Zoom links

The correct zoom links are in the acknowledgement for registering for each day of the conference.

Please register here:

Sep 13 - https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJctc-uuqDgrG9ae4m_fo0aMhKbqcUf55lM7

Sep 14 - https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJUvfuCvrz8uHNNOLIsWavnoVGomWPGhx4kn

Handouts for 2021

Registration

While registration is not essential given the Zoom format, we would very much appreciate knowing who you are. Links for registering can be found below.

Sep 13 - https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJctc-uuqDgrG9ae4m_fo0aMhKbqcUf55lM7

Sep 14 - https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJUvfuCvrz8uHNNOLIsWavnoVGomWPGhx4kn

Programme and abstracts

Mon Sept 13th

Meeting of the Southern Association of Ancient Philosophy, Oxford (by Zoom), Sept 13-14th 2021

Mon Sept 13th

2:00 Conference starts.

In memoriam Sarah Broadie (Lesley Brown and Alex Long will say a few words).

2:15-3:45pm

Sophie-Grace Chappell (Open University)

'Autonomy in Sophocles' Antigone'

The first place in recorded history where anyone talks about ‘autonomy’ is Sophocles’ Antigone, line 821, where the Chorus describe Antigone as autonomos. My main question is what this word means in the Greek original, and what that teaches us about (the history of) the concept of autonomy. My answer is that, strikingly to a modern ear, it means that Antigone is seen as ‘making a law for herself’; but equally strikingly, that this is not praise of her but a damaging criticism.

4:00-5:30pm

Jenny Bryan (Manchester)

'Cognitive and Ethical Progress in Empedocles'

Tues Sept 14th

9:30-10:15am

Guus Eelink (Oxford)

'Is Protagoras a Relativist about Truth?'

Graduate Student Paper

There is a widely held view in the scholarship that Protagoras as portrayed in the Theaetetus is a relativist about truth. According to this view, Protagoras claims that truth is relative to believers, and that each belief is true - not simpliciter, but - in relation to the believer. What has often been taken to support this view is Socrates' occasional claim that, according to Protagoras, beliefs are true for the believer. Socrates may be taken to mean - in line with the widely held view - that Protagoras relativizes the truth of beliefs to the believer. However, I shall argue that this is a mistaken interpretation of Socrates' claim, and I shall propose an alternative interpretation. Moreover, I shall argue that Protagoras as portrayed in the Theaetetus is not a relativist about truth. Instead, I shall argue that Protagoras as portrayed in the Theaetetus claims that all beliefs are absolutely true.

10:15-11:00am

Maeve Lentricchia (Cambridge)

'Lucretius on Attention'

Graduate Student Paper

In Book IV of the de rerum natura, Lucretius appeals to a notion of attention: a complex physiological process whereby the animus, or a sense organ, either (1) voluntarily or actively selects an image, or (2) involuntarily or passively is absorbed in a particular train of images. My paper discusses just one of the four varieties of attention that Lucretius recognizes: voluntary intellectual attention. The paper has two parts. First (1) I set out the philosophical significance of voluntary intellectual attention—how it emerges as an answer to a question that Lucretius raises about how we can think of things at the moment we desire to do so. Second (2), I reconstruct from the DRN the step-wise physiological mechanism which constitutes the voluntary attentive process. This mechanism, which is marked by the expression ‘se parare et contendere,’ involves a preparatory effort through which the animus organizes itself around a particular desire and a selective action. Through a close reading of Lucretius’ discussion of the soul in Book III (3.180-88), I show that the voluntary attentive process is in keeping with the principles of atomist physics.

11:15-12:45pm

Sukaina Hirji (University of Pennsylvania)

'White Blindness, and Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Alcibiades'

There has been growing reflection within the field of Classics about the role the discipline has played in the invention and dominance of a certain conception of “whiteness”. I suggest that similar concerns arise within the field of Ancient Philosophy. I draw on Plato’s account of self-knowledge as mirroring in the Alcibiades to argue that we should take an approach of epistemic humility to these challenges, one that involves fostering a more pluralistic set of methods and approaches within the field. On the interpretation I defend, in the Alcibiades, knowing one’s own ignorance involves knowing one’s own epistemic limitations, and this is best achieved by the help of someone better positioned to see one’s shortcomings. To better know our own limitations as scholars and teachers of ancient texts, we ought to seek out, amplify, and integrate challenges to our own practices.

