Abstract of publication #4/19
As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, there have been Oriental (mizrahi) Jews who have lived an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle in Eastern European fashion. Alongside this phenomenon, Sephardic ultra-Orthodoxy has penetrated the public consciousness as a group phenomenon with a political dimension, mainly since Shas joined the list for elections to the 11th Knesset (in 1984). This ultra-Orthodoxy is not content with a cultural message that merely calls to "restore the crown to its rightful place." [*explanatory note] The stated ambition is to operate in all realms with the goal of advancing the economic and social status of mizrahi Jews. And indeed, over the past twenty years, Shas has worked actively to create the impression that it is creating a Sephardic ultra-Orthodoxy and restoring the crown to its rightful place.
My claim is that Shas has failed in achieving these objectives. It did not make any change in the basic historical situation characterizing Sephardic ultra-Orthodoxy, namely, the Lithuanian control of the religious world in Israel, and the subjection of Sephardic Jews to the Lithuanian lifestyle. The ultra-Orthodox Sephardim have blended into the Lithuanian communities in Bnei Brak, Jerusalem, Netivot, Kiryat Sefer and Beitar Eilit. Shas even contributes to the continued formation of the Sephardic ultra-Orthodox in the image of the Lithuanian ultra-Orthodox. This takes expression mainly in its refraining from integrating secular subjects with religious studies among Sephardic elementary and high school students as well as after they have concluded their learning in the Shas educational system, and in neglecting the true struggle in the economic-social realm. This strategy does not lead to "restoration of the crown to its rightful place," since the educational path that is "exclusively sacred" [i.e. limited to religious studies] is foreign to Sephardic culture; moreover, adoption of this approach in education is the direct cause of poverty in the ultra-Orthodox sector in general, and among Sephardic members of the Torah world in particular. The result is the failure of Sephardic ultra-Orthodox to achieve a renewed connection to religion and to tradition through cultural forms familiar to them from their countries of origin. Instead, the image of the mizrahi ultra-Orthodox is fashioned after the image of the Ashkenazic ultra-Orthodox: lacking any skills for integration into the modern economy, and entirely dependent on public resources, which can be attained only through factional politics.
This strategic choice on Shas's part is most astounding, since hundreds of thousands of mizrahis who joined the movement or supported it, expected it to fight to obtain resources for advancing the education of their children, and not to be content with advocating religious and traditional values only. This population, that defines itself as traditional, takes issue with the ideal of closing oneself off in the world of yeshivas and kollels [yeshivas for married men], and seeks to assure the economic future of their progeny.
And yet, most Shas voters are clearly not ultra-Orthodox. In a survey conducted in 2000, after the leaders of Shas declared the "Sephardic revolution" (in a series of articles in the Yediot Aharonot daily newspaper on the occasion of 15 years since the establishment of Shas), an attempt was made to sketch a profile of the typical Shas supporter. The study found that 94% of Shas voters defined the roles of their movement along religious-ethnic lines; their primary interests lay in fortifying religion, strengthening the power and pride of Sephardic Jewry and creating a bridge between religious and secular. 57% of Shas voters defined themselves as religious and traditional, 30% defined themselves as ultra-Orthodox, and 13% defined themselves as secular. These data indicate that 70% of Shas voters do not view themselves as ultra-Orthodox, and most likely, do not aspire to conduct an ultra-Orthodox lifestyle and do not support education that includes religious subjects only. Moreover, it should be assumed that many of those who define themselves as ultra-Orthodox would adopt a model that integrates secular studies alongside religious studies ("Torah im derekh eretz"), were such an alternative proposed. This model is applied to a significant extent among the Sephardic Jewish population in France and is also operated in a number of yeshivas in Israel.
Mizrahi public figures and Shas activists claim that Shas identified cultural hardship and offered solutions. Is it really so? Has the party succeeded in shaping a new-old ultra-Orthodox Sephardic identity? There is no doubt that Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef has labored intensively in this realm and continues to do so. His comprehensive halakhic undertaking, his ability to rule on new and difficult issues that arise on occasion, while demonstrating deep knowledge of the Talmud and rabbinic sources, and his struggle against the Ashkenazic halakhic authorities are all noteworthy. Yet, do all these indeed compensate for what is lacking from the broad Torah culture of mizrahi Jewry? What of the realms of liturgical poetry and music? Literature and legend [aggadah]? And where in the Sephardic ultra-Orthodox educational system does the integration of Torah and science take expression?
