97Dominion

Dominion or Decline: Anglo-American Naval Relations in the Pacific 1937-1941

By IAN LOWMAN

Berg, Oxford, 1997

327 pages. Price £14.95 (paperback) ISBN 1-85973-116-3

This claims to be a bold, revisionist work by a lecturer in history and politics at the University of the South Pacific. It proposes to break new ground in several areas: a review of Anglo-American naval relations in the Pacific in the 1937-41 period which fills a gap in the literature; a review of Anglo-American naval relations 'on the ground' in the Pacific in the 1920s and 1930s which suggests that antagonism rather than co-operation was the norm; an analysis of the work of both navy plans divisions in the formulation of naval policy and the place of the navy in the larger military whole; and finally a considerable analysis of the Admiralty's Far Eastern Naval War Memorandum and the US Navy Department's War Plan Orange. The revisionism lies in the author's contention that Admiralty policy was not simply that of 'Main Fleet to Singapore' but encompassed the Malay Barrier and the area to the north, including the relief of Hong Kong. This view was upheld even against the mainstream of thinking in the other services. Preservation of the Empire remained the paramount concern. The Admiralty Plans Division never abandoned the hope of strengthening Hong Kong to allow it to sustain a siege until relieved and in the late 1920s and early 1930s much survey work went on to determine possible fuelling bases and anchorages between Singapore and Hong Kong.

A three phase strategy was proposed. Phase 1 saw the concentration of the main fleet, phase 2 an advance to Hong Kong, and phase 3 economic blockade of Japan. The whole strategy not only was out of line with the views of the Committee of Imperial Defence but was based on the false assumption that the Japanese would adopt a defensive naval posture. Plan Orange was a mirror of British intentions, except that Manila was seen as the forward base. American policy was, however, one of studied ambiguity guided by parsimony, and funding simply was not provided to develop bases or equipment. In the end planning had to assume that bases would be built after war broke out, while those who favoured a rapid riposte against Japan and those who favoured a slow one were outgunned by those who wished to assume a defensive posture for hemispheric defence. The position was so bad that there was no acceptable fleet base on the entire Western US coast, while Pearl Harbor was both poorly equipped and not the choice of the USN – the war reserve of anti-aircraft ammunition was calculated to last 18 1/2 minutes and the base provided only 70 per cent of naval requirements.

Unlike Great Britain, the USA accepted that Pacific possessions might be worth recapturing but were not worth defending. War Plan Orange was totally unrealistic and as early as 1931 the Navy Department recognised it could not be implemented with the available resources. At the same time, Army and Navy views, for example on the defence of the Philippines, were unbridgeably far apart. By comparison with Britain, American rearmament was slow and lackadaisical. By October 1940 the American planning agencies were in a state of complete confusion, prompting Admiral Richardson, when C-in-C US Fleet, to ask in exasperation for information from the Pacific Fleet command as to 'why we are here and what we are supposed to be doing'.

There is a fascinating review of what was happening in the Pacific in the late 1930s where a vicious little series of encounters took place and a climate of mutual suspicion and mistrust grew up as both US and British parties annexed small islands and reefs which might act as commercial seaplane bases. Only on the Yangtse did mutual self-preservation lead to co-operation. Some time is spent on looking at the despatch of RN forces to the Far East. Pound is credited with deeply Machiavellian motives. His much trumpeted argument with Churchill over the despatch of the Prince of Wales to the Far East is seen as a devious cover. Pound, it is claimed, only started this argument in order to divert or prevent debate on the Admiralty's plans to send the old R-class battleships east - which Churchill was known to oppose.

Stylistically the book is dense and academic. It makes few concessions in terms of typography, design, footnotes, abbreviations or presumptions of knowledge of the players and events. But it repays the endurance of reading, revealing a staggering catalogue of misunderstanding, wishful thinking, failure of comprehension, poor intelligence and political ineptness. And yet, although it fulfils its goal, it is not a rounded work. Relationships with the Dutch and French as well as estimates of Japanese intentions are neglected or implied, and yet these coloured relationships with the United States. More work remains to be undertaken here. A second volume covering the post-1941 period is promised and should prove worth the wait. This is a good solid piece of historical research which does appear to fill gaps in the literature and throw new light on Anglo-American relationships. It does not require loud claims of revisionism to justify the quality of some otherwise very meticulous research.

DEREK LAW

King's College London