1:45 -3:15pm

Giulia Bonasio (Durham)

'Is Phronêsis an Epistêmê? A Comparison Between the Protrepticus and the EE'

Jaeger argued that in the Protrepticus and in the EE, phronêsis is the virtue of practical and of theoretical wisdom. Some scholars agree, and others agree with respect to the Protrepticus, but disagree with respect to the EE. A detailed comparison of how phronêsis is understood in the two works remains to be done. So far Jaeger’s proposal has shaped the debate. His proposal presupposes two premises that I challenge in this paper. First, it presupposes that we should read the Protrepticus in search of a distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom or a lack thereof. Second, it presupposes that we should not consider the common books to be part of the EE. On the view that I defend, in the Protrepticus, phronêsis is an epistêmê. That is, phronêsis is knowledge of something. Aristotle says that it is knowledge of the truth, of nature, of the just and of the advantageous. Qua knowledge of these matters, phronêsis is useful for practical purposes. I argue that this understanding of phronêsis relates to the demonstrandum of the Protrepticus, namely that phronêsis qua knowledge is beneficial and useful even for non-philosophers, in particular for lawgivers and politicians. In the EE, Aristotle argues explicitly that phronêsis is not an epistêmê because it cannot be used for a purpose opposite to its own and because it occurs with the character virtues. Phronêsis is a virtue that we acquire and possess once we engage in relevant actions and ways of thinking: it is one thing to possess knowledge of what is just and good, and another thing is to be a just and good person. I argue that the difference in how Aristotle understands phronêsis in the two works relates to their audiences and to their aims.

3:30-5:00pm

Stefan Sienkiewicz (Oxford)

'Proof Against Proof: A Reading of Sextus Empiricus'Against the Logicians 8.463-481'

This paper offers a new reading of the final chapters of Sextus Empiricus’Against the Logicians(M8.463-481).In particular, it argues against two commonly held assumptions about this stretch of argument.The first, that it involves the sceptic deploying his classic method of equipollence (opposing equally compelling arguments against one another and suspending judgement in light of them), and the second, that the final argumentative manoeuvre of the sceptic’s is to accept that his arguments against proof eliminate themselves.I offer arguments against both of these claims: the standard method of equipollence is not at play during the course of the argument and what the sceptic welcomes is not the self-elimination of his argument against proof, but the self-elimination of a higher-order argument – an argument which isabouthis argument against proof.I suggest that this alternative way of construing Sextus’ text makes better sense of, as well as improves, the arguments of both the sceptic and his dogmatic opponent.

2nd September 2021

Dear Ancient Philosophers,

We are writing to provide a Zoom link for the meeting of the Southern Association of Ancient in Philosophy Sept 13th -14th. The meeting begins at 2pm on Monday. The programme for the meeting (including abstracts) can be found at the end of this message.

Join Zoom Meeting

https://zoom.us/j/5678112434?pwd=ejNTbjBrMitDb1RadlZHdHRYb3Mydz09

Meeting ID: 567 811 2434

Passcode: nu4jwm

Handouts for talks will be distributed by email ahead of time.

While registration is not essential given the Zoom format, we would very much appreciate knowing who you are. Links for registering can be found below.

Sep 13 - https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJctc-uuqDgrG9ae4m_fo0aMhKbqcUf55lM7

Sep 14 - https://zoom.us/meeting/register/tJUvfuCvrz8uHNNOLIsWavnoVGomWPGhx4kn

We were all saddened to learn of the death of Sarah Broadie early this August. We would like to take a moment to remember Prof. Broadie and her monumental contribution to ancient philosophy at the start of the meeting. Lesley Brown and Alex Long have kindly offered to say a few words in her memory.

If you have any questions about the meeting, please do not hesitate to get in touch. We look forward to seeing you at the SAAP meeting in September.

