Re-establishing a Canadian Armoured Brigade Group in Europe: Sustainable Options

By Wolf Riedel, OMM, CD, QC

One cannot understand how the Russian leadership thinks strategic issues without appreciating the fact that the Kremlin sees itself as being at war with the West.[1]

Introduction

Canada's current defence policy—Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE)[2]—issued in 2017, identifies several security threats with the most significant coming from Russia and China.

The re-emergence of major power competition has reminded Canada and its allies of the importance of deterrence. ... A credible military deterrence serves as a diplomatic tool to prevent conflict and should be accompanied by dialogue. NATO allies ... have been re-examining how to deter a wide spectrum of challenges to the international order by maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a “near-peer.”[3] (Emphasis added).

While Canada has committed itself to be the framework nation of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) multinational battalion in Latvia (eFP-L), it has done little since 2017 to create a sustainable advanced conventional military capability within the CAF.[4] Amongst the disparate group of tanks and tracked infantry fighting vehicles within the eFP-L, Canada’s contribution consists of no tanks, a company of LAV6.0 light armored vehicles and a flyover four-gun battery of towed artillery. Latvia itself can muster but one lightly-armoured mechanized brigade and four even more lightly manned and equipped National Guard brigades. On the other hand, Latvia has recently acquired two battalions of M109A5O self-propelled artillery from Austria.

The eFP-L is integrated into the Latvian Mechanized Brigade which itself, is incorporated into the fledgling NATO Multinational Division North (MND-N) whose headquarters are located in Denmark and Latvia. MND-N controls the NATO forces in both Latvia and Estonia (which, together with it’s British led multinational battle group [eFP-E] is somewhat better armoured than Latvia’s). The Division also controls some Lithuanian elements, although, Lithuania’s sole mechanized infantry brigade, together with Poland’s northeastern forces are assigned to the NATO Multinational Division Northeast (MND-NE) which covers the Suwalki gap situated between Belarus and the Russian Kaliningrad Oblast on the Lithuanian/Polish border. This leaves MND-N principally with one Latvian and one Estonian mechanized brigade, one Estonian light brigade, and 8,000 Latvian National Guardsmen,

On the other hand, the highest density of Russia’s most capable ground and air forces are in it’s Western Military District[5] which borders the Baltics, the Ukraine, and indirectly (via Belarus) Poland. While Russia has an extensive grey-zone and hybrid toolkit of coercive activities short of conventional combat,[6] the possibility of targeted or widespread use of conventional forces, such as occurred in Georgia and the Ukraine, cannot be discounted.

The Baltics present a unique challenge to NATO. On the one hand, an increased NATO military presence in the Baltics would be seen by Russia as an escalation against its interests in the region while a drawdown of troops by NATO would be seen by the Baltic States as abandonment.[7] Notwithstanding the former and because of the latter, NATO must provide a credible deterrence to keep Russian activities in check.

... the challenge NATO confronts is not successfully to deter on an average day; it is to deter on the one day out of a thousand, or 5,000, when Moscow, for whatever reason, sees the prospect of a crushing win over its most dangerous adversary as an attractive prospect. ...

... RAND’s wargaming suggests that NATO needs to be able to rapidly mobilize, deploy, fight, and sustain up to 21 maneuver brigades, ... in a full-scale conflict with Russia in the Baltics. Given current plans and capabilities, the U.S. Army might be expected to supply up to 12 of those brigades:

• up to three ABCTs[8] stationed in the Baltics—the “stay in the game” force.

• three more ABCTs drawn from secure brigade-sized propositioning sites

• up to six additional armored, infantry (IBCT), or Stryker brigade combat teams. [9] (Emphasis Added)

Whether or not the next US administration is prepared to make such commitments in the future waits to be seen. Currently, however, and notwithstanding a drawdown of its forces in Germany, there are encouraging signs of commitment such as the reactivation of V Corps headquarters in Kentucky and its assignment to EUCOM[10], and the uptick of US activities in Poland including the rotation in of the 1^st Cavalry Division HQ (Fwd) from Fort Hood, Texas, the prepositioning of an aviation brigade and a heavy armoured brigade combat team’s equipment and the Atlantic Resolve series of fly-over exercises.[11] These US forces, however, are committed to Poland which itself already has a fairly robust military in the order of eight heavy, two medium and four light brigades. There is no indication at this time that these US troops will deploy further forward into the Baltic states where the multinational NATO commitment comes—with the exception of Canada—almost exclusively from European countries.

Of the necessary 21 manoeuvre brigades required, the three Baltic States themselves can realistically provide a total of only six to ten full infantry or mechanized brigades and some minor reserve forces. In the aggregate, the three NATO eFP battle groups could be counted as one additional armoured brigade.

In a recent report[12] into the NATO eFP initiative, the authors made the following observations about the Baltics:

Most interviewees believed that NATO’s deterrence by denial in theatre is sufficient under present circumstances, meaning that the situation in and around the north-eastern flank is considered relatively stable. ...

However, most interviewed experts agreed that the Allies would need to strengthen the eFP in a significantly worsened, but still permissive environment, even if the main bulk of NATO’s reinforcements (VJTF, NRF and other follow-on forces) would not be deployed unless conflict was imminent. ...

One way to proceed with the strengthening of the eFP, while not increasing the number of rotational troops, would be to deploy additional equipment from framework (and other contributing) nations for storage in host nations. Ideally, each host nation would store sufficient materiel for a full eFP brigade, including the equipment in use by the rotating BG. Additional costs for building storage facilities etc. could be covered jointly by equipment providers and host nations,[13]

They made the following key recommendation:

Plans should be made for the rapid augmentation of the eFP from battalion to brigade-size formations in the event of a deteriorating security environment. These plans should be fully and regularly exercised in all host nations.[14] (Emphasis added)

The question of whether or not Canada, as the Latvian eFP-L framework nation, should increase its NATO commitment and furnish one of those additionally needed armoured brigades and whether such brigade should be prepositioned in Latvia or Poland[15] is, of course, political. However, since the Canada doesn’t currently have an armoured brigade, per se, to furnish, the issue becomes practically moot.

The purpose of this article is to show one way forward whereby a transformed Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) could furnish one or even more armoured brigades for operations in Europe and particularly, for the Baltics.

The Need to Change The Army’s Status Quo

Are today’s CAF ready for the next conflict? Do they project a credible deterrence? Are they value for money? The answer is a resounding, no.

