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INTRODUCTION TO THEOLOGY
COURSE AIM:
To make students understand the meaning, nature and the scope of Theology. Students should also be able to explain more about the branches of theology while relating them to modern sciences.Students will also be acquainted with the Catholic methods of theologizing.
COURSE OUTLINE:
1. Meaning of theology
2. Matters that pertain to theology in General
3. Nature and methods of theology
4. Analyses of the nature of theology
5. Relationship between theology and other sciences
6. Sources of theology
7. Historical Development of theology
8. Various branches of theology
9. Theology and Modern Sciences
10. Status and Method of Catholic Theology
N.B Students will have to read some theological books for more consultation.
MEANING,NATURE AND THE SCOPE OF THEOLOGY
THEOLOGY:
The term theology is not in the Bible but the idea of theology is found in the Bible.The term theology is got from the Pagan background.
The term Theology today is understood as the Science of Faith however the word theology has undergone various meanings within the course of history.
ETYMOLOGICAL
Theology comes from the Greek words (Theos and Logos)
Theos=God
Logos=Word
Therefore Theology means; Word of God or God’s Talk or literally it means words about God, or reasoning about God. It also has been defined as “disciplined thinking about God.” Now as you know, thinking involves categories and concepts symbolized by words. Therefore theology consists of studying and refining concepts about God, and about humanity in relation to God. If a statement does not relate to God in some way it is not truly a theological statement.
However, the term is used in both a narrow and broad way. In its narrow usage, to do theology is to reason very specifically about God himself, his nature and person. But the term also is used broadly to mean reasoning about anything in relation to God.
IN CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY [B.C]
In classical antiquity,we had three different approaches to the understanding of the term Theology.
I-Platonic Approach
II-Aristotelian Approach
III-Cultic Approach
1.PLATONIC APPROACH
In this approach poets were regarded as theologians since they gave a mythological explanation of the ultimate mysteries of the world.These thologians spoke of the life and works of gods and their relation to the world.
2.ARISTOTELIAN APPROACH
Here theology assumes a remarkably philosophical approach/understanding.Aristotle spoke of philosophical theology which deals with beings as beings and explained the moveable/changeable beings in their relation to the immoveable being.
3.CULTIC APPROACH
In this approach Theology was considered as related to Religious phenomena in their link with the gods to assure the prosperity of the nation and individual.
SOURCES OF THEOLOGY
(I)-CHRISTIAN SOURCES
-Scripture
-Tradition
-Magisterial teachings
-Christian Arts
(II)-ANTHROPOLOGICAL SOURCES
-Human natural resources including philosophy
-Human sciences
-Natural signs
-Human Experiences
VARIOUS THEOLOGIES IN THE BIBLE
In the Bible we have different theologies that developed in different times;
1.Yahwistic Theology
2.Priestly Theology
3.Deuteronomic Theology
4.Elohist Theology
1.YAHWISTIC THEOLOGY
Yahwistic Theology is centered on anthropocentric nature of God (centered on Man),it is located in Genesis 2-3.In this theology God is called Yahweh and the mountain where God revealed Himself is called Sinai.
2.ELOHIST THEOLOGY
In this theology God is known to be Elohim since God is seen as transcendent one.God speakes through the prophets ,Angels and Dreams.It Focuses on the fear of God mean while the mountain of the Lord God is called Oreba.
3.DEUTERONOMIC THEOLOGY
In Deuteronomic Theology God is also called Yahweh and God speaks through Moses in order to lead his people.This Theology focuses on obedience to the Mosaic Law.We can read more about this Theology in the Books of Deuteronomy and Number.
4.THE PRIESTLY THEOLOGY
In priestly Theology we see more emphasis and focus are put on God speaking through the Priests and Priests offered sacrifices through the Oracles.This theology is located in Genesis Chapter One.
THEOLOGIES IN THE NEW TESTAMENT
New Testament Theology
New Testament Theology is that branch of the Christian disciplines which traces themes through the authors of the NT and then amalgamates those individual motifs into a single comprehensive whole. Thus it studies the progressive revelation of God in terms of the life situation at the time of writing and the delineates the underlying thread which ties it together. This discipline centers upon meaning rather than application, i.e., the message of the text for its own day rather than for modern needs. The term employed most frequently for the current state of biblical theology is "crisis," due to the growing stress on diversity rather than unity and the failure to attain any consensus whatever as to methodology or content.
Therefore We have at least five various theologies in the New Testament as described below;
1.Marcan Theology
2.Mathew Theology
3.Lucan Theology
4.Johanne Theology
5.Epistles and Acts of Apostles Theology
1.THEOLOGY OF MARK
A growing consensus has emerged in recent years that the sacred evangelists were both historians and theologians. They produced accurate histories of the life of Christ and at the same time preached its implications for life in the church. Further, each evangelist had a distinctive message, seen in the way he selected and omitted certain scenes and details. It is therefore accurate to speak of a "theology of Mark." His major themes will here be traced and an attempt made to delineate the way in which each is seen throughout his Gospel
(i)-Christology
The book itself declares that it is "the gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God." There is a great difference of opinion as to the central emphasis in this regard. Many have thought that Christ/Messiah is predominant and expresses Mark's portrayal of Jesus as the antitype of the suffering servant of Yahweh.
Jesus is seen as demanding that this fact be kept secret. Here we find the primary critical problem of the Gospel. Every group with which Jesus is involved is forced to silence: the demons (1:23-25, 34; 3:11-12), those healed."Son of God," the title which begins the Gospel (1:1) and occurs at the climax in the centurion's cry (15:39). The stress on sonship occurs at the baptism (1:11) and transfiguration (9:7) and is a key element in Jesus' control over the demonic realm (3:11). Further, Jesus is seen as omniscient.The balance between these is important and demonstrates that Mark is probably trying to present a balanced picture in order to correct an overly enthusiastic stress on the supernatural aspects.
Mark's favorite designation is "Son of man," a term which undoubtedly was Jesus' own self-designation but which also went beyond to picture the heavenly figure of Dan. 7:13. In Mark it speaks of his humanity (2:10, 27-28); his betrayal, suffering, and death and his exaltation and future reign
The final aspect of Mark's emphases is Jesus as teacher. In the past this designation was usually attributed only to Matthew, but recently it has been more and more recognized that Mark gives Jesus' teaching office prime place in his work. The one who performs such great and mighty deeds is demonstrated as the one who teaches.
(ii)-Cosmic Conflict
In Mark, Christ is presented as the one who "binds" Satan (3:27). Where Matthew centers upon healing miracles, Mark stresses exorcism. This is nowhere seen better than by comparing Mark and Matthew with respect to the healing of the demon-possessed/ epileptic child.
(iii)Eschatology
Many have stated that Mark is primarily a proponent of a futuristic eschatology, perhaps even calling the church to the imminent parousia in Galilee (Marxsen). Yet the Markan emphasis goes beyond this. According to 1:15, the kingdom has already come, and the time of fulfillment is here. Jesus' deeds and words demonstrate the presence of the kingdom within history, and Jesus will continue to mediate this end-time power until the final consummation of the divine plan.Therefore the disciple exists in present hope, and Mark's eschatology is "inaugurated" rather than final.
(iv)-The Miracles and Soteriology
One cannot ignore the centrality of the miracle stories, for they form one fifth of the Gospel and 47 percent of the first ten chapters. The basic word, as in all the Synoptics, is "power" (dynamis), which points to the power of God operative in his Son. Mark, however, is careful to stress that the miracles do not form apologetic proof that Jesus is the Christ. The central theme in Mark is that they can be known only by faith; they cannot produce faith.
The connection of the miracles with faith and forgiveness leads to the further point: when faith is present, the miracles point to the salvific power of God in Christ. By actualizing the power and authority of God in the situation, they make the reader cognizant of the radical demands of God.
(v)-Discipleship
The final emphasis in Mark, and in some ways the major emphasis along with Christology, is the discipleship motif. Again there is certainly controversy here, as some have argued that Mark has a negative thrust intended to show the error of the disciples (Weeden). However, this is hardly true of the Gospel as a whole. Mark does wish to stress the radical nature of the call and the difficulties of achieving the goal. However, the reader is expected to identify with the disciples in this dilemma, and it indeed forms the heart of the Gospel.
2.THEOLOGY OF MATTHEW
In order to understand the theology of Matthew's Gospel it is helpful to begin at the ending. Its climatic conclusion, the Great Commission (28:16-20), has been called the key to the Gospel's theology. Several important themes are brought together in these verses.
First is the focus on the resurrected Christ. Each of the Gospel writers portrays a facet of Jesus' life and ministry. Prominent in Matthew's Gospel is the picture of Jesus as the Christ, the messianic Son of God who was also the suffering servant.
Another aspect of Matthean Christology is the affirmation of Christ's spiritual presence with the disciples. Jesus assured the disciples, "I will be with you" (28:20). The first of a series of OT texts cited by Matthew is Isaiah's prophecy of Immanuel (Isa. 7:14). Its significance is made clear in the phrase "God with us" Christ's presence continues. Jesus' promise to the disciples, "Where two or three come together in my name, there am I with them". This relates also to the Gospel's ecclesiology, the doctrine of the church.
The term "kingdom" seems to have a spiritual and a physical aspect to its meaning. The spiritual aspect was present in the ministry of Jesus but the physical consummation is anticipated at his return The kingdom of heaven about which Jesus preached was entered by repentance and Forgiveness was based ultimately on Christ's death
Opposed to the kingdom of heaven is the kingdom of Satan from whom those with faith in Christ are delivered While Satan is powerless before the Spirit of God nonetheless he will actively hinder and counterfeit the work of God until the consummation.
The ministry of the kingdom carried on by Christ is continued by the church (16:18). The Spirit who enabled Christ to carry out his work will enable the disciples to continue it . The ministry of the church is thus a phase of the kingdom program of God. Ultimately God's program with Israel would also be compelted with a positive response to the gospel of the kingdom.
3.THEOLOGY OF LUKE
The theology of Luke may be discerned by observing several converging lines of evidence. Since a Gospel lacks the logical sequence of propositional statements characteristic of the epistles, great care is needed to assess this evidence accurately.
Theological Themes
Some of the specific themes and topics in Luke are:
(i)-Christology
As in the other Gospels, Jesus is seen as Messiah.He is also the Son of God, as the angel indicates (Luke 1:35) and as he himself recognizes at age twelve.One unique contribution of Luke is the presentation of Jesus as a prophet. He is compared and contrasted with John the Baptist as a prophetic figure. Luke hints at his prophetic.Also the ministry of Elisha comes to mind at the raising of the son of the widow of Nain near where Elisha had raised the son of the "great woman" of Shunem.
(ii)-Soteriology
Without question, Luke emphasizes the need and provision of salvation. The Gospel focuses on the cross through the passion predictions in common in Matthew and Luke, in the early foreshadowings and especially through the sayings at the Last Supper In Acts the cross is seen as God's will, though accomplished by sinful people (Acts 2:23). If neither the Gospel nor Acts contains the explicit statements familiar from Paul on the theology of atonement, that does not mean Luke's doctrine is deficient. The Gospel presents the need of salvation and the progress of Jesus to the cross vividly.
Nevertheless, Luke has a very strong theology of glory. He emphasizes the victory of the resurrection, with a declaration of the vindication of Jesus .The ascension is stressed predictively in the middle of the Gospel and in the middle of Luke's two-volume work, Luke 24 and Acts 1.
(iv)-Doxology
This theology of glory finds practical expression in repeated ascriptions of glory to God. These occur especially at the birth of Christ (2:14) and on the occasions of healing.
(v)-The Holy Spirit
The Spirit is prominent from the beginning (Luke 1:15, 41; 2:25-35). Jesus was conceived by the overshadowing of the Spirit. He was full of the Spirit and led by the Spirit at the time of his temptation . The Spirit was upon him in his ministry.The Lord promised the Holy Spirit in answer to prayer and in anticipation of Pentecost.
(vi)-Prayer
This is especially significant at times of crisis in the life of Jesus (Luke 3:1; 6:12; 9:18) and in the early perilous days of the church.
(vii)-The Power of God
Along with the other Gospels, Luke records the miracles of Jesus and uses the word dynamis. This emphasis continues throughout Acts.
(viii)-Sense of Destiny; Prophecy and Fulfillment
This is a unique emphasis of Luke. The verb dei, "it is necessary," occurs frequently with reference to the things Jesus "must" accomplish.This is seen both in terms of accomplishment (Luke 1:1, translating peplerophoremenon as "accomplished" and in terms of fulfillment of OT prophecy. "Proof from prophecy" is a significant aspect of Luke's writing.
(ix)-Eschatology
This aspect of Luke's work has occasioned much discussion. It was the view of H. Conzelmann that Luke wrote against a background of concern because Jesus had not yet returned. Luke supposedly met this alleged "delay of the parousia" by reworking Jesus' teachings which the church is to continue. Without dealing here with Conzelmann's various ideas on this and other topics, we may note that further study has shown that, while Luke sees a period of faithful service prior to the Lord's return (e.g., the parable of the nobleman, or the ten minas,he also retains strong eschatological teachings and a sense of imminency.It is misguided speculation (cf. Luke 17:20-21) which Luke rejected, not the imminency of the Lord's return. It is against this background that Luke's unique emphasis on "today" is to be seen.
(x)-The Word of God
This is a more significant theme in Luke's writings than is generally recognized. Logos occurs in the Gospel prologue (1:2), in 4:22, 32, 36, and notably in the parable of the sower, which stresses obedience to the word of God.
4.THEOLOGY OF JOHN
From his Gospel we learn a good deal about the Father and, indeed, it is to John more than anyone else that Christians owe their habit of referring to God simply as "the Father." John uses the word "father" 137 times (which is more than twice as often as anyone else; Matthew has it 64 times, Paul 63). No less than 122 refer to God as Father, a beautiful emphasis which has influenced all subsequent Christian thinking. John also tells us that this God is love (I John 4:8, 16), and love is an important topic in both his Gospel and his epistles. We know love in the Christian sense because we see it in the cross
(i)-Christology
Throughout the Johannine writings there is a good deal of attention given to Christology. The Gospel begins with a section on Christ as the Word, a passage in which it is clear that God has taken action in Christ for revelation and for salvation. Christ is "the Savior of the world" (John 4:42), and this is brought out when he is referred to as Christ (= Messiah), Son of God, Son of man, and in other ways. They all depend in one way or another on the thought that God is active in Christ in bringing about the salvation he has planned. John has an interesting use of terms like "glory" and "glorify," for he sees the cross as the glorification of Jesus.
(ii)-Miracles
John's treatment of the miracles is distinctive. He never calls them "mighty works" as do the synoptists, but "signs" or "works." They point us to significant truth, for God is at work in them. "Work" may be used of Jesus' nonmiraculous deeds as well as those that are miraculous, which suggests that his life is all of a piece.John's Jesus is fully divine, indeed, but he is also fully human.
(iii)-The Holy Spirit
John tells us more about the Holy Spirit than do the other evangelists. He is active from the beginning of Jesus' ministry (John 1:32-33), but the full work of the Spirit among man awaited the consummation of Jesus' own ministry. The Spirit is active in the Christian life from the beginning and there are important truths about the Spirit in Jesus' farewell discourse.The Spirit is active in leading Christians in the way of truth and John has a good deal to tell us about the Christian life. He speaks of "eternal life," which seems to mean life proper to the age to come, life of the highest quality.John's is a profound and deep theology, though expressed in the simplest of terms. It sets forth truths which no Christian can neglect.
5. EPISTLES AND ACTS OF APOSTLES THEOLOGY
Theological meaning of the entire Epistles and the Acts of the Apostles can be summarized as below;Theology here is that God is authoritative.this is seen from the fact that Peter the Apostles was chosen as the Head of the Church.
Peter received his authority from the above over the Church.This demonstrates the future procedures to be respected and followed in choosing the successors of Peter in this case the Popes are respected as the successors of Peter with full authority from the above.
The Holy spirit plays the vital role in leading the Church which depends only on the Holy Spirit,s guidance.
THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PATRISTIC PERIOD
The Patristic Period
The Patristic Period is a vital point in the history of Christianity since it contexturalizes the early Christian information from the time of the death of the last Apostle (John) (which runs roughly about 100 A.D. to the Middle Ages (451 A.D. and the council of Chalcedon
The Patristic period is filled with theological importance on the development of Christian doctrine. Many of the debates of this time are housed in both theological and philosophical issues. Without a helpful understanding of both of these disciplines, the student of historical theology will find the patristic period difficult to comprehend cohesively. This period is characterized by immense doctrinal diversity and the age of “flux.”
OVERVIEW OF KEY THEOLOGIANS DURING THE PATRISTIC PERIOD
Justin Martyr (c. 100-165) is one of the greatest Christian Apologists writing against paganism. He provided history with an early example of a theologian who attempted to relate the Gospel to the outlook of Greek philosophy.
Irenaeus of Lyons (c. 130-200) probably a native of Asia Minor, was elected bishop of the southern French city of Lyons around 178. He is chiefly noted for his major writing adversus haereses (Against the Heresies) that defended the Christian faith against Gnosticism.
Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-215) was a leading Alexandrian writer with a concern to explore the relationship between Christian thought and Greek philosophy.
