons why they belong to "the masses" rather than to the small class of superior persons. No problem arises however provided that the masses know their proper place―that is, they respect and obey their superiors and do not presume to possess equal status. The masses should realize that, by reason of their mediocrity and shallowness, they are ill-equipped to make judgments or to set an example in areas such as morality, the arts, political life, philosophy, or science. Such realization is "almost their highest advance towards humanity."

What class you belong to, for Marx, depends upon social conditions―which also determine the type of person you are. Marx does not simply deny that the great mass of human beings often exhibit spiritlessness, indolence, superficiality, and self-complacency. Instead he insists that we examine the origin of these characteristics―an examination that reveals how the masses are oppressed victims of a ruling class. According to Marx, a radical change in social relationships is necessary, one that ends oppression of the masses and releases suppressed potentialities. The great mass of the people, the proletariat, must overthrow the exploiting class of capitalists and destroy the capitalist system of private property that produces, instead of progress, a stifling state of alienation.

Further Thought: What difference in directing one's own life follows from these two different outlooks on "the masses"? Nietzsche thinks that superiority cannot be shared with everyone without ceasing to be superiority; Marx asserts that the potentialities of the masses do not develop because of an exploiting, ruling class. Assess the worth of these claims. Can they both be partly correct?

5.343 Which view of human nature, Marx' or Nietzsche's, would you most fear? Would fears be based primarily upon their views of human nature in itself or upon the practical influence their views have?

5.344 Compare and contrast the positions of Nietzsche and Marx with respect to human nature. Are any differences resolvable? If so, explain how. Use the brief contrast presented in the text as a starting-point. But also expand upon it considering such issues as freedom, socialism, and democracy. With whom do you most agree?

Sources

Footnotes

1. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra tr. by Marianne Cowan (Chicago: Gateway Books, 1957), p. 7.

2. Ibid., p. 11.

3. Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (New York: MacMillan Company, 1907), p. 20.

4. Ibid., pp. 226-227.

5. See Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, in Walter Kaufmann, ed., The Portable Nietzsche (New York: Viking Press, 1968), p. 553.

6. Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964), Vol. II, p. 206.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., Vol. I, p. 102

9. Ibid, pp. 32-33.

10. Ibid., pp 102-103.

11. Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in David McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 54.

12. Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 (New York: International Publishers, 1964, p. 108.

13. Ibid., pp. 110-111.

14. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in T. B. Bottomore and Maximilien Rubel, eds., Karl Marx: Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 68.

15. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 137.

16. Marx, "Preface to A Critique of Political Economy, " in Karl Marx & Frederick Engels, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 182.

17. Ibid., pp. 182-183.

18. Marx, "Excerpts from James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy," in Quintin Hoare, ed., Karl Marx: Early Writings (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 277-278.

19. See Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Mclellan, op. cit., p. 53.

20. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Programme," in Bottomore and Rubel, op. cit., p. 258.

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