Restructuring the Canadian Army - A Sustainable Option

By Wolf Riedel, OMM, CD, QC

... Another way of putting this is that no planning is being done for a major war.

This is shortsighted in the extreme. A military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis is very different from one that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.

The Canadian Forces needs a plan.[1]

Introduction

Canada's current defence policy—Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE)[2]—issued in 2017, identifies several security threats with the most significant coming from Russia and China.

The re-emergence of major power competition has reminded Canada and its allies of the importance of deterrence. ... A credible military deterrence serves as a diplomatic tool to prevent conflict and should be accompanied by dialogue. NATO allies ... have been re-examining how to deter a wide spectrum of challenges to the international order by maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a “near-peer.”[3] (Emphasis added).

While Canada has committed itself to be the framework nation of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) multinational battalion in Latvia (eFP-L)[4], it has done little since 2017 to create a sustainable advanced conventional military capability within the CAF that would form a credible deterrent to Russia.[5]

The Baltics present a unique challenge to NATO. On the one hand, an increased NATO military presence in the Baltics would be seen by Russia as an escalation against its interests in the region while a drawdown of troops by NATO would be seen by the Baltic States as abandonment.[6] Notwithstanding the former, and because of the latter, NATO must provide a credible deterrence to keep Russian activities in check.

... the challenge NATO confronts is not successfully to deter on an average day; it is to deter on the one day out of a thousand, or 5,000, when Moscow, for whatever reason, sees the prospect of a crushing win over its most dangerous adversary as an attractive prospect. ...

... RAND’s wargaming suggests that NATO needs to be able to rapidly mobilize, deploy, fight, and sustain up to 21 maneuver brigades, ... in a full-scale conflict with Russia in the Baltics. Given current plans and capabilities, the U.S. Army might be expected to supply up to 12 of those brigades:

• up to three ABCTs[7] stationed in the Baltics—the “stay in the game” force.

• three more ABCTs drawn from secure brigade-sized propositioning sites

• up to six additional armored, infantry (IBCT), or Stryker brigade combat teams. [8] (Emphasis Added)

Of the necessary 21 manoeuvre brigades required, the three Baltic States themselves can realistically provide a total of only six to ten infantry or mechanized brigades and some minor reserve forces. In the aggregate, the three NATO eFP battle groups could be counted as one additional armoured brigade. With it’s more recent focus to draw down its forces in Germany in favour of some modest support for Poland, it is not realistic to expect that the US will, in fact, commit the requisite six ABCTs.

In a recent report[9] into the NATO eFP initiative, the authors made the following key recommendation about the Baltics:

Plans should be made for the rapid augmentation of the eFP from battalion to brigade-size formations in the event of a deteriorating security environment. These plans should be fully and regularly exercised in all host nations.[10] (Emphasis added)

The question of whether or not Canada, as the eFP-L framework nation, should increase its NATO commitment and furnish one of those additionally needed armoured brigades and whether such brigade should be prepositioned in Latvia or Poland[11] is, of course, political. However, since the Canada doesn’t currently have an armoured brigade, per se, to furnish, nor the means to deliver it there, the issue becomes practically moot.

The purpose of this article is to show one way forward whereby a transformed Canadian Army would, at least, have an armoured force capable of operations in Europe and particularly, for the Baltics. Left for the time being is the case of what land forces Canada needs for the looming threats in the Pacific.

The Need to Change The Army’s Status Quo

Are today’s CAF ready for the next conflict? Do they project a credible deterrence? Are they value for money? The answer is a resounding, no.

The current Canadian Army structure consists of three symmetric, underequipped regular force mechanized brigade groups (CMBG) with only two out of three of each brigade’s infantry battalions equipped with LAV6.0s, a smattering of Leopard 2 tanks and a handful of towed artillery[12] while the ten reserve force brigade groups (CBG) are each established at under strength in personnel by at least one half and are totally lacking in any and all essential war-fighting equipment.[13]

In summary, the size and capabilities of the Canadian Army is limited to the equipment currently held by its regular force. There is no plan in place to expand the force in the event of an emergency. The reserve force has nothing to commit other than individual augmentees to fill holes in the regular force establishments and has no plan for creating a more meaningful capability. Canada’s commitment to the eFP-L is therefore one without any reasonable plan to expand the force. This constitutes a profound failure in Canada’s military leadership.