Tertullian (c. 160-255) was a major figure in early Latin theology who produced a series of significant controversial and apologetic writings. He is noted for his ability to coin new Latin terms to translate the emerging theological vocabulary of the Greek-speaking eastern church.
Origen (c. 185-254) was a leading representative of the Alexandrian school of theology, especially noted for his allegorical exposition of Scripture, and his use of Platonic ideas in theology, particularly Christology. The originals of many of his works, which were written in Greek, have been lost, with the result that some are known only in Latin translations of questionable reliability.
Cyprian of Carthage (died 258) was a Roman Rhetorician of considerable skill who was converted to Christianity around 246, and elected bishop of the North African city of Carthage in 248. He was martyred in that city in 258. His writings focus primarily on the unity of the Church, and the role of its bishops in maintaining orthodoxy and order.
Athanasius (c. 296-373) was one of the most significant defenders of orthodox Christology during the period of the Arian controversy. Elected as a bishop of Alexandria in 328, he was deposed on account of his opposition to Arianism. Although he was widely supported in the West, his views were only finally recognized at the Council of Constantinople (381) after his death.
Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 329-389), also known as Gregory Nazianzen, is remembered for his Five Theological Orations written around 380, and a compilation of extracts from the writings of Origen called Philokalia. He also wrote defensively on the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity.
Basel of Caesarea (c. 330-379) also known as “Basil the Great” was based on Cappadocia, in modern Turkey. He is remembered for his writings on the Trinity, especially the distinctive role of the Holy Spirit. He was elected bishop in Caesarea in 370.
Augustine of Hippo (c. 354-430) is widely regarded as the most influential Latin patristic writer. He was converted to Christianity at the northern Italian city of Milan in the summer of 386. He returned to North Africa, and was made bishop of Hippo in 395. He was involved in two major controversies – the Donatist controversy, focusing on the church and sacraments, and the Pelagian controversy, focusing on grace and sin. He also made substantial contributions to the development of the doctrine of the Trinity, and the Christian understanding of history.
Cyril of Alexandria (died around 444) was a significant writer who was appointed patriarch of Alexandria in 412. He was involved with the controversy over the Christological views of Nestorius, and produced major refutations and defenses of the orthodox position on the two natures of Christ. Vincent of Lerins (died before 450) was a French theologian who settled on the island of Lerins. He is particularly noted for his emphasis on the role of tradition in guarding against innovations in the doctrine of the church, and is credited with the “Vincentian canon.”
KEY THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE PATRISTIC PERIOD
Christian theology, from its inception, appealed to Scripture and was grounded in Scripture. How, though, does one define “Scripture?” The term “canonical” was used to described what would be included in the Scriptures. These are Scriptural-writings that define a limited number that are accepted as God’s Word by the church. For the writers of the New Testament the term “Scriptures” referred mainly to the Old Testament Scriptures. Tertullian declared that alongside of the Old Testament were the evangelicae et apostolicae litterae evangelical and apostolic writings. Agreement was finally made at a later time as to what books should be included. Athanasius, in 367 A.D., circulated his 39th Festal Letter which included the 27 books of the New Testament Christians have in their Bible today. How did these books come together as authoritative? The principle used is of recognition, not imposition. The church does not create the canon, rather, they acknowledge, conserve and receive it.
How does tradition coincide with Scripture? During the early years many doctrines were espoused that seemed to rest on the Scriptures, but were in fact a deviation of Christian truth. In a context where cultic groups were distorting the truth, and appeal to tradition became important. The word “tradition” means “handed down.” Irenaeus called it the regula fide, or rule of faith. This rule of faith was faithfully preserved by the apostolic church, and is found in the Scriptures. Tradition came to mean, then, “a traditional interpretation of Scripture.” In this way, the rule of faith was that which was commonly accepted by the church as one that received the truth of the Scriptures and formulated a statement, creed or confession about those truths (such as the Apostle’s Creed). The English word “creed” comes from the Latin credo meaning “I believe.” Later statements of faith were known as confessions, such as the Westminster Confession of Faith. These are the basics of Christian belief that every Christian should be able to accept and be bound by. A creed differs from a confession in that it is a universal statement of the most simplistic truths of the Christian faith.
The Apostle’s Creed is the most familiar creed of the Christian church. It is divided into three sections dealing with God, Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit. The Nicene Creed is a longer version that highlights material in the relationship between Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit.
The two natures of Christ was also a large controversial subject during the Patristic period. The conclusion was that Jesus Christ was of the same substance of God, described in the term homoousios (of one substance). Two schools had two opinions on this: the Alexandrian School placed emphasis on the divinity of Christ, and the Antiochene school placed an emphasis on the humanity of Christ. The debates surrounded the Arian controversy of determining whether Jesus was God, or a created being. Arius taught that Christ was a created being. The Council of Nicea (c. 325) was convened by Constantine and settled the Arian controversy by affirming that Jesus was homoousios with the Father (i.e. of the same substance).
After the controversy over the divinity of Christ was settled, the doctrine of the Trinity naturally came to pass since this was all intertwined. The basic idea behind the Trinity is that there are three persons within the Godhead – Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and that these three are to be regarded as equally divine and of equal status. Athanasius and Basil of Caesarea wrote vigorously on this subject defending orthodoxy. The Eastern Cappadocian fathers (Gregory Nazianzen, Basel and Gregory of Nyssa) also wrote in defending this doctrine.
The doctrine of the church (ecclesiology) also rose as an important subject, especially concerning its holiness. The Donatists argued that the church was a body of saints where sinners had no place. This became particularly important when persecution broke out in that the Donatists did not want to allow back into the church defectors who recanted and then recanted of their recantation because of that persecution. The Donatists argued for their exclusion from the church. Augustine, otherwise, stated that the church must remain a mixed body of individuals – saints and sinners. The validity of the churches’ holiness did not depend upon the holiness of the members, but the person of Jesus Christ.
The doctrines of grace also came to the forefront in the writings of Augustine over the heresy propagated by Pelagius, a British monk who believed that Adam’s sin did not affect any of his progeny. So forceful was Augustine’s pen against Pelagius that he became known as the “doctor of grace.” Pelagius taught that the resources of salvation were within humanity, where Augustine taught that they were in Christ Jesus alone. The ethos of Pelagianism could be summed up as “salvation by merit,” whereas Augustine taught “salvation by grace,” following Ephesians 2:8-10 The Council of Carthage (c. 418) resolved to uphold the doctrines of grace and condemned Pelagianism in uncompromising terms.
THE MODERN SENSE OF THEOLOGY
1. ST. THOMAS UNDERSTANDING OF THEOLOGY
THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274) is well-known for his theological writings. He is arguably the most eminent philosophical theologian ever to have lived. To this day, it is difficult to find someone whose work rivals Aquinas' in breadth and influence. Although his work is not limited to illuminating Christian doctrine, virtually all of what he wrote is shaped by his theology. Therefore it seems appropriate to consider some of the theological themes and ideas that figure prominently in his thought.
DEMONSTRATING GOD’S EXISTENCE
DEMONSTRATING GOD’S EXISTENCE
Aquinas thinks there are a variety of ways to demonstrate God’s existence. But before he turns to them, he addresses several objections to making God an object of demonstration. This essay will consider two of those objections. According to the first objection, God’s existence is self-evident. Therefore, any effort to demonstrate God’s existence is, at best, unnecessary For Aquinas, this objection rests on a confusion about what it means for a statement to be self-evident.
Aquinas concedes that, for some people, God’s existence will be a matter of faith. After all, not everyone will be able to grasp the proofs for God’s existence. Thus for some people it is perfectly appropriate to accept on the basis of sacred teaching that which others attempt to demonstrate by means of reason.
For our purposes, it might be helpful to present Aquinas' argument in a more formal way:
1. The world contains instances of efficient causation (given).
2. Nothing can be the efficient cause of itself.
3. So, every efficient cause seems to have a prior cause.
4. But we cannot have an infinite regress of efficient causes.
5. So there must be a first efficient cause “to which everyone gives the name God.”
2. ST. BONAVENTURE UNDERSTANDING OF THEOLOGY
Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (ca. 1217 to 15 July 1274), the religious name of Giovanni di Fidanza, was a Franciscan friar, Master of Theology at the University of Paris, Minister General of the Franciscan Order, and Cardinal of the Catholic Church. During his lifetime he rose to become one of the most prominent men in Latin Christianity. He thought of Christ as the “one true master” who offers humans knowledge that begins in faith, is developed through rational understanding, and is perfected by mystical union with God.
To understand theology as a “science” making faith intelligible, Bonaventure must clarify its material cause. Determining that material cause of theology is the same as settling on its subject. On this point, there had been considerable dispute among the Masters. Aristotle's “sciences” were all limited to a particular genus, such as “animal” or “soul” or “memory” or “ethics.” Even his universal science of metaphysics was limited to studying substances; it eschewed the other categories.
Theology, by contrast, cuts across all genera and includes God, who is not confined within any genus. Bonaventure was familiar with many accounts of the subject of theology: “things and signs,” the work of “reparation for sin,” “Christ—head and members,” “God,” and “the object of belief (credibile). To throw light on these conflicting answers, Bonaventure turned to his study of the Arts with a subject that lets theology range over all realities and all thoughts about which one can have religious faith.
3.WILLIAM OF OCKHAM UNDERSTANDING OF THEOLOGY
William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) is, along with Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, among the most prominent figures in the history of philosophy during the High Middle Ages. He is probably best known today for his espousal of metaphysical nominalism; indeed, the methodological principle known as “Ockham's Razor” is named after him. But Ockham held important, often influential views not only in metaphysics but also in all other major areas of medieval Philosophy and Theology.
His theological ideas states that in theology what matters is Faith alone not reasoning because faith and reason can not be combined together.
Ockham was a nominalist, indeed he is the person whose name is perhaps most famously associated with nominalism. But nominalism means many different things:
A denial of metaphysical universals. Ockham was emphatically a nominalist in this sense.
An emphasis on reducing one's ontology to a bare minimum, on paring down the supply of fundamental ontological categories. Ockham was likewise a nominalist in this sense.
A denial of “abstract” entities. Depending on what one means, Ockham was or was not a nominalist in this sense. He believed in “abstractions” such as whiteness and humanity, for instance, although he did not believe they were universals. (On the contrary, there are at least as many distinct whitenesses as there are white things.) He certainly believed in immaterial entities such as God and angels.
CONNECTION BETWEEN FAITH AND THEOLOGY
Faith and theology relate to religion and beliefs. While theology can be described as a system, study, or set of beliefs, faith is considered the belief or trust in a body of beliefs. Religious studies center on the different theologies of the world's religions, and faith is connected to this study as one of the main characteristics of people who follow a particular theology. Scholars who write about these subjects often can define religious beliefs in an objective way, with lists of common characteristics, and those who believe in the objects and rituals are connected by faith. A summary of the connection could be that faith is belief and theology is a system of beliefs.
God is most often the center of studies in theology. Those who believe in a particular theology, for example Christianity or Catholicism, have faith in God. A common description of faith is that it is believing in what is unseen, and faith and theology are connected by having God, rather than humans, as the object of study. Other disciplines such as history or sociology focus on events, actions, and movements of people, whereas theology looks at the role of God in the world and the faith of people in how they live in the world.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FAITH AND THEOLOGY
1.Faith is supernatural quality infused in to our soul by God mean while theology is an acquired quality in the theologian partly through intellectual effort.
2.Faith is concerned with what is revealed by God n formal sense,Theology is also concerned with the implication of reflection.
3.Faith assents to revelation solely on account of the authority of the revealing God but theology also assents to the implication of the revelation.in this case the motive of the assent is not the authority but human revelation.
4.the certitude of faith is absolute and supreme,certitude of theology is inferior since it depends on the ideas derived from revelation and human reasoning.
5.Faith reaches it object (revelation) through mental and voluntary adheresion.theology reaches it object(revelation) in scientific manner through the process of induction,deduction,analyses and syntheses.
In conclusion we can say that true theology can not do without faith though the two arenot identical.Consequently the criteria of the catholic theology is that it must be faithful to the scripture,tradition,magisterium and ofcourse the catholic theology must express scriptural and magisterial teachings in scientific manner or rational demonstration of the true faith.
THEOLOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORD OF GOD AND
MAGISTERIUM
1.The word of God is the criteria for the magisterial teaching.
2.The word of God is “norma normans non normata” magisterium is not above the word of God but it is guided by the word f God.
3.The magisterium teaches only the truth which has been handed to it therefore sacred scripture ,tradition and sacred magisterium are interconnected.
TWO TYPES OF ECCLESIASTICAL MAGISTERIUM
1. EXTRA ORDINARY MAGISTERIUM
It involves a solemn infalable acts of defining a matter of faith and morals on part of either a whole college of Bishops in an ecumenical council or aThe Pope himself as the head of collage of Bishops when he teaches in “EX CATHEDRA” or when there is “sensum fidelium”.Such teachings are infallible because they are guided by the wisdom of scripture,tradition and also by the Holy spirit.
2.ORDINARY MAGISTERIUM
This refer to all exercises of the Bishop’s teaching authority and pastoral ministry.This authority must be exercised in line with the Papal Office.the ordinary magisterium can be universal or non-universal.
THEOLOGY IN RELATION TO OTHER SCIENCES
Modern studies of the relationship between theology and science are now nearly half a century old, and may be dated back to a seminal work by Ian Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, first published in 1966. Further pioneering work was done in the 1980s and 90s by people like John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke and Paul Davies; and this topic has lately been something of a boom area in universities in Europe and America. It’s helpful to begin our exploration of this territory with some very simple questions: What is religion or theology? What is science? How can they interact?
CHARACTERISTICS OF SCIENCE AS APPLIED ALSO SOMETIMES IN
THEOLOGY
If we take each of them in turn and see whether theology also has got the same characteristics or in one way or the other can applied in theology.
(i) Rationality. Science is, of course, about applying rational principals to our study of the world.This is an obvious thing which are found in theological studies.
(ii) Objectivity. Scientists are, of course, as objective as possible in the ways in which they approach their experiments.this can also be applied in theology.
(iii) Induction. The inductive method is the means whereby we make a lot of observations and from them deduce general principles that explain those observations. To some extent many theologians have taken in to consideration.
(iv) Determinism. It is a commonplace notion that science presumes a deterministic outlook: that events will follow causes in law-like and predictable ways which it is the task of the scientist to tease out, and understand. In the studies of eschatology determinism has been used by some theologians.
(v) Reductionism.This is the method which tries to understand complex wholes in terms of the operations of their parts. If you want to know how bodies work, you look at the organs they contain; if you want to understand organs, you look at cells; to understand cells, you look at complex biochemicals; to understand biochemicals, you look at simple molecules; to understand these you look at atoms; to understand these you look at nucleons; and so on. Understand the behaviour of the bits and you understand the behaviour of the wholes.This is found in the process of theologizing.
NEED OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND MODERN SCIENCES
1. The first way in which science and theology can interact is conflict, or opposition. Science and theology are, as it were, in competition with each other over the same theoretical territory. One must be right, and the other wrong. This, of course, is the line taken by a number of popular commentators in the media, for whom conflict of any kind is always more interesting than consonance (presumably, because it sells better). More productive approaches, however, are both possible and desirable.
2.The second way is independence. This is the view that science and theology are both important, and both have important things to say to us; but they operate in fundamentally different territories. The naturalist Stephen Jay Gould, an exponent of this view, wrote of ‘non-overlapping magisteria’: science explores how the world works, and the physical and biological processes that have led to it coming to be the way it is, whilst theology explores the domain of values, and of ultimate meaning. Another characterisation of this approach is to say that science deals with ‘how’-type questions and theology deals with ‘why’-type questions.
This is an attractive position in many ways; but it seems to deny that any fruitful interaction between science and theology is possible.They are exploring different domains, using different techniques.
3. That leads to the third way in which these disciplines might interact: dialogue. This is the view that an understanding of the sciences can be valuable in informing the way in which we do theology; and reciprocally, an understanding of theology can inform the way in which scientists do science. More obviously, perhaps, it is clear that a sense of values (which Gould assigns to the magisterium of theology) will inform the practice of scientists, since it lies behind any ethical codes which govern their behaviour
4.The fourth way in which science and theology can interact is integration. Barbour believes that it should be possible for insights from both these disciplines to be united to generate what he calls an ‘inclusive metaphysics’. Other writers have been less keen than Barbour in pursuing this path, since they fear (and experience tends to show) that it can lead rather to the assimilation of one or other of these disciplines under the categories of the other, inevitably failing to do proper justice to the discipline which is assimilated.
In conclusion we can say that,Despite this recognition that there can be a number of ways of viewing the relationship between science and theology, there appears to be a common perception that these disciplines are radically different, and that they must be opposed to one another. How they came to be seen this way is in itself an interesting topic, as we shall see in my next article, which will explore the origins of the ‘conflict myth’. We will then conclude this short series by looking at some consonances some positive interactions between science and theology.
STATUS AND METHOD OF CATHOLIC THEOLOGY
1. LISTENING TO THE WORD OF GOD
One of the methods is that all people might have access to the Father, through Christ, the Word made flesh, in the Holy Spirit, and thus become sharers in the divine nature. Listening to God’s Word is the definitive principle of Catholic theology it leads to understanding and speech and to the formation of Christian community because the Church is built upon the word of God,she is born from and lives by that word.