The current Canadian Army structure consists of three symmetric, underequipped Regular Force mechanized brigade groups (CMBG) partially equipped with LAV6.0s, a smattering of Leopard 2 tanks and a handful of towed artillery while the ten Reserve Force brigade groups (CBG) are each under strength by at least one half and are totally lacking in all essential war-fighting equipment. Neither the Navy nor the Air Force is capable of projecting or sustaining a deployed armoured brigade in Europe. Effectively, the limited demands being put on the CAF by the SSE are set as low as they are because the CAF can’t cope with anything greater.

The reasons why Canada’s substantial financial defence input—some $23 billion this year—generates few defence outputs are many and varied and beyond the limited scope of this article.[16] In large measure, however, much of the problem turns on the fact that over one half of Canada’s defence dollars are tied up in paying for salaries and benefits to full-time civilian and military personnel all too many of whom are devoted to the exorbitant administrative overhead of the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CAF thus limiting the funds available for equipment and operations and maintenance. This is not just a question of “too much tail and not enough teeth” because the CAF is just as understaffed and underequipped in the essential “tail” components needed for war fighting.[17]

Equally significant is the failure of the military leadership of the CAF for over one half of a century to create a proper modern Reserve Force which is capable of providing credible, trained, deployable units and formations rather than limited numbers of individual or sub-sub-unit augmentees.[18] In Afghanistan, Canadian contingents were augmented with 15% to 25% reservists. In total, 4,642 reservists deployed in both combat and support roles; 16 gave their last full measure of devotion to their country with a further 75 wounded. It’s not individual reservists who are lacking; it’s the organization, equipment, collective training and the leadership which is lacking.

Equipment – The Modern Army’s Sine Quo Non

While the old phrase The Army equips the man while the Navy and Air Force man equipment may still hold some truth, the simple fact is that without the appropriate equipment even the best trained and motivated soldiers will quickly become casualties on a modern battlefield when opposed by a trained enemy with superior equipment. While one cannot deny the role played by the fighting spirit of a well-trained soldier, more-and-more, the quality and quantity of the deployable equipment and the ability to sustain it is whereby the capability of an army is measured.

When discussing the equipment available within the Canadian Forces, and the Army in particular, one must consider the roles of the various units that exist, or should exist, within the force. In Canada such roles are:

1. Combat (Cbt). Cbt elements—also known as manoeuvre elements—such as infantry, armour, and anti-armour are those that engage in direct combat with the enemy;

2. Combat Support (Cbt Sp). Cbt Sp elements, such as indirect artillery fires, combat engineers, air defence, reconnaissance, and some electronic warfare and some aviation, are those that directly enable the cbt elements; and

3. Combat Service Support (CSS). CSS provides more general support to all elements. It is convenient to sub-divide CSS into sustainment functions (which term replaces the term CSS in the US Army) and manoeuvre enhancement functions. Sustainment includes supply, transportation, maintenance, health services, and personnel support while manoeuvre enhancement includes a grab bag of other capabilities such as horizontal and vertical engineering, military police, Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear defence, communications, military intelligence, influence activities and other enablers.

With some very minor exceptions all of the Canadian Army’s equipment is concentrated in its four Regular Force brigades and consists of the following major components:

1. Armour. Three armoured regiments with Leopard 2A4, 2A4M and 2A6M tanks and ancillary equipment with tanks at approximately half strength and the bulk of each regiment made up of a variety of wheeled reconnaissance vehicles. Reserve Force units are equipped with a smattering of light and ultra light wheeled reconnaissance vehicles many of limited value;

2. Infantry. Six mechanized infantry battalions are equipped with LAV6.0 infantry section carriers and ancillary support vehicles. Three battalions are equipped on light scales with wheeled vehicles. Reserve Force units have little equipment available beyond small arms and a few wheeled vehicles;

3. Anti-Armour. There is a significant capability gap in anti-armour weapons system as between the hand-held 84mm Carl Gustaf and a limited number of TOW anti-armour missiles systems recently brought back out of storage and which are integral to Regular Force infantry battalions;

4. Fires. Indirect fire capabilities are confined to three full-time regiments which each have only two batteries’ worth of M777 155 mm ultra-light howitzers and a target acquisition battery. A general support regiment which is part of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB) provides multi-purpose coordination centres, additional target acquisition capabilities and uninhabited aerial surveillance systems but no additional indirect fire capabilities. The CAF’s sixteen reserve artillery regiments and three independent batteries generally have the guns and vehicles to equip approximately six regiments with 105mm howitzers of marginal capability and without any of the necessary integral regimental headquarters or service support elements. There are no multiple rocket launchers in the inventory;

5. Ground Based Air Defence. Canada currently has no GBAD capability;

6. Combat Engineers. Three Regular Force combat engineer regiments are equipped to provide three or four field or counter IED or support squadrons per brigade group. One engineer support regiment is part of the CCSB. The eleven reserve combat engineer regiments are all under strength and hold only minimal equipment;

7. Electronic Warfare: One four-squadron hybrid (made up of both Regular Force and Reserve Force members) electronic warfare regiment is part of the CCSB; and

8. Aviation. Canada has one CH-147 Chinook heavy-lift helicopter squadron, six CH-146 Griffon utility helicopter squadrons and no viable attack helicopter capability;

In summary, the size and capabilities of the Canadian Army is limited to the equipment currently held by its Regular Force. There is no plan in place to expand the force in the event of an emergency. The Reserve Force has nothing to commit other than individual augmentees to fill holes in the Regular Force establishments. As J.L Granatstein and LGen (ret’d) Charles Belzile stated when discussing mobilization (or “activation”) of the reserves in their ten year review of the Special Commission of the Restructuring of the Reserves 1995:

... Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war.

This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.

The Canadian Forces needs a plan.[19] (Emphasis added)

Similarly, Canada’s commitment to the eFP-L is one without any reasonable plan to expand the force if there is an emergency.

A properly transformed Canadian Army using it’s current numbers of full-time and part-time soldiers and geographic facilities could, if properly equipped and trained, and supported by the Navy and Air Force double the Army’s current combat capabilities and facilitate planning for the use of an effective, credible, expanded force in Europe.

In the interim, however, a modest, minimal solution is available to the CAF.

The Minimal Solution – Phase 1

The minimal solution is to preposition the equipment for an armoured brigade for the ePF in Europe by using existing holdings of equipment and full-time personnel primarily out of western Canada. The solution would be conducted in two phases, the first being to preposition a mechanized battle group and the second expanding into a full brigade.