There are several options to creating a more viable force:

• Expand the regular force with additional personnel and equipment so as to create a viable armoured brigade for Europe. This ought to be a non-starter. Full-time personnel costs already eat up over one half of the defence budget and any such increase would create a need to significantly increase the annual defence budget over time;

• Reduce the size of the regular force by a brigade and transfer its equipment to a reorganized reserve force trained for and tasked to augment, in an emergency, the regular force elements already in Europe. This reduces overall annual personnel costs and therefore can generate funds for additional equipment to expand the deployable component of the force from what it is now; or

• Reorganize the existing force to create what would become deployable reserve force units and find full-time force reductions from outside the field force (such as from administrative headquarters) to acquire the necessary equipment holdings for that force over time.

A properly transformed Canadian Army using it’s current numbers of full-time and part-time soldiers and geographic facilities could, if properly equipped and trained, double the Army’s current combat capabilities and facilitate planning for the use of an effective, credible, expanded force in Europe.

Transformation – Regular Force

To understand what follows a few terms should be made clear.

• a regular force unit is one that is made up predominantly of full-time, i.e. regular force, soldiers although it might be augmented in an emergency with individual or small teams of up to sub-units of reservists. Its primary purpose is to be available for operational deployment on very short notice or to contain such personnel whose skills are so complex that they require honing on a daily basis;

• a reserve force unit is one that is made up predominantly of part-time Class A reservists[14] although it will have a core of full-time regular force soldiers holding key administrative or leadership roles. Class A reserve force units are designed to expend just enough collective training days each year to remain proficient in their field and to be capable of being mobilized to full-time service. Their purpose is to provide major war fighting capabilities that are not required on a day-to-day basis but only in an extreme emergency; and

• a hybrid unit is one that is made up of a mixture of full-time regular force and part-time reserve force soldiers. A hybrid unit can be predominantly regular force where more than one half of the sub units or personnel are regular force or predominantly reserve force where more than half of the sub units or personnel are Class A reserve force. The purpose of hybrid units is to provide adequate service to the force on a day-to-day basis but to be capable of rapid expansion in size and capabilities in an emergency.

Essential to, and the first step of, any reorganization that would create a force capable of fighting a near peer in Europe as required by the SSE is the reorganization of the existing holdings of equipment and full-time personnel of the three existing, medium-weight, symmetric regular force CMBGs[15] into three full-time asymmetric brigades: 1 Canadian Armoured Brigade Group (1 CABG) centered in Edmonton; 2 Canadian Light Brigade Group (2 CLBG) in Petawawa; and 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (5 CMBG) in Valcartier.

Concurrently, the Canadian Army should also reduce its divisional headquarters from five to three (thereby freeing up approximately two hundred person years (PYs) of full-time personnel for reallocation). The proposed structure should be as follows:

• 2 Canadian Division (2 Div) in eastern Canada with 2 CLBG, 5 CMBG, the Canadian Combat Support Brigade (CCSB), all reserve brigades in Quebec, Ottawa and the Maritimes and all the Canadian Rangers under command and absorbing the currently existing 5^th Canadian Division’s training and support facilities and those in Petawawa of the currently existing 4^th Canadian Division;

• 2 Div will be primarily responsible for force generating agile, rapidly deployable light and medium elements for national and international operations such as counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, peace making and for northern operations;

• 3 Canadian Division (3 Div) in western Canada with 1 CABG, and all reserve brigades in southern Ontario and western Canada under command and absorbing the training and support facilities in southern Ontario of the currently existing 4^th Canadian Division;

• 3 Div will be primarily responsible for force generating heavy armoured forces for employment with NATO in Europe; and

• Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and 1 Canadian Division HQ (1 Div) remain as the force employment agencies for all CAF mission assigned elements;[16]

While there are some differences in structure amongst most modern forces, an armoured brigade generally has at least three manoeuvre battalions of which at least one is a tank regiment while the remainder are armoured infantry. In addition there ought to be at least an armoured artillery regiment; a reconnaissance regiment; an engineer regiment, a service support battalion and medical, signals and military police (MP) elements. 1 CMBG currently has enough personnel and most of the equipment to create such a structure with minimal disruption.