2. FAITH, THE RESPONSE TO GOD’S WORD
Faith comes from what is heard, and what is heard comes through the word of Since Jesus Christ, the Word made flesh, ‘is himself both the mediator and the sum total of Revelation the response that the Word seeks, namely faith, is likewise personal. By faith human beings entrust their entire selves to God, in an act which involves the ‘full submission’ of the intellect and will to the God who reveals.therfore thology must follow this method.A criterion of Catholic theology is that it takes the faith of the Church as its source, context and norm. Theology holds the fides qua and the fides quae together.
3. Theology, the understanding of faith
The act of faith, in response to the Word of God, opens the intelligence of the believer to new horizons. St Paul writes: ‘it is the God who said, “Let light shine out of darkness”, who has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ’ (2Cor 4:6). In this light, faith contemplates the whole world in a new way it sees it more truly because, empowered by the Holy Spirit, it shares in God’s own perspective. That is why St Augustine invites everyone who seeks truth to ‘believe in order to understand [crede ut intelligas]’.A criterion of Catholic theology is that, precisely as the science of faith, ‘faith seeking understanding [fides quaerens intellectum] it has a rational dimension. Theology strives to understand what the Church believes, why it believes, and what can be known sub specie Dei. As scientia Dei, theology aims to understand in a rational and systematic manner the saving truth of God.
THE VOCATION OF THE THEOLOGIAN
1. A true theologian is neither one who attempts to measure the mystery of God with His/hers own intelligence nor one who’s simply an echo of the ordinary magisterium.
2. He is the one who is aware of his or her own limitation but at the same time a critical questioner of the ordinary teachings of the Church.
3. He is to help the faithful to express the authentic sense of faith by reminding them of essential lines of faith and helping them to avoid diversion and confusion.
4. A theologian is an expert in theological areas and must be disposed to share his or her competence however no catholic theologian should dissent from infallible magisterial teachings but not all dissent is outlawed. Ordinary teaching cannot demand the same kind of unconditional assent as infallible teachings.
DISSENTING THEOLOGIAN
In investigating dissenting theologian, the congregation for the doctrine of faith follows transparent procedures so as to arrive at the judgment about the theologian’s intellectual position. The judgment does not concerned the person but only his or her intellectual position taken.
THREE CLASSICAL PARADIGMS OF THEOLOGY
1. The Augustinianism
2. Thomisticism
3. Neo-Scholasticism
These approaches to theology represent the three most influential traditions within Western Roman Catholic theology as an academic discipline. In addition to these approaches, the Roman Catholic tradition contains many other schools of theology. A rich diversity of ascetic, spiritual, and liturgical theologies exists in the West. Monastic as well as academic traditions exist. Eastern Christianity contains other rich traditions. My focus on just the Augustinian, Thomistic and Neo-Scholastic approaches is not meant to slight these other traditions; it is meant to provide a somewhat more detailed examination of the traditions most influential in Western academic theology. Such a focus, moreover, enables one to grasp much more clearly the major changes and transitions that have occurred in the academic study and teaching of Roman Catholic theology
SOME OTHER CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES OF THEOLOGY
1. Theology as transcendental Anthropology
2. Liberation theology
3. Theology as existentialism or correlation approach.
FACTORS WHICH HAVE LED TO TODAY’S VARIOUS TRENDS IN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY
1.Renewal of Patristic and Biblical studies. Reassourcement which means return to the sources.
2.Historical awareness. That theological conclusion should be in relation to its historical background.
3.Pastoral awareness. Every theology must have pastoral awareness because God talks to people in different ways.
4.Liturgical Awareness. People prays means they express their believe.
5.Vatican two also contributed to the various trends in catholic theology since it has open the door for other experiences and ideas.
6.Feminist movement. This movement always emphasize on the reflection of the mystery of Christian faith more especially in conversion of women and in social terms while criticizing patriarchal time.
7.Ecumenical and interreligious system. This trend says the church also finds logos from other’s religious faith.
Prepared for you by: Br. Churchill Ojok Chris
churchilljk2@gmail.com
GOD BLESS YOUR STUDIES
PHILOSOPHY OF GOD
( NATURAL THEOLOGY)
Purpose
To acquire theoretical and practical knowledge of the Nature and existence of the Transcendent, Supernatural, and Sacred.
Objectives
By the end of the course students will be able to:
1. Articulate various views about the nature and existence of the transcendent
2. Assimilate practical and theoretical knowledge for life
3. Contribute in the eradication of atheism and superstition
4. Live as mature Christian life
Content
The Course starts with the definition and nature of natural theology. After which it proceeds with the analysis of different proofs of the existence and nature of God in monotheist tradition. This is followed by a critique. It then tackles difficulties of some thinkers against fundamental truths of natural theology. Then it turns to the discussion of divine attributes. It closes with the issues about divine providence.
Methods of Delivery
Lectures, class discussion, and practical exercises.
Instructional Materials
White board, Blackboard, handouts, and internet.
Course Assessment
Cats, class presentation, and end of semester examination.
Course Requirements
1. Active course attendance. The student will be required to make a presentation individually or jointly.
2. Students will do one written CAT and one class presentation which will earn them 15 marks each.
3. Students will do the end 0f Semester examination which will bear 40 marks.
Textbooks and Journals for the Course
Anselm, “Monologion” & “Proslogion” both in The Major Works. Oxford University Press, 1998.
Aquinas, SummaTtheologiae, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros, 1948 .
Summa Contra Gentiles, esp. trans. Pegis, Anton. University of Notre Dame Press, 1975.
Aristotle, Physics, particularly Bk. VII & VIII. Metaphysics, particularly Bk. XII
Augustine, Confessions, trans. Chadwick, Henry. Oxford, 1992.On Free Choice of the Will, trans. Williams, Thomas. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993.
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy. trans. Green, Richard. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1962.
Bonaventure, The Journey of the Mind to God. trans. Boehner, Philotheus. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993.
Butler, Joseph. The Analogy of Religion, Natural and Revealed, to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Ann Arbor, MI: Scholarly Publishing Office, University of Michigan Library, 2005.
Clark, Samuel. A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God: And Other Writings. Ed. Vailato, Ezio. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Craig, William Lane. The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz. NY: Barnes & Noble Books, 1980.
Descartes, Rene. “Meditations” in Selected Philosophical Writings. trans. Cottingham, John., Stoothoff, Robert., Murdoch, Dougald. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Howard-Snyder, Daniel, ed. The Evidential Argument from Evil. Indiana University Press, 1996.
Hume, David. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977.
. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion: The Posthumous Essays of the Immortality of the Soul and of Suicide. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998.
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. trans. Smith, Norman Kemp. NY: St. Martin’s Press. 1929.
. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. trans. Ellington, James W. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977. .
Kenny, Anthony. The Five Ways: St. Thomas Aquinas’ proofs of the existence of God. London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1969.
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press, 1975.
Mackie, J.L., The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the existence of God. Oxford University Press, 1982.
Newman, John Henry Cardinal. An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. University of Notre Dame Press, 1979.
Plantinga, Alvin. God and Other Minds. Cornell University Press, 1967.
. God, Freedom, & Evil. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1977.
Plato, Republic, particularly Bk. VII.
Plotinus, Enneads. trans. MacKenna, Stephen. New York: Larson Publications, 1992.
Pseudo-Dionysius, “Letter Nine” in The Complete Works. trans. Luibheid, Colm. New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1987.
Stump, Eleonore, ed. Philosophy of Religion. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1999.
The Existence of God. 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press, 2004.
. Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
Varghese, Roy Abraham. The Wonder of the World: A Journey from Modern Science to the Mind of God. Arizona: Tyr Publishing, 2004.
Course Schedule
Sessions I and II
Introduction
1. Course Preliminaries
2. Definition of Natural Theology
NATURAL THEOLOGY is the science of God, so far as God can be known by the light of human reason alone.
The word Theology is derived from two Greek nouns, theos and logos, and means literally speaking or reasoning about God.
By Natural Theology is meant that kind of reasoning about God, which starts from principles, the truth of which can be known to us by the light of our natural reason left to itself, that is, to its innate capacity of perceiving and judging the facts as well of common as of scientific experience, and of drawing conclusions from these facts according to principles that either are self-evident or have previously been proved.
*Material object is God, because it deals with the existence and the nature of God.
*Formal object: God in so far as knowable through the light of natural reason alone. God as knowable through creatures, as their 1st principle and proper cause, as the pure act of subsistent existence.1
1. Difference between Natural and Dogmatic/Sacred Theology
There is another system of truths regarding God which is called Supernatural, or more commonly, Dogmatic Theology or Sacred Theology.
In the first place they differ in their foundation. For whereas Natural Theology is based upon principles known by reason with human certainty, Supernatural Theology has for its foundation principles accepted by faith which rests on the authority of God Himself, who has declared them to us by Divine revelation.
From this difference there results another regarding the method of demonstration used in the two sciences. Natural Theology draws its arguments from the intuitions of reason and from facts of experience; Supernatural Theology finds the premisses of its conclusions in the sources of Christian Revelation, which are the Canonical Scriptures and the documents of Divine Tradition.
Finally there is a vast difference between the achievements of the one and the other. Natural Theology inquires into the existence, the attributes, and works of the one infinite God, without being able to treat of the inscrutable mysteries of the Blessed Trinity and of the Word Incarnate; whereas Supernatural Theology, although it does not pretend to make these mysteries comprehensible to reason, yet, guided by Divine revelation, which has established their reality, analyzes their meaning, shows their consequences, illustrates their harmony with known truths, and thus throws light upon the Divine beauty of Christian Revelation.
Hence we see that the chief subject-matter of which Natural and Supernatural Theology treat, is the same; but the aspect, under which they view it, is altogether different, or to express this in the language of the schoolmen, Natural and Supernatural Theology agree to a large extent in their material object, but they differ in their formal object.
The very nature of Supernatural or Dogmatic Theology implies and demands that Natural Theology should precede it and prepare its way. For it is the duty of reason to prepare the minds of men for the acceptance of Divine revelation, upon which Dogmatic Theology is built. Before an infidel can reasonably feel obliged to acknowledge a creed as Divine, he must be convinced that there is a God, who can communicate truths to men, and that men can accept these truths without danger of deception. It is Natural Theology that opens the way to this conviction by strict logical reasoning. Christian Doctors therefore rightly call the truths developed in Natural Theology the praeambula fidei; and the office assigned to Philosophy in general, when it is called the handmaid of (Dogmatic) Theology, belongs especially to the particular branch of Philosophy now under consideration.
-The material object of both natural and revealed theology is the same, God,
Their formal objects vary: a) Formal object of Natural Theology God insofar as knowable through natural reason; b) The formal object of Sacred theology is the study of God on the basis of revelation: What God has told us about himself and about things
-Concerning Sacred Theology one starts by accepting the revelation
-Both are wisdoms: a) One revealed: simply Ultimate; b) The other reasoned: ultimate in the natural order2
Divisions of Natural Theology3
-Demonstration of God’s existence
-Essence of God
-Relations between creatures and God: creation, providence and existence of evil
Natural Theology and metaphysics
Natural theology is not empirical like natural science. It is part of philosophy, more specifically, metaphysics. “Metaphysics studies being as being. The part of it which studies being in general is called metaphysics, or ontology. Other parts study particular beings: thus inorganic beings as beings are studied in cosmology, organic beings in psychology, the infinite being in natural theology” 4
The order of our discussion is suggested by the three following questions:
· Can we know for certain that there exists One first intelligent and infinitely perfect Cause of all things, that is to say, One personal God of infinite perfection, Creator of the world?
· Granted that there exists One personal God of infinite perfection, what are the special attributes of this One infinite Being?
· If there be such a personal God, what can we know about His action upon this world?
Sessions III & IV: The Existence of God
1. There are four general standpoints
a) The opinion that we have naturally and immediate consciousness of God's existence. This stand is known as Ontologism. Proponents: Descartes, Malebranche, Rosmini
b) The opinion that we can prove the existence of God a priori from the mere concept which we form to ourselves of God. This kind of proof for the existence of God is commonly called the Ontological Argument. Proponents: St. Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz
c) The opinion that the existence of God, although it cannot be perceived by us immediately, nor be proved a priori, can be proved evidently a posteriori by reasoning from the contingent and finite things of this world to God, the necessary, self-existing, infinite Being. Proponents: Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas
d) The opinion that it is reasonable and man's duty to believe in the existence of God, but that it is impossible to prove by evident arguments that the denial of that existence is an untruth. Proponents: Kant
2. The Arguments
A. The Ontological Argument5
It is an a priori argument for the existence of God (that is, an argument showing the existence of God from the meaning of the concept of God as the most perfect or real being, rather than an a posteriori argument based on statements of experienced facts).
(Anselm's version): 1. Everyone acknowledges that by "God" we mean that being than which nothing greater can be conceived. 2. But a being that exists only in the mind is not as great as a being that exists in the mind as well as in reality. 3. Therefore, God must exist both in the mind and in reality, since a God that existed only in the mind would not be that being than which nothing greater could be conceived.
(Descartes' version): 1. God is by definition absolutely perfect. 2. It is more perfect for a thing to exist than not to exist (at least this is what people practically believe). 3. Therefore, God must exist.
Hume's refutation (based on flaws in the logic of the argument): if we can conceive of something, it is not a logical contradiction. If something is conceivable as existing, it can likewise be conceived of as nonexistent (and this applies to God as well). It is always illegitimate to think that from a definition, idea, or statement of meanings that one can make claims about reality (which are always based on observations).
Kant's refutation (based on flaws in the grammar of the argument): Existence is not a predicate. That is, to say of God that He exists or does not exist does not add or subtract anything from the concept of God; it only affirms that there is something that I think when I use the word "God." To imagine or think of anything presupposes that the thing exists as the object of thought. To imagine or think that the thing exists in no way changes what one thinks: it still is the object of what one is thinking.
Malcolm's revision: If God does not exist, His nonexistence is logically necessary (that is, His existence is inconceivable). If He does exist, then He must have always and necessarily existed, for He cannot have come into existence because that would mean that He is not eternal and independently perfect. Hence, either the concept of God's existence is logically impossible (self-contradictory) or logically necessary. But it is not self-contradictory, so it must be logically necessary (that is, God exists).
In other words, if by definition, God is eternal and cannot have come into existence or have been caused to come into existence, then by definition if he exists at all, his existence is part of what he is: that is, his existence is logically necessary. If God does not exist, his not existing must also be part of his very definition, because nothing other than that definition could account for his actually existing or not. But if God's non-existence is part of his definition, then his existence is logically impossible (which would mean that the existence of God would be a contradiction in terms, a logical contradiction). However, we know that there is nothing logically contradictory about a God who exists, so we can rule out the possibility that God does not exist. The only other available option is that he exists, and (as shown above) if he exists he exists necessarily.
B. Argument from the First Cause
Not all things are effects of causes, but there exists an unproduced First Cause, endowed with intelligence and free-will, in other words a personal God.
Everything in so far as it is an effect is indebted for its actual existence to some other thing. But supposing there be no self-existent being, then the totality of being must be an effect, no matter whether it be a finite or an infinite series of various kinds of being. Consequently in that supposition whatever falls under the concept of existing being past or present, must be indebted to another being for its existence. But this is evidently absurd; for it cannot be true without the existence of something beyond the bounds of what falls under the notion of existing being. Therefore the supposition that there is no self-existent being is unreasonable, and the assertion of a self-existent being is demanded by reason.
C. Argument from Design
The manifold and beautiful order of nature is the work of a designing mind of vast intelligence; and must be ultimately explained by the existence of a personal God.
Order is the adaptation of diverse things to one definite result. Order of simple coexistences is called statical; order of motions and activities is called dynamical. Thus for instance, in a well-arranged library we have statical order, in machinery not only statical, but also dynamical.
Any good popular treatise on astronomy and physiology will serve as a rich source of illustrations bearing on the truth of these statements, nor is there any one who will be foolish enough to dispute them. It must, however, be carefully noted, that we do not as yet affirm that everything in this world is well-ordered, nor do we say that there is a universal combination of things for the fulfillment of one common purpose. Were we to claim all this, we should indeed be claiming only what, if rightly understood, is most true. But so far-reaching a proposition is not necessary for the argument from Design, nor would it be sufficiently warranted until we have carried our inquiry further.
Confining, therefore, our attention to those manifestations of order which are obvious to every one who cares for the study of the workings of nature, we ask: How did these orderly arrangements, their harmony, beauty, and usefulness, come to be? May we suppose, with Epicurus, that they are the effect of chance? in other words, that they are owing to an accidental concurrence of atoms, moving in infinite space, and meeting one another in such a way as to form, after many failures, various kinds of inanimate and animate bodies?
In the first place, the inherent forces of matter cannot be appealed to as the cause of the order prevailing in the inorganic world. We know that material elements produce different effects according to their different collocations in regard to one another.{36} Consequently, each effect is the natural outcome of a previous disposition of the parts of matter. This being so, every orderly effect is due to a pre-arrangement of particles suitable to the production of such an effect. That is, the order which is worked out by the elements of matter, presupposes order in the combination of the working elements. Thus the question of order in the world of inanimate matter is thrown back to the origin of that combination of elements which generated order.
Nor do we escape the necessity of seeking a cause external to the combinations themselves, by pleading the possibility of an eternal series of combinations. In the first place, eternal succession is a self-contradictory conception. Succession implies links of a series; it is constituted by the continuous addition of link to link. Now links added to one another are always numerable. Links of a series must always be in some number, however immense the number may be.
