He delimits seven forms of aggressive behavior; but these forms are not universally shared to the same degree; so there is no unitary aggressive instinct. Moreover, for human beings, the particular displays of aggression are culturally dependent. Thus platform torture, pole and stake torture, headhunting, cannibalism, the duel of champions, or genocide are different displays of aggression in different societies. Regardless of the details of its cultural expression however, human beings have a hereditary disposition to be aggressive.
This innate predisposition is not a drive that constantly builds up pressure until there is a discharge; instead, according to observational evidence, it lies waiting to exhibit itself under certain environmental conditions. The conditions that constitute the primary triggering mechanisms, according to Wilson, are fears arising from encounters with strangers and competition for scarce resources, often evident in circumstances of high population density, or crowding. In past evolution, aggressive responses to these conditions have conferred a survival advantage. In the present―where nuclear weapons and massive military firepower have taken the place of spears, arrows, and stone axes―aggressive responses no longer confer an advantage. We cannot wait however for biological evolution to eradicate the predisposition to aggression. Instead, we should use techniques of cultural influence and control to "work around" the predisposition. Finding these techniques is an important task for anthropology and social psychology. Some general directions with respect to environmental conditions that render aggression less adaptive are already evident. To combat the "fear-of-strangers" phenomenon, we can promote cross-cultural ties that break down narrow allegiances based on family ties, race, language, nationality, religion, ideology, and economic interests. To combat competition for scarce resources, we can take steps to lower population densities in various ways. Hopefully, in the interests of human welfare, we can create environmental conditions that decrease the likelihood of aggression.
In addition to culture, ethics, and aggression, Wilson casts the light of sociobiology upon incest taboos, sex differences (including sexual division of labor, temperamental differences in assertiveness and aggressiveness, and participation in political governance), the family, homosexuality, sexual practices, altruism, and religious belief.
In each case, he wants to identify the precise biological constraints on particular types of behavior so as to make possible sounder ethical choices as to what society should promote, condone, discourage, or forbid. At this point in time, he regards the scientific evidence in sociobiology to be suggestive, but also sufficiently tentative to warrant a great deal more research. The evidence suggests, for example, a biological basis for incest taboos and homosexuality due to the selective nature of the evolutionary process; it also suggests a biological basis for altruism and religious belief. Thus, according to Wilson, because strong religious belief confers an advantage in the long, evolutionary process by promoting a strong sense of group identity and commitment, it has probably become part of our innate structure.
Wilson concludes On Human Nature with some very general statements about values.
First, we ought to pass beyond selfishness and tribalism and take a nobler view of human beings by being able to envision the history and future of our genes as constituting a common pool of the whole human species, existing over many generations.
Secondly, we ought to assure a high degree of diversity in the gene pool so as to increase the likelihood of those rare genetic combinations that produce truly exceptional individuals.
Thirdly, we ought to accede to universal human rights because, given current environmental conditions in advanced technological societies, inequities are so likely to produce long-range disadvantageous consequences for human survival.
And fourthly, in so far as we possess a predisposition to religious belief―with its consecration to personal and group identity, attention to charismatic leaders, and myth-making―we ought to replace the inadequate religious mythologies with the relatively more adequate "mythology" of scientific materialism. In other words, we should consecrate ourselves to advancement of scientific knowledge of the evolutionary process, both biological and cultural, and to the grand ethical goals that this knowledge makes possible. In such advancement and goals lie our greatest hopes for the future.
