G&Uin P:Rev
Naeem, Saima and Zaman, Asad, "Gender and Ultimatum in Pakistan: Revisited", Pakistan Development Review, Vol 53, p1-14, Spring 2014.
ABSTRACT
Shahid Razzaque (2009) analyzes the effects of gender on the Ultimatum Game in Pakistan. A more detailed analysis of the data set reveals several additional insights that are not discussed in the original publication. While we confirm Rezzaque (2009) finding that cultural effects lead to significantly different gender related behavior in Pakistan. Contrary to most of existing literature, female proposers offered significantly smaller amounts than male proposers. Additionally, we show that behavior of gender differ significantly with urbanity at least initially. Similarly two observations of Razzaque (2009) were not supported with the detailed data analysis. First, Razzaque (2009) associated learning effect to female respondents only. A close data analysis, however reveal strong learning effect resulting from rejected offers in initial periods. Second, Razzaque (2009) concludes stronger response from male participants after gender revelation. Our data analyses indicate same degree of deviations from average offers for both male and female participants.
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