Moving all of Canada’s Leopard 2 tanks to Edmonton would permit the LdSH to become a fully equipped tank regiment. 1 and 2 PPCLI are already armoured infantry (albeit with wheeled rather than tracked armoured fighting vehicles) and do not need to change. 3 PPCLI, however, as a light infantry battalion, has no role in an armoured brigade and should be considered for reroling into what, for lack of a better term, could be called a reconnaissance strike battalion.[17]

Besides the transfer of the tanks to the LdSH, there would be a need for some additional equipment and personnel adjustments:

• as an armoured brigade, it is essential that its artillery regiment have armoured self propelled artillery (either wheeled or tracked) however, such a regiment could be a reserve heavy hybrid one where up to two batteries could be reservists. In the case of 1 RCHA, eighteen such guns are required. There are sufficient reserve force artillery units near to 1 RCHA which could man such batteries and which could easily train at Shilo with 1 RCHA. Acquisition of such guns and conversion of the reserve units to their use should be a high priority. On the plus side, rearming would free up eight M777 light towed howitzers to go to either 2 CLBG or 5 CMBG; and

• a reroled 3 PPCLI should be capable of being equipped with: many of it’s own current vehicle holdings; the new LAV 6.0 recce versions currently being procured; the Army’s current TOW systems; and with the Army’s current UAV systems. Acquisition of improved anti-armour systems and armed UAVs should be a moderate priority. Some cross postings/attachments of armoured corps recce crewmen to the battalion would be desirable while surplus infantrymen could bulk out 1 and 2 PPCLI or be available for reassignment to other units;

To convert 2 CLBG to a truly light, quick reaction force, it must have lighter, more easily deployable equipment. It already has the appropriate organizational structure of three infantry battalions, a reconnaissance regiment, an artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, a service support battalion and medical, signals and MP elements. The following are reequipping/restructuring points:

• as a light brigade, its two battalions’ worth of LAV series of vehicles should be withdrawn from the brigade and reallocated elsewhere. This will require a reevaluation of what ground transport and equipment should be acquired for both the light infantry battalions and the light reconnaissance regiment. Acquisition is a high priority;

• 2 RCHA already has two gun batteries and as a quick reaction force such batteries should remain regular force making it a predominantly regular force hybrid. A third reserve battery should be formed from artillery reservists in the Pembroke and Ottawa areas. Consideration should be given as to whether the regiment should consist of three six-gun M777 batteries or of one six-gun M777 battery and two lighter, more air transportable 105mm batteries. Acquisition is a medium priority.

5 CMBG require the least amount of restructuring as it is already organized and equipped primarily as a medium weight force.

The following are reequipping/restructuring issues:

• one battalion’s worth of LAV6.0s and all ancillary equipment should be transferred from 2 CLBG to 5 CMBG to fully equip 3^e R22R as an armoured infantry battalion;

• depending on the equipment mix decided on for 2 RCHA, 1 RCHA’s eight M777s and, perhaps, two of 2 RCHA’s M777 should go to 5 RALC. This would provide 5 RALC with up to 18 M777s which is sufficient for three batteries. If 2 RCHA stays fully M777 equipped twelve additional M777s will be needed to be acquired to fully equip the regiment. In that eventuality consideration should be given as to whether 5 RALC should instead be equipped with wheeled, armoured self propelled 155mm guns. Acquisition, if required, is a medium priority. 5 RALC should become a predominantly regular force hybrid regiment by keeping its two regular force batteries and forming a third, reserve force, battery from artillery reservists in the Quebec City area.

The above reorganization requires minimal disruption and minimal new equipment acquisition. All existing personnel and facilities remain as they are although reporting lines will change from four to two divisional headquarters. A modest reduction in personnel provides a pool capable of redistributing to assist with the subsequent restructure of the reserve force. Interim solutions are easily available as placeholders until such time as new equipment is procured. More importantly it restructures the Army into purpose built centres of excellence that can develop doctrine specific to their primary missions and upon which the subsequent transformation of the reserves can be built.

Transformation – Reserves/Hybrid - Factors

While the transformation of the regular force brigades is relatively simple, can be done at relatively low cost and has a low negative impact on personnel or facilities, transformation of the reserves, primarily because of decades of neglect, is much more complex.

This paper concentrates only on the structural elements of transformation. Legislative changes, terms of service, a restructured recruiting and training system, etc are critically vital and have been discussed elsewhere.[18]

First and foremost, one needs to address the elephant in the room.