Dewey and Wilson: A Comparison
On Human Nature was published in 1978, whereas Dewey's Human Nature and Conduct was published in 1922. Yet, aside from terminological differences―for example, Dewey talks about "native impulses" instead of "innate structure" and "genes," and about "habits" or "customs" instead of "culture"―considerable overlapping of positions occurs. Using an evolutionary model of continuing adaptation to environmental conditions, both Wilson and Dewey stress the importance of acquiring scientific knowledge in directing human life. Both view innate predispositions, social influences, and environmental demands as vital factors in human existence. Both deny the presence of any ultimate purpose or goal in the evolutionary process. Both accept the need for change, particularly the need for modification of values in the light of current scientific knowledge and changing environmental conditions. To be sure, there is a difference in emphasis. Dewey, taking primarily a sociological approach, stresses social influences with respect to human nature while Wilson, taking primarily a biological approach, stresses innate structure. At first glance, this difference in emphasis seems fairly insignificant.
Upon examining their positions more carefully though, we find that more than emphasis is involved. Dewey stresses social influences because he maintains that any innate structure or native impulse is extremely "plastic" and that there are no pure impulses. In other words, our native impulses are so enmeshed with, and molded by, social influences that it is meaningless to talk about a separate predisposition, such as aggression, in describing human behavior. Accordingly, Wilson's search for precise biological constraints affecting human behavior warrants far less importance from Dewey's perspective. Although Dewey would grant that this search has value as a way of establishing very broad limits for the direction of life, he would reject any inclinations toward a biological determinism, because of the enormous importance of social influences.
His rejection of any kind of biological determinism also rests upon his analysis of the function of intelligence. Intelligence is not the slave of either impulse or habit, for Dewey. Regardless of its biological origins, it is a remarkably flexible and useful instrument in adapting to environmental conditions and fostering moral growth. Because of this flexibility and usefulness, Dewey would not worry, as Wilson does, that our values are bound to biological capacities unchanged since the Ice Age. Indeed he would regard what Wilson advocates for a more adequate direction of human life simply as an attempt to use intelligence as a means of escaping biological drives and social habits that are no longer either well-adapted to environmental conditions or productive of moral growth. In addition to moral growth, intelligence is the key to human freedom as well―in so far as it allows us to take account of conditions influencing us, to envision future consequences, and to gain greater control over the future.
Wilson, on the other hand, would maintain that Dewey fails to take fully into account advancing knowledge of human genetics. He would insist that the relation between innate structure and behavior is much more binding than Dewey realizes. Moreover, he would maintain that the probable "mapping" of genes onto chromosomes in the future will provide even more conclusive evidence than is presently available to establish a strong relationship.
Controversies: Some Objections and Possible Replies
(1) The False Doctrine of Evolution
Evolutionary models for the guidance of human life fail because the theory of evolution is a false doctrine. The theory has not been proven. Even scientists who accept the theory cannot agree upon how it works. In addition, (a) there are unexplainable gaps in the supporting evidence; (b) the theory violates other fundamental natural laws, such as the Second Law of Thermodynamics; and (c) the dating techniques used to establish that the earth is millions or billions of years old are unreliable. Consequently, the positions of Dewey and Wilson (or any others based on evolution) can be safely dismissed.
A Possible Reply: The theory of evolution is one of the most complex and comprehensive hypotheses ever offered in the history of science; and there is an enormous amount of relevant, supporting data that has been collected for well over a century. Hence the adequacy of the theory cannot be determined in a few paragraphs where strongly religious or anti-religious convictions, rather than scientific judgment, are apt to carry the greatest weight.
What is most significant however is the fact that the overwhelming majority of reputable scientists in this field, using the generally accepted criteria for adequacy in scientific explanation, agree upon the overwhelming superiority of the theory of evolution compared with any competing, scientific hypothesis. Opponents, of course, are free to accumulate what scientific evidence they can to dispute the theory―since no scientific hypothesis whatsoever should be taken to be infallibly true and to be beyond question. But we cannot accept these opponents' claims until we very thoroughly consider the scientific support for the theory of evolution, based upon the generally accepted criteria for adequacy in scientific explanations. Unfortunately, due to religious convictions, many opponents of evolution are unwilling or unable to do this.
