Post date: Aug 19, 2015 8:49:00 AM
The overattribution effect has proved to be a well-replicated if not a tenacious finding in the social psychological literature. This paper explores the possibility that 1) the robustness of the overattribution effect may be partially due to the insensitivity of traditional measures to subjects' judgmental uncertainty (i.e., attitude extremity scores) and 2) ability (i.e., attributional complexity) and motivation (i.e., normativeness of the position defended in the essay) may interact to diminish the overattribution effect. On the basis of Jones and Davis's (1965) correspondent inference theory, confidence measures were included to tap subjects' judgmental uncertainty. Subjects, who were identified as being high versus 'low in attributional complexity (Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, and Reeder 1986) were exposed to essays in favor of (normative) or opposed to (counternormative) federal support for AIDS research that had been prepared under free choice or constraint conditions. Subjects then estimated the essayist's attitude on the issue and rated their confidence in the attitude estimate. Attitude extremity scores showed the standard overattribution effect. As predicted, however, diminution of the overattribution effect was found for high-complexity subjects evaluating counternormative essays prepared under constraint. The discussion focuses on qualifications on the previously established pervasiveness of the overattribution effect.