The only purpose that the current reserve structure is good for at present is to provide a flexible labour pool that the full-time regular force can draw on from time to time to bulk up its numbers. Most recently that purpose has been, and continues to be, to provide additional full-time personnel at various headquarters (but especially in Ottawa) in excess of the full-time regular force PYs authorized by the government. This inability of the regular force to live within it’s personnel allocations, and misuse of reserve force funding has been and continues to be to the detriment of the Army’s ability to build a viable part-time reserve force. In effect, short-term, day-to-day, perceived needs of administrative headquarters are undermining Canada’s ability to plan for and to grow into a larger force in an emergency.

During the war in Afghanistan each deployed rotation had from 15 to 25% reservists as individual augmentees albeit that each such reservist required extensive training prior to deployment. It is somewhat surprising that a full-time military of 67,000—of which 23,000 were regular force Army—was severely stressed to keep 3,000 people in the field to the point that it required such a large reserve contribution. Regardless, reservists were proud and willing to serve.

Using reservists to bulk out regular force units or hybrid units with augmentees is a viable course of action that should continue. However, that does not, per se, grow the forth into more units. Both the regular force and the reserve force can and should be structured so as to optimize the use of full-time personnel where needed day-to-day and part-time personnel where they are only needed in an emergency. That system, however, must be more formalized than it is now so as to ensure proper leadership, training and accountability of reservists rather than the current ad hoc system.

The critical point, however, is that the current reserve force has neither the equipment nor training to provide more than individual or small sub-sub-unit augmentation to the regular force units which have all the equipment. The Army is entirely incapable of, in the words of General Belzile, growing into a great host in a crisis. For that matter, its incapable of growing at all. What the three regular force brigades offer right now, regardless as to how well they are organized, is all that Canada will ever get in a crisis unless more equipment is put into the inventory.

The purpose of reserve force transformation is to create a plan so that the reserve force will be able to bring to the table additional capabilities beyond mere augmentation if, and when, Canada needs them.

It may be arguable as to how many combat and support elements Canada will need in an emergency. In large measure, this is akin to asking oneself as to how expensive a life insurance policy one needs to purchase and for what situations. It is largely a deductive process based on known facts and circumstances. While many factors exist and could be taken into consideration, the following are the ones utilized for the recommendations that follow:

• Canada’s primary reserve force is currently authorized at an approximate strength of 21,000 Army, 4,000 Navy, 2,600 Air Force, 2,500 Health Services and 600 Military Police. Over and above the primary reserve there are some 5,000 Canadian Rangers. Like the transformation of the regular force, it is desirable to use the existing reserve force numbers and their existing locations and facilities such as armouries and divisional training facilities. While some argue that there is a need to expand the reserve force, there is no demonstrable reason for that. What is desperately needed more than anything else is to better organize, equip and train the force that is already authorized and funded;

• the Army reserve force currently has 123 units organized into 10 brigades. Health Services adds another 12 field ambulances and the Military Police the equivalent of four companies. All are undermanned, poorly equipped (if at all) and lacking collective training. Based on roughly 3,000 to 4,500 personnel and roughly 8 units to a brigade, Canada’s roughly 24,000 Army, Health Services and MP reservists could form, at best, 40 to 50 fully manned units organized into 5 or 6 brigades/brigade groups. In order to undergo proper collective training and to become mobilizable into an expansion force, amalgamation of existing partially manned units into fewer fully manned units is required. Make no mistake. This will create friction within the reserve force but there simply is no other option. While a method can be worked out to preserve regimental traditions within say companies of an amalgamated battalion, amalgamation is essential if any proper command, control and training regime is ever expected to bring the current force up to deployable standards;

• the basic argument against reserve force amalgamation is that such previous programs a half century ago failed to form viable full-sized units. Looked at realistically though, those downsizings were brought on by economic factors, did not actually structure the units as full-sized ones, provided no additional equipment, cut funding for training and provided no viable missions or roles for the units. The programs were conducted under the then prevailing regular force attitude that only full-time forces-in-being had any value on what was contemplated as a rapid strike by Soviet armies on a mass nuclear battlefield. Any effort to improve the capabilities of the reserve force through amalgamation alone will undoubtedly fail. It will require a serious effort to assign true operational roles to such reserve units together with the appropriate equipment and training to make mobilization a sustainable capability;