Kind regards,

Marion & Karen Margrethe

Meeting of the Southern Association of Ancient Philosophy, Oxford (by Zoom), Sept 13-14th 2021

Mon Sept 13th

2:00 Conference starts

2:15-3:45pm

Sophie-Grace Chappell (Open University)

'Autonomy in Sophocles' Antigone'

The first place in recorded history where anyone talks about ‘autonomy’ is Sophocles’ Antigone, line 821, where the Chorus describe Antigone as autonomos. My main question is what this word means in the Greek original, and what that teaches us about (the history of) the concept of autonomy. My answer is that, strikingly to a modern ear, it means that Antigone is seen as ‘making a law for herself’; but equally strikingly, that this is not praise of her but a damaging criticism.

4:00-5:30pm

Jenny Bryan (Manchester)

'Cognitive and Ethical Progress in Empedocles'

Tues Sept 14th

9:30-10:15am

Guus Eelink (Oxford)

'Is Protagoras a Relativist about Truth?'

Graduate Student Paper

There is a widely held view in the scholarship that Protagoras as portrayed in the Theaetetus is a relativist about truth. According to this view, Protagoras claims that truth is relative to believers, and that each belief is true - not simpliciter, but - in relation to the believer. What has often been taken to support this view is Socrates' occasional claim that, according to Protagoras, beliefs are true for the believer. Socrates may be taken to mean - in line with the widely held view - that Protagoras relativizes the truth of beliefs to the believer. However, I shall argue that this is a mistaken interpretation of Socrates' claim, and I shall propose an alternative interpretation. Moreover, I shall argue that Protagoras as portrayed in the Theaetetus is not a relativist about truth. Instead, I shall argue that Protagoras as portrayed in the Theaetetus claims that all beliefs are absolutely true.

10:15-11:00am

Maeve Lentricchia (Cambridge)

'Lucretius on Attention'

Graduate Student Paper

11:15-12:45pm

Stefan Sienkiewicz (Oxford)

'Proof Against Proof: A Reading of Sextus Empiricus' Against the Logicians 8.463-481'

This paper offers a new reading of the final chapters of Sextus Empiricus’Against the Logicians(M8.463-481).In particular, it argues against two commonly held assumptions about this stretch of argument.The first, that it involves the sceptic deploying his classic method of equipollence (opposing equally compelling arguments against one another and suspending judgement in light of them), and the second, that the final argumentative manoeuvre of the sceptic’s is to accept that his arguments against proof eliminate themselves.I offer arguments against both of these claims: the standard method of equipollence is not at play during the course of the argument and what the sceptic welcomes is not the self-elimination of his argument against proof, but the self-elimination of a higher-order argument – an argument which isabouthis argument against proof.I suggest that this alternative way of construing Sextus’ text makes better sense of, as well as improves, the arguments of both the sceptic and his dogmatic opponent.

1:45 -3:15pm

Giulia Bonasio (Durham)

'Is Phronêsis an Epistêmê? A Comparison Between the Protrepticus and the EE'

Jaeger argued that in the Protrepticus and in the EE, phronêsis is the virtue of practical and of theoretical wisdom. Some scholars agree, and others agree with respect to the Protrepticus, but disagree with respect to the EE. A detailed comparison of how phronêsis is understood in the two works remains to be done. So far Jaeger’s proposal has shaped the debate. His proposal presupposes two premises that I challenge in this paper. First, it presupposes that we should read the Protrepticus in search of a distinction between practical and theoretical wisdom or a lack thereof. Second, it presupposes that we should not consider the common books to be part of the EE. On the view that I defend, in the Protrepticus, phronêsis is an epistêmê. That is, phronêsis is knowledge of something. Aristotle says that it is knowledge of the truth, of nature, of the just and of the advantageous. Qua knowledge of these matters, phronêsis is useful for practical purposes. I argue that this understanding of phronêsis relates to the demonstrandum of the Protrepticus, namely that phronêsis qua knowledge is beneficial and useful even for non-philosophers, in particular for lawgivers and politicians. In the EE, Aristotle argues explicitly that phronêsis is not an epistêmê because it cannot be used for a purpose opposite to its own and because it occurs with the character virtues. Phronêsis is a virtue that we acquire and possess once we engage in relevant actions and ways of thinking: it is one thing to possess knowledge of what is just and good, and another thing is to be a just and good person. I argue that the difference in how Aristotle understands phronêsis in the two works relates to their audiences and to their aims.