Phase 1 of this plan would include the following steps:

1. reorganizing the three existing full-time, medium-weight, symmetric Regular Force CMBGs[20] into three full-time asymmetric brigades: 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade Group (1 CABG) centered in Edmonton; 2 Canadian Light Brigade Group (2 CLBG) in Petawawa; and 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (5 CMBG) in Valcartier;

2. reorganizing the Canadian Army from five into three divisions: 2 Canadian Division (2 Div) in eastern Canada (with 2 CLBG, 5 CMBG, the CCSB, all reserve CBGs in Quebec and the Maritimes under command and absorbing 5^th Canadian Division’s and some of 4^th Canadian Division’s training and support facilities). 2 Div will be primarily responsible for force generating agile, rapidly deployable light and medium elements for national and international operations such as counterinsurgency, peacekeeping and peace making; 3 Canadian Division (3 Div) in western Canada (with 1 CABG, all reserve CBGs in Ontario and western Canada under command and absorbing some of 4^th Canadian Division’s training and support facilities). 3 Div will be solely responsible for force generating heavy armoured forces for employment with NATO in Europe; and Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and 1 Canadian Division HQ (1 Div) remain as the force employment agencies for all CAF mission assigned elements;[21]

3. relocate 2 PPCLI from CFB Shilo to CFB Edmonton so as to concentrate all 3 Div Regular Force infantry in one location;

4. designate CFB Shilo to become the 3 Div artillery training centre;^[22]

5. negotiate with the Latvian, Polish and/or US governments to share or establish equipment prepositioning facilities and training facilities in Latvia and/or Poland;

6. exchange all vehicles and equipment between 1 RCR and 3 PPCLI so as to make the former a light battalion and the latter a mechanized one. Preposition 3 PPCLI’s equipment in Europe;

7. exchange all vehicles and equipment between 2 RCR and 3 R22^eR so as to make the former a light battalion and the latter a mechanized one;

8. stand up a new hybrid reconnaissance regiment within 1 CABG. Transfer the existing LdSH reconnaissance squadron to the new reconnaissance regiment and stand up a new hybrid MUAV squadron and a new hybrid anti-armour squadron within the new regiment;

9. reallocate all tanks from across the CAF and associated equipment to 1 CABG, preposition one complete squadron to Europe and relocate the remaining equipment to CFB Edmonton/Wainwright. Stand up one reserve tank squadron and one reserve reconnaissance troop within the LdSH;^[23]

10. reduce 2 CLBG to light scales and transfer all remaining equipment ancillary to supporting LAV6.0 battalions to 1 CABG and 5 CMBG;

11. lease or otherwise acquire one self-propelled artillery battery for use in Europe^[24] as well as training spares to be located with 1 RCHA at CFB Shilo. Stand up a new reserve gun battery inside 1 RCHA;

12. if desired, preposition Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) equipment and elements in Europe;

13. identify and preposition equipment and stores (including munitions) required to form an expanded National Support Element (NSE) for the Task Force in Europe;

14. establish a small command and control cell from CJOC/1 Div to serve with MND-N or, at a minimum in Kingston, to be primarily responsible for all Canadian activities in North and Central Europe; and

15. develop a joint operational plan for the fly-over deployment of a Canadian battle group from 3 Div to Europe including the future acquisition of a Navy Roll-on, Roll-off cargo ship capability for Phase 2 and to exercise the plan on an annual basis at a minimum.

The advantages and disadvantages of Phase 1 of the minimal solution are:

Advantages:

1. relocating 2 PPCLI to Edmonton facilitates the sharing of mechanized infantry resources within 1 CABG. While the contemplated establishment for a CABG is two mechanized infantry battalions, leaving 3 PPCLI within 1 CABG facilitates the brigade meeting the current full-time eFP-L requirements until such time as 3 Div’s reserve units are up to strength, trained and equipped to take on rotations;

2. locating all tanks to 1 CABG allows for the creation of a centre of excellence for armour training and doctrine development within 3 Div and facilitates maintenance. Neither a light nor a medium brigade requires heavy armour;

3. collocating all 3 Div artillery in CFB Shilo facilitates training and doctrine development at a western Canadian artillery centre of excellence to supplement the Artillery school;

4. if Poland is to be used as a base, there is less of a risk of a negative reaction from Russia as to the prepositioning of additional NATO resources in the Baltics;

5. if Poland is to be used as a base it provides access to less vulnerable port, airfield, storage and training facilities than Latvia and a potentially more stable assembly area;

6. if Poland is to be used as a base, linkages with the MND-NE and/or the US V Corps, could be developed as well as with MND-N;

7. if Latvia is used as a base, any deploying force does not need to transit through the Suwalki Gap situated between Belarus and the Russian Kaliningrad Oblast on the Lithuanian/Polish border nor through Lithuania;

8. Navy and Air Force elements can develop and exercise plans for the deployment and sustainment of land forces in Europe; and

9. CJOC, 1 Div and 3 Div can gain experience and plan for the training of and the prepositioning of a CABG, and larger forces, in Central Europe;

Disadvantages:

1. the battle group has no organic air defence elements therefore arrangements would need to be made to incorporate into the air defence structure of whatever formation it becomes employed with;

2. if Poland is used as a base, the base would be between 4-800 kms from Latvia and accordingly it would take at least one day to move the force once assembled;^[25] and

3. if Poland is used as a base, the route from any assembly area in Poland would need to traverse Lithuania via the Suwalki Gap and as such any movement to Latvia would need to be integrated into the gap’s defence plans.