If the forces of matter are inadequate to explain the order of the inorganic world, much less can they account for the existence of life and the orderly relations which exist between animate and inanimate beings?
Whence comes the adaptation of inanimate nature to the support of life? The natural tendency of brute matter cannot explain it. The relation of brute matter to life is accidental to its nature. Whence then did the relation originate? No satisfactory answer to this question can be given except this that an Intelligent Ruler of this world arranged the material elements of which the universe is built up in such a way that they gradually became adapted to the service of living beings whose existence he intended and foresaw.
We have then seen hitherto that the adaptations to one another which connect the various groups of beings in the macrocosm of the universe must be attributed to a Designing Mind. The same conclusion we arrive at by pondering the order prevailing in the microcosm of each living organism, from the tiniest unicellular plant up to the most highly organized animal.
"That there is an absolute break between the living world and the world devoid of life, is what scientific men are now agreed about -- thanks to the persevering labours of M. Pasteur. Those who affirm that though life does not arise from inorganic matter now, nevertheless it did so 'a long time ago,' affirm what is at the least contrary to all the evidence we possess, and they bring forward nothing more in favour of it than the undoubted fact that it is a supposition which is necessary for the validity of their own speculative views.
What then was it which gave birth to organic life? To say, it had no beginning, but that from eternity there existed one or several series of living organisms, would involve the postulate of succession without beginning, which we have proved to be self-contradictory.
That the Ruler in whose mind the order of the world originated is a self-existing intelligence, and consequently a personal God, does not follow immediately from the fact that the order of the world must be the work of a superhuman Intelligence. What does, however, follow immediately is, that the Intelligence which rules the physical world is so vast, that no human understanding and wisdom can be compared with it.
If, however, we would show that the order of the world is due, not only to an Intelligence far exceeding all intelligence of man, but ultimately to a self-existent Intelligence -- in other words, to a personal God, we must go back to the argument of the First Cause.
Cf. William Paley’s argument6
The Analogical Teleological Argument of Paley: If I stumbled on a stone and asked how it came to be there, it would be difficult to show that the answer, it has lain there forever is absurd. Yet this is not true if the stone were to be a watch.
1. According to Paley, the inference from the observation of the intricate design of the universe to the conclusion of a universe-maker who constructed and designed its use would be inevitable.
2. The inference is as follows …
Watch : watch maker :: universe : universe maker
Just as the function and complexity of a watch implies a watch-maker, so likewise the function and complexity of the universe implies the existence of a universe-maker.
See the similar, but more thoroughly elaborated, design argument presented by Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Whereas Hume's argument is an argument from design, we shall see that Paley's argument is more of an argument todesign.
D. Argument from Morals
Mankind has at all times believed in the existence of an intelligent nature superior to the material world and to man. This universal belief can only be explained as the result of the real existence of such a nature. But to grant this much is to grant implicitly the existence of a personal God.
We claim to find in this universal recognition which we assert, not only a corroboration of what has preceded, but an argument of absolute value in itself. We claim that a fact like this of the consent of nations in the recognition of God must be deemed the voice of universal reason yielding to the compelling evidence of truth. The cause must be adequate to the effect. A universal effect must imply an equally universal cause. But truth alone is such a cause. Error is always partial, local, temporary; truth alone is everywhere the same.
First, about the fact. From the ancient writers, pagan as well as Christian, many well known passages have been collected in which this universal recognition of a Divine government of the world is attested.
One is prone nowadays to suspect passages like these of resting too little on solid information, too much on the inferences and generalizations of oratory. Still they have their value, and attest to us the results of such actual experience as came within the reach of former generations. They have a right also to be taken together with the results of modern inquiry which, if they are found to agree with them, they can complete. "The assertion that rude non-religious tribes have been known in actual existence, though in theory possible, and perhaps in fact true, does not at present rest on that sufficient proof which for an exceptional state of things we are entitled to demand. . . . So far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate acquaintance."{44}
Here, however, the very natural objection will occur to the reader's mind: Do we not find an opposing voice at the other end of the scale of civilization? Do not those who deem themselves and are perhaps deemed by the mass of men to represent the acme of intellectual culture, proclaim themselves to be conscientiously agnostic in reference to this important doctrine? That there are these apparent exceptions to the general law must of course be admitted. But we must not allow our adversaries to assume too much. Undoubtedly there is an increasingly large number of persons who profess themselves to be agnostics. Still only a small portion of these can be regarded as persons of special culture: and if there are some such, it must not be forgotten that there are many more of equal culture who are earnest theists.
(1) Ignorance of natural causes. Men observed the marvelous course of nature in the midst of which they lived, and, unable as yet to detect the physical causes from which they actually spring, attributed them to the action of invisible beings which they anthropomorphically invested with form and qualities resembling their own.
(2) Fear excited by the stupendous forces of nature, by the flash of the lightning, the roll of the thunder, the fury of the waves, and the shock of the earthquake.
(3) The fraud of the ruling classes, of priests and kings, who played upon these natural predispositions of the people by stamping them with the seal of their own superior authority: so doing because they perceived that the tendency of the beliefs was to exalt their own character as priests and kings by causing them to be regarded as the Divine representatives and as the mediators through whose instrumentality alone the Divine anger could be appeased.
It will help to render the force of our argument more distinct, if we bear in mind the difference between what were once happily called by Cardinal Newman" Implicit and Explicit Reason." To reason, that is to say, to be intellectually moved by certain premisses to the adoption of the conclusion towards which they point, is one thing. To give an accurate account of the nature of the premisses grasped by the mind, is quite another.
The illustration is taken from one class of inference, but is applicable to others. To give an accurate account of one's reasoning is a faculty confined mainly to those who possess the art of reflection and analysis, born of the discipline of philosophical training
In the last clause of the thesis we are proving, we assert that to admit this universal recognition of a superior intelligence governing the universe is implicitly to admit the existence of a personal God.
The Five Ways of St. Thomas Aquinas7
A. The First Way: From the Existence of Motion
B. The Second Way: Proof from Existence of Efficient Causes
C. Proof from Existence of Corruptible Beings
D. Proof of God’s existence from Grades of perfection
E. Proof of God’s existence from Finalized activity of natural beings
Session V &VI: Solution to Difficulties against Fundamental Truths of Natural Theology
1. Traditionalists
Arguments urged by Traditionalists in favour of the opinion, that only by faith can we be certain of God's existence.
(1) First Traditionalistic Argument. -- The existence of God is an article of Christian faith. But articles of Christian faith must be believed on the authority of God -- they cannot be proved by natural reason alone. Consequently the existence of God is indemonstrable.
(2) Second Traditionalistic Argument. -- It is impossible that the contemplation of finite things should lead to any certain knowledge of the Infinite God.
2. Kant’s Difficulties
Kant, in his celebrated work, Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason), discusses at length the Ontological Argument, the Argument of the First Cause, and the Argument from Design. He finds fault with each of them, and arrives at the conclusion that speculative reason is unable to come to a satisfactory result in the matter.
Those who use the ontological proof, begin with the assumption that the concept of an infinitely perfect being is not self-contradictory.
The Argument from Design is held in higher respect by Kant. He objects, however, to its conclusiveness for two reasons.
(a) By itself alone it does not lead us to the knowledge of a Self-existing, Infinite God and Creator, but only to the persuasion that there exists an intelligent Architect of this world. To know something definite about the nature of this Architect, we must fall back upon the unsound ontological proof; for, in trying by means of the Argument of a First Cause to bring the Argument from Design to a full issue, we commit ourselves to the ontological proof, inasmuch as we reason a priori from self-existence to Infinity.
(b) Kant again doubts whether the supposition underlying the Argument from Design is valid, "that well-ordered effects of nature no less than well-ordered effects of human art, can only have been produced by the pre-arrangement of an intelligent mind.
3.Spinoza’s Stand
According to the pantheistic theory, expounded in Spinoza's Ethics, there is only one substance, unproduced and infinite -- God. Besides God, no substance can exist or be conceived to exist: consequently, whatever is, is in God; it is a mode or affection of the Divine Nature. God is not the transient or external cause of all things, but their immanent cause; they are all determined by the necessity of the Divine Nature to exist and to act in a certain definite manner Hence it follows that so-called freedom of will is a chimera and that things could have been produced by God in no Other way or order than as they have been produced.
These are the leading tenets of the thirty-six propositions, in which Spinoza, in the first part of his Ethics, explains his views about the primary cause of all things. From the general refutation of pantheism given above (Th. X. § 78), it is evident that these propositions contradict external and internal experience, and contain a virtual denial of the first principles both of speculative and of practical reason. Yet they are worked out with a show of exactness which has captivated while it has imposed upon many minds. It becomes, therefore, worth while to deal with them in some measure. We shall, however, confine ourselves to the one underlying fallacy on which the entire system is based. This is his misuse of his ambiguous definition of substance, which we shall examine briefly, and then pass on to the principles by which the German pantheists Fichte and Hegel, in spite of the unpopularity of their systems, have led the way to more modern forms of monism.
Spinoza rests his proof that God is the only possible substance on the proposition that one substance cannot be produced by another substance, which is a virtual assertion of pantheism. Substance is defined by Spinoza as "that which is in itself and is conceived by itself alone, that is to say, that of which the concept can be formed without involving any other concept."
This definition is patently ambiguous, and in order to make sure whether Spinoza's sixth proposition is really implicitly contained in it, we must inquire into the different ways in which the definition may be understood. Its meaning depends upon the interpretation of the phrase, "that which is in itself and is conceived by itself." This may signify (1) a complete individual, physical being, as distinguished from its natural properties and accidental modifications; it may also signify (2) a self-existing being, a being under all aspects independent of any other being, whether as an underlying subject in which it inheres, or as a cause from which it proceeds. This may signify a substantial principle imparting to the whole its specific character, or a natural property really distinct from the being of which it is predicated, or an accidental modification of a being. Thus the soul of a dog is in the matter of its body as a specifying principle (forma substantialis): the faculty of understanding, considered in its operations, is in the human soul as a natural property really distinct from the soul; and the derangement of mind is in the lunatic as an accidental modification.
If, then, we take Spinoza's definition of substance in the first of the two senses given above, and his definition of mode in the first of the three senses just explained, his first proposition is false. It is not true, for instance, that a dog is prior in nature to the specifying principle called his soul. Taking the same interpretation of the definition of substance along with the second and third interpretations of the definition of mode, we find the first proposition to be evidently true; for it is undeniable that natural properties and accidental modifications of a particular being cannot be conceived, except as following the existence of that being. In so far as they do not follow its existence in the order of time, they at least follow it in the order of nature, that is to say, their existence cannot be conceived but on the supposition that the being exists of which they are predicated. Finally, if we take Spinoza's definition of substance in the second sense given above, and his definition of mode in any of the three senses explained by us, it appears at once that his first proposition is altogether false. We have proved that God is physically and metaphysically simple. He is therefore not a substance like matter, which can be raised to diverse substantial degrees by the reception of diverse specifying principles. Nor are there in Him natural properties to be conceived as something under certain aspects really distinct from His essence, and following that essence, in the way that an act of our understanding is really distinct from and follows the essence of the soul. Much less can God be the subject of merely accidental modifications.
4Aristotle
His first argument is this: Before a body can be changed, it must exist. But it cannot come into existence except in virtue of a change, and this change supposes another change, and so on to infinity in the past. Consequently matter has been changing from eternity.
Second Argument of Aristotle. -- Where time is, motion is. But time had no beginning; for every moment of time is the end of past and the beginning of future time. Consequently there was no first moment.
Third Argument of Aristotle. -- The origin of all motion is ultimately due to God, the first absolutely unchangeable cause. But the first absolutely unchangeable cause cannot produce motion except from eternity to eternity: for otherwise He would undergo change Himself. It is therefore impossible that motion if existent should ever have had a commencement.
Sessions VII, VIII & IX: Divine Attributes
From the causality of things surrounding us, from the thoughts and volitions of our own mind, from the orderly arrangements visible everywhere in Nature, from the universal belief of mankind in some sort of Deity, and finally from the logical consequences of atheism and agnosticism, we arrive by lawful reasoning at the conclusion that the universe is not an effect of the forces of matter, nor of the evolution of some Unknowable being, but has started into existence at the will of a self-existing Mind, through the power of a personal God, whose Essence is one, simple, infinite, and who is the cause of all finite things, not by self-evolution, as pantheists would have it, but by creation out of nothing. His decree to create was a free act, and had no beginning; but there is nothing to prove that the effect of that decree must have been without beginning. On the contrary, creation from eternity is hardly admissible, even if its absolute impossibility is not demonstrable. Moreover, as regards the existence of the universe known to us, we have in its changes and generations an evident proof of its limited duration, and in this its limited duration an additional argument for its dependence upon the good pleasure of the one, infinite, personal God.
The basis on which throughout we shall have to build is the doctrine of the Divine Infinity, which itself rests on the doctrine of the Divine Unity and Simplicity. In carrying it out we shall be guided by the three canons of Divine attributes laid down already.
According to these canons those names of created perfections must be predicated of God, the meaning of which by abstraction and total denial of limits can be conceived without their implying any imperfection. They cannot indeed be predicated of God and of creatures univocally, but they can analogically. We have also seen that names of created perfections which necessarily connote imperfection, cannot be predicated of God save in a metaphorical sense.
It may be interesting to note how these canons were expressed by the ancient writer who goes under the name of St. Dionysius the Areopagite. Among his works there is one, De Divinis Nominibus, held in high esteem during the Middle Ages, and explained by St. Thomas.
In this book the attributes of God are said to be established in three ways, which are named, the way of removal, the way of affirmation, and the way of eminence.
(1) The way of removal we may call also the way of negation. -- By this way what are termed the negative Divine attributes are found. We "remove" from God in thought any name of created perfection, the meaning of which cannot be conceived in the abstract without connoting a defect. Thus we say, by the way of removal, that God is incorporeal, i.e., cannot be formally extended according to three dimensions; that He is simple, i.e., not composed of parts; that He is immutable, i.e., cannot pass from one state of existence to another. These negative attributes, whilst explicitly denying certain imperfections of created beings to exist in God, affirm thereby implicitly the opposite perfections to be in Him.
(2) The way of affirmation. -- By this is predicated of God whatever created perfection can be conceived in the abstract without connotation of imperfection. Thus we state that God is powerful, wise, truthful, benevolent, &c. Power, wisdom, veracity, benevolence, are perfections conceivable without necessarily connoting a defect. In affirming them of God we must however be on our guard not to apply to Him the limitations encompassing their abstract meaning, in so far as the latter is verified in creatures. The expedient open to us in order to guard ourselves against this error is called,
(3) The way of eminence. -- We have recourse to this way when we affirm positive attributes of God in such sort as to deny at the same time that the perfection affirmed is limited in Him. Thus we say by way of eminence that God's wisdom, power, goodness, benevolence, is boundless or infinite.
We have also to hear in mind the mutual relations of the attributes among themselves before we can thoroughly grasp the explanation to be given of them. In treating of the Divine simplicity we have seen that God is not only physically simple but also metaphysically, which means that no two concepts can be formed of His Essence without the one overlapping the other. Consequently, as the physical simplicity of God forbids us to admit accidental perfections in Him, the significations of any two Divine attributes must implicitly cover one another. From this it does not, however, follow that the names of different attributes of God convey the same knowledge to our mind. The term, "Divine Mercy," differs explicitly in its meaning from that of "Divine Justice." We say, therefore, that both attributes (and the same holds good of any two Divine attributes taken together), are distinct from one another metaphysically, though they do not combine in metaphysical composition. They express the idea of One Incomprehensible God inadequately under different aspects. For this reason St. Thomas well says that the names of God are not "synonymous." "Though the names given to God signify the same thing, yet they signify it under many different mental aspects, and consequently are not synonymous," for "those words are said to he synonymous which signify one and the same thing from the same point of view."
In the second chapter of that hook we proved that there exists a self-existent, intelligent Being, rightly called a personal God; and in the third chapter we demonstrated that unity, simplicity, and infinity are proper to Him. These fundamental truths are the basis upon which our further speculations on the Divine attributes must rest. Having established that God is infinitely perfect, we see at once that we are to deny of Him whatever attribute necessarily involves an imperfection, and to affirm whatever attribute can be conceived without connotation of a defect. Consequently, the Divine attributes are partly negative, partly positive. We shall treat in the three first chapters respectively of God's immutability, eternity, immensity; in the next three, of His infinite knowledge, His infinitely perfect will, and His infinite power. After this we shall add a special chapter on the metaphysical essence of God. Since the chapters on the knowledge and will of God are of higher importance than the rest, we shall treat of them at greater length.
I. The Immutability of God.
The Divine Being is absolutely immutable.
Change is a passing from one state of being to another. If a thing passes from one species to another, it is said to be substantially changed. Thus, according to the scholastic view, oxygen and hydrogen change substantially when transformed into water. Food is changed substantially by assimilation into a living body. If the specific being of the thing is not affected, the change is called accidental. Instances of accidental change are mechanical motion in a body; in a living being, growth and sensation; in a human mind, a new set of thoughts and volitions.