Today, various individuals and organizations in ultra-Orthodox society are trying to break through the siege of poverty and to permit – albeit to a limited extent and under scrutiny – secular studies that will prepare young people for earning a livelihood. Yet today as well, among Shas circles there is no one with the fortitude to urge the directors of the institutions of Torah education to encourage their graduates to pursue professional training. Until the summer of 2004, requests of this type were channeled only to directors of educational institutions for girls. And if Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef is unable to oppose the Lithuanians and change the path whereby young men learn religious subjects only, who other than he is capable of doing so?
Following the establishment of Shas, Rabbi Ovadiah Yosef led a struggle against the Lithuanian hegemony and rebelled against the authority of Rabbi Shakh. The peak of this rebellion was when he joined the Rabin government in 1992 in opposition to the explicit position of Rabbi Shakh. His rebellion succeeded in the political realm, but failed in the cultural realm, since no change occurred in the world of the Sephardic yeshivas, where Lithuanian control continues unchallenged to this day. In this sense, Shas's missed opportunity is prominent and does not appear to be reparable in the near future, since the party did not manage to establish an alternative to the world of Lithuanian yeshivas.
Fifty years have passed since the mass immigration to Israel from the Islamic countries, during which a drastic change occurred in the cultural perceptions and values of Israeli society. In the past, theories that were later revealed to be mistaken regarding western cultural superiority relative to eastern were rampant, and Israeli society is still paying for the mistakes of the past. However, the lesson was learned to a great extent, and as a result, there was also an admission of error through the ritual of "requesting forgiveness for generations" [*?] on the part of Ashkenazi leaders and public figures.
The protest of the mizrahi Jews erupted in 1959 in the Wadi Salib events, making its way to the public agenda in the "black panther" demonstrations in the beginning of the 1970s, and taking expression in the political upheaval in 1977, when the Likud coalition took the government for the first time, and undermined the hegemony of the Ma'arakh (Labor) coalition that been in place until that time. Following the upheaval, the approach by which the cultural gap was invoked to explain the inter-ethnic gap in Israel began to wane, both in terms of the social awareness, and in terms of academic research. At present, there is a growing recognition that the economic and social position of Israeli citizens, including those of mizrahi origin, is a function of access to education and learning, or proper professional-technological training. These are the main causes that enable social mobility.
The educational system is also slowly weeding out early perceptions. In the past, entire populations were defined as 'underprivileged,' the 'other Israel,' [or 'the second Israel'] or 'ethnics,' and separate educational frameworks were prepared for them with the declared goal of working for their advancement. Today, however, there is a growing realization that these frameworks in fact perpetuated the gap. The public discourse is changing: today, no group is defined as having "low learning potential," or having "mental barriers."
The changing public discourse and the insights of the educational experts also affect the political arena. In May 2004 the Minister of Education established a "Force for the National Goal of Promoting Education in Israel" (Dovrat Commission, May 2004). The committee was asked to propose a thorough reform in education, in light of the sub-standard achievements of Israeli students in international achievement tests. In the report written by the committee (approved by the government on the day it was submitted) the analysis of the causes for this situation no longer focuses on the cultural gap between the various ethnic groups, since in the opinion of the authors, the root of the problem lies mainly at the economic-social level:
"In the social-economic reality of Israel, the education system must reduce gaps that arise from the socio-economic background of the students in their ethnic or regional origin…"
Another reference in the report discusses "educational deficit" as a source of differences in achievement:
"A quality education system grants a true opportunity for each child to exhaust his potential within, and to reduce the effect of relative educational deficits that arise from family situation, living conditions, and the nature of the community to which he belongs. The State of Israel does not stand up to this test with dignity."
Among other things, the report states that the gaps between "the primary Israel" and the "other [secondary] Israel" arise from economic causes, namely, from the extent of control over resources and means. Positions and roles in the government system are part of the booty that power groups divide among themselves; it is therefore possible to bring about social change by influencing the control of resources and access to them (not only by processes of modernization and bridging cultural gaps).
Entirely opposite processes from these described above occur in the ultra-Orthodox sector: although the Sephardic ultra-Orthodox have adopted the norms and lifestyle of the Lithuanian Torah world, their stigmatization as "franks" (a derogatory term for mizrahi Jews) still carries force, and they are perceived as inferior. In addition, the post-elementary ultra-Orthodox educational system (for boys) does not enable access to secular studies. This cultural choice (refraining from studying math, computers, English and standard modern Hebrew) is the cause of the retrogression and poverty that prevail in this sector. Shas's policy supports the approach of not studying these subjects, and thus severely impedes on the chance of "restoring the crown to its rightful place."