The Minimal Solution – Phase 2

Phase 2 of the minimal solution involves expanding the single prepositioned battle group to a full CABG using primarily equipment within the existing Army’s inventory. Phase 2 would include the following steps:

1. Phase 1 maxes out Canada’s tank holdings. To increase the prepositioned force by two tank squadrons in Europe would requires transferring two squadrons from Edmonton/Wainwright to Europe leaving just one or two[26] for shared training in Canada as between the two regular and one reserve squadrons;

2. a decision is required as to whether in the event of the deployment of the prepositioned brigade, the eFP-L remains under command of the Latvian Mechanized brigade, or comes under command of the Canadian prepositioned brigade;[27]

3. in the event that it is decided that the current eFP-L remains with the Latvian Mechanized Brigade, preposition a second LAV6.0 battalion’s equipment from Edmonton to Europe;

4. lease or acquire two additional self-propelled batteries and ancillary regimental equipment and preposition in Europe;[28]

5. lease or acquire two Avenger[29] GBAD batteries and ancillary equipment. Preposition one in Europe and one in Gagetown with 4^th Artillery Regiment (General Support) for training purposes. Stand up two reserve GBAD batteries in the Maritimes;

6. reallocate the equipment from one of the RCD’s reconnaissance squadrons in Petawawa to prepositioning in Europe. Reorganize the remainder of the RCD into one reconnaissance squadron, a new hybrid MUAV squadron and a new hybrid anti-armour squadron;

7. review MUAV, anti-armour, and reconnaissance headquarters equipment holdings across the Army and reallocate equipment holdings (primarily from LdSH and reserve reconnaissance regiments) to a prepositioned reconnaissance regiment in Europe;

8. review engineering equipment holdings across the Army and reallocate equipment holdings (primarily from 1 CER, 4 ESR and reserve CERs) to a prepositioned Combat Engineer Regiment in Europe;

9. review service support equipment holdings across the Army, Health Services and Military Police and reallocate equipment holdings (primarily from 1 Svc Bn, reserve Svc Bns, 1 Fd Ambulance, reserve field ambulances, 1 MP Platoon and reserve MP platoons) to a prepositioned service battalion, field ambulance and military police platoon in Europe;

10. review communication equipment holdings across the Army and reallocate the equipment for a brigade headquarters and signals squadron (primarily from 1 CABG and reserve signals regiments) to a prepositioned brigade headquarters and signals squadron in Europe; and

11. augment the eFP-L NSE with sufficient additional maintainers to maintain prepositioned brigade equipment post exercise usage.[30]

The advantages and disadvantages of Phase 2 of the minimal solution are:

Advantages:

1. all advantages from Phase 1 above apply;

2. Canada will have prepositioned the equipment holdings for a full heavy brigade in Europe for service as part of the MND-N in addition to the eFP-L with a minimal commitment of additional full-time personnel abroad and with a minimal need to acquire additional equipment above current holdings;

3. Canada will be able to conduct up to major brigade level exercises in conjunction with it’s allies including exercising the Air Force and the Navy in land force deployment and sustainment plans. In time, such exercises can involve two reserve force CABGs in addition to 1 CABG;

4. a prepositioned brigade will meet the requirements of the SSE[31] as to maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of conflict with a “near-peer” while enhancing Canada’s standing amongst it’s allies particularly those in Europe;

5. drawing resources principally from 3 Div, 1 CABG and reserve forces leaves the resources of 2 Div’s two brigades—2 CLBG and 5 CMBG—and CANSOFCOM mostly untouched so as to leave them available for other quick reaction missions suitable for light and/or medium and special operations forces;

6. while 3 Div’s equipment holdings are reduced due to prepositioning, it has sufficient residual equipment and manpower so as to conduct training in Canada and provide limited reinforcements to the deployed brigade. This deficiency is mitigated by having all major training exercises within the brigade conducted as flyover exercises in Europe; and

7. acquisition of a hybrid operated RORO capacity by the Navy during Phase 1 would allow for the transfer of equipment to Europe and the continual exercising of sustainment, reinforcement and sea lane protection activities for Phase 2.

Disadvantages:

1. disadvantages b and c from Phase 1 apply;

2. the formation of a fully equipped prepositioned brigade in Europe weakens both the equipment holdings of 1 CABG and other CAF elements, however, they should remain sufficient to allow training of both regular force and reserve force elements of 3 Div on shared equipment. More importantly 1 CABG should be conducting most of their major annual exercises on prepositioned equipment in Europe. Similarly, in time, the additional reserve CABGs would do at least some of their annual summer exercises in Europe; and

3. deploying a full brigade of 4,500 plus personnel by air would require a minimum of two (more probably three) lifts assuming all RCAF 8 Wing’s air transport resources (CC-150, CC-177 and CC-130J) were available and serviceable. Contingencies need to be planned to quickly ramp up additional leased air transport. The deployment and redeployment of at least one annual exercise needs to be programmed as a priority exercise for 8 Wing and requires tight coordination with the Army’s exercise timetables especially when reservists are involved.

The Optimal Solution – Preliminary Analysis

While the minimal option provides a more rational purpose-built asymmetric organizational structure for the Army and positions a CABG for operations in Europe while the brigade’s personnel remain garrisoned in Canada, it does not increase Canada’s overall military outputs. Canada’s Army is still left with only three equipped and deployable brigades and ten non-deployable, underequipped reserve CBGs. That leaves the question: What is our plan to change from a military that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little. to one that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis?

The answer to that question lies completely in how we go about reversing the over fifty years of neglect that has been foisted on Canada’s Reserve Force (and to a lesser extent the Regular Force) with the aim of creating reserve units and formations that are capable of being deployed as entities rather than merely as individual or sub-sub-unit augmentees to the existing three regular manoeuvre brigade groups.

In that respect the additional questions to ask are:

1. what truly is the purpose of a reserve force?

2. what size of force do we need day-to-day? and

3. what size of force do we want to grow to in a crisis?

By definition:

15(1) There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the regular force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for continuing, full-time military service. ...

(3) There shall be a component of the Canadian Forces, called the reserve force, that consists of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for other than continuing, full-time military service when not on active service. (Emphasis added)

In short, reservists are members of the CAF who ordinarily serve on a part-time basis and in emergencies are mobilized or activated to serve full-time for whatever duration the emergency dictates.

By virtue of their part-time nature, individual reservists annually cost approximately one-sixth of that of a comparable full-time member for pay and benefits and once the operations and training costs for such things as vehicle maintenance, ammunition, fuel and other supplies are factored in, the annual cost for a reserve unit, as compared to their full-time counterparts, can be from one half for very complex units such as aviation to one quarter for less complex ones such as an MP battalion. The trade off is that such units are less ready for deployment and, therefore, may require a period of pre-deployment training. It is important to note, however, that under the current regime of the Army’s Managed Readiness Plan, even full-time units are only adjudged to be ready for deployment in one year out of every three with the other two years allocated for resetting and rebuilding the unit.

In Canada a paradox has arisen in that reservists are more valued for the Class B service that they can perform in various continuing, full-time and routine positions created throughout the CAF but particularly in its various headquarters. This is quite simply a work-around of the manpower ceilings imposed by the government on the Regular Force. Full-time Class B reservists provide very minor cost savings over their Regular Force counterparts and for all intents and purposes do not truly fall within the definition of the Reserve Force. Class B reservists consume significant portions of reserve budgets very frequently without benefit to the Reserve Force itself.