Both Dewey and Wilson stress the importance of changing values according to environmental conditions. They fail to note however the confusion that such change creates. Although adapting values to current conditions is attractive in theory, it very likely produces vacillation and insecurity with respect to values, in practice. Whether the issue is international diplomacy, forms of government, child-raising, or sexual activity, people can never be confident about their values if they are always subject to change according to the latest perception of environmental conditions. To some extent, of course, moral accommodations are called for in some circumstances; but a core of fundamental "moral truths" is also needed.
A Possible Reply: If values change as a matter of adapting to environmental conditions, it does not follow that they are changing rapidly all of the time. So people can have a sense of fundamental values continuing over extended periods. Thus we need not fear an excess of vacillation and insecurity. What we should fear instead is a secure, confident, unquestioning morality that runs contrary to our scientific knowledge of the human condition and even hinders the acquisition of such knowledge.
(3) Dewey's Overemphasis of Social Conditions
Dewey's social interpretation of human nature leaves the impression that we can create a better life by engaging in some "social engineering" based upon application of the social sciences. This impression however has not been supported by the evidence. Social workers within the welfare system and corrections personnel within the criminal justice system have not been very successful in getting people off welfare or in rehabilitating criminals. Scientifically informed techniques of childrearing and family therapy have not eliminated family problems. The world does not seem to be a safer place than it was before. Indeed, despite all the attention given to altering social conditions based upon expanded knowledge in the social sciences, people do not seem to be happier, more secure, or less alienated.
A Possible Reply: Success or failure in applying the social sciences is not a simple issue. For example, since this is not a perfect world, we cannot determine success or failure from these applications alone; we also need to consider what the situation would be without them. Moreover, in the absence of infallibility and omnipotence, we cannot always know the correct, best answer to a problem and we cannot completely control either the social conditions affecting an individual or the impulses operating within. The best we can do consists in fostering those social conditions that, to the best of our knowledge, are conducive to moral growth. We know that social conditions are fundamental in forming the nature of the individual person; and we must proceed accordingly.
We should also note that results of applying the social sciences are not as bleak as the objection asserts. Numerous individuals have escaped the stultifying consequences of adverse social conditions, have gained greater control over their own future, and achieved greater moral growth because of changes initiated upon the bases of studies in the social sciences.
(4) Wilson's Unscientific Openendedness
In the absence of any identification of particular types of behavior with specific genes, anyone can frame plausible hypotheses about linkages that make sense. For example, Wilson links homosexuality and incest taboos to innate structure because of the advantages associated with these kinds of behavior in the evolutionary process. But if incest taboos are innate, we plausibly can speculate that the frequent repugnance toward homosexuality is innate as well, because such repugnance would entail reproductive advantages in the course of evolution. Indeed it is highly questionable whether there can be any type of human behavior that cannot be linked plausibly to innate structure because of some supposed evolutionary advantage or other―in the absence of a scientific requirement that behavior be identified with specific genes. Such openendedness entails disastrous consequences for Wilson's position―because, given any recommendation for a better, more enlightened future, someone can always counter the recommendation with the claim that opposition to it has an innate basis. Thus, for example, Wilson asserts that we should not discriminate against homosexuals; but someone else can assert that we must because there is a strong, innate repugnance to homosexuality. Far from promoting ethical progress, Wilson's position stifles it instead.
A Possible Reply: As science advances in the future, we can expect the identification of particular types of behavior with specific genes. Thus the openendedness alleged in the objection will not be a problem. Even now however, this objection is misguided because it fails to take into account the considerable evidence accumulated within sociobiology for claims made about innate structure as a basis for behavior. These claims are not merely "plausible speculations;" any particular claims are warranted by the scientific evidence. There may be sound reasons for questioning some of these claims; but there is nothing unscientific about them.
As for the possibility that future ethical progress may be blocked by our innate structure, we probably will arrive at a time in the future when we can remove such blockages by appropriate genetic engineering.