• economic factors continue to hinder the proper equipping of both the current regular force and current reserve force, but paradoxically not the growth of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces’ administrative headquarters. Canada has reached a point where its forces-in-being are incapable of major operational deployments as is proven through the SSE assigning no requirements to deploy beyond battle group level and the numerous capability gaps that exist within the force. As such, the inability to expand the full-time forces-in-being beyond their current structure in an emergency because of the lavish proliferation of administrative overhead is a corporate risk that has developed insidiously over the years which needs to be corrected in a major way. Note that we have not said it should be examined and studied. That has already happened several times without any meaningful corrective action being taken. A major cut in the 17,000 DND/CAF personnel in the National Capitol region together with the reduction in facilities there will generate a sufficient annual cost reduction in administrative overhead to itself allow for a gradual equipping of the Army;

• unification and integration has seriously undermined the Army’s ability to provide combat support and combat service support to deployed units and formations. Our current processes involve ad hocing such support from other non-deploying units, formations and bases into temporary national support elements (NSE). For the United States, whose Army is primarily expeditionary, its support brigades outnumber its manoeuvre brigades. There are 31 manoeuvre brigades and 75 support brigades in its active component and 27 manoeuvre brigades and 137 support brigades in its National Guard and Reserve components. For armies that are not as expeditionary in nature, such as the UK, Italy, Poland and France the ratio is closer to 1 to 1. Canada by contrast has 3 manoeuvre brigades (13 if we wish to count the reserves at all) but only 1 support brigade and even that has no sustainment elements within it. Since Canada is a country whose Army primarily operates on an expeditionary basis it needs to correct this serious imbalance, by creating more hybrid support formations and units that can be utilized for both day-to-day operational support or mobilized in emergencies for expeditionary deployments when needed;

• the current reserve force structure leans heavily to manoeuvre units (of its 123 units, 51 are infantry battalions and 18 are armoured reconnaissance regiments). While theoretically speaking it might be desirable to corrected the manoeuvre/support imbalance by reroling many combat arms unit to support trades, practically speaking amalgamation will already strain the reserve force; large scale reroling could break it. As such, every effort should be made to retain individuals in career fields that they have already chosen and established proficiency in. That said, structures could be put in place to entice new recruits to desperately needed support trades and units that need to be built up; and

• current and historical reserve force manpower levels indicate that the following regions of Canada should be capable of manning and maintaining the numbers to fill the following fully manned organizations:

o the four western provinces one brigade group;

o Ontario one brigade group and a small support brigade; and

o Quebec and the Maritimes one brigade group and a small support brigade or two larger support brigades.

Transformation – Reserves/Hybrid - Structure

To an extent the suggested reserve force/hybrid structure that follows is designed to complement the previously set out restructure of Army’s regular force structure and locations as well as the factors set out immediately above.

3 Div - Edmonton

With 1 CABG in Edmonton/Wainwright oriented towards a potential European high intensity conflict, it is only logical that reserve units in Western Canada be organized and structured to provide depth and breadth to support that mission by sharing both training facilities and personnel. This could primarily done by forming a reserve armoured brigade from amongst the units across the three Prairie provinces and British Columbia. All four provinces are required to provide a sustainable flow of 5,000 reservists (the brigade units and a training depot battalion). No new facilities are required and, until new equipment is acquired, the reserves could use 1 CABG equipment on a shared basis for collective training at Wainwright.

One reserve force CABG would be the minimum required to provide depth to 1 CABG by way of reinforcements and replacements and even up to battle group rotations in the event that 1 CABG needs to sustain Latvia on indefinite rotations.

As stated in the introduction to this article, however, the Baltics require more armoured brigades both in country as well as on a flyover basis to provide a proper deterrent against potential Russian aggressive moves in the region. Therefore, a second reserve CABG, would provide further depth by way of reinforcements and replacements (of both personnel and equipment) to a fly over CABG capability in Europe on an indefinite basis. Such a capability is highly desirable and would expand the Army’s deployable force capability beyond the limited ones that are currently envisioned in the SSE. Once all three CABGs are equipped Canada would have an ultimate capability, in the event of the most severe situation, of deploying a full armoured division.

The location of this second reserve force CABG is a difficult one in that there is insufficient capacity in the western provinces to recruit and maintain such a second brigade while other range facilities in Canada are marginal. Central Ontario, however, provides an excellent foundation for such a force although, admittedly, it will require transportation in order to get it’s troops to the requisite training facilities for collective training, which, like the western brigade, could initially be done using 1 CABG’s equipment. Meaford provides an excellent facility for individual and small team training, and initially a battalion’s worth of 2 CLBG’s divested LAV6.0s could and should be located there.