One should note as well that a reserve force with limited equipment has little benefit to a country’s overall defence outputs in an emergency. Soldiers and their machines are intrinsically linked. Reservists need to train on the equipment they will deploy with and, on activation, must either have their own equipment with them or else step into prepositioned equipment already on site. To have an Army that only equips one half of its total force as Canada does, automatically ensures that half of its force is left out of battle.

The capital cost for equipment should be the same for part-time units as that for their comparable full-time counterparts if one is planning for a reserve force that is contemplated to be used on active service. In other words we should not merely provide ersatz training equipment to the Reserve Force but the actual equipment they are expected to deploy with.

The primary aim of any major defence review should be to clearly determine what type of forces and what quantities of them are needed on a day-to-day basis for immediate employment or whose skill sets are so complex that they need to train continuously. Those become the full-time force. In addition such review should also determine what type of forces and in what quantities are needed over-and-above the full-time force to be available in the event that an emergency occurs which is beyond the capabilities of the full-time force to handle. Those become the part-time force.

The deployment in Afghanistan was an aberration for western nations in tying down significant forces on continuous asymmetric combat rotations for a considerable period of time. Hopefully NATO has learned that such missions are very much a zero-sum game. While there is clearly still a major role for light and medium forces on short-term stabilization missions, where reserve forces are mostly limited to augmentation, NATO’s premier mission is deterrence in Europe against a modern and well equipped opponent where reserve formations and units can and should play a major part in providing a large force which is relatively inexpensive to maintain in peacetime.

Units such as artillery, armour, air defence, anti-armour, or even some mechanized infantry and extensive CSS elements are not needed for most of Canada’s day-to-day operations but are indispensable for deterrence or peer-to-peer combat in a crisis. On the other hand, light and some mechanized infantry, special operations forces, cyber defence and some engineering or CSS units are required daily or on short notice. There ought to be no question that elements of the full-time force which rarely needed to deploy in their primary role but are needed in crisis, should be replaced, in large part, by part-time reservists.

The main question left facing Canada is: should it live within the Army’s current equipment base and therefore replace many full-time personnel within those units with part-time reservists and thereby generate cost savings to better equip and train the total force or should one start with the authorized personnel strengths (less a significant part of it’s administrative overhead) and invest in additional equipment so as to be able to rapidly expand into a larger force in time of crisis. The answer to that question comes from a dispassionate analysis of the worst case scenario NATO faces. That should lead to the conclusion that Canada should start with its current manning levels and add the necessary equipment over time to ensure it’s total force is a deployable defence output.

The Optimal Solution – Force Transformation

Canada’s current Reserve Force is not fit for purpose beyond the haphazard generation of individual augmentees and, together with elements of the Regular Force, needs to be transformed. Such transformation should include the following:[32]

1. reorganizing the existing Army Reserve by amalgamating its ten non-deployable brigade headquarters and roughly 140 non-deployable, undermanned units into two CABGs (primarily manned by reservists): one centred in western Canada the second in Ontario; and three hybrid support brigades—one artillery brigade primarily in Quebec, one sustainment brigade primarily in southwestern Ontario and one manoeuvre enhancement brigade primarily in the Maritimes[33]—which contain in total roughly 50 deployable, fully-manned part-time or hybrid battalions or regiments of roughly 400-700 persons each;

2. disbanding the non-deployable CCSB and reassigning its units and personnel as part of the full-time components of the hybrid artillery brigade and the hybrid manoeuvre enhancement brigade;

3. enacting legislation and regulations to support the revised structure, to provide fixed terms of service and to provide for meaningful employer support;

4. removing all individual training functions from reserve units and concentrating such duties into five regional, non-deployable hybrid depot battalions roughly aligned with each of the five reserve and hybrid brigades;

5. maximizing the use of high school and university summer vacations to facilitate completion of Development Period 1 individual training at depot battalions and to provide full summer employment to students so as to stimulate recruiting;

6. limiting the training within the five reserve and hybrid brigades and units solely to the collective training of their organizations with annual training cycles for Regular and Reserve Forces units aligned from 1 Sep to 31 Aug;

7. limiting the collective training within the brigades and units to 49 mandatory collective training days of ten monthly 2.5 day weekends and one three week exercise so as to ensure full attendance at collective training yet ensuring a minimal negative impact on families and civilian employers; and

8. equipping the five reserve and hybrid brigades and units fully so as to be viable, credible and deployable entities.

While a number of the elements of the transformation will raise questions, two in particular stand out.

The necessity to amalgamate, and thereby reduce the overall number of, reserve units will be questioned by the reserve community. This is perhaps the one single issue that separates the reserve leadership from that of the Regular Force. Reservists argue that past amalgamations have shown that rather than forming a full unit, amalgamation has historically created units that were less than the sum of it’s two or more prior parts. In large part, the formation of one of the strongest lobbying organizations on behalf of the Army Reserve—Reserves 2000—was formed as a result of initiatives for amalgamation efforts within the then Central Militia Area in Ontario. Ever since, Reserves 2000 vehemently opposes any such efforts and, instead called for an expansion of the Reserve Force within it’s current formation and facilities footprint.[34] The problem in such an analysis, however, is that such amalgamations were also accompanied by reductions in funding and equipment and in local facilities all of which contributed to making continued reserve service less attractive.

While Reserves 2000’s efforts are laudable in that they kept alive the true concept of the Reserve Force[35] at a time when the full-time leadership of the Army was attempting to build something more akin to a mini-Regular Force which could and would be called on to augment the Regular Force on a more day-to-day basis. That said, the model that Reserves 2000 was proposing, and continues to propose, would have been unsustainable from square one because the money for such an expanded force—for pay, equipment and operations and maintenance—simply wasn’t, and isn’t, there.

Just as important is the question of how viable it is to expand the Reserve Force when the reserves themselves are already struggling to recruit, train and retain the relatively low numbers that they are currently allocated. It is primarily this ability to draw sufficient numbers and the complexity of skills needed in order to form deployable units of various types that dictates a fundamental transformation into the five-brigade model suggested above. In short, one can build out of the numbers that the Army Reserve is actually capable of maintaining the suggested two CABGs and three hybrid support brigades and the necessary basic and advanced training lists for personnel in the recruiting and training stream.