(5) Wilson's "Revolution" in Ethics
While Wilson insists that increasing scientific knowledge of an innate structure placing biological constraints on human behavior establishes the need for a revolutionary approach to ethics, we seriously can doubt that he offers a radically new approach. The assertion that ethical judgments must take account of the presence of innate biological drives would hardly shock most philosophers, past and present. Although sociobiologists may well gather additional scientific evidence about the nature and extent of these innate drives, the basic ethical task is the same through time―namely, to use our best capacities for judgment, including reason or intelligence, to direct our own behavior and to create those social conditions most conducive to moral progress. Nothing Wilson suggests lays out a different task. Perhaps his only radical point is the suggestion that, in the future, we may control behavior through genetic engineering.
Wilson's approach does however pose some threatening ethical possibilities. In the future, there is the danger that we will act unwisely in using our capacity to alter gene structure through programs of genetic engineering. In the present, there is the danger that we will stifle development of potentialities by failing to alter relevant social conditions because we presume some innate source for various kinds of behavior. Attributing undesirable behavior to an innate source is a temptingly simple solution to personal and social problems. A child's belligerent behavior, a student's poor performance in school, or a woman's failure to pursue a political career may easily be attributed to some unchangeable, innate source whereas, in actuality, we have not made a sufficiently serious attempt to alter social conditions that affect behavior. One is also reminded of the evangelist who, following public exposure of his heterosexual and homosexual affairs, blamed the behavior on his "genes." The dangerous moral mistake in such situations would consist in the tendency to attribute to innate structure behavior that lies reasonably within our control and is therefore subject to ethical choice.
A Possible Reply: What is most promising and new about sociobiology is the precise discrimination of innate structure and of subsequent biological constraints on human behavior. This preciseness will establish a sound basis for ethical choices, in contrast with the groundless speculation and mythological, philosophical, or religious claims of the past. That is why sociobiology marks a significant advance in ethics.
Knowledge in sociobiology will lead to a more precise measurement of the social burdens associated with suggested programs to alter social conditions. Given limited resources, we will be better able to make sound ethical judgments as to what we should promote or discourage. Far from stifling development of potentialities, this sociobiological approach will make possible concentration on the most promising potentialities. At the least, it will allow concentration on a knowledge of the costs or burdens to be born in accomplishing some social goal-so as to minimize the wasting of precious resources.
5.40 Consider Dewey's view of human nature―including the function of impulses, habits, and intelligence; the role of social conditions and the theory of evolution; the "emergence" conception of the mind; and consequences for the direction of life. Then evaluate the adequacy of his position.
5.41 With respect to social issues such as job discrimination, busing, fair housing, and integration, some persons argue that we cannot bring about progress or greater justice through laws or government programs and that we must wait for a change in people's "hearts." What do you think that Dewey would say about this? Do you agree with him?
5.411 Given Dewey's view of human nature and its consequences for the direction of life, what general advice do you think he would offer regarding the following: crime in society, gun control, civil rights, education, welfare programs, the government's role in society, and the avoidance of war? Would you have any strong agreements or disagreements with any of this advice?
5.42 How would you differentiate the social views of human nature of Marx and Dewey? With whom would you least agree?
5.43 Consider Wilson's view of human nature―including his treatment of biological evolution, cultural evolution, innate structure, environmental demands, and cultural influences. What consequences for the direction of life follow from his view of human nature? Evaluate the adequacy of his position.
5.44 What are the three spiritual dilemmas mentioned by Wilson? Would you agree that each is a genuine problem to be faced?
5.45 How does Wilson treat the subject of aggression? How is his treatment like or unlike the treatment of aggression by Freud and Hobbes? What would Dewey say about aggression? With whom would you most agree?
5.451 As one form of aggression, Wilson lists the moralistic and disciplinary aggression used to enforce the rules of society. Would Freud, Hobbes, and Dewey also describe enforcing social rules as aggression? What do you think?
