Logic & Philosophy of Language 6-1

The following quotations may not directly speak about the philosophy of language of these authors, but we will draw their respective positions from these passages.

PLATO

(http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/GREECE/PLATO.HTM)

Far and away the most influential passage in Western philosophy ever written is Plato's discussion of the prisoners of the cave and his abstract presentation of the divided line. For Plato, human beings live in a world of visible and intelligible things. The visible world is what surrounds us: what we see, what we hear, what we experience; this visible world is a world of change and uncertainty. The intelligible world is made up of the unchanging products of human reason: anything arising from reason alone, such as abstract definitions or mathematics, makes up this intelligible world, which is the world of reality. The intelligible world contains the eternal "Forms" (in Greek, idea ) of things; the visible world is the imperfect and changing manifestation in this world of these unchanging forms. For example, the "Form" or "Idea" of a horse is intelligible, abstract, and applies to all horses; this Form never changes, even though horses vary wildly among themselves—the Form of a horse would never change even if every horse in the world were to vanish. An individual horse is a physical, changing object that can easily cease to be a horse (if, for instance, it's dropped out of a fifty story building); the Form of a horse, or "horseness," never changes. As a physical object, a horse only makes sense in that it can be referred to the "Form" or "Idea" of horseness.

Plato imagines these two worlds, the sensible world and the intelligible world, as existing on a line that can be divided in the middle: the lower part of the line consists of the visible world and the upper part of the line makes up the intelligible world. Each half of the line relates to a certain type of knowledge: of the visible world, we can only have opinion (in Greek: doxa); of the intelligible world we achieve "knowledge" (in Greek, epistemŽ). Each of these divisions can also be divided in two. The visible or changing world can be divided into a lower region, "illusion," which is made up of shadows, reflections, paintings, poetry, etc., and an upper region, "belief," which refers to any kind of knowledge of things that change, such as individual horses. "Belief" may be true some or most of the time but occasionally is wrong (since things in the visible world change); belief is practical and may serve as a relatively reliable guide to life but doesn't really involve thinking things out to the point of certainty. The upper region can be divided into, on the lower end, "reason," which is knowledge of things like mathematics but which require that some postulates be accepted without question, and "intelligence," which is the knowledge of the highest and most abstract categories of things, an understanding of the ultimate good.

ARISTOTLE (We have already discussed him earlier.)

ST AUGUSTINE

(http://www.radicalacademy.com/philaugustine1.htm#epistemology)

Augustine, who during his formation in philosophy had made contact with the Skepticism of the Academicians, knew that the problem of knowledge involved two difficulties, one regarding the existence of the knowing subject (which fact was denied by the Academicians), and the other regarding the origin of knowledge itself. As for the first question, Augustine overcame the Skepticism of the Academy and arrived at the affirmation of the existence of the knowing subject with the famous argument: "If I doubt, I exist -- Si fallor, sum."

Regarding the second question, i.e., the origin of knowledge, Augustine as a Platonist underrates sensitive cognition, which he does not make the foundation of intellective knowledge. (Thus he differs radically from Aristotle and Aquinas in this important question.)

Whence, then, does intellective cognition draw its origin? From illumination. As the eyes have need of the light of the sun in order to see sensible objects, so the intellect needs the light of God to know the world of intelligible beings. Eternal truths, ideas, species, formal principles are imparted to our intelligence by Wisdom, the Word of God. Intellectual knowledge is not the result of the acquisitive operation of the intellect, but a participation or grant of God. It is in this participation that Augustine's innatism with regard to ideas consists.

It follows from this that the intellect, considered in itself, is incapable of acquiring knowledge of intelligible beings, but is made capable of such knowledge through illumination. The mystic schools of the Middle Ages were to appeal to this natural inability of the intellect in order to affirm that humility and prayer are the best means to acquiring wisdom.

CARTESIAN LINGUISTICS AND HUMBOLDT

[See commentary on the work of Chomsky Cartesian Linguistics, continued here.]

Please contact jmomandia at gmail dot com for any heresies found here.

First Edition. Hong Kong, 11 July 2007