Simply put, the regional footprint of facilities across Canada that Reserves 2000 supports and that the reserves currently occupy, can be easily justified on the basis of providing a method of engaging communities in the CAF and providing an opportunity for more Canadians to serve their country locally on a part-time basis. The maintenance of over two hundred units (including Army Reserve, Health Services Reserve, Military Police and other reserve lists) whose authorized manning levels are well under the equivalent Regular Force establishments, and which low levels they are struggling to maintain, is not.

To be viable, credible, and deployable, reserve units need to be authorized and funded to be manned to the equivalent of their Regular Force counterparts. With the current authorized numbers only five brigades—two large CABGs and three smaller support brigades can realistically be formed.

The Optimal Solution – Equipping the Force

The extent to which, and the pace at which, the force will be equipped will undoubtedly be dictated by the funding made available by the government. As has been alluded to above, DND and CAF spend an inordinate amount on administrative overhead on full-time military and civilian salaries which could and should be reduced. LGen Leslie in his limited Report on Transformation estimated that his recommendations could lead potentially to between $750 million to $3.1 billion in annual administrative savings.[36] Such full-time administrative personnel reductions and savings, if redirected to equipment acquisition, would go a long way to equipping the force over time and provide for ongoing operations and maintenance costs without requiring additional budget allocations.

The desirable level of equipping would firstly be to bring 1 CABG back to be fully equipped in Canada for the purposes of shared training of both 1 CABG and the reserve CABG in Western Canada. Secondly, the reserve CABG in Ontario needs to be equipped for its training and for potential operational deployments. The end state would be the personnel and equipment for three fully equipped CABGs, including the prepositioned equipment in Europe, thus providing for long term rotations of the eFP Latvia battle group, the deployment of a CABG onto the prepositioned equipment in Europe, replacement of combat casualties for the deployed CABG and even the ability to activate one full armoured division in an extreme emergency.

In addition, each of the hybrid artillery brigade, sustainment brigade, and manoeuvre enhancement brigade should be fully manned and equipped with an end state of being able to provide continuous combat and combat service support rotations to: the ePF Latvia battle group; other deployed Army contingents anywhere in the world; a deployed brigade in Europe (either on exercise or operations); or, in an emergency, a deployed Canadian division. Depot battalions need to be manned and equipped to such levels that they can continue to provide individual training regardless of the deployment status of any of the brigades.

While such objectives may at first blush seem excessive based on Canada’s recent low levels of defence outputs, they are totally commensurate with defence outputs generated by other NATO countries in comparison to their budget inputs.[37]

The use of trained and equipped reserve brigades as a combat multiplier is well established within the US Army where 27 of 58 manoeuvre brigades (including 5 heavy Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT) are in the Army National Guard (ARNG)) and 137 of 212 support brigades are in either the ARNG or the Army Reserve (USAR). Effectively the reserve component of the US Army is manned and equipped to be able to essentially double the strength of the US Army’s full-time Active Duty component.[38]

To fully equip a force of two additional CABGs and three support brigades and to project and sustain it overseas would require the following major equipment over and above the equipment already held:

1. two regiments of tanks—roughly 90-130[39] plus associated equipment;

2. four to five battalions of LAV6.0—roughly 400 to 500 LAV6.0 variants plus associated equipment[40];

3. four regiments of self propelled artillery—roughly 60 M109A7 plus associated equipment;

4. one regiment HIMARS multi-barreled rocket launchers—roughly 20 launchers plus associated equipment (including one battery to be prepositioned in Europe);

5. one regiment GBAD—roughly 36 LAV6.0 based Interim Manoeuvre-Short Range Air Defence (IMSHORAD) launchers (including one battery to be prepositioned in Europe) plus associated equipment;

6. miscellaneous support vehicles—roughly 4,000[41]; and

7. Roll-on, Roll-off cargo ship—roughly 1-2;

Obviously, any procurement plan on this scale would require a multi-year, multi-phase implementation process which would need to be integrated with the Army’s basic transformation plan. While the costs associated with equipping such a force seem prohibitive at first blush, it bears repeating that the manpower required for the force does not exceed what is already authorized.[42]

The ultimate objective is to reach a level of competence and equipment holding so that fully trained reserve CABGs and their hybrid combat and combat service support enablers are capable of deploying to Europe on flyover exercises to train for the eventuality of a combat deployment just in the same way that the ARNG and USAR brigades do now. As a side benefit, the two reserve CABGs provide an additional six manoeuvre units and their integral support units while the three support brigades provide yet more support personnel all of which could, on occasion, take on longer term rotations as Canada’s eFP battle group contingent and NSE in Latvia thus, for example, relieving 1 CABG of every alternate rotation.

The advantages and disadvantages of Phase 2 of the optimal solution are:

Advantages:

1. 1. 1. Canada’s status within NATO would be enhanced and it’s forces would provide both a more credible deterrent and more lethal combat capability;

      2. the fact that one half of the deployable field force is part-time reduces the annual pay and compensation and operations and maintenance costs of what it would be for a pure full-time force of the same size and as such makes it more sustainable year-after-years;

      3. shared equipment and aligned training cycles of part-time and full-time units in Canada ensure that the amount of equipment in Canada is sufficient for training and, together with the prepositioned equipment, is sufficient for operational use for the full force and can be managed through a common system;

      4. prepositioned equipment in Europe ensures that both part-time and full-time units can train for deployment to Europe;

      5. prepositioned equipment in Europe and reserve training equipment in eastern Canada will have a lower usage rate than average and require less maintenance over its life cycle;

      6. provision of hybrid cbt sp and CSS units will provide full-time support for all deployed operations on a day-to-day basis and a surge capability to support up to a divisional force in the event of an emergency;

      7. depot battalions, together with the Combat Arms School concentrate recruit management and individual basic and advanced training outside of the deployable field force. As static units they are able to continue large scale force generation even in an emergency if the bulk of the field force is required to deploy;

      8. depot battalions in conjunction with civilian universities could supplant the need for a costly military establishment such as the Royal Military College;

      9. standardization of DP1 training and selected advance training as between the Regular Force and Reserve Force could facilitate seamless component transfers, and establish a common human resources, and financial management systems;

      10. slow rate of initial transformation will allow for adjustments for developing weapons technologies, organizations and doctrine;

      11. as reserve force capabilities mature, more options for operational use or for force restructuring will be available to Canada;

      12. steady state deployments for exercises in Europe will facilitate exercising Navy and Air Force planning and exercising of force projection, sea lane protection and force sustainment;

      13. cost effectiveness for sustaining the force is enhanced through deployable part-time resources

Disadvantages:

1. shared equipment in western Canada will receive a higher usage rate and will require additional maintenance over its life cycle;

2. at the rate of 49 days mandatory training per year, reserve CABGs will take four years to go through a full readiness cycle and may require additional predeployment training depending where they stand in their readiness cycle; and

3. more funding will be required for the capital acquisition and ongoing maintenance of equipment than for that of the current force, however, as an offset that could be an advantage in favour of Canadian defence industries.

