Unsustainable At Any Price

A new and very extensively revised edition of Unsustainable at Any Price is now available.

Are the Canadian Armed Forces ready for the next conflict? Do they project a credible deterrence? Are they value for money? This book argues that the answer is clearly, no. Canada has built an ineffective force structure that is quickly becoming unsustainable both as combat forces and as a line item in Canada's budget. As a consequence Canada must reassess what it's military's structure should be and, in particular, must critically examine the respective roles and organization of it's Regular Force and Reserve Force components. To be blunt, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces are in a crisis but refuse to face the issues involved.

Canada's current defence policy—Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) issued in 2017 —concedes that: "Recent years have witnessed several challenges. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea is an example that has carried grave consequences. Activities in the South China Sea highlight the need for all states in the region to peacefully manage and resolve disputes in accordance with international law, and avoid coercion and other actions that could escalate tension. ... The re-emergence of major power competition has reminded Canada and its allies of the importance of deterrence. ... A credible military deterrence serves as a diplomatic tool to prevent conflict and should be accompanied by dialogue. NATO allies ... have been re-examining how to deter a wide spectrum of challenges to the international order by maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a “near-peer.""

Canada, however, has done little since 2017 to confront the situation. It neither maintains credible “advanced conventional military capabilities” nor can it be considered as having a military that is capable of “near-peer” combat with either Russia or China. It's forces were structured and trained to meet the challenges of an asymmetric war in Afghanistan and have changed little since they left that country.

Canada's defence outputs do not match the significant financial input made by the government each year primarily due to devoting the majority of its defence budget to the high costs of maintaining a professional full-time military and civilian bureaucracy and a bloated headquarters system that continues to draw funds away from much needed equipment acquisition programs and operations and maintenance expenses.

Conversely, Canada's Reserve Force is underfunded, lacks even the most fundamental equipment, and at best has little ability to deploy any elements above platoon strength. This situation is as a result of decades of neglect notwithstanding the substantial commitments made 4,642 individual reservists who served as augmentees to Regular Force units in Afghanistan where they made up between 15 and 25% of the deployed contingents there and suffered 16 fatalities and 75 wounded.

The book proposes a plan whereby Canada can double its effective combat strength by forming five fully manned and equipped brigades, two combat and three support from within its current authorized strength if a number of changes are made to the overall structure of the Department of National Defence; headquarters are downsized to provide the necessary funding for equipment; and a tighter integration between the Regular Force and Reserve Force.

The author is a retired colonel of the Canadian Armed Forces who has served as both a reservist and as a Regular Force member who served in the artillery, the infantry and the Office of the Judge Advocate General.