Enquiries and further information:

The local contact for this year's event is James Warren

Contact jiw1001@cam.ac.uk 

Abstracts

Hannah Laurens, ‘Aristotle’s nous: where biology meets theology’

As we know, for Aristotle ‘life is said in many ways’ (Top. VI.10, DA II.2). Living manifests itself in a variety of ways: through growth and nourishment, through perception and thought. What it is to be alive for one kind of living being is not what it is to live for another kind. Even so, what all forms of life – plants, animals, and human beings – have in common is the possession of a soul, that which ‘animates’ their matter. But even here we come up against a discrepancy: that which is alive ‘to the max’, according to Aristotle, i.e. the Prime Mover-God, is nothing but a self-thinking soulless being. Has such life nothing in common with soul-generated living? Aristotle seems to be driven by a biological notion as well as a theological notion of life (Mansion, 1978). Can these notions be reconciled? In this paper, I argue that in his conception of nous these notions of life come together. Not only is nous’s function of thinking central; through thought we achieve a divine kind of self-love which allows us to experience the greatest pleasure of being alive possible.

Ashley Lance, ‘Categories and Hierarchies in the Physiognomics’

This paper explores the pseudo-Aristotelian Physiognomics and the ways it participates in categorizing, organizing, and hierarchizing groups of people. The work, authored by two unknown students at the Lyceum, explores the science of physiognomy and its methods for appropriately connecting traits to their corresponding categories. At times, traits are assigned to signs that are located or most easily recognized in groups of people. This paper surveys those moments and how the two authors diverge from each other in how they discuss those signs. Key questions are to what extent are the authors engaging in similar frameworks of grouping people? Are there indications of any form of hierarchies? And how does the method of categorization relate to practices of physiognomy and philosophy? 

Sean Williams, ‘Pyrrho and Buddha’

The paper lays out a historically identifiable line of transmission of ideas from the Buddha to Pyrrho, by way of Ananda, Madhyandina / Mandanis and Calanus. It sets out an interpretation of Pyrrho, based on the early testimonies in Greek, as a philosopher who propounded a rounded ethical doctrine – based on indifference, being unopinionated and cultivating dispassion to achieve inner peace. It compares this doctrine with the earliest Buddhist suttas, which would have been current at Pyrrho’s time, and shows that there was a very high degree of similarity between Pyrrho and the very earliest form of Buddhism.

Simona Aimar, ‘Powers as sources of change in Aristotle’

In Metaphysics .1, Aristotle characterizes a primary notion of power (dunamis). A power in this primary sense, he tells us, is a source of change (1046a10-11). This talk asks: what exactly is a primary power for Aristotle? I will contend that: (i) in the chapter, the expression ‘source of change’ refers to the notion of an efficient cause (cf. Physics II.3, 194b29-30, inter alios); (ii) the resulting characterization of primary powers is a definitional account of what it is to be a power in this primary sense. Thus, in my view Aristotle’s primary powers are not primitive or undefined features of things. Instead, they are features of things that are fully characterized in causal terms.

I will defend my reading on both textual and philosophical grounds. First, I will show how further passages from the Physics and Metaphysics bolster this interpretation. Second, I will argue that my interpretation equips Aristotle with the necessary tools to address enduring objections to the concept of power. Finally, I will conclude by examining some broader implications of this account, particularly concerning the connection between powers and possibility (a central theme of my current book project).

Daniel Vázquez, ‘Arguing both sides of a question’

Diogenes Laertius 4.28 states that Arcesilaus was “the first to argue both sides of a question.” This claim, however, is surprising. A. A. Long (1986; 2006, 109) goes as far as to say it is “false” and “misleading”: false because he was not the first to introduce the practice and misleading because he was better known for arguing against any position, not for arguing both sides. But could there be another way to understand Diogenes’ report? Luca Castagnoli (2019, 187) has already pushed back against Long’s second indictment, suggesting that we can perfectly construe Arcesilaus’ capacity to argue against any position as being able to argue either side in a dialectical exchange, depending on the views of the interlocutor. Yet, the claim still strikes as false. Could this be challenged, too? There seem to be too many counterexamples. At least from Protagoras onwards, we can point at various philosophers and texts arguing both sides of a question, including Gorgias, passages in Plato’s dialogues, Aristotle, and, assuming early dating, Dissoi Logoi and Demodocus II.

The variety of forms of argumentation in these and later authors calls for a reconstruction of the history of arguing both sides before and after Arcesilaus. Doing this requires addressing at least two initial tasks I will sketch in this paper: first, a reconstruction and assessment of the evidence of these practices, and second, an examination of the debate for and against it. With this in place, I will then argue that some of the champions of arguing both sides demonstrate a sensibility and awareness of a required moral framework, which includes framing strategies, rules of engagement and what we might call felicity conditions to prevent and minimise the abuses and transgressions that worry detractors and critics of these practices. I shall conclude by looking at Diogenes Laertius’ claim in 4.28 again and argue that instead of dismissing it as false, we can understand it as referring to a specific way of arguing both sides, a method not truly mastered until Arcesilaus came along. 

Riccardo Chiaradonna, ‘Plato’s essentialism in the Phaedo’

The paper will focus on Plato’s account of predication in the final proof of the soul’s immortality in the Phaedo. Plato’s account includes three items: opposite Forms, opposite characters and participants named after the opposites (eponymy).  As I aim to show, eponymy deriving from Forms involves opposite characters such as large and small, but does not involve Forms of objects (e.g. Human): in other words, eponymy is not intended to explain species-membership. Plato opposes indeed ‘what Socrates is’ and ‘what Socrates has’ (e.g. largeness), but ‘what Socrates is’ should be explained as a reference to Socrates’ individual soul and not to Socrates’ participation in the Form Human. I will also develop the idea set out by scholars such as Alan Code that this section of the Phaedo forms the background of Aristotle’s account of predication in the Categories.