This lecture exposes development and market theory as institutional responses to a specific form of white fragility: the inability to justify European authority after traditional legitimations have collapsed. The anxiety is not moral guilt about exploitation—morality would require acknowledged agency. The anxiety is structural: how to maintain dominance when religious authority no longer compels, when Enlightenment universalism contradicts colonial hierarchy, when extraction cannot be openly defended.
Smith and development economics solve this problem identically. They construct procedural systems that promise order without requiring anyone to claim responsibility for producing that order. Markets coordinate "automatically." Development follows "best practices." Both frameworks allow white institutional authority to persist while appearing as technical necessity rather than political power. This is fragility operationalized: the need for dominance to appear as expertise, for control to register as service, for extraction to present as coordination.
The insecurity reveals itself through compulsive depoliticization. Every political question—distribution, sovereignty, historical accountability—must be converted into an administrative problem. This conversion is not strategic concealment. It is structural requirement. White institutional legitimacy cannot withstand political interrogation because it has no defensible political ground. Colonial violence, wealth concentration, and ongoing extraction cannot be justified through argument. They can only be naturalized through procedure.
Ferguson's anti-politics machine and Smith's invisible hand are therefore not neutral analytical tools appropriated for domination. They are anxiety-management technologies produced by domination's legitimacy crisis. The invisible hand does not describe markets; it constructs markets as solutions to the problem of justifying inequality without defending inequality. Development does not address poverty; it constructs poverty as technical deficiency rather than as outcome of historical dispossession, because acknowledging dispossession would require acknowledging dispossessors.
The fragility is visible in the structure's brittleness: it cannot accommodate political challenge without collapsing entirely. Any suggestion that markets serve particular interests rather than general welfare, or that development entrenches rather than alleviates dependency, appears not as empirical claim but as categorical confusion—evidence of failure to understand economics, incapacity for rational analysis, unsuitability for institutional authority. The defensiveness is built into the epistemic structure. White institutional authority reproduces by constructing frameworks in which its own necessity appears self-evident and its contestation appears as ignorance.