3:30-5:00pm

Sukaina Hirji (University of Pennsylvania)

'Eudaimonia as Efficient and Final Cause'

Dr. Karen Margrethe Nielsen

Tutorial Fellow, Somerville College &

Associate Professor, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford

Somerville College

Woodstock Road

Oxford OX2 6HD

United Kingdom

30th July 2021

Dear colleagues,

Oxford currently has one of the highest covid rates in the UK, and so the meeting of SAAP this September 13-14th will have to take place by Zoom, following last year's format. Early this summer we were still hopeful that we could meet in person, using a hybrid model that allows remote participation. With Delta spreading unchecked among the young, it would be irresponsible to encourage travel into Oxford at present.

We will circulate a Zoom-link and instructions for joining closer to the date. Handouts will be available by dropbox.

We are delighted to share the tentative program below. There may be minor tweaks, but we expect the start and end times to remain the same.

We look forward to seeing you at the meeting in September.

Kind regards,

Karen Margrethe & Marion

Draft programme for 2021 meeting.

Mon Sept 13th

2:00 Conference starts

2:15-3:45pm

Sophie-Grace Chappell (Open University)

'Autonomy in Sophocles' Antigone'

4:00-5:30pm

Jenny Bryan (Manchester)

'Cognitive and Ethical Progress in Empedocles'

Tues Sept 14th

9:30-10:15am

Guus Eelink (Oxford)

'Is Protagoras a Relativist about Truth?'

Graduate Student Paper

10:15-11:00am

Maeve Lentricchia (Cambridge)

'Lucretius on Attention'

Graduate Student Paper

11:15-12:45pm

Stefan Sienkiewicz (Oxford)

'Proof Against Proof: A Reading of Sextus Empiricus' Against the Logicians 8.463-481'

1:45 -3:15pm

Giulia Bonasio (Durham)

'Is Phronêsis an Epistêmê? A Comparison Between the Protrepticus and the EE'

3:30-5:00pm

Sukaina Hirji (University of Pennsylvania)

'Eudaimonia as Efficient and Final Cause'

Original announcement (27th May 2021)

Dear ancient philosophers,

We are writing with an update about this year's meeting of the Southern Association of Ancient Philosophy, which will take place at Somerville College, Oxford Sept. 13-14. The meeting will start at 2:30pm on Monday and end at 4:30pm on Tuesday.

The pandemic has made planning a challenge, but with restrictions lifting in the UK, and vaccinations reaching critical mass, we would like to take this opportunity to host a proper reunion. We realise that many of you will not be able to travel to Oxford, or may not feel safe attending an in-person meeting. To ensure that the decision to host the meeting on site does not exclude members of our community, we will provide a zoom link for those who wish to attend remotely.

A full program will be distributed in the coming weeks, but we are delighted to announce that this year's speakers are:

Giulia Bonasio (Durham)

Jenny Bryan (Manchester)

Sophie-Grace Chappell (Open University)

Sukaina Hirji (University of Pennsylvania)

The two graduate papers will be presented by

Guus Eelink (Oxford)

Maeve Lentricchia (Cambridge)

This year, we must ask attendees to book their own accommodation (Oxford colleges typically rent rooms at a reasonable rate). Here's a link to the website for booking college rooms: https://www.universityrooms.com/en-GB/city/oxford/home

There will be a dinner at Somerville in the evening of Sept 13th, and plenty of time to catch up between talks. Details about registration to follow. If you have questions, please contact us at:

karen.nielsen@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

marion.durand@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Kind regards,

Marion & Karen Margrethe

This messsage comes from the Southern Association for Ancient Philosophy Mailing List. To change your details or unsubscribe please visit:

https://lists.cam.ac.uk/mailman/listinfo/classics-saap