Central and Southwestern Ontario have a larger capacity to recruit and man reserve units than simply a single CABG and as such it makes sense to place a reserve-heavy hybrid support brigade, specifically a sustainment brigade, into the region as well. Existing reserve force units in the region could be organized into a service battalion, field ambulance, an engineer support regiment, a transport battalion, a special troops battalion (for such services as a human resources and finance company, a supply company, a POL company and other miscellaneous services) and a signals squadron. In addition it could be the holding formation for a military police regiment albeit with its various companies located across the country

The creation of such a brigade provides a somewhat logical geographic span of control for 3 Div, i.e. the western portion of the country, and the ability to train support elements to build the sustainment capabilities for a European force albeit that such a sustainment brigade would have a broader mandate than just Europe and would also generate forces for employment on other operations as well.

In addition there is sufficient capacity and capability in the region to also build up to two or three light infantry battalions which do not require an additional manoeuvre brigade group headquarters and whose primary focus would be providing manoeuvre forces for a rear area security zone or for urban operations and which, for administrative purposes, would be under the command of the sustainment brigade.

2 Div - Montreal

While 3 Div is focused on the remote likelihood of peer-to-peer conflict in Europe and therefore has most of it’s manpower balanced in favour of the lower recurring cost of reservists, 2 Div is oriented more towards the day-to-day needs of a more mobile light quick reaction force and a medium weight follow-up force and whose two manoeuvre brigades are primarily regular force.

The primary mandate for this division and it’s two regular force brigade headquarters is the day-to-day generation of any and all forces required for foreign Security Force Assistance, peacekeeping functions and northern operations in up to battle group strength. As such, while there is no requirement for an additional reserve force manoeuvre brigade headquarters, there is definitely a need for several light and medium weight reserve manoeuvre battalions to provide a depth capability for 2 CLBG and 5 CMBG through reinforcement, replacement and occasional battlegroup rotations.

The core of the proposed reserve force for 2 Div is through the creation of two hybrid support brigades.

The first is a primarily reserve hybrid artillery brigade headquartered in Quebec, utilizing the existing reserve force artillery regiments in Quebec and the Maritimes, and the service support and medical units in Quebec as well as the existing regular force 4^th Artillery Regiment (General Support) in Gagetown.

Effectively this brigade would have three to four artillery regiments, an engineer regiment, a service battalion, a field ambulance and a signals squadron. While 4^th RCA(GS) already holds some UAV, radar and command and control equipment, and while there is also an ongoing program to acquire ground based air defence equipment, there is also a need to develop and acquire additional general support target acquisition and long range engagement capabilities including multi-launch rocket systems and attack drones all of which could function well within a hybrid artillery support brigade. Such an acquisition program should be a high priority for the Army.

Quebec also has the capacity to form and maintain up to three additional manoeuvre battalions—light or mechanized infantry and armoured reconnaissance—to provide reserve manoeuvre depth to both 2 CLBG and 5 CMBG. Such units could train on equipment already held by 2 CLBG and 5 CMBG until such time as their own equipment holdings could be brought up to strength.

There is no practical need for an additional reserve force manoeuvre brigade group headquarters in Quebec and further there is not the capacity in Quebec to generate the additional service support, engineer or medical elements that such a brigade group would require. As such, these additional two or three manoeuvre units should be placed under the command of the artillery brigade for administrative purposes

The second support brigade is what for all intents and purposes could best be described as a hybrid manoeuvre enhancement brigade created, in large part, out of the CCSB.

Currently the CCSB is a small non-deployable administrative headquarters located in Kingston but which commands units in locales stretching from New Brunswick to Alberta. The proposal is to reorganize the CCSB to make the brigade a deployable entity and to increase it’s capabilities.

While the CCSB would spin off the 4^th RCA(GS) to the Quebec based artillery brigade, it would retain the Canadian Army Intelligence Regiment, the Influence Activity Task Force, 21 Electronic Warfare Regiment and 4 Engineer Support Regiment.

Maritimes reserve units would amalgamate to form the brigade’s service battalion, field ambulance, and signal squadron as well as a newly created Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) defence regiment .