The transformation proposed in this article, if accepted, would require a phased and dual track implementation stretching from four to six years involving:

1. initially creating a coalition to support transformation, communicating the vision for change and setting implementation goals and measures; reviewing, aligning and validating the force structure (particularly vis-à-vis allocation of the full and part-time positions); drafting and implementing the legislative, regulatory, and doctrinal changes necessary; and the settling of the details of the transformation plan;

2. by the middle of the second year a detailed implementation could begin commencing with the initial realigning/repositioning of the Regular Force components including equipment reallocation; realigning training infrastructure to support the steady state of the future force; addressing the acquisition of equipment to support the end state force; and commencing the realignment of the Reserve Force components;

3. by the end of year three validation of the flyover concept for a single battle group can be completed; and the implementation of the repositioning plan for a brigade’s equipment can be adjusted and implementation commenced; and

4. by the end of year five: prepositioning of a brigade’s equipment should be complete and brigade-level flyover training can commence and be validated; realignment of the Reserve Force can be validated; and the reequipping of the total force in Canada can be reviewed and adjusted as equipment starts to come on line.

Conclusion

The transformation in structure and doctrine proposed in this article is extensive and fundamental in nature. It is nothing less than a paradigm shift in how the CAF will do business in the future. Why embark on a process that will undoubtedly cause friction, even resentment in many elements in the force? The answer lies in the continuing challenges that the CAF faces: in meeting the necessity to generate and sustain greater defence outputs for the funding that the Government commits; in the operational demands placed on it by the SSE; and in the demands placed on it by the varied operational environments that it must prepare for.

Defence spending is a delicate balance between personnel costs, capital equipment costs and operations and maintenance costs. Since the late 1960s, however, DND has responded reactively to defence policies that came in fits and starts together with ever more chaotic funding crises. As a result the three core cost allocations have gone out of balance by underfunding equipment and operations and maintenance while over half of the current $23 billion budget goes predominantly to full-time personnel including a lavish civilian and military headquarters establishment.

In consequence actual defence outputs have been dangerously depleted. As salaries rise annually, defence outputs will drop even further unless the government provides more funding. By restructuring the force so that full-time forces are committed solely to the necessary day-to-day or rapid response commitments while part-time forces are trained and equipped for the less frequent but more extreme challenges the military provides a cost-effective, sustainable force that can reallocate more of the allocated funds to necessary equipment and operations and maintenance.

The SSE has conflicting demands that a symmetric agile, multi-purpose, combat-ready force cannot meet efficiently. On the one hand it needs to be capable of rapid response and engage in peacekeeping or stabilization missions against lightly armed non-state actors while on the other it needs to deter and be prepared to engage against state actors who have the ability to engage from grey zone, through hybrid to conventional peer level conflict. While Canada’s current medium force structure is suitable against the former it is seriously lacking against the latter.

Russia has clearly shown its intentions against its NATO neighbours through its actions in Georgia and the Ukraine and even Belarus.[43] At the time of writing, Vladimir Putin and his parliament have just changed the Russian constitution in such a way as to allow him to stay in power until 2036. Clearly Russia’s fundamental approach to its neighbours is not about to change in the near term. While Canada has recognized the dangers in northern Europe and has committed itself to be the framework nation for the eFP-L in the Baltics, it has taken no steps to create the necessary forces and capabilities which would be seen as a credible deterrent there. Simply put Canada lacks vision. Canada has a military that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.

Creating an asymmetric force with one division containing all light and medium forces will give Canada a true purpose-built, scalable, and agile force which is trained and equipped to react to many types of international incidents which require a rapid response.

Similarly, the second division will give Canada a true purpose-built force which is trained and equipped to react to grey zone, hybrid and conventional conflict with a peer-to-peer enemy. One full-time armoured brigade provides the capability to maintain the current eFP-L commitment in Latvia indefinitely. Prepositioning an armoured brigade’s equipment in Europe will enhance deterrence and afford the ability to train for deployment and sustainment in theatre while retaining the personnel and their families in Canada. Reorganizing the Reserve Force and parts of the Regular Force into two reserve armoured brigades and three hybrid support brigades provides depth and breadth to the CAF’s capabilities and fulfills the call for a credible military deterrence that the SSE envisions with the significant cost savings which are inherent in reserve forces.

The proposed transformation will give Canada a military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis by leveraging the capabilities that can be generated by a cost effective Reserve Force that is properly constituted, trained and equipped to be capable of forward deployment as units and formations.

Colonel (ret’d) Wolfgang W. Riedel, OMM, CD, QC has served for forty-four years in the ranks and as an artillery, infantry and legal officer in the Regular Force and the Reserve Force. As Deputy Judge Advocate General – Reserves he was Canada’s Senior Reserve Force Legal Officer and was a member of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council.

He is the author of the book Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis, the article The Canadian Army Needs Paradigm Shift in the Canadian Military Journal and nine novels in the Allies series and the Mark Winters, CID series.

[1] Russian Strategic Intentions: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment 9SMA) White Paper May 2019, Ch 6 Goure, Dr. Daniel, Russian Strategic Intentions SMA Publications NSI Inc., Boston p.32

[2] National Defence, Strong, Secure, Engaged Canada's Defence Policy Ottawa, 2017 http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017- eng.pdf and http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-fra.pdf

[3] Ibid at p. 50

[4] Riedel, Wolf, Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis Amazon, 2020, pp. 3-11 https://www.amazon.ca/Wolf-Riedel- ebook/dp/B086HXC66Q

[5] Boston, Scott et al, Assessing the Conventional Force Imbalance in Europe: Implications for countering Russian Local Superiority, RAND Corporation 2018 pp. 5-6 https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2402.html https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2402.html

[6] Supra Note 1, Ch 4 Weitz, Richard Moscow’s Gray Zone Toolkit pp. 21-25 and consider as examples the cyber attacks on elections and on Covid-19 vaccine research as evidence of an already ongoing Russian war against the West

[7] Supra Note 1 Ch 17 Lamoreaux, Dr. Jeremy W., Countering Russian Influence in the Baltic States pp. 95-98

[8] Armored Brigade Combat Team. A heavy force of approximately 4,500 troops equipped with tanks, tracked infantry fighting vehicles and self propelled artillery.