God is not liable to any of these changes. This truth some scholastic authors express by saying that God is physically immutable. They distinguish between physical and moral mutability, understanding by the former a liability to change of physical being, by the latter a liability to change of will. Thus men are morally mutable, because they can form new resolutions, and abandon those previously adopted. In human beings such a moral change cannot go on without a physical change accompanying it; but it is not immediately evident that every moral change of God would also be a physical change. The infinite Being is adequately sufficient to choose and not to choose from eternity, as we have explained in the chapter on creation. Why, then, should He not be able to choose at one time one thing, at another another, without change in His Being? Why must He be not only physically, but also morally unchangeable? This question we shall treat of in the chapter on the perfection of God's will. For the present we are only concerned about proving that the Being of God cannot be changed in any way.
In proof of this we appeal first to God's simplicity.
By every change a thing must either lose or acquire some quality or affection of its being. On the former supposition, it must consist of at least two really distinct realities before it changes; otherwise it would lose nothing. On the latter, it is composed of at least two distinct realities after the change. In neither case can it be a necessarily simple Being. But, as we have shown (Th. VIII. §§ 61, seq.), God is necessarily simple to the exclusion of all real and even of all virtual composition. Consequently He must be absolutely unchangeable.
The same conclusion may be drawn from the infinite perfection of God. As has been proved above (Th. IX. §§ 65, seq.), God is infinitely perfect. But evidently He could not be so if He were liable to any change; for by this He must either become more or less good. If we take the first alternative, and suppose Him to be bettered by the change, He could not have been infinite before it. The other alternative is still more obviously untenable. If He became less good by the change, His infinity would evidently cease to be.147. It is, indeed, very difficult to see how the immutability of God thus proved can be consistent with His supreme freedom of choice, but we shall treat of this subject in the chapter on the Divine will. Here we shall merely call attention to the difficulties which arise from the fact of creation and the revealed mystery of the Incarnation.
(1) Difficulty. -- God of His own free choice created the world out of nothing. He was not necessitated to create it, and if He had not done so, He would not be the Creator. Consequently the attribute Creator has been added to His Being. But it could not be added without causing a change. Therefore God has undergone a change.
Answer. To solve this difficulty, we are to explain what is meant by the statement, God created the world. It means that God by an eternal free decree resolved to produce the world out of nothing, and fixed the moments of its commencement and the term of its duration. He then in harmony with that decree originated it by His infinite power. Both the decree of creation and the power by which it was executed are truly in God, but not as entities really distinct from His Essence. His Essence is infinite, and in virtue of its infinity is sufficient for forming and executing any decree without internal change. From this it follows that the attribute Creator is not an intrinsic denomination signifying some intrinsic affection or state accruing to the Essence of God, but an extrinsic denomination, signifying the dependence of the world on God as regards its origin.
The same must be said of the attributes, Preserver of all things, Ruler of the universe, and the like. They are extrinsic denominations signifying different respects under which creatures depend upon God's will and power.
The difficulty, then, is solved by denying the statement that the attribute of Creator has been added to the Being of God. The truth is, that by creation God has produced things outside Himself, and from this production, by which in Himself He is in nothing changed, God is extrinsically denominated the Creator.
(2) Difficulty. -- Any difficulty drawn from the mystery of the Incarnation, strictly speaking, has no place in a philosophical treatise. Still it is convenient to give it a place, as it is one likely to occur to the minds of readers. The Son of God, who is really one Being with the Divine Essence, became Man an at a definite moment of time. Since that moment He has had not only a Divine Nature, but also a Human one. But it would seem that the union of a Human Nature with a Divine Person could not be accomplished without a change in the latter.
The answer to the difficulty is that the infinite God does not need any self-adaptation for any work which He pleases to perform. Consequently the Son of God needed not to adapt Himself for the assumption of a human nature. Without change of Himself, He was able to assume humanity at any moment, on the supposition that a human nature existed in such a state as to be fit for assumption by the Divine Person. Consequently the mystery of the Incarnation neither denotes nor connotes any change in the Son of God; but it denotes the creation of a particular human nature supernaturally raised to union with the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity, and it connotes the absence of human personality in that nature, on account of its being taken up into the personality of the Son. It was not, so to speak, the Divinity moving towards the Humanity, but the Humanity moving towards the Divinity.
II. The Eternity of God.
God is eternal in the strict sense of the word.
148. The word "eternal" taken in a wider sense signifies endless existence, though that existence may have a beginning, and may run through various successive phases. Thus, the life of men after the day of the general resurrection will be eternal, though not without successive mental acts and bodily movements. It is called eternal simply because it will never cease.
In its strict sense the word eternity implies an existence which is essentially without beginning, and without end, and without any successive phases of being. We beg the reader not to overlook in this definition the word essentially. If we imagine a spirit created by God from eternity, and preserved by His infinite power for ever without any internal change, the existence of such a spirit would be indeed without beginning and end, and without successive phases of being, but it would not be eternal in the strict sense of the word. And why not? Because the essence of that spirit would have no existence of itself, but would be indebted for its existence and its boundless duration to the free choice of the omnipotent God.
From the definition of eternity just given it is evident that the term, if predicable at all in its strict sense, is predicable of God alone. No creature can be essentially without beginning and end and internal succession. Not essentially without beginning, for there is no reason why any creature must be created from eternity. Not essentially without end; for God may withdraw from the creature His preserving power. Not essentially without internal succession, for at least the infinite power of God can cause in it a new phase of existence.
Is then God Himself eternal in the strict sense of the word? Yes; because as the First Cause, and the only source of all possible being, He must exist with absolute necessity, and therefore can have no beginning. Absolute necessity of existence must be identical with His essence, on account of His simplicity, which we have proved to be not only physical but metaphysical (Th. VIII. § 61, seq.); and therefore it is impossible that He should cease to be. His existence is unchangeable (Th. XXII.); therefore it cannot contain any different successive phases or modes of being.
Boëthius, who flourished about A.D. 500, in his work, De Consolatione Philosophiae, thus defines eternity{1} "Eternity is a simultaneously full and perfect possession of interminable life." What in our definition was implied by the terms "existence essentially without beginning and without end," is expressed by Boëthius more explicitly in the phrase, "possession of interminable life." Indeed, as eternity proper belongs to God alone, it is identified with the highest life conceivable, the self-activity of infinite Intellectual Will. This life is "interminable," or boundless, because it endures of absolute necessity. It is "simultaneously possessed" in its fulness and perfection, because, being infinite, it is neither capable of development nor liable to defect. As it is now, so it has been always in the past, and will be always in the future. Coexisting with all assignable moments of time, the eternal God is above any of our measures of the contingent duration of created being. In Him, therefore, is neither present, nor past, nor future. As Boëthius expresses it, Nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit aeternitatem -- " The passing now makes time, the standing now makes eternity."{2} In other words, the duration proper to the eternal Being must be conceived as one everlasting state, whereas the duration of temporal being is liable to a succession of states really distinct from one another.
150. Between temporal and eternal duration there is a duration intermediate, which, for the sake of distinction, is called by the scholastics, aeviternal duration, or aevum. It is the duration of created spirits. Both time and aevum are contingent durations, dependent upon the freewill of the one eternal Being. But while time is made up of successive states or phases of being, aevum does not imply any succession. A created spirit may be annihilated, but the specific spiritual being proper to it cannot be changed; consequently there is no succession in it, as regards its substantial perfection. Nevertheless, spirits are not quite above time, or succession of states in their existence; for, though the specific perfection of their substantial being is unalterable, they can still pass from one thought and volition to another, and the creator may cause in them now one, now another accidental perfection. Their essential being is above time, but they are liable to accidental modification of temporary duration. The duration, called time, belongs most properly to matter, which changes as well in its substantial as its accidental perfection.
St. Thomas expresses the difference between time, aevum, and eternity briefly in this way: "Time has an 'earlier' and a 'later'; aevum has no 'earlier' and 'later' in itself, but both can be connected with it; eternity has neither an 'earlier' nor a 'later,' nor can they be connected with it."
In other words: Time is made up of a series of changes in a substantial stratum, or in the accidental state of a complete substance; aevum is not itself a series of either substantial or accidental changes, but in the finite incorruptible substance, of which it is the duration, there may be accidental changes; Eternity is the duration of a Being above all change, whether substantial or accidental. As the duration called eternity is nothing really distinct from the Eternal God Himself, we are right in saying that all and each of the successive events which happen in this world are coexistent with the whole of eternity considered in itself. But none of them is coexistent with the whole of eternity in so far as eternity is considered in its relation of coexistence with preceding or following events, for the simple reason that each temporary event is a passing reality, whilst eternity is, so to speak, a standing reality, the everlasting Being whose Essence is Existence, abiding always the same with absolute necessity. The works of His hands are the heavens. They shall perish, but He shall continue; and they shall all grow old as a garment, and as a vesture shall He change them, and they shall be changed; but He is the self-same.
Hence we gather the solution of difficulties against the eternity of God, such as the following:
Two things, the duration of which wholly coincides with the whole duration of a third thing, must coexist with one another. But the Deluge and the Franco-German War are two things, the duration of which according to the exposition given, wholly coincide with the whole duration of God. Consequently, whilst the Germans were fighting against the French, the earth was covered with the waters of the Deluge.
This difficulty, though commonly urged, need not detain us long, after the explanations given of the strict contents of the meaning of time as distinguished from duration. Both in God and in created things there is duration, for duration in itself is pure perfection. But the Divine duration, since it is a changeless persistency in existence, does not in itself offer any means of distinguishing before and after. When, however, substances are created whose being is liable to successive phases of existence, they, at each period of their existence, coexist with God, they last, whilst the entire being of God is persisting. But this clearly does not cause them all to be contemporaneous with one another, since although coexisting with the entire being of God, they are not coexistent with the entire duration of God.
The same difficulty and the same solution will present themselves when we compare the Divine immensity with the localization of bodies. Since God is everywhere, and everywhere whole and entire, wheresoever any extended substance is placed it is in the same place with the whole of God: but it would be absurd to conclude therefore that all bodies are coincident in point of place.
III. The Immensity of God.
God is immense.
The word "immense," explained according to its etymology, signifies a state of things not capable of measurement, or of reference to another thing taken as a rule or standard. Things of this world are measured chiefly under one of three aspects, either according to their extension in space, called simply extension; or according to their extension in time, called duration; or according to their extension in being, called perfection. Under none of these aspects is God measurable. In so far as no created perfection can be applied as a measure to His infinite perfection, we call Him infinite; in so far as His duration is beyond the measure of any created duration, we call Him eternal; and in so far as He is so present to all things in space, that His presence cannot be measured either by parts of space or by the whole of it, we assign to Him the attribute of immensity.
In virtue then of this perfection God exists everywhere in space, without consisting of parts corresponding to parts of space, and without being limited to any extension of space. To understand more fully what this means, the reader must bear in mind what space properly is, and in what different ways things can be conceived to exist in space.
As time is not a particular enduring reality existing in itself, but an object of thought, which is formed by collecting mentally and reckoning together the successive states of changeable things; so space is not a thing having its own individual being different from the corporeal beings which are said to exist in it, but it is an object of thought, formed by thinking about the extension of bodies under a peculiar aspect, namely, by thinking of the relation of distance between their surfaces, which distance involves three dimensions, and may therefore be called volume. Representing to ourselves the volume between the surfaces of one or several particular bodies, we form the idea of a space, or place within the world; and thinking of the volume between the extreme surfaces of the whole material world, we conceive the whole of actual space. Space, therefore, is only actual in so far as extended bodies exist.
Beyond the corporeal world there is, however, infinite possible space, inasmuch as by the power of God the extension of the world can become larger, and exceed any assignable limit.
The whole of actual space coincides with the whole of the corporeal world, considered as included within the extreme surfaces of the extreme bodies. Each particular body has its own particular space, which means that it is extended according to three dimensions between the surfaces surrounding it. In so far as it is included in its own surfaces it is sometimes said to have an internal space or place; whilst the surfaces of other bodies surrounding it are called its external space or place.
We have next to consider and discriminate the way in which things can exist in space. A thing is said by the scholastics to exist circumscriptively in space, if it be divisible into parts corresponding to the parts of the surfaces surrounding it. As only bodies are thus divisible, they alone can exist in space circumscriptively.
A thing is said to exist in space definitely, if its presence be limited to a certain part of space, and its whole substance be everywhere within the bounds of that part of space. Thus the human soul is said to exist definitely in the body, because its existence is conterminous with the body in such a way, that its whole substance exists whole in the whole body and whole in every part of it, and on the other hand is found nowhere outside of the body. A thing which exists in space circumscriptively is said to be formally extended. The definite existence of an indivisible substance in space is called virtual extension.
By the immensity of God we understand a mode of existence in corporeal things or space, which is neither circumscriptive nor definite. It is not circumscriptive, because in God there are no parts assignable corresponding to the parts of space. And it is not definite, because there is no space real or possible where He does not exist in His entirety, or in other words, because no limit of possible space can be given beyond which He would not be present to created things, if the world were extended thus far by His power.
Is then the way of existence we are speaking of really proper to God? That He must exist without having parts corresponding to the parts of space, is evident from His simplicity. But how shall we prove that His essence must extend its presence to every possible space that may be created, and is not confined to any fixed limits of corporeal magnitude?
For our first argument again as ever we may appeal to the infinity of God. On account of this attribute we have to predicate of Him whatever perfection can be conceived without connotation of defect. But the perfection of being indivisibly and unlimitedly present to any possible created being, and of surpassing by an extension which we may call infinitely virtual, the formal extension of every conceivable corporeal magnitude is evidently a perfection without defect. Consequently it is in God, that is to say, He is immense.
A slightly different way of arriving at the same conclusion is opened by the consideration that the creative power of God is infinite. God can create any number of worlds outside the present, and God alone can do it. If, therefore, He will create them, He must create them by the immediate application of His own power. Now it is inconceivable that any efficient cause should immediately apply its power there, where it is not by its substance. Consequently the Divine substance is such that it would be present to any possible world supposing that world to start into existence. This presence would not be anything new in God: or He would not be immutable. Therefore we must say that the Divine substance has an existence eminently equivalent to any possible extension whatever of corporeal worlds, i.e., that God is really immense.
It is gratifying to see this great truth accurately stated by Newton in Scholion Generale, added to the third book of his Principia, where he says: "God is present everywhere, not only by His power, but also by His substance; for power cannot subsist without substance."
155. To express more fully how God is in all His creatures, scholastic philosophers are wont to say that He is in each of them "by essence, presence, and power." St. Thomas illustrates the meaning of this phrase by some instances taken from human life. "A king is said to be in his whole kingdom by his power, though he is not present everywhere. A thing is said to be by its presence in all things which are in view of it, as all things that are exposed in a room are present to a visitor, who nevertheless is not in substance in every part of the room. Finally, a thing is said to be according to its substance or essence in that place in which its substance actually is to be found."
St. Thomas proceeds to apply this doctrine to three forms of error not at all too antiquated to deserve mention in our day. The first found an eloquent advocate in John Stuart Mill, the second was partly at least adopted by some of the deists of last century; and the third is, to say the least, not opposed with enough decision by some Christian authors who have written on the subject.
These are St. Thomas's explanations: "There have been some, to wit, the Manicheans, who have said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the Divine power, but visible and corporeal things to the power of a contrary principle. Against these then we must say that God is in all things by His power.
"There were others who believed indeed that all things were subject to the Divine power; yet did not extend Divine Providence to the things here below. Their mind is well expressed in the words of Scripture: 'He walks about the poles of Heaven and does not consider our things.'Against these we must say that God is in all things by His presence. Again, there were others who granted that in some way all things are under the sway of Divine Providence, but at the same time made the assertion that not all things were immediately created by God. According to them He created immediately only the first creatures, and these created the rest. Against them we must maintain that God is everywhere by His essence.
"Thus then He is in all things by His power, in that all depend upon Him, and by His presence, inasmuch as all things are 'naked and open to His eyes;' He is in all by His essence, because He is with all as the cause of their existence."
In order to prevent any misunderstanding of the phrase, "God is in creatures by His essence," St. Thomas presently remarks that it does not mean that His essence is an ingredient of created essences, but only that His substance is with them all as the cause of their existence.
And, in the same place, he tells us that the being of God in creatures by His essence signifies a closer proximity than His being in them by His presence. It signifies His being, not at a distance from His creatures, as one who sees them from afar, but at their side, sustaining them by His power. Or, to quote the words of the Saint: "God is in all things so as to surround them on all sides with His Being" and, "Nothing is distant from God, as though He had it not in Himself."
Sessions X & XI: Metaphysical Essence of God
The metaphysical essence of God, or that Divine attribute by which the human intellect must principally distinguish Him from all created beings, is the attribute of self-existence. In other words, God is best defined by saying that He is the self-existing Being, or "He who is." Consequently, the transcendental attributes, "Truth," "Goodness," "Beauty," belong most properly to God, who is to be called the first and supreme Truth, the first and supreme Goodness, the first and supreme Beauty.
The essence of a created thing is that in virtue of which it is what it is (id quo res est id quod est), or that which constitutes its inmost being, and without which it could not possibly be what it is said to be. Using the term in a wider sense, we apply it not only to natural substances, but also to artificial things, to accidental determinations of substances, and even to defects. Thus we speak of the essence of a machine, of the essence of colour, of the essence of a disease, of sin, &c. But primarily the word "essence" is used of natural substances.
