Mind Final Review


This is the review sheet for the final exam for Philosophy of Mind.  


The final is on Thursday, May 19 from 12:45-2:45 in DH 110.  It is closed book and closed notes.  


The questions below are the full list of questions you should be prepared to study.  I will give you 3- 5 of these questions to answer on the final exam.  


I.  The first section of the exam will give you 5-8 of these terms.  You should be prepared to give a brief, accurate definition of the term, list the relevant philosopher connected to the term, and where possible, give an example to illustrate the term.  (15 points)

Epiphenomenalism

Interactionism

F-Monism

D-Dualism

A-Materialism

Interactionism

Pan-protopsychism

Global workspace model theory of consciousness

Multiple Drafts Model

Neural correlate of consciousness

Zombie (philosophical)

Theory of Mind (in cognitive science)

What-It's-Like Consciousness

Easy Problem

Hard Problem

The Explanatory Argument

The Conceivability Argument

The Inverted Qualia Problem

Causal Closure

Intrinsic Properties

Clout


Section II: Essay Questions


You will get 3-5 of these questions to answer.  Be as thorough as possible, demonstrating your mastery of the articles, the concepts, the arguments, and the objections related to the question.   


1.  What makes certain kinds of consciousness, like the bat's, difficult or impossible for us to access?  What can we know about their conscious awareness?  What can't we know?  Why?


2.  What are the grounds for thinking that philosophical zombies like Chalmers describes are possible?  Explain.  Critically evaluate this argument.


3.  What are the main features of qualia on the traditional view according to Dennett?  How does the Chase and Sanborn Coffee Tasters example disprove these aspects of qualia, according to Dennett?  How good is this argument?  


4.  What does the thought experiment concerning Mary show about physicalism, according to Jackson?  


5.  How do the notions of logical possibility (metaphysical possibility) and conceivability play a role in anti-reductionist arguments like Nagel’s and Chalmer’s?  Critically evaluate this argument method.  


6.  What are the reasons favoring panpsychism or pan-protopsychism, according to Chalmers?  What is the view?  What are the problems with this view?


7.  Describe the multiple drafts model of consciousness presented by Daniel Dennett.  What are the important ways in which the theory departs from conventional theories, as Dennett sees it?  


8.  Describe Prinz's theory of consciousness.  Specifically, explain the major theses of the view with regard to attention.  How does Prinz's view differ from Dehaene and Naccache?  What argument does Prinz give to defend this difference?  


9.  What are the major theses of Graziano's Attention Schema Theory of Consciousness?  How does his account build onto and add to what we've learned about consciousness in the Global Workspace Theory?  

 

10.  What is the global workspace model of consciousness developed by Dehaene and Naccache?  What are the central theses of the view?  How does consciousness, in the robust sense, occur, according to them?  Are they eliminativists about consciousness?  What is the function of consciousness?  What did it evolve for?  


11.  What are the major theses of the IIT account of consciousness from Tononi and Koch?  How does their approach differ from the more philosophical accounts we considered like Nagel's?  How does qualia differ in their account in contrast to the way Dennett explains it?