Finally, there is sufficient capacity and capability in the Maritimes to also build up to two light infantry battalions which, like Quebec, do not require an additional manoeuvre brigade group headquarters and whose primary focus would be as manoeuvre forces for rear area security zone or for urban operations and which, for administrative purposes, would be under the command of the Maritimes hybrid manoeuvre enhancement brigade.

Because much of the brigade is spread across the country but the bulk of it’s reservists and at least one of its regular force units is in the Maritimes, the CCSB/manoeuvre enhancement brigade headquarters should be moved to the Maritimes.

The creation of two support brigades provides a somewhat logical geographic span of control for 2 Div, i.e. the eastern portion of the country, and balances the structures of the two force generation divisions at four fully manned brigades each.

While the three support brigades are divided between 2 Div and 3 Div their purpose is to generate support forces, both combat support and combat service support for any and all missions assigned by CJOC. It is envisioned that CJOC and 1 DIV will establish an NSE for any given mission and select the appropriate support elements from any of the three support brigades or elsewhere as required on a case-by-case basis.

Transforming the Air Force and Navy

This paper concerns itself primarily with the poor state of the Army reserve force and how it can become a significantly more effective force through the utilization of it’s reserve elements. There are, however, also complementary roles for the Air Force and Navy through which reservists can make a significant difference:

• The Air Force currently employs some 2,600 reservists (primarily but not exclusively former regular force personnel many of whom are on full-time contracts). The Air Force already has three aviation squadrons and four Construction Engineering Flights that are termed “reserve heavy”;

• There are three capabilities that stand out as rarely required during peacetime day-to-day operations but critical in emergencies being: attack helicopter; medical casualty evacuation and operational deployment of an aviation “battalion” headquarters and support element which would command and control a composite element of several aviation squadrons (short of all 1 Wing resources) on operations;

• Currently fourteen US Army National Guard Combat Aviation Brigades exist made up of multiple battalions of multiple companies each. It would be beneficial if a Canadian composite aviation “battalion” could train with and slot into a US Aviation brigade in emergencies;

• in addition, supporting our forces in the Baltics during a conflict would undoubtedly involve reinforcing and sustaining it, in large part by air. This would be particularly important if Canada went so far as to create a flyover brigade. Such a capability should be both planned and exercised regularly which could involve air reservists on annual exercises and who, in an emergency, would provide surge crews, and airhead control parties;

• As for the Navy, it currently employs some 4,000 reservists in 24 Naval Reserve Divisions in locations across the country but primarily in its eastern half. From the Army’s point of view the primary capability lacking in the Navy is an ability to project and maintain an expeditionary force overseas. To date such operations have been more administrative in nature involving rented civilian shipping;

• If one looks at the issue dispassionately, one can’t help but conclude that Canada, being a user of what are for the most part, are expeditionary forces, needs a more robust naval capability to move and sustain up to a heavy armoured force by sea, possibly under contested circumstances, and therefore needs to develop and regularly exercise a contingency plan to obtain, load, escort and unload such shipping. That could include a primarily reserve hybrid force as crew on, for example, a Roll on-roll-off ship and its escorts.

Conclusion

The SSE has conflicting demands that a symmetric force which styles itself as agile, multi-purpose, combat-ready cannot meet efficiently. On the one hand, The Army needs to be capable of rapid response and to be able to engage in peacekeeping or stabilization missions against lightly armed non-state actors and northern operations while on the other it needs to deter and be prepared to engage against state actors who have the ability to engage from grey zone, through hybrid to conventional peer level conflict. While Canada’s current medium force structure is mostly suitable against the former it is seriously lacking against the latter.

Canada has recognized the dangers in northern Europe and has committed itself to be the framework nation for the eFP-L in the Baltics, however, it has taken no steps to create the necessary forces and capabilities which would be seen as a credible deterrent there. Simply put Canada lacks vision. Canada has a military that is small, thinks small, and plans for very little.

Creating an asymmetric army with one division containing all light and medium forces will give Canada a true purpose-built, scalable, and agile force which is trained and equipped to react to many types of international or northern incidents which require a rapid response.

Similarly, the second division will give Canada a true purpose-built force which is trained and equipped to react to grey zone, hybrid and conventional conflict with a peer-to-peer enemy. One full-time CABG provides the capability to maintain the current eFP-L commitment in Latvia indefinitely.