Under this aspect of the meaning of "essence" a distinction is to be drawn between the essence of a thing as existing and as conceived by a human intellect.
There are in the order of existence as many essences as there are different substances; for each particular substance has its peculiar being, and is in virtue thereof one particular substance and no other. As St. Thomas expresses it: Esse proprium cujuslibet rei est tantum unum -- " The proper being of each thing is only one."
If a particular individual thing could be conceived by us adequately and according to its proper being, our knowledge of its essence would be complete; in other words, we should have grasped what some among modern scholastics call the physical essence of the thing.
But no substance is fully known by us according to the inmost constitution of its being. Consequently of none do we know exactly its physical essence. Such distinction as we are able to draw between one individual thing and another, is based upon a difference of accidental determinations, or individual marks (notae individuantes). Thus we tell one man from another by his figure, gait, size, countenance, voice, &c.
The essence of created things as conceived by us does not contain all, but only some of the realities of which its physical essence is made up, to wit, such as are found in other things of a similar, though not really the same, physical essence.
Conceiving for instance the essence of an individual man as a sensitive rational being, I conceive it in no way adequately as it is existing, but only inadequately according to those notes which I conceive as obtaining in all individual men. These individuals differ from one another precisely in virtue of their different physical essences, whilst at the same time they resemble one another on account of the similarity of those essences. The notes which form the basis of such a resemblance constitute the metaphysical essence of each member of the group.
The metaphysical essence is consequently an inadequate mental expression of the physical essence of a thing. That expression may be of various shades of perfection. It may express only the remote genus to which a thing belongs, or its proximate genus only, or its proximate genus together with the specific difference, by which the lowest species of which it is a member, differs from other species. Thus I express the metaphysical essence of my friend very inadequately by saying that he is a substance, more to the point by giving him the name of living being, still better by affirming that he is an animal, and best of all by Dearing that he is a rational animal.
What we have said about physical and metaphysical essence, is based upon the doctrine laid down by logicians that the universal as such has no existence, but exists only inasmuch as it is realized in particular things resembling one another. Hence it is readily understood that the metaphysical essence of a created thing is a true but imperfect mental delineation of the physical essence; and that consequently the distinction between metaphysical and physical essence, in so far as both are verified in one individual thing, is not a distinction existing as such objectively, but in thought only. Yet as it is based upon the objective similarity of physical essences, it is not a mere fiction, but founded on a real fact.
The limitations of the human intellect prevent our having any more accurate conception of the essence of a created being than is obtained by putting together those notes which constitute its lowest species. We say accordingly that we know the essence of a thing, when we are able to express the realities intelligible in each member of its lowest species. For the same reason the definition of a thing is supposed sufficiently to express its essence, when it gives a good account of its specific nature, as is done by indicating the proximate genus and the specific difference of that nature. Here then the old principle of St. Thomas is verified, that our way of speaking imitates the inadequacy of our conceptions. Although the metaphysical essence of a thing expresses its real physical essence but very imperfectly, yet it is simply called "essence." "Essence or nature," says St. Thomas, "comprises only those notes of a thing which fall under the definition of a species, as for instance humanity comprises only those notes which are contained in the definition of man; for by these man is man."
"Essence is properly that which is signified by a definition. But a definition comprises only the constituents of a species, not those of an individual."
"The essence of each thing is that which is signified by its definition."
These remarks about "essence" may suffice to explain the sense in which Catholic philosophers speak of the Divine Essence. Sometimes they use the term to express what would correspond to the physical essence of creatures. We meet for instancv with passages like the following: "Although the existence of God and some of His attributes are knowable, yet His Essence cannot be known by us, so long as we are in this life." In such phrases "Essence" means the Being of God as it is in itself. Thus considered, it is hidden from our direct and immediate intuition. Our natural knowledge about it is altogether inferential, analogical, and inade~ quate. And, indeed, so it must be. Experience testifies that we are unable to grasp adequately the physical essence of even the meanest of creatures. How then shall we fathom that of the Creator?
The question then arises: Is there among the attributes of God any one attribute that may rightly be called His metaphysical Essence? This attribute, if such there be, must distinguish God from all species of finite beings after the manner in which the metaphysical essence of creatures of a certain species distinguishes them from those of another species of the same proximate genus. And as the metaphysical essence of a creature is for our intellect the root of its specific properties, so the metaphysical essence of God should furnish a foundation for our mind to construct thereupon in systematic order the rest of the Divine attributes.
To this question different answers have been given by different schoolmen. Scotus thought that the attribute of infinity was aptly called the Essence of God; Billuart held that the Divine intelligence, inasmuch as it is self-existing, deserved that name.
Neither of these two opinions satisfies the explanation of metaphysical essence given above. To human reason, unaided by revelation, infinity is not the root of all the attributes of God; for we cannot understand why God must be infinite, before we have understood that He is self-existent and one. Nor again is the attribute of intelligence, considered as self-existent, the starting-point from which our intellect proceeds in order to establish the rest of the Divine attributes. Moreover, this attribute of intelligence contains more than is necessary to distinguish God from all creatures. For this purpose it is not requisite to affirm that He is a self-existent Intelligence; it is enough to say that He is self-existent; for a self-existent being must be infinitely intelligent, as our previous arguments have shown.
It is then in the attribute of self-existence alone that we find these properties which make a Divine attribvte correspond to what we call in creatures metaphysical essence. In this attribute there is expressed as well that which is (analogically) common to God and to creatures, as also that by which He is distinguished from them all. God exists really and creatures exist really. God has His proper being, or, rather is it, and so has every creature its proper being. Inasmuch therefore as "being," conceived in the highest possible abstraction, means nothing more than opposition to nothingness, we say truly: God is and the creature is. Yet the Divine being and the created being differ infinitely from one another in that the former is independent, the latter dependent; the former uncaused, the latter caused; the former has all things of itself, the latter has absolutely nothing of itself, but is itself an effect produced out of nothing according to a preconceived idea derived from the Divine essence. This infinite difference is indicated by saying, that God not only is, but is of Himself, in virtue of His own essence; in a word, He is self-existent. From this concept of self-existence we have unfolded the unity and infinity of God and established rules for determining whether any given created perfection is to be affirmed or denied of the Creator and in what sense. Following these rules we found the chief negative and positive attributes of God, as expounded in the six previous chapters of this Book.
Self-existence is consequently, for a logically reasoning human intellect, not merely a distinctive excellence of the Divinity, it is the one fundamental excellence from which all others are to be explained. Therefore it deserves the name of Divine Essence.
198. The only objection worthy of consideration against this view is this, that self-existence does not sufficiently mark off the one true God from the fictitious deity of pantheists and the uncreated atoms of materialists. It would seem that monotheists, pantheists, and materialists agree with one another perfectly in that they suppose a self-existent source of all being. Monotheists believe in a self-existent personal and infinite God, who created all things other than Himself out of nothing by His omnipotent will. Pantheists, at least our modern Spinozists and Hegelians, assume a self-existent substance or idea developing into various spiritual and material things as so many modes or determinations of its proper being. Materialists imagine self-existent atoms driven by inexplicable laws to evolve out of their innermost potentiality life and sense and reason.
If then self-existence is predicated both of fictitious first causes and of the one true First Cause, how can we say that it expresses the essence of God?
To understand fully the answer to this question, the reader must bear in mind what has been proved in Book I. chap. iv. against the pantheistic and materialistic hypothesis. It has been shown there{8} that both the self-existent and self-evolving deity of pantheists, and the self-existent atoms assumed by materialists, are intrinsically absurd. Now definitions are not made to distinguish the thing defined from intrinsic absurdities, but to point out its difference from realities. The definition of God must therefore contain that by which God is clearly and primarily distinguished from all real things that are not God. And from all these He is clearly and primarily distinguished by the definition: God is the self-existent being. If, therefore, according to the common way of speaking, the essence of a thing is the import of its definition, self-existence must be the essence of God.
The truth underlying the difficulty which we have solved amounts to this, that the phrase, God is the self-existing being, is not a definition, which in an age like our own should be put forward without proper explanation. Yet this does not prevent it from being a good definition in itself. All definitions need explaining according to the circumstances of those to whom they are propounded.
199. Comparing the definition given with the name under which God revealed Himself to Moses: "I am who am. . . . Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you;" we see that the phrase, He who is, is identical in meaning with the self-existent being. The term, " self-existent being," denotes that actual essence which alone is incapable of being rightly conceived otherwise than as existing in itself. Every other actual essence can be conceived as not existing in itself, as a mere term of the Divine intellect, a purely possible imitation of the Divine essence. But this is exactly what is meant by the Scriptural phrase, "He who is." God is accurately defified to be the self-existent being, ipsum esse in se subsistens, and He is equally well defined, He who is, Qui est.
For the appropriateness of this name revealed by God Himself, St. Thomas gives three reasons.
(1) This name suggests to us that God is not a being made according to a preconceived eternal idea, but a necessarily existing essence."
(2) This name, as it is of the widest universality, does not, like other names, such as Mighty, Wise, Just, connote a certain class or classes of beings. Consequently, when used with emphasis as the proper name of the Divine Being, it suggests to us that that Being is not limited in His perfection to the reality conceivable in one or more genera of finite things, but unites in Himself eminently whatever outside Himself can be conceived as being, in opposition to privation or defect." (3) The name He who is, as it contains the substantive verb to be in the present tense, connotes the essence of God to be unalterable eternity, an unchangeable standing "now" in the midst of transitory created existences.
The metaphysical essence of God naturally suggests His three transcendental attributes: Truth, Goodness, Beauty. We call them transcendental, because they transcend all the genera and classification of substances inasmuch as they are not properties of a certain class or classes of substances, but are, to a certain extent, verified in every creature. They express the perfection of all being whatsoever, as bearing certain relations to intellect and will.
Every being, in so far as it is conceivable as a positive reality, is true; in so far as its perfection is matter of approval or desire to a rational will, it is good; and in so far as its perfection involves an excellence which the intellect cannot contemplate without the will, if duly disposed, being moved to a certain complacency and delight, it is beautiful.
As then God unites in His self-existent essence all conceivable perfections, He must stand in such a relation to every intellect and will as to deserve in a most proper sense the denominations of Truth, Goodness, Beauty. A short explanation and proof of this will aptly conclude this chapter.
(1) Truth. We must distinguish objective truth, intellectual truth, moral truth. A thing is objectively or essentially true, in so far as it deserves the name of thing, and is not a mere chimera. Every conceivable possible or actual substance is consequently objectively true. Besides this properly transcendental meaning of truth, there are two other senses in which truth is found only in rational beings. A rational being apprehending and judging a thing in harmony with its possible or actual existence, and not confounding the one with the other, has formal or intellectual truth; its intellect is formally or intellectually true. Intellectual or formal truth is the conformity of the knowing intellect with the object known (adaequatio intellectus cum re).
A rational being when it addresses itself to other minds by speech or equivalent modes of expression, is said to be truthful or not according as it manifests or not what it takes to be objective truth. This sort of truth or truthfulness is generally called moral truth. The speaker is under a moral obligation to be truthful in this manner.
In each of these three meanings truth is proper to God without limit. He is infinitely perfect objective Truth; for He is not only a really conceivable Being, but He is the only Being the acknowledgment of whom explains all realities, as He is the principle of all possible being and the First Cause of all actual being outside Himself. Being possessed of an infinite intellect, which is really identical with His essence, He is the first intellectual Truth, not liable either to the shadows of ignorance or to the depravations of error. Moreover it has been proved in our exposition of His moral attributes that His veracity and faithfulness are absolutely perfect. Each revelation He makes is therefore morally true; and as the manifestation of infinitely perfect wisdomr altogether infallible.
(2) Goodness is distinguished as absolute and relative. Absolute goodness is the perfection. of a being, in so far as it cannot be considered in itself without eliciting the approval of a rational and righteous will. Relative goodness is the perfection of a being, considered in its aptitude to satisfy the natural tendencies of other beings.
From these definitions it appears easily that God is supreme goodness both absolute and relative. He is supreme absolute goodness by virtue of His infinitely perfect essence, which contains without any defect everything worthy of approval and love. He is supreme relative goodness, for, as we shall see in Book III., no creature can reach the goal of its existence unless it be preserved and directed by Him, who alone is the First Cause of its goodness; and, as we see in Ethics, no rational being can find the happiness for which it has been made, save through union with Him by perfect knowledge and love. Nay, just as being, when taken as a necessary attribute, cannot be predicated except of God, so goodness is predicable with absolute necessity of God alone. In this sense our Saviour said, "None is good but God alone."
St. Thomas gives a fuller explanation of this truth in the following words: "God alone is good by His essence. For the goodness of everything is based upon its perfection. Now there is a threefold perfection of a thing to be distinguished. The first is that which constitutes its existence. To this a second perfection is added, in that the thing existing receives some accidental qualities necessary for its perfect operation. Its third perfection consists in attaining something outside itself as the end of its existence. . . . But of these three perfections none belongs to any creature in virtue of its essence. God alone possesses them in this way. Indeed of Him alone can it be said that His essence is His existence; He alone cannot receive accidental qualities, but possesses as identical with His essence what is predicated of others accidentally -- for instance, power, wisdom, &c. He also has no end to reach, but is Himself the end of all things. It is consequently evident that God alone is essentially perfect in every respect, which is tantamount to saying that He alone is good in virtue of His essence."
In the following article the Angelic Doctor explains thus the relation of God's goodness to that of creatures: "Everything is said to be good in virtue of the Divine goodness, inasmuch as this is the prototype, the first efficient cause and last end of whatever is good. Nevertheless everything is good in itself, in so far as it is a sort of copy of the Divine Being, from the resemblance to which it is formally denominated good. Thus under one aspect there is one goodness of all, under another aspect there are, if we may say so, many goodnesses."
Note. -- Goodness in a more limited sense signifies reasonable benevolence. That this must be predicated of God in regard to His rational creatures we have proved when treating of the moral attributes.
(3) Beauty is the inseparable companion of perfect goodness. By the beautiful we mean that which, when intellectually perceived, excites by its mere contemplation feelings of satisfaction and delight in the well-disposed will. This idea is happily expressed in the old saying, Pulcrum est splendor veri -- "Beauty is the lustre of truth."
The description given applies equally to a beautiful edifice, a beautiful statue, a beautiful sermon, a beautiful saying, beautiful music, and to a beautiful idea, a beautiful way of acting, a beautiful character, a beautiful soul. As our intellect in this life can have no direct intuition but of sensible things, it is impossible for mortal men to contemplate beauty intuitively unless it appears under sensible forms. Yet its essence is in no way sensible, but purely intellectual. The most essential note of beauty in corporeal things is proportion of parts to a whole and to one another. Now proportion as such is evidently an object not of sense-perception, but of intellectual apprehension, whether it exists in the region of colour or of sound or of ideas, in the harmony of the animal body, limb with limb, or in the fitness of moral action to the rational nature of the doer. It follows from this that a brute beast, although it may have an attraction for bright colour, has no true taste for beauty; and that the ability of a man to judge of its presence or absence increases with the power of his intellect to strike a comparison between phenomenal appearance and ideal type. Pulchra dicuntur quae visa placent, says St. Thomas. "Things beautiful are those of which the mental intuition causes delight." The more comprehensive the mental intuition of the beautiful, the greater is the spiritual delight produced by it. Things of which we can have no direct intuition are to be judged beautiful if it can be shown that on the supposition of immediate contemplation spiritual satisfaction would naturally arise. This being so, God must be infinitely beautiful. In the section on Divine Life we draw the conclusion that the comprehensive knowledge which God has of this His perfection necessarily involves in Him a state of infinite happiness. How much more must this infinite perfection of the Creator suffice to make finite minds happy if they are allowed to behold it. As God is the final end of man, even the knowledge of Him as He is reflected in the mirror of creatures would, as is proved in Ethics, become so perfect in our final state as to cause in us a perfect natural happiness, supposing us not to have been raised to a supernatural state, nor ever to have forfeited the attainment of our last end by sin not pardoned. Indeed, the millions of infants who die without baptism every year will rejoice throughout eternity over the Divine beauty as it is reflected in creation. Yet their knowledge of God and the happiness resulting from it cannot be compared with what Christian faith leads us to live and to long for. By this faith we are certain that all those who believe in the Word made Flesh with that living faith which works through charity are children of God by adoption. As such they are destined to see God face to face, and to find a torrent of delight in the vision of His eternal and unchangeable beauty. The hope of coming to the enjoyment of this beauty of beauties has guided and strengthened the Apostles and martyrs of all ages in the midst of persecutions and torments. They reckoned with St. Paul "that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us," when we shall see "the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who only hath immortality, and inhabiteth light inaccessible" to the intuition of mortals. The same hope forms even at the end of our materialistic nineteenth century an inexhaustible source of consolation for millions of Christians, who experience in the practice of Christianity the fulfillment of the Divine promise: "He shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God." It is they who truly can rejoice in the thought of their Creator even here on earth, whilst His essence is not seen by them. If all around seems dark, in Him they find light. If everything else be lost, in Him they recover it abundantly. "Wearied with the never-ceasing din of the world, wearied with the monotonous bustle of commerce and of trade, wearied with the hollow pretensions, the duplicity, the jealousies of political parties, wearied yet more with the trivialities of social intercourse, and with the solemn littlenesses of individual self-assertion as it jostles its way among the crowd to gain its own wretched hillock -- what a joy and consolation to pass by contemplation (if only for an hour) into the bosom of our ever-tranquil God." It was during an hour of this sublimest of all contemplations that St. Augustine exclaimed "Too late I loved Thee, O Thou, Beauty of ancient days, yet ever new! too late I loved Thee."