[9] Shlapack, David A, Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States: What it Takes to Win RAND Corporation 2017 p. 2-3

https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT467.html

[10] Yakovleff, Lt. Gen. (ret’d) Michel, V Corps Could Serve Massive Role in Europe, Association of the United States Army, 22 June, 2020

https://www.ausa.org/articles/v-corps-could-serve-massive-role-europe, and

[11] Szopa, Maciej and Palowski, Jakub, “US Army to Preposition Heavy Armour in Poland. Another Stage Begins” Defence 24, 9 June 2020

https://www.defence24.com/us-army-to-preposition-heavy-armour-in-poland-another-stage-begins

[12] Stoicescu, Kalev and Jarvenpaa, Pauli, Contemporary Deterrence: Insights and Lessons from Enhanced Forward Presence International Centre or Defence and Security, Estonia, 2019

https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICDS_Report_Contemporary_Deterrence_Stoicescu_J%C3%A4rvenp%C3%A4%C3%A4_January_2019.pdf

[13] Ibid pp. 13-14

[14] Ibid p. 15

[15] Canada currently is based out of and prepositions equipment in Adazi, Latvia while the US Army is currently prepositioning in several locations in Poland with Drawsko, Pomorskie in northwest Poland as the primary combat training centre.

[16] Supra Note 4. Chs 1 – 3 for a discussion on the issues facing the CAF

[17] Ibid pp 15-23

[18] For a full and detailed discussion of the problem see Champion, C.P., Relentless Struggle: Saving the Army Reserve 1995-2019, Durnovaria, Ottawa, 2019

[19] J.L. Granatstein and LGen (retd) Charles Belzile, The Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Calgary, 2005 p. 12

https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/41/attachments/original/1413661138/Restructuring_The_Reserves_-_English.pdf?1413661138

[20] The Army capstone document Waypoint 2018: The Canadian Army Advancing Towards Land Operations 2021, Kingston, 2018 p. 4 builds a symmetric, agile, multi-purpose medium-weight force and minimizes the likelihood of large force-on-force exchanges. This creates a “Jack of all trades, master of none” structure and ignores the reality of the lessons coming out of Europe.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/assets/ARMY_Internet/docs/en/waypoint-2018.pdf

[21] Restructuring the divisions firstly, eliminates unnecessary administrative overhead and secondly, restructures the headquarters to better command and control the contemplated combined Regular Force and Reserve Force restructure.

[22] it is contemplated that as the Army expands 3 Div will eventually receive self-propelled artillery and their training functions and equipment would be centralized at Shilo using 2 PPCLI’s former facilities.

[23] Canada has a total of approximately 42 2A4+, 20 2A4M, 20 2A6M gun tanks; 12 ARVs; and 18 AEVs. One squadron currently requires 19 tanks but could be reorganized to a three-troop, 15 tank squadron like that of most of our allies.

[24] This could, for example, involve using US Army equipment already in Poland or Germany or one of Latvia’s M109A5O batteries. Training in the interim could take place in Minnesota using guns from the 1^st Bn 125^th Field Artillery of the Minnesota National Guard.

[25] One possible area is Eblag, Poland which is just southeast of Gdansk, the headquarters of the 16^th Polish Mechanized Division and approximately 500 kms from the centre of Latvia.

[26] Two if a fifteen-tanks per squadron establishment is adopted. The various versions of the Leopard 2 in inventory complicate matters.

[27] Currently the Latvian Mechanized Brigade has two mechanized and one light infantry battalion and probably requires the additional armoured and mechanized elements of the eFP battle group to remain with it to be effective.

[28] Latvia currently has two M109A5O battalions but really only one mechanized brigade to support. The possibility of having one of those battalions in direct support of the CABG should be explored else Canada will need to lease or acquire a suitable battalion and training stocks for Canada. Once such an arrangement is completed, the equipment of the two M777 batteries of 1 RCHA should be transferred to 2 CLBG and 5 CMBG to bring each of them up to three gun battery establishment.

[29] Leased Avengers would be a short-term, interim solution to build experience until such time as Canada’s current GBAD procurement project delivers a viable solution.

[30] This could be a combination of some additional staff deployed full-time to Europe as well as part-time stay behind or flyover augmentees from 3 Div.

[31] While meeting the general requirements of deterrence of a “near-peer”, the force actually exceeds the concurrent operations matrix found in the SSE (see Supra Note 2 at p. 81) although neither the predeployment of equipment nor short duration exercises would merit as deployments and the program can be considered under the rubric of “meet commitments to NATO Allies under Article 5”

[32] This very brief summation is described in much greater detail, with explanations for the rationale used, in Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis, Supra Note 4 at chapters 4 to 9.

[33] It should be noted that each of the three hybrid support brigades will have one or more reserve infantry battalions or reconnaissance regiments attached to enhance domestic operations capabilities and to provide additional augmentation or additional security units to the designated five manoeuvre brigades or as may be required.

[34] Supra Note 14

[35] i.e. a trained part-time military element capable of being called into full-time service during emergencies

[36] Leslie, LGen Andrew, Report on Transformation 2011, Ottawa , p. 66 http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-reports-pubs/transformation-report-2011.page

[37] Supra Note 4 p. 9

[38] Ibid pp. 59-60

[39] The variation depends on whether a three or four troops per squadron configuration is adopted

[40] The variation depends on whether 3 PPCLI will be equipped in Canada as only 1 and 2 PPCLI need to be equipped to complete the 1 CABG establishment.

[41] This includes everything from standard cargo vehicles to specialized vehicles such as recovery, engineer, ambulance etc both soft skin and armoured, wheeled or tracked.

[42] Supra Note 4 pp 15-23 posits that in order to create a more sustainable CAF, Canada needs to reduce the excessive annual costs associated with full-time salaries being consumed within the DND and CAF HQs on unnecessary administrative overhead by reducing the number of authorized full-time civilian and military positions. Any such savings realized should be reallocated to annual equipment and operations and maintenance functions.

[43] “Belarus says Russian mercenaries arrested ahead of presidential election”, The Guardian, Associated Press in Minsk, Wednesday 29 July 2020

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jul/29/belarus-says-dozens-of-russians-arrested-ahead-of-presidential-election