Converting Canada’s Army reserve force from 10 undermanned, non-deployable brigade groups into two reserve force CABGs and three hybrid support brigades provides true depth and breadth to the CAF’s capabilities; creates the capability to have a forward deployed flyover brigade in Europe; provides the capability to field up to a full armoured division in an extreme emergency and fulfills the call for a credible military deterrence that the SSE envisions. It does so with the significant cost savings which are inherent in reserve forces and within the current manning and facilities structure of both the Army’s regular force and reserve force.

The proposed transformation is the option which will give Canada a military that thinks in terms of turning itself into a great host in a crisis by leveraging the capabilities that can be generated by a reserve force that is properly constituted, trained and equipped to be capable of forward deployment as units and formations.

[1] J.L. Granatstein and LGen (retd) Charles Belzile, The Special Commission on Restructuring the Reserves, 1995: Ten Years Later Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, Calgary, 2005 p. 12 https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/cdfai/pages/41/attachments/original/1413661138/Restructuring_The_Reserves_-_English.pdf?1413661138

[2] National Defence, Strong, Secure, Engaged Canada's Defence Policy Ottawa, 2017 http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-eng.pdf and http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/mdn-dnd/D2-386-2017-fra.pdf

[3] Ibid at p. 50

[4] The eFP-L is integrated into the Latvian Mechanized Brigade which itself, is incorporated into the fledgling NATO Multinational Division North (MND-N) whose headquarters are located in Denmark and Latvia.)

[5] Riedel, Wolf, Unsustainable at Any Price: The Canadian Armed Forces in Crisis Amazon, 2020, pp. 3-11 https://www.amazon.ca/Wolf-Riedel-ebook/dp/B086HXC66Q

[6] Supra Note 1 Ch 17 Lamoreaux, Dr. Jeremy W., Countering Russian Influence in the Baltic States pp. 95-98

[7] Armored Brigade Combat Team. A heavy force of approximately 4,500 troops equipped with tanks, tracked infantry fighting vehicles and self propelled artillery.

[8] Shlapack, David A, Deterring Russian Aggression in the Baltic States: What it Takes to Win RAND Corporation 2017 p. 2-3 https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT467.html

[9] Stoicescu, Kalev and Jarvenpaa, Pauli, Contemporary Deterrence: Insights and Lessons from Enhanced Forward Presence International Centre or Defence and Security, Estonia, 2019 https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ICDS_Report_Contemporary_Deterrence_Stoicescu_J%C3%A4rvenp%C3%A4%C3%A4_January_2019.pdf

[10] Ibid p. 15

[11] Canada currently is based out of and prepositions equipment in Adazi, Latvia while the US Army is currently prepositioning in several locations in Poland with Drawsko, Pomorskie in northwest Poland as the primary combat training centre.

[12] Eight M777 155mm howitzers per brigade

[13] For a fuller discussion of the current state of the Canadian Army see supra Note 5 and W Riedel, Creating an Armoured Brigade for NATO: Sustainable Options https://sites.google.com/view/wolfriedel/blog/2020-03-30-re-establishing-a-canadian-armoured-brigade-group-in-europe

[14] Class A reservists serve part-time, currently somewhere between 20 to 60 days per year on average; Class B reservists are on temporary full-time service typically on administrative or training functions; Class C reservists are on temporary full time service typically while deployed on operations. Generally to maintain a single Class A reservist costs approximately 1/6^th of the pay and benefits of a regular force soldier.

[15] The Army capstone document Waypoint 2018: The Canadian Army Advancing Towards Land Operations 2021, Kingston, 2018 p. 4 builds a symmetric, agile, multi-purpose medium-weight force and minimizes the likelihood of large force-on-force exchanges. This creates a “Jack of all trades, master of none” structure and ignores the reality of the lessons coming out of Europe. http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/assets/ARMY_Internet/docs/en/waypoint-2018.pdf

[16] Restructuring the divisions firstly, eliminates unnecessary administrative overhead and secondly, restructures the headquarters to better command and control the contemplated combined Regular Force and Reserve Force restructure. Two force generating division headquarters are more than sufficient for an Army the size of Canada’s.

[17] Such a battalion would blend the concepts of the traditional brigade reconnaissance regiment/squadron and more aggressive elements such as are contemplated by the newly formed UK Strike brigades. Such a battalion could consist of a reconnaissance squadron, an anti-armour company and an armed UAV company.

[18] See supra Note 5