Sessions XII &XIII: Divine Providence and its Relation to Existing Evil.
The existence of Divine Providence.
All things created are under the sway of Divine Providence, and none of them can frustrate the final end absolutely intended by the Creator, or move towards it in a way and under circumstances not foreseen by His intellect, or not freely either approved or at least tolerated by His most holy will. The final end of creatures consists in the first place in a certain degree of manifestation of the Divine perfections in the created likenesses of God, and in the second place in the perfect union of rational creatures with their Creator by knowledge and love. This is technically expressed by saying that the end of creation is God's external glory both objective and formal and the happiness of rational creatures.
Providence as well as prudence, considered in its etymological meaning, is equivalent to foresight. This etymological signification of the word coincides pretty well with the real import of what we call prudence in a man and providence in God. We say that a man is prudent when the whole tenor of his life justifies the supposition that in his undertakings he has a definite object in view, and uses constantly the means fit for the attainment of his purpose. In a similar sense we attribute providence to God; for this predicate is given to Him in order to imply that He has settled from eternity the final goal toward which the whole of His creation and each particular creature is to be directed, that He has ordained the means by which the end shall be reached, and that He rules in the course of ages all events so perfectly as that nothing shall occur to bar His final and absolute intention.
It was this idea of Providence that suggested to the deep Christian philosopher, Boethius, the following definition of it, which was adopted by St. Thomas: "Providence is the all-regulating and stable plan of God, the supreme Ruler of the universe."
To be more explicit, we may give the definition another form and say: "Providence is God the supreme Lord of the universe Himself, inasmuch as He directs all things to an end fixed by Him, in harmony with His eternal plan.
The verification of this definition supposes the existence of two Divine operations with regard to creatures:
(1) The assignment of an end to all things and of ways by which they shall reach it.
(2) Actual direction of all things to that end.
Can it be proved that Providence thus explained really exists? Or shall we say with the artisan-philosopher Chubb and other more recent deists, that the existence of a Creator cannot be denied, but that His influence upon this world does not extend beyond laying the foundation of it, which being laid all things go on as best they can without their author watching their course or interfering in any way? Against this deistic position we enunciate our thesis in its several parts.
First we say that God has prefixed a final end to everything created, and that He allows nothing to frustrate that end or move towards it otherwise than as He foresees and either approves or at least tolerates.
We call attention to the phrase, approves or at least tolerates. Why do we not say simply: Whatever happens is God's will? Because this expression might be taken to mean that even the sins committed by rational creatures are willed by God, at least as means to an end. This of course would be inconsistent with God's holiness. Although He can tolerate sin, and can turn the misery following it into an occasion of good, He never can approve of or wish for sin in order to reach His end. We express this in scholastic terms shortly by saying that God wills sin, not positively but permissively. The term permissively does not imply that God gives permission to sin, but means only that for good reasons He does not hinder those sins which rational creatures commit through the abuse of their free will. Having thus made clear the meaning of our statement, we may proceed to prove its truth.
It has been demonstrated in Books I. and II. that the one self-existing personal God has created all things, and that He is infinitely wise and powerful. Moreover, we have shown in chapter i. of this Book that the being of each creature depends continually upon Him for its existence, and that no action of a creature can come about except under His concurrence. Now it is evident that an infinitely wise and good Being cannot act without intending a good end, nor in His actions lose sight of that end. It is also evident that all effects of Divine action are decreed from eternity. It follows that the origin, the duration, the various phases of existence and action of each particular creature were from eternity willed by God, either positively or permissively, with a view to a certain end. Moreover, it follows that the influence which He continually exercises upon the activity of creatures is in harmony with His eternal plan, and involves the continual intention of the end.
As we have seen in Book II., God is really identical with an intellect of Infinite Wisdom and a will of Infinite Goodness. By His Infinite Wisdom He understands from eternity the end to be reached by creation, and the various ways in which by His omnipotence He might reach it. His will of infinite goodness embraces the end He has in view and fixes by irrevocable decree the ways in which it shall be reached. Abiding in Himself by His absolutely perfect essence, He watches and directs in the course of time the exercise of every faculty of His creatures. He watches and directs it without any toil or labour, paying equal attention to the whole and to the minutest details. As by one eternal glance of His infinite understanding He comprehends the dimensions of space, and calculates the distances and orbits of the heavenly bodies, and by one omnipotent volition keeps the whole machinery of the universe in motion, with a continual regard to the final goal it is to reach; so by the same eternal all-penetrating intuition does He read the most secret thoughts of every mind, observe the most minute oscillations of every organic cell, and count the most insignificant vibrations of every atom of matter, ruling by His omnipotent will all things so that there is no thought of any mind, no oscillation of any cell, no vibration of any atom, which is not in some way or other duly subordinated to the end He intends.
And this end -- wherein does it consist? Evidently it must be an external manifestation of His internal perfection; not a manifestation in the pantheistic sense, as though God evolved Himself, as it were, into the visible and invisible universe, but a manifestation by the production of finite created likenesses of the infinite Divine essence. That the end of the world created can be nothing else is evident from a truth demonstrated in Book II. We showed there that God loves Himself with absolute necessity, and cannot love anything else but with reference to His own infinite goodness. Now the external manifestation of the Divine perfection through created likenesses is called in scholastic language, God's external glory, just as His internal perfection as known to Himself alone is called His internal glory. Moreover, scholastics distinguish between external objective and external formal glory. By the external objective glory of God they mean created things in so far as they are adapted by their very existence and activity to bear witness to the Divine perfection, on the supposition that somewhere in creation there are intelligent beings, who can intellectually perceive them and form a judgment on their nature. The external formal glory of God is the acknowledgment of His perfection produced in the minds of intellectual creatures by the contemplation of His works.
Supposing these definitions, it is so evident that the Creator of the world intends His external objective and formal glory, that without such an intention we cannot even conceive creation to be possible. For it is repugnant to reason that a finite being should exist, the nature of which is not a copy, however imperfect, of the essence of the One infinite Being; consequently God, producing creatures, intends the production of likenesses of His own essence, as so many mirrors in which His infinite goodness is reflected under some aspect or other. If He did not intend this, He would be acting without any knowledge or intention at all -- a supposition absolutely alien to His wisdom. But if He intends it, His intention is directed to what we have defined as His external objective glory. Moreover, as He cannot love anything but with reference to His own goodness, so He must will that the activities of created intellects and wills shall be related to that goodness according to their natures. But they cannot be related to it rightly save by the acknowledgment that God is what He is, the supreme Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. To this acknowledgment all rational creatures must finally arrive. If they are not impeded in the right use of their reason, they will arrive at it in the course of this life, unless through their own fault they prefer darkness to light. If it be impossible for them to know God before they leave this life, as in the case of the innumerable multitudes of children who die before the use of reason, at their entrance into the next life the Creator will manifest Himself to their immortal souls, draw them to His love, and thereby make them happy. Not indeed with the supernatural beatitude of which we learn from revelation, but with an enduring natural happiness.
Those who wilfully shut their mind against the knowledge of their Creator, at all events will be undeceived in the moment when they depart from this life. As so many other delusions vanish when death puts an end to our earthly existence, so before all others that delusion of delusions will disappear, which makes man believe that there is no personal God who rules the world.
The Monotheist and the Agnostic will then agree perfectly in the recognition of that God, whose eternal power and divinity St. Paul{2} declares to be clearly visible in His works. They will both recognize their God, but with very different feelings.
The one will then be forced to acknowledge Him as infinitely good, albeit he still refuses to love Him; the other, if indeed he perseveres till the end of his days in acknowledging his Creator both in theory and practice according to the lights received, will know and love Him, and thus reach what is called in our thesis, the secondary end of creation, the beatitude for which rational creatures are destined. This secondary end God does not intend absolutely, but conditionally. He says as it were to every rational creature with reference to eternal salvation or final misery: "I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing. Choose therefore life."{3} If man, by either expressly denying or practically ignoring his dependence upon God, obstinately refuses to choose life, it is not so much his Creator that condemns him, as his own malice, which changes him from a vessel of Divine mercy into a victim of Divine justice. God has implanted in the heart of man a nature longing for perfect happiness. In vain does man strive to quench his thirst for happiness with the perishable goods of this world. He possesses them only for a short while, and whilst he is enjoying them, the better part of his being does not cease to crave instinctively for the fullness of truth and goodness and beauty, which is to be found nowhere but in God alone. Now if the nature of man is thus naturally driven towards God as the source of its beatitude, it follows evidently that it is the intention of our Maker to cause our happiness by perfect knowledge and love of Himself, at least on the condition that we co-operate with His benevolent designs.
No human being, however wretched he may be, is excluded by God from final happiness, unless through his own fault he makes himself unworthy of it, by persevering in a state of rebellion up to his last breath. St. Paul's words are in harmony with our rational inference when he says that "God will have all men to be saved." How could it be otherwise?
Here, no doubt, many a reader is tempted to say: "All well and good; but I am at a loss to see how you can affirm that even the uncivilized savage is under the influence of the Divine light, which you say, guides every human being to his last end who does not deliberately turn away from it? To this grave difficulty which in theology meets with a deal of attention, we may be content to give a compendious answer in a philosophical treatise. It is clearly God's arrangement that men should depend largely upon one another for their instruction and progress in knowledge of all kinds, religious knowledge included. The necessary consequence of this is that through the neglect and malice of some who should be the natural teachers and leaders of their fellow-men, the latter should suffer. But God can rectify the evil.
But what about the secondary end of the irrational creation? Shall we say that the elements, plants, and dumb animals are destined also to glorify God formally by knowledge and love, and thus to become happy through Him? Evidently this would be absurd. Even the highest among irrational creatures, the dumb animals, are unable to form a rational judgment on anything, to have a rational desire of anything, to reflect upon happiness, to wish for happiness, or to grieve for its absence. Their knowledge is but a reaction of their sensitive organism upon impressions produced in them by material things. Their cravings are blind emotions, resulting from the combination of the innate instinct proper to their species, with impressions made upon them. It is impossible that such beings should know and love God, or be happy in Him. Shall we then say that their end is not to glorify God formally, but only objectively, to be realizations of Divine thoughts, to be, as it were, books written by infinite wisdom? This is true as far as it goes, and there are those who think that it was in no sense necessary for God to go further and place a crown on His creation by the creation of rational creatures. But at all events, the objective praise which they render Him would have far less meaning, if there were no beings who could read the Divine ideas expressed in their existence. Those beings are the rational souls of men; and in a far higher degree, the pure spirits called angels. It is to them and through them that the heavens tell the glory of God, and the firmament announces the works of His hands. Yet we cannot say that the material world below men is properly meant for the use of angels. These do not need to be roused by sensible impressions to the evolution of their intellects. Being altogether independent of matter, they are endowed with innate ideas, and therefore able to know and love God, without going first through a process of intellectual development aided by material impressions. Only those rational beings who are compounds of matter and spirit, stand in need of such helps. Man, therefore, must be the favoured creature, for whose utility the Divine Majesty has created the visible universe that surrounds us. And indeed everywhere we find irrational creatures supplying the wants of human nature. They serve mankind partly by providing nourishment, clothing, shelter, and other bodily conveniences; partly by stirring up their intellects and wills to the pursuit of arts and sciences, and by leading them through the knowledge of creatures to that of the Creator; and last but not least, by affording opportunities for the practice of moral virtues, patience especially, and resignation to the inscrutable ways of their Creator.
From the doctrine of Providence thus proved and explained, two important corollaries are to be drawn. The first is this: God does not intend the final well-being of any individual living creature of this world except man. And man himself is to be perfectly happy, not here on earth, but hereafter.
It is therefore quite intelligible, that God should allow millions of irrational creatures to be sacrificed for the sake of man, to serve his eternal welfare remotely or proximately. No less reconcilable is it with Divine Providence, that under certain conditions mortal men should be wasted by contagious diseases, emaciated by famine, or fall in the flower of their age on the battlefield. In a word: God cares more for one immortal soul that does not resist Him, than for the whole of the material universe.
God must rule His creatures with a wise regard for their natural dignity, according as that is greater or less. Now the human soul stands by its nature in an infinitely nearer relation to God than the most perfect of dumb animals. It is an image of the Creator, whilst every other living creature of this world exhibits only some trace of His Majesty. It owes its origin immediately to His creative power; whilst a dumb animal is a living erection made by secondary causes on the groundwork laid by God in the creation of matter and life. The rational soul alone is able and destined to know and love God, and thus to be personally happy, whilst everything else is made to reveal the Creator to His rational creatures, and to promote their eternal welfare during a short period of time, till that day shall come of which St. Peter says, that on it "the heavens shall pass away with great violence, and the elements shall be melted with heat, and the earth and the works in it shall be burnt up."
The other corollary we are to derive from the great truth of Divine Providence may be thus formulated: Every man, however low his social position, ought to be treated with reverence by his fellow-man, as a personal being destined for an eternal exaltation and happiness infinitely greater than all the aims of temporal ambition. On the other hand, dumb animals must be left in their own sphere, and be treated as things, not cared for as persons, not accepted as subjects of right against whom injustice can be committed, but as living instruments which man may utilize in every reasonable way.
The relation of Providence to existing evil.
Neither from the evils which exist in this world, nor from those which, according to Divine revelation, await the wicked in the life to come, can any lawful inference derogatory to Divine Providence be drawn.
One of the most harassing questions which have ever wearied the brains of philosophers, and stimulated the zeal of Christian apologists, is as to the possibility of such an enormous amount of evil in a world created by an infinitely good God, and continually under the sway of His Providence.
Absolutely speaking, this difficulty against the moral attributes of the Creator is sufficiently solved by an appeal to the arguments by which we have proved to demonstration the existence of one personal, infinitely perfect, and infinitely wise God. These arguments are built on evident premisses, according to the rules of sound Logic. The opponent of the doctrine proved has first to show a want of internal soundness in our arguments before he can hope to destroy them by difficulties. No puzzling doubt, however great, can overthrow evident conclusions. A man charged with a crime, who has manifestly proved his alibi, cannot possibly be the perpetrator, although from accidental circumstances grave suspicions may have arisen against him. In a similar way, when once it has been evidently proved that God exists, and is infinitely good; the evils of this world cannot be attributed to the absence of a wise and benevolent Providence, even if the existence of those evils remain to a large extent a riddle to us. A man who waited to render homage to his Creator till he had solved all the problems, to the solution of which his curiosity might urge him, would act far more absurdly than a child who refused to honour and obey his parents till they had justified to his mind all the details of their housekeeping. The distance between a child's mental capacity and that of his parents is, after all, finite: but God's mind is infinitely above ours.
Yet this answer, though substantially adequate, it is clearly desirable to supplement by a detailed account of the relation in which evil stands to the infinitely good will of God. Such an account we must now endeavour to render, and before all things it is necessary to fix accurately the sense of the term evil. Some modern philosophers take evil to be any absence of good in a thing. They distinguish, consequently, three sorts of evils, metaphysical, physical, and moral. Metaphysical evil is understood by them to be the absence of a certain perfection in a being, the nature of which is incompatible with such a perfection. Thus, for instance, the absence of feeling in a stone, the absence of reason in a dumb animal, and the absence of learning in an infant, are in this view metaphysical evils. By physical evil they mean a defect which mars the natural integrity of a being, or interferes with a proper development of its activity. Thus, under the category of physical evil come, bodily diseases of whatever kind, mental imbecility, liability to great fits of passion preceding the use of free-will, want, destruction of property by drought or inundations, violent death, &c. Under the term of moral evil they comprise the deviation of the free-will from the moral law, and the actions proceeding from a will thus gone astray, as lying, theft, murder. In order that such volitions and actions may be considered as moral evils in the strict sense of the word, their source must be a will deliberately malicious. Otherwise, we have only what moralists call material sin, not formal.
In this explanation of evils nothing seems to be objectionable but that the term evil is taken in a wider sense than its usual application allows. Men commonly do not call every imperfection an evil, especially where the imperfection is the mere absence of a perfection not due to a thing. Everything is good, inasmuch as its state of existence harmonizes perfectly with its nature. A nature of a lower order is in itself less good than a nature of a higher order. Yet the essence of that lower nature does not involve what is properly called evil. The word evil signifies not the mere absence of a perfection, but its absence in a being to which under a certain aspect it is due. Therefore, only physical and moral evils are evils in the strict sense of the word.
What are called metaphysical evils cannot possibly militate against the infinite goodness of the Creator. To abolish them would mean to annihilate all creatures. A created being, either infinitely perfect, or at least so perfect that none more perfect could be created, is a contradiction in terms. The hypothesis of an infinitely perfect creature would involve the existence of two infinite beings, disproved in the First Book. The hypothesis of a creature so perfect that none more perfect could be, would amount to an implicit denial of the infinite power of the Creator. We have already shown in Book I. that an absolutely perfect world is impossible. The world of an infinitely good God can only be relatively perfect, that is to say, perfectly adapted to its end as intended by the Creator. In Section i of this Book, we have seen that God intends by creation the manifestation of His goodness, or His external glory, and the beatitude of rational creatures. Neither the one nor the other can be intended in an infinite degree. In other words, God can neither intend that any particular creature, or any multitude of creatures, should adequately represent His unbounded perfection; nor can He intend that any purely finite creature should enjoy a happiness of infinite intensity. He must, therefore, intend both the primary and the secondary end of creation to be realized within certain limits. Now, every finite degree of external glory of God falls infinitely short of an adequate expression of the infinite Divine goodness. Comparing, therefore, finite degrees of external manifestation with the adequate expression of the Divinity, we may say that the difference between, 1, 100, and 1,000,000 degrees vanishes. Which of these degrees shall God intend in creation? Surely, whichever He pleases. The selection depends entirely on His free-will. He does not need any creature. He may, therefore, choose among the indefinite multitude of possible beings without violating any of His perfections; yet so that He shall always attain His own glory, both objective and formal; subordinate the course of things perfectly to the end He has in view, and conduct to final happiness those rational creatures who obey the voice of their conscience. With these restrictions, we affirm that no amount of imperfection in created natures can be adduced as an exception against the statement of the monotheist: "An infinitely good and wise God rules this world."
Supposing, then, that God creates a world filled with creatures of a nature under many aspects very imperfect -- an hypothesis doubtless verified in this world of ours, the possibility of moral evil, and the natural necessity of physical evil, is sufficiently explained. Man has a free-will. By his very nature he is such that he can commit sin. Again, both man and the rest of the living creatures of this world, in consequence of their imperfect nature, must be liable to many physical sufferings, unless God is continually to work miracles for their deliverance. Does, then, the infinite goodness of God require that by supernatural interference He should prevent all physical and moral evils? The answer is evidently to be given in the negative.
First, as regards physical evils, God cannot, indeed, intend them for their own sake. He cannot delight in the misery and sufferings of His creatures. But there is no reason whatever to prove that He may not allow these evils, with the intention to compensate them by some good occasioned thereby. Nay, He may even intend them as means to an end. It is not necessary that He should lay open to our view the particular final cause of every disease and every misfortune; it is enough for us to know that He is infinitely good, infinitely wise and just. Knowing thus much, we are certain of two truths which must satisfy every reasonable thinker. The first is, that an infinitely good, and wise, and just God must draw some good out of every evil He allows, and cannot allow any without a reason worthy of His infinite wisdom. The second may be formulated thus. A human mind, though able to get a true knowledge of God amply sufficient to guide the man on his way to his last end, is manifestly unfit to comprehend the eternal counsels of the Almighty. Add to this, that in many cases experience and history show to the faithful Christian distinctly, how in the hand of Providence physical evils become instruments of great boons in the moral order. Poverty and sickness teach man most forcibly his nothingness, and open his mind to the consolations of religion. The blood of the martyrs became the fertile seed of Christianity, whilst the ignominious death of Christ our Saviour enhanced the glory of His Resurrection, brought out the Divine origin of His Church, and opened to fallen mankind the road that leads to the Heavenly City, where "God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more."
None can understand this fully, unless he believes that God became Man, that as Man He died upon the Cross, and afterwards ascended glorious into Heaven. The belief in these truths makes it easily conceivable that through many tribulations we must enter into the Kingdom of God. An acquaintance with the life and doctrines of Christ and His Apostles goes far to reconcile the believer in Christianity with the hard lot of the poor, and the promiscuous distribution of temporal goods, and of merely natural mental gifts among just and unjust. A Christian knows that there is another life, in which both the unbridled sensuality and supercilious cruelty of Dives and the patient resignation and heroic suffering of Lazarus will be duly rewarded. And reflecting how vastly the natural endowments of Lucifer surpass the most splendid human genius, he no longer wonders at beholding at times among men the spectacle of great abilities thrown away in a bad cause.
But this reflection involves another difficulty far greater than that drawn from mere physical evils. God foresaw from eternity the fall of Lucifer and the evil angels. He foresaw all the sins of man. Why did He not hinder them?
Let us first see in what relation God stands to moral evil. Moral evil in the strict sense of the word consists in a free turning away of the created will from the law laid down by God. God necessarily loves His own goodness and everything else in relation to it. He can, therefore, never approve of a created free being deliberately ignoring its true position to Him. But sin manifestly involves a deliberate refusal of the creature to stand to God in that attitude of subject to ruler, which is the proper posture of a creature before its Creator. No sin, therefore, can be pleasing to God. He manifests His disapproval of it to every man who commits sin, and that in the very moment when he is about to commit it. For sin in the strict sense of the word is not committed without disobedience to the voice of conscience, which re-echoes the will of the Supreme Lawgiver. But it is one thing to disapprove of sin, and quite another thing not to impede it. God does not impede sin; although, absolutely speaking, this was possible for Him. Yet we must not forget that He is infinitely free as well as infinitely powerful. He can, therefore, tolerate sin, if this toleration is not opposed to His Divine perfections. But it is not opposed to any one of them; as will easily appear on comparing it with those perfections which at first sight it would seem to violate, namely, His wisdom, His holiness, His justice, and His mercy.
First, then, it may be argued as an objection, that God does not attain the end He intends by tolerating sin; for the sinner does not glorify God as he ought to do, and forfeits his own happiness, if he dies in the state of grievous sin. We reply that the end which God intends is His own glory, and that on such terms as to leave it to the choice of the free creature to become throughout eternity a living monument of His beatifying love or of His rigorous justice. As regards the happiness of the free creature, He intends that happiness only on condition that the creature prepares for the same before the time of probation expires with the close of this earthly life.
But is the toleration of sin compatible with the sanctity of God? No sin can be committed, unless God concurs to the sinful action. But in doing so He seems to approve of sin; for there is nothing which could necessitate Him to lend the sinner His aid. In answer to this difficulty, let us repeat briefly the solution already given in the chapter on Divine concurrence. We there showed that God does not concur in the sin itself, nor does He encourage the sinner to abuse his free-will. The concurrence of God, which the sinner abuses, consists in this, that God grants him the use of the moral freedom that belongs to his nature. To do so He has reasons worthy of His infinite wisdom, although incomprehensible to human minds.
But scarcely is this answer given, when another difficulty arises: God puts one man in circumstances in which it is very easy to avoid sin, and He places another in positions which make sin, apparently, unavoidable. Is such an unequal treatment of two creatures of the same human nature not against Divine justice? Is it not acceptance of persons? Compare the case of a well trained child of good Christian parents with that of a youth who grows up in the surroundings of vice and impiety.
We answer in the first place that God's justice does not oblige Him to treat creatures of the same nature exactly in the same way. The justice of God is not commutative, but distributive. It is not manifested by paying to creatures what they have any right to ask of Him, but in granting them what He cannot refuse to their nature and their merits without denying His own goodness, wisdom, and benevolence. If then He grants thus much to all men, the objection against His justice ceases, although He may make the grant to one in a sufficient, to another in an abundant degree. Certainly nobody can prove that poor, ignorant, and badly educated people fall into or are punished by God for really grievous sins, the avoidance of which was not made morally possible for them, either naturally or supernaturally by special internal graces. Their acts often do not involve that malice which prompts better-endowed minds to similar excesses. Ignorance frequently excuses them from grievous guilt, when they do things objectively very serious. From reason and revelation we must conclude that no man is ever necessitated to violate the law of God culpably, and that every sin imputable to man is caused only by abuse of freedom against the voice of conscience. Add to this, that throughout the Old and New Testament God calls Himself with a sort of preference the protector of the poor; and indicates that their human frailties will be judged with great mercy. For what else is the meaning of these passages of Scripture: "He that despiseth the poor reproacheth his Maker; " "He that hath mercy on the poor lendeth to the Lord;" "He" (the Messiah) "shall judge the poor of the people and he shall save the children of the poor;" "He shall spare the poor and needy and He shall save the souls of the poor;" "He" (the Messiah) "shall judge the poor with justice;" "To him that is little, mercy shall be granted; but the mighty shall be mightily tormented," "The prayer out of the mouth of the poor shall reach the ears of God;" "The Lord will not accept any person against a poor man;" and the poverty of the Word Incarnate, His perpetual companion during life, what else does it signify than that the poor are dear to God? If they are dear to Him, it is impossible that any one of them should perish finally unless by his own grievous fault. What we have said of poor and uninstructed men may be applied to all those who without their own fault are in great danger of sin. Experience proves that they are often protected in quite an astonishing way, if they use those precautions which Providence has placed within their reach.
But how is it consonant with the mercy of God, to grant the sinner moral freedom, when He foresees that the wretched man will abuse it and ruin himself? A father surely should not hand his son a loaded pistol, at a time when the latter shows himself overcome by disgust of life and ready to get rid of it at the first convenient opportunity. Really, however, there is an infinite disparity between the two cases. The father is bound by human and Divine law to follow another line of action. He is the head of a family and not the ruler of the universe. It is not with him to draw out the fundamental laws of his domestic government. Through the voice of his conscience he is informed of the will of his Maker. And his conscience tells him that he does grievous wrong by thus occasioning the death of his son without any sufficient reason. No motive can be made out for putting the temptation in his way but wanton cruelty and desire of the suicide of his charge. God, on the contrary, in granting moral freedom does not intend that the sinner shall abuse it. By warning him through the voice of conscience He manifests clearly that He wishes him to turn away from the temptation. His foreseeing that the free creature will go wrong could only obscure His mercy, if it were not easily understood that He has quite sufficient reason for allowing the use of freedom, although this use becomes mischievous through the fault of the creature.
We may insist upon the natural harmony between a free creature and the use of freedom; we may call attention to the truth that God can and will elicit good from evil, that He is free to grant or not to grant those special privileges of grace by which He preserves saints at times, that sufficient grace to avoid formal sin is offered to every one. Considerations like these suffice to show that the argument raised against the mercy of God from the existence of moral evil is unsound, although they do not unveil the mystery of Divine wisdom that shrouds from our view the reasons for which, in particular cases, moral evils are not prevented. We are only allowed to see some of the Divine artifices by which our incomprehensible Creator raises upon the spiritual ruin caused by sin, the most splendid edifices of virtue and true greatness, or causes the malice of the wicked to be one of the many rungs in the ladder by which His faithful servants ascend to the height of Divine charity and intimate union with God. Thus the fallen Peter becomes the immoveable Rock of the Church, the strength of his brethren, the model of pastors, the undaunted hero whom nothing can separate from his crucified Master. On the other hand, the rage of unbelievers causes St. Stephen to practice heroic charity, makes St. Lawrence exult upon the gridiron, and peoples Heaven with an innumerable multitude of martyrs.
"Yet," continues our objector, "according to Christian belief, eternal punishment is the lot of him who dies in grievous sin. Why should this be? Why should those who refuse grace up to death lose for ever all chance of salvation?"
Before answering, let us formulate one principle. It is this: What Infinite Wisdom deems just must a priori be approved by a finite understanding. But we have proved the First Cause of all things to be infinitely perfect and wise, and may we not reasonably expect that among the arrangements of Infinite Wisdom there will be many beyond the grasp of our limited faculties? However, let us see what human reason makes of the arguments of our opponent.
First, then, it is alleged that according to justice there must be proportion between the magnitude of a crime and the punishment inflicted for it, and that this does not seem to be the case if a grievous sin committed in the twinkling of an eye is to be expiated by never-ending torments.
This reasoning rests manifestly on the wrong supposition that the magnitude of crime is to be measured by the time required for its perpetration. If this were the case, the boy who plays truant for half a day would be a far greater criminal than the ruffian who in half an hour commits a dozen murders. Common sense does not take this view of the matter. Whilst committing the boy to the cane, it delivers the murderer to the gallows. Every one agrees that by the crimes committed within the space of thirty minutes, the murderer has forfeited twelve times over all the benefits which he might have enjoyed in human society on earth for forty or fifty years. It is evident then that time cannot be the standard by which punishment is to be determined. Not the duration of a bad deed, but its internal wickedness, must be the measure of the expiation due to it. But its wickedness increases in proportion as the obligation is sacred which is deliberately violated. Now it is evident that no obligation of man towards man can stand comparison for a moment with the obligation of man to obey God. The right of God to the obedience of His reasonable creature is absolute and infinite. No right can be more strict; and every other right is based upon it. A wilful violation, therefore, of this right implies a malice which opposes itself to the foundation of all orders. It is, in comparison with social disorders, considered as violations of merely human rights, an infinite moral disorder. Hence it is justly punished with an infinite penalty But a finite creature cannot suffer a penalty infinite in intensity. The duration, therefore, of the penalty must be infinite. This must be insisted upon all the more emphatically, because the soul of a man who dies in mortal sin leaves this world in a state of opposition to its Creator. The distortion of the human understanding and will, caused by a deliberate refusal to acknowledge God as Supreme Master, cannot be repaired when the time of preparation for man's last end has passed. Death puts a term to that time. Consequently, the free-will of man remains for ever in the same relation to God in which it is in the moment of the separation of soul and body. The will of one, therefore, who dies impenitent, after having committed grievous sin, remains for ever averted from God, refusing to embrace lovingly the only Being in which the created spirit can find his beatitude. Happiness is incompatible with such a state. On the contrary, it must be a state of the deepest dissatisfaction and misery; for it is impossible that a rational and spiritual nature should ever find rest and peace unless it be united with God, the source of all goodness, and beauty, and truth. The misery of the dying, impenitent sinner lasts then as long as the perversity of his will. His will is incorrigible; hence his misery must be irremediable.
Accordingly, there is perfect harmony between Divine justice and the most essential feature of eternal punishment as proposed by Catholic doctrine. Catholic theologians agree that Hell would cease to be Hell, if the damned could only enjoy the Beatific Vision of God. Whatever may be the nature of the fire of Hell and its effects upon the damned, it is certain that the pain which it causes is nothing in comparison with the distress and despair produced by the consciousness of having for ever forfeited access to the only true source of peace and happiness. It is, however, a connatural consequence of this greatest of all penalties, that the damned should suffer positively through the intervention of creatures. He who has refused to make use of creatures as instruments in the service of his Creator, is justly punished by experiencing pain through their influence. Hence our reason sees how congruous it is that, according to the law of God, rebellion against Him should be punished in the next world through the instrumentality of a real, material being, bearing some similarity to earthly fire. The "fire" of the sun has remotely a share in all the benefits God grants us through His creatures for our salvation contempt of those benefits is appropriately avenged by a substance similar to that by the aid of which the benefits were conferred, that is, by fire.
In what way this will be done is irrelevant to our discussion here. Readers may consult St. Thomas.
Let us now turn to the objection against Divine mercy based upon the same doctrine of eternal punishment. "Whatever may be the demands of justice!" exclaims the unbeliever, "infinite mercy requires the final extinction of all punishment, all the more so because eternal punishment is useless, and consequently its infliction real cruelty!"
Let us judge of the relation between mercy and punishment, not according to blind sentiment, but in the light of reason. First as regards the infinity of Divine mercy. To place limitations to the Divine mercy as it is in itself, one must show that that mercy somehow falls short of the standard required by Infinite Wisdom. But how shall the infidel show this? Not certainly by pointing out that the effects of God's mercy are limited. In fact it seems intrinsically repugnant that creatures should act according to their nature, and yet evil be removed from them without any limit. To answer, however, more positively we may solve the difficulty thus. As Divine Mercy is infinitely perfect because it is in perfect harmony with Infinite Wisdom, so Divine Justice is infinitely perfect for the same reason. Consequently, a priori, there is no ground why, in the relation of God towards His reasonable creatures, either one or other of these two attributes should be manifested exclusively. It would appear more proper that both should shine forth in their effects. Of course, God owes it to His own goodness that the joint glorification of these two attributes should be in harmony with the final happiness of all reasonable creatures, on the supposition that none of them refuse to fulfil the conditions laid down for the attainment of that happiness. But if some submit to their Creator, and others rebel against Him, it behoves the dignity of God to make a final irrevocable distinction between loyal subjects and obstinate rebels. This distinction may be made in such a way that the everlasting punishment of the wicked shall itself be a manifestation both of justice and of mercy, -- of justice in point of duration, and of mercy in point of intensity. According to St. Thomas, this is what is actually done. He says: "In the damnation of the reprobate, mercy manifests itself, not by putting a stop to the penalty inflicted, but by alleviating it somewhat, so as to exact less than what is really due."
239. From this discussion on Providence, in respect of the permission of evil and the infliction of eternal punishment, it is, we hope, evident that the Christian philosopher, after having proved on philosophical grounds the existence and attributes of God, may face boldly any difficulty by which adversaries try to undermine his conclusions. To do more than dispel the fallacies with which unbelief opposes the evidences of reason and the testimonies of Christianity in favour of an infinitely wise and good Providence, is a task neither necessary nor possible. It is not necessary; because after the truth of Divine Providence has been established, man knows enough for taking a proper view of life. Under such a Providence as Natural Theology discloses to our reason, and Christian revelation proposes to our faith, life is certainly worth living, in obedience to the voice of conscience and in opposition to the impulse of blind passion. All the duties imposed upon us by the voice of conscience can be fulfilled without investigation of the secret counsels and hidden ways of the Supreme Being. No need to lose time in such investigations. When once we clearly understand that we are essentially servants of an infinitely good Master, it behoves us to pay Him adoration, confidence, and love, and to be anxious rather about a complete knowledge of the duty of the creature to its Creator than about the ways by which the Creator guides